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Abstract 
This thesis examines the phenomenon of Left-Right in political discourse from the 
perspective of political theories of radical democracy, discourse and representation. Extant 
research conceives of Left/Right as spatial metaphors, exploring their meaning and/or 
function in democratic politics. This thesis focuses on how Left-Right structure political 
identification in modernity and on the implications this has for theories and practices of 
radical democracy. 
The thesis argues that Left/Right structure political space and constitute public subjects 
who identify themselves and others in relation to that space. Through a critical discussion 
of Jürgen Habermas, it shows how such subjects are constituted as dispassionate 
individuals defined by their opinions, arguments and beliefs which acknowledge their 
partiality to others and the whole. Through a critical reading of Ernesto Laclau, the thesis 
also argues that radical democratic demands cannot be channelled through ‘the Left’, 
because doing so entails a confinement within the Left/Right space of politics, divesting 
subjects of political passion and commitment. This space co-opts disparate demands into 
participating in public debate as if they were not excluded, disabling them from laying claim 
to a radical equality that is not yet instantiated. 
Overall, the thesis aims to make a contribution to theories of radical democracy by showing 
that proponents of Laclauian populism should focus more on other spaces to effect a 
radical antagonism with the public subject and a dislocation of its relation to the state. Only 
this way can it reinstitute the truly radical dimensions of democracy that Left/Right tame. 
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Introduction 
1. The origins of Left/Right  
The stage was set on 26 August 1789.1 The members of the French Third Estate had spent 
months planning it. They had argued at length about the procedures for the new, radical 
National Assembly. It was only in May that year that they finally agreed that to speak one 
should not address the speaker of the house but stand on a podium and address all the 
deputies simultaneously. It was only in June that they had managed to persuade large 
sections of the clergy to join them, after which the nobles followed, and the National 
Constituent Assembly was officially formed. On 14 July the newly formed National Guard 
had stormed the Bastille.  
It now fell to the deputies to institute democracy and draft a constitution. To accomplish 
this, they met to discuss the bill ‘The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen’. 
On 26 August, in one specific place – the St. Louis Church in the Versailles – the deputies of 
the National Constituent Assembly were tasked with ushering in a new order around the 
concept of ‘the people’. Members of all three estates were present, but they were openly 
hostile towards each other. Among the nobles and the clergy, there was ardent opposition 
to the new democratic order, while some of the former members of the Third Estate were 
opposed to the presence of the members of the first two estates. They were thus of one 
body, but it was a body that was divided. This division, however, had levelled the 
hierarchical structuring principles of the ancien régime. Now the different parts of the body 
were equal.  
They were one body of equal parts that was gathered in one particular place, and they had 
to reach decisions. As such, they had to organise themselves in a manner that could signify 
their position in relation to the topics for discussion. One prominent deputy had suggested 
that they adopt the English system whereby two opposing sides would confront each other, 
but eventually, it was affirmed that the active speaker would address the entirety of the 
deputies from the podium. Insofar that it was one body, all the deputies were in the same 
place, but insofar that it was a divided body, the different parts also organised themselves. 
Specifically, on 26 August 1789, this meant that all the deputies who favoured “liberty and 
equality” had gathered in front of the speaker’s podium and to the left, thus expelling 
 
1 I largely take this historical account from Gauchet, Marcel, 1996, ‘Left and Right’, in: Nora, Pierre & 
Kritzman, Lawrence (eds.), Realms of Memory: Conflicts and Divisions v. 1: The Construction of the 
French Past, translated by: Arthur Goldhammer, Columbia University Press: New York, pp.241-298. 
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deputies, who were not so disposed, to other parts of the confined space. That this was a 
historic gathering would hardly have been lost on the deputies that day. While the 
American Revolution had recently preceded this event, what was taking place in St. Louis 
Church was of a different magnitude. A major power was becoming a democracy. However, 
one doubts that the deputies would have known that the way in which they had gathered 
would carry such weight in the democratic revolution they were about to embark upon.  
It is conceivable that the deputies might have decided on dividing themselves left to right in 
a drunken stupor the night before. This seems as likely an explanation as any. However, 
that this division, more so than others, favoured a recognition of equality is undoubtable. 
For example, an Up/Down division would have signified a dominance of the people sitting 
above and a Front/Back or Centre/Periphery division would have granted increased 
participatory opportunities to the people close to the speaker’s podium. With Left/Right, all 
were on an equal level and had equal access to participation. In other words, all the 
deputies could be counted as equals and all deputies could give an account of their reasons 
in an equal manner. It was always likely that deputies would mingle mostly with those with 
whom they shared opinions and knew from their respective estates, so distinctive groups 
were always likely to form – rather than a chaotic whole, in which shouts and interventions 
would not be able to be made out and understood. Distinctions were thus always going to 
emerge. But who could have imagined that those simple distinctions could have left such a 
mark on history? 
Left/Right are in this sense historical categories. In the beginning they enabled the deputies 
and the spectators to understand themselves and others in relation to the whole body. 
Today, however, Left/Right are not only for members of parliament and spectators of the 
deliberation that takes place within buildings such as the St. Louis Church. Left/Right have 
morphed into words that most of us use on a regular basis when we talk about politics. 
Something happened between then and now, and the available literature on the subject is, 
as we shall see, severely lacking. As such, it is the purpose of this thesis to shed some light 
on what made Left/Right not only endure but establish a hegemony over political 
discourse. I do this with a specific goal in mind: to develop an understanding of how radical 
politics should engage with Left/Right today.  
2. Argument 
This thesis is about the political metaphors Left and Right and their function in modernity. 
Inspired by Laclauian populism, I problematise our understanding of the relationship 
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between radical politics and the Left/Right spectrum and argue that radical politics should 
not engage Left/Right in any way. 
The steps of the arguments are as follows. Firstly, drawing on Claude Lefort, I argue that 
modernity is conditioned by the absence of the markers of certainty. A public subject 
emerges within this openness to usher in an era of politics. Through a discussion of the 
work of Marcel Gauchet, I argue that Left/Right become the markers of public subjects and, 
through their constitutive openness to different issues, come to signify order in modernity, 
based on equality in difference, which furthermore ties them to certain conceptions of 
rationalism. With Gauchet, I outline the key concept of the citizen-voter, which is the 
particular, and historical, form that the public subject takes with the emergence of 
Left/Right. I argue that it is the citizen-voter that first grasped at Left/Right and that the 
identity of citizen-voter is tied up with a concept of rationalism that stresses ordered 
partiality. With Torben Dyrberg, I argue that Left/Right channel other spatial metaphors 
that beget modes of identification imbued with more affective investment, enabling John 
Rawls’ public use of reason to be freestanding from comprehensive doctrines. With this, I 
further tie the citizen-voter and Left/Right together with a rationalism that stresses 
partiality – although this time it is a conceptual, rather than a historical, link – as I 
particularly highlight the anti-perfectionism in Rawls’ public use of reason. I thus argue that 
the emergences of the citizen-voter and of Left/Right were conceptually dependent on and 
constitutive of a type of rationalism that stresses an ordered partiality.  
Importantly, I argue that this move constitutes particular expressions as native to the 
subjectivity of the citizen-voter. These are arguments, beliefs, opinions and similar types of 
expressions that acknowledge difference. This move then simultaneously excludes types of 
expressions – most notably expressions that seek an acknowledgement of a truth or an 
absolute. Once expressions acknowledge ordered partiality, they also lose affective 
investment – or commitment to a cause. In partaking in Left/Right ordered political space, 
you then need to commit to a particular way of doing politics, foregoing your commitment 
to other types of politics, be that strikes, demonstrations, etc.  
Through the work of theorists such as Chantal Mouffe and Jacques Rancière, I can then 
argue that something is excluded from Left/Right and the identity of the public subject, as 
the binary inscribes a relationality between public subjects that is particular. Rather than 
going back to Rawls, I qualify this particularity of the public through a critical reading of 
Jürgen Habermas, arguing that Left/Right come to order reason-giving arguments, othering 
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alternative modes of expression – especially modes of expression that are invested with 
more affect and commitment and seek an engagement with the category of truth and the 
absolute. Not only do these modes of expression cover religious and cultural expressions, 
but also expressions that seek a recognition of structural oppression and inequality. I 
criticise this Habermasian political space in a Laclauian fashion, arguing that it is a political, 
hegemonic project.  
With Ernesto Laclau, I argue that radical politics constitutes the emergence of the excluded 
parts, articulated to a counter-hegemonic chain of equivalences, as ‘the whole’ through a 
radical antagonism. This relies on affectual investment in a popular identity, not in a public 
identity that defuses affectual investment, that can only be accessed through particular 
modes of expression and that effects a recognition of ordered partiality between parts qua 
the structuring effects of Left/Right. I thus centre my notion of radical politics around a 
particular reading of Laclau’s book, On Populist Reason, that seeks to emphasise a break 
with the existing order. I conceptualise order as located at the intersection of the state and 
the citizen-voter. As such, I argue that radical politics must engage at the level of the state. 
In this sense, my arguments can also be read as a friendly critique of the notion of radical 
democracy by Laclau and Mouffe in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy and the notion of 
agonism championed by Mouffe.  
Agonistic or radical democratic approaches to Left/Right have previously come to the 
defence of Left/Right and their ability to turn potential enemies into adversaries by 
allowing for a constitutive representation of difference. However, while I am sympathetic 
to these projects, they reaffirm Left/Right. Whereas I seek to critique Left/Right and 
question the ways in which Left/Right structure political life, these approaches take 
Left/Right for granted, thereby assuming that whatever structuring effects might be 
attributed to them are unimportant to radical politics. I argue that this lack of engagement 
restrains these projects themselves, as I show Left/Right to enable a way of governance, 
rather than to function to enable agonistic politics. 
Notably, I argue that these approaches take the place of the in-common as their starting 
point. That is, while these projects are theorised through an emphasis on exclusion, by 
reaffirming Left/Right, they become political projects for the citizen-voter as the public 
subject, rather than political projects for the excluded. This is problematic for, in one sense, 
excluded parts do not share in the equality of the public subjects and rectifying this relies 
on evidencing this inequality. Yet, this depends on a mode of expression which establishes 
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an indisputable acknowledgement of inequality. As we are then dealing in terms of truth 
and the absolute, such a mode of expression is imbued with affectual investment and, as 
such, does not recognise the principle of partiality. However, there is no room for this in 
Left/Right hegemonic political space. This critique of agonistic and radical democratic 
politics is one of the key points to the contribution that I make to democratic theory in this 
thesis. I discuss it further later in the introduction.  
In the main text, I further explore this through a variety of examples, and argue that radical 
politics must instead focus its attention on creating a counter-hegemonic chain of 
equivalences structured around an empty signifier – away from Left/Right, the markers of 
the hegemonic political space in modernity. As such, I conceptualise order as located at the 
intersection of the state and the space of the citizen-voter, which, I argue, dissolves the 
state into the space of the citizen-voter itself and thus claims for itself political being tout 
court. In other words, to effect a radical antagonism one must displace the relationship 
between the citizen-voter and the state, but this cannot be done through participation in 
the Left/Right deliberative practises of the citizen-voter. 
To take Left/Right for granted thus amount to taking for granted the political practices 
native to the citizen-voter. However, these practices are inimical to the emergence of a 
break at between the citizen-voter and the state. For Laclauian populism, which seeks the 
radical antagonism, it prevents an impassionate representation of ‘the people’ as a whole. 
For all demands, which are the base units of Laclauian populism, are impassioned and filled 
with commitment, as they are forwarded from a place of real, material precarity. But even 
for radical democracy, which so stresses the importance of the emergence of radical 
difference, through its engagement with (or ignorance of) Left/Right, fails to problematise 
the intersection of the state and the citizen-voter and thus only really enables an 
emergence of difference as arguments, opinions, beliefs, etc. The emergence of the 
difference of the excluded is supposed to ameliorate their precarious existence, but when 
Left/Right circumscribe that difference, this amelioration is unrealisable. Left/Right, by 
forcing radical politics of equality into participating in these practices thus prevent the 
exposition of structural inequality. As such, if radical politics necessitates a break at the 
intersection of the state and the citizen-voter, Left/Right function to depoliticise its 
demands and drives. 
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3. Research questions 
My principal research question is as follows: 
 
➢ Research question 1: How should radical politics engage with Left/Right? 
 
This question places the argument within the context of Laclauian political theory but also, 
more broadly, within democratic theory. In answering this question, I focus on 
representation and discourse, and on how these are particular, rather than universal – and 
aim to show how Left/Right structure these. Accordingly, a second research question is:  
 
➢ Research question 2: How do Left/Right create a political space and what kinds of 
political expressions emerge from it? 
 
In the early days of the French Revolution, Left/Right partitioned a physical space in order 
to generate a legitimate, equal, division within the body. However, a few things have 
happened since then. First, the body has grown to the point where most people now enjoy 
some kind of say over the management of society. Second, people no longer talk directly to 
each other in one confined space. Instead, deliberation about the management of society 
takes place across society in a variety of formats and settings. Yet Left/Right have adapted. 
Undoubtedly this has something to do with the notion of a legitimate division within a 
singular body, where different parts, at least ideally, are equal. I argue that this ‘wild’ body 
is a public body. It is an ensemble of people who come together as public subjects and who 
use Left/Right as a means to divide themselves politically. This leads onto a third specific 
and critical question:  
 
➢ Research question 3: How are things excluded from the Left/Right political space in 
which the public subject is constituted, and on what grounds does this exclusion 
take place? 
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As we look at the period between the French Revolution and today, one thing that stands 
out is the development of universal suffrage. As more people have been granted the right 
to vote, more people have thus also been able to identify themselves as public subjects. 
However, it would be a mistake to think that, because we now have universal suffrage, the 
body is complete and the division that Left/Right accomplish is the end of the story. 
Instead, I argue that the body cannot be understood immanently, but only through 
representation. As such, Left/Right come to order a discursive space that is a 
representation of the body to itself as a political community. But that representation is 
meaningful only insofar as it can differentiate itself from something that it is not. Left/Right 
enable the body to represent itself as legitimately divided within itself but also play a role 
in that exclusion from the political community – by qualifying a discursive space of equals, 
Left/Right help set the parameters for exclusion from this space. 
Radical politics is situated in relation to this constitutive exclusion. I argue that Laclauian 
populism should avoid engaging with Left/Right, because these have specific functions in 
modern politics that are inimical to the emergence of Laclauian populism. I argue that 
Left/Right enable a forgetting of the exclusion that constitutes all representations of the 
body. Furthermore, Left/Right constitute the ways in which the divided parts of the body 
relate to each other as public subjects. This relationality is in one sense structured around 
equality, in that the different parts have to recognise their own (equal) partiality to the 
system in which they are constituted (just as the deputies in the National Constituent 
Assembly had to). But being constituted in this way, they are also required to adopt a 
certain type of political expression in relating to each other – centred on the expression of 
opinions, arguments, beliefs, etc. I argue that this mode of expression is centred around a 
particular type of public subject: the citizen-voter (a term taken from Gauchet). According 
to Gauchet, the citizen-voter is partly immersed in politics and partly adrift from it, 
constituted as an onlooker – an observing analyst. I argue that the citizen-voter is deeply 
connected with the discursive practice of Left/Right, which constitute a space for modes of 
expression native to the citizen-voter.  
Laclauian populism, which I conceive as a type of radical politics, centres around the 
representation of the populist movement as the whole and the incarnation of ‘the people’ 
counterposed to ‘the system’, ‘the caste’, ‘the establishment’ etc. It thus takes an 
expression that is other to that of the citizen-voter and denies the principles of partiality to 
construct the category of ‘the people’ and make power visible. As such, it makes no sense 
for radical politics to seek to channel itself through Left/Right. For doing so would only 
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translate the demands of radical politics into arguments, opinions, beliefs, etc. (categories 
of expression that do not engender affectual investment [which is needed to sustain a 
subjectivity]). The hegemonic Left/Right political space constitutes people making demands 
as citizen-voters and forces the translation of their articulation accordingly. In other words, 
Left/Right-ordered political space co-opts the radical potential of unmet demands by 
presenting claimants as already partaking in the equality of the public subjects. It makes 
power invisible and converts the expression of lived precarity and inequality into an 
‘opinion’ inviting rebuttal. Radical politics works through the exposition of power but 
Left/Right forbid its evidencing. In this sense, Left/Right function to depoliticise demands. 
4. Outline of the thesis 
In developing these arguments, the thesis begins with a review of the existing literature on 
Left/Right and with an exposition of the founding theory of democratic theory. In Chapter 
One, I review political science research to show how Left/Right are used as a meta-space 
that can divide preferences and onto which issues can map. I then address some of the 
connotations that have been ascribed to Left and Right, while also noting how people 
disagree about the exact meaning of these terms. Left/Right thus open up a kind of space, 
but the meaning of that space is contested. I then turn to Lefort and his argument that 
modernity is founded on an empty place of power, and to his long-time collaborator and 
one of the most important scholars to have written on Left/Right: Gauchet. Gauchet, who 
is grossly underused in anglophone scholarship, provides us not only with a historical 
account of Left/Right, where we can see the different meanings that the words have borne 
over time, but also with an account of the emergence of the citizen-voter. These are 
contributions to the study of Left/Right that tie in with some of the key insights of Lefort 
and democratic theory. That is, Gauchet shows us that we should not look at essences to 
Left/Right but at how they designate a type of relationality between those who are 
constituted through their usage. This is what his concept of the citizen-voter accomplishes. 
Having then situated myself and synthesized the existing literature on Left/Right with 
democratic theory, we start to look more closely at the function of Left/Right in modernity 
in Chapter Two. Here I critically consider Noberto Bobbio’s influential book on Left/Right 
and his argument that equality is their central theme. He argues that equality is a historical 
question rather than a political one. As such, he does not focus on how some people are 
rendered other to the ‘space of equals’ that Left/Right create. To clarify this further I read 
Mouffe against Dyrberg, the latter of whom has written extensively on the function of 
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Left/Right in modernity. Following Dyrberg, I argue that Left/Right function as orientational 
metaphors to structure a democratic identity. They accomplish this by channelling other 
orientational metaphors (Up/Down, In/Out and Front/Back) that engender more affectual 
investment in identification and divesting the Left/Right identity of that passion. Dyrberg 
argues that Left/Right can function in tandem with Rawls’ concept of the public use of 
reason. With Mouffe, I note however that one cannot subtract passion from identification 
and that exclusion is constitutive to it. As such, instead of Left/Right engendering a Left and 
a Right identity that is devoid of affectual investment, they structure different kinds of 
public identities; they constitute different kinds of public subjects. Finally, I bring in 
Rancière for an aesthetic account of political space. With him, I argue that space is 
constituted by a distribution of the sensible. In relation to political space, this entails a 
police (ac)count of subject positions and their relationality.  
In Chapter Three I turn to Habermas, a particularly useful thinker for this thesis due to his 
significant influence within liberal theory and because he wrote the book on one particular 
kind of political space – the public sphere. His theory of communicative action erects 
regulative principles to bring about ideal speech situations designed to generate sincerity, 
inclusion, and the forceless force of the better argument – situations that can lead to 
rational consensuses. His ideal of the political public sphere, I then argue, is a discursive 
space for reason-giving arguments where Left/Right name the participants. 
Chapter Four addresses Laclau. I argue that we need to focus on the creation of meaning 
and identity, rather than on the creation of consensus, and take account of the ‘logic of 
lack’. Identity is never complete, only a partial fixation of particularities to a (false) 
universality. Laclau contends that identities are conceivable insofar as they belong to a 
system, but also insofar as they are different from other identities that also belong to the 
system. In his vocabulary, identities are articulated to a hegemonic system – which 
becomes synonymous with the category of space. As this is always only a partial fixation, 
identities can also be articulated to counter-hegemonic systems, which is most likely to 
happen when requests and demands are not met. Laclauian populism lies in the 
construction of such a counter-hegemonic system, whose structuring principle is the 
impossibility of an ultimate fixation of meaning. I use Laclau to argue that Habermas offers 
a hegemonic project that seeks to construct identities based around argumentation – a 
particular mode of expression native to the citizen-voter – and that this constitutes a 
political space that depoliticises demands by turning them into arguments ordered by 
Left/Right. 
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In the final chapter, I argue that Left/Right enable a subjectification where people come to 
identify with the public subject, and that this entails a relationality based on the modes of 
expressions native to the citizen-voter. I then argue for a theory of performance of political 
space, which is most often an extension of the performance of the identity of the figure of 
the journalist – the public subject par excellence. Here I introduce two case studies to show 
how Left/Right structure political space and the way in which excluded parts are not 
allowed to evidence their exclusion, as their expressions of lived experience are translated 
into partial arguments. Through these case studies I thus offer a friendly critique of the 
democratic theories that seek to engage these performances while bolstering my 
conclusion that radical politics should not engage the Left/Right spectrum. 
5. Motivation and contribution 
This thesis is situated within the field of democratic theory. It treats a number of theorists, 
such as Alain Badiou, Jacques Rancière, Laclau and Mouffe. I engage these theorists 
because I have sympathy for their overall political projects and because I, largely, agree 
with their theoretical insights. Normally, political projects are informed by theoretical 
insights. That is, we base the ought on a conception of what is. In reference to the is, Laclau 
has, on several occasions, referenced a certain logic, which he most often describes in 
terms of hegemony, as being universal.2 While Laclau articulates this logic in terms of 
hegemony, I find variations of the same logic to be present in Badiou in terms of set theory, 
in Butler in terms of performativity and in Lacan in terms of psychoanalysis, etc. In this 
thesis, I call this logic ‘the logic of lack’. This logic outlines a constant retreat of presence. In 
this sense, we are not dealing with a ‘normal’ ontology, although that will be made clearer 
in the main body of the text. 
However, while I agree that this logic is universal, we cannot simply refer to it and then be 
done with the ontological question. For, as Laclau is often keen to point out, we cannot 
operate outside of the context in which we find ourselves – even if this context is never 
fixed. As such, I am saddened that so little concerted effort has been made to understand 
the structuring effects of the Left/Right spectrum. For, as structuring mechanisms, they 
function not to give expression to the logic of lack, but to ensure its concealment. I believe 
this spectrum to be largely hegemonic over political discourse, yet, most democratic theory 
 
2 Laclau, Ernesto, 2000a, ‘Structure, History and the Political’, in: Butler, Judith, Laclau, Ernesto & 
Žižek, Slavoj (eds.), Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, 
Verso: London, pp.182-212, p.189. See also Laclau, Ernesto, 1999, ‘Politics, Polemics and Academics: 
An Interview by Paul Bowman’, Parallax, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp.93-107, p.101. 
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largely just accept them uncritically.3 As such, political projects born from democratic 
theory might be said to be somewhat lacking, as they have no critical understanding of 
Left/Right, i.e. they lack a critical component of the context in which we find ourselves. 
As mentioned, I argue that Left/Right belong to the public subject as the citizen-voter; that 
Left/Right signify an ordered difference expressible in the formats of beliefs, opinions, 
arguments, etc., and that they enable a conception of rationalism to flourish. I worry that a 
radical politics for the excluded parts of society, when not properly equipped with a critical 
understanding of the structuring effects of Left/Right, is fed into Left/Right’s structuring 
mechanisms and essentially have their radicality negated. 
I exemplify this problematic in the main text through numerous examples. One such 
example revolves around a disability activist in Denmark, Mette Lylloff. Lylloff, like so many 
other people in material precarity, seeks a recognition of the material precarity 
experienced by people in her situation. She seeks a recognition of a truth, in the hope that 
this can be acknowledged and her precarity ameliorated. However, the place where she 
might forward this request for recognition, the place I refer to as ‘the public’, is one in 
which the citizen-voter reigns supreme and Left/Right structure political expressions. As I, 
with Noberto Bobbio, argue that the Left is always the pole that seeks inclusion, Lylloff’s 
politics becomes readable as leftist politics. But the two are different. For a leftist politics is 
one that acknowledge the validity of the citizen-voter and structures its being in the 
formats of beliefs, opinions, argument, etc., while Lylloff’s politics does not acknowledge 
partiality but instead seeks a recognition of lived experience.  
People who live in materially precarious situations, such as Mette Lylloff, are the subjects 
of radical politics. However, by ascribing her politics to a Leftist politics of inclusion, there 
exactly arises a misrecognition of radical politics with Leftist politics. For, in stressing 
inclusion into the public, people like Lylloff must either refrain from expressing themselves 
in terms that seek a recognition of lived experience, or accept that their expressions are 
translated into arguments, opinions, etc. In other words, her expressions will be made 
partial, taking the quest for recognition out of the frame entirely. 
As I have already alluded to, I conceive of radical politics as either situated around inclusion 
into the existing order or a break with the existing order. I situate myself with the latter 
conception. And, while I do not specify this politics to that great an extent in the thesis – 
 
3 In the thesis I exemplify this uncritical stance mostly through the writings of Mouffe and Laclau. 
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beyond referring to my reading of Laclauian Populism – it should be noted that I think of 
this politics, not in terms of historical conjectures, but in a more Badiouian vein as a politics 
of truth – a reading I do not consider alien to the spirit of Laclau’s work on populism. This is 
not an anarchist politics that seeks horizontal order, for it acknowledges that hierarchical 
order and exclusion are ineradicable features of society. Rather, it is a politics that, by 
positioning itself always on the side of the excluded, always seeks to challenge the existing 
order, no matter its relative degree of hierarchy and exclusivity. I conceive of it this way 
exactly because ‘the logic of lack’ is universal. It is not historically contingent but instead 
constitutive of all human societies that have ever existed.  
This could be read together with a Mouffean4 or Derridean notion of ‘democracy to come’5 
– or a Laclauian and Mouffian radical democracy for that matter – but their primary focus 
on inclusion rather than the break; on groundless order rather than revolutionary politics, 
remains a politics for the public subject – not a politics for the excluded. In so being, they 
speak more to the self-understanding – or, ego-identification – of public subjects, than to 
the realisation of material demands made by excluded parts. Their politics acknowledges 
the universality of ‘the logic of lack’, but, in speaking primarily to the public subject, ‘the 
logic of lack’ becomes an obstacle and a problem that we have to live with. In so doing, 
they arrive at their politics from outside of this logic, as the establishment of the logic as a 
problem requires parameters for diagnosing phenomena that are arrived at from outside 
this logic itself. As such, it can only be considered as a logical fallacy as ‘the logic of lack 
itself’ is universal.  
Instead, politics should be conceived as the exposition of this universality. As such, instead 
of being articulated in relation to historical conjectures through decrees to public subjects, 
it must be expressed in terms of breaks, marked by the emergence of the bodies of the 
excluded, which always exceed the police (ac)count performed through Left/Right. To be 
clear then, the exposition of this excess is what radical politics should be all about. 
Additionally, while ‘the logic of lack’ speaks to a logic of discourse, it also structures 
materiality.6 As such, a politics that acknowledges ‘the logic of lack’ must be directed at the 
 
4 Although her recent book on populism can be read as emphasising the break over the inclusion. 
See Mouffe, Chantal, 2018, For a Left Populism, Verso: London. 
5 Mouffe, Chantal, 1993a, The Return of The Political, Verso: London, p. 8. Derrida discusses this at 
length in Derrida, Jacques, 1994, Specters of Marx, translated by: Peggy Kamuf, Routledge: New 
York. 
6 That discourse is material is nicely exemplified in Carpentier, Nico, 2017, The Discursive-Material 
Knot: Cyprus in Conflict and Community Media Participation, Peter Lang Inc: New York. 
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state (or their pre-modern equivalents), as parameters for material constellations (for 
example, the parameters for what kind of bodies can be assembled where) are exactly 
located at the level of the state – based on its monopoly on violence. This eternal politics is 
then an eternal revolutionary politics, always working to give ‘the logic of lack’ expression 
in the name of the excluded parts. 
Finally, this thesis is intended as a contribution to both the study of Left/Right and 
democratic theory more broadly. There is currently a dearth of work on the democratic 
function of Left/Right. Despite their hegemony over public discourse, to which their 
popularity in political science attests, there are almost no historical accounts of their 
emergence – especially of their emergence outside France – and, considering the amount 
of people who muse over the degree of usefulness that the spectrum commands today, 
there are precious few engagements with the ideological effects of Left/Right in, and on, 
modernity. My hope is that I can here carve out new territory in which to engage with 
Left/Right and better understand the democratic functions they have in political modernity. 
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Chapter 1: Left/Right as spatial markers 
1. Introduction 
Despite their fundamental place in political modernity, and their continuing common 
usage, the scholarly literature analysing the terms “Left” and “Right” in politics is far from 
overwhelming. Complicating matters, what literature does exist is scattered across a 
myriad of fields, making it difficult to summarise neatly and succinctly. Nevertheless, that is 
what this chapter aims to accomplish. Moving from field to field, it reviews and critically 
assesses key texts engaging with the concepts of Left/Right, showing what we can learn 
from them but also their limits.  
Overall, I look in each field to find out what we can learn and build on our understanding of 
Left/Right. As such, I treat it as a puzzle, and with each new piece that I put down, we see a 
little bit more of the whole picture. To accomplish this, I look to political science, 
anthropology and cognitive linguistics. I find that they allude to the spatial nature of 
Left/Right but that they lack a temporal dimension. This means that they can explain, to 
some extent, what Left and Right mean and how politics can be built up around them, but 
they cannot explain Left/Right themselves and the space the they open. To make up for 
this, I also engage the most prominent historical account of Left/Right, which ties it in with 
the fabric of modernity. The chapter shows that there is a gap in the Left/Right literature in 
that it has rarely been explicitly theorised in a spatial capacity. This has made us unable to 
theorise exclusion from this space that Left/Right create and, as such, has held back 
political approaches that seek to engage this place of exclusion. As I move forward in this 
thesis, I attempt to make up for this lack of theorisation. 
First, I engage political science with Anthony Downs and William Riker. I position Downs as 
the first to equate Left/Right with a properly political space. He employs Left/Right as 
foundations for his theories on political behaviour and uses them to divide up individuals 
with tastes and preferences. These preferences, he posits, are employed in a rational way 
in order to accomplish a maximum amount of utility income. Left/Right thus form a linear 
space that account for the whole of the political community, defined as individuals with 
tastes and preferences. Riker speaks to Downs in his assertion that, yes, we need to think 
about space, but, no, space is not one-dimensional, but multi-dimensional and revolves 
around issues. Riker speaks of the ability of politicians to manipulate political discourse by 
invoking different issue spaces at different times. He calls this ability ‘heresthetics’. Yet, 
despite Riker reconceptualising space as multidimensional issue space, it remains the task 
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of the politicians to effect a relocation of individuals to different ‘spatial neighbourhoods’. 
In that sense, he too relies on a meta-space of sorts, onto which issue spaces map. I end up 
appreciating the need to think spatially when thinking about Left/right but criticising 
Downs and Riker for failing to provide theory that can explain Left/Right themselves and 
the space they create. 
Second, I engage the anthropological work of Jean Laponce, Chris McManus and others. As 
these scholars look at cultures far and wide and examine the meaning that these cultures 
have attached to Left/Right and, in particular, Up/Down, we see that Laponce posits that 
Left/Right are about religion and equality. To make this argument, he notes that Up is 
always associated with religion, hierarchy and, in general, ‘the good’ and Down vice-versa. 
Yet, according to Laponce, the French revolution secured a levelling of the existing political 
symbolic order, whereby Up was rotated onto Right and Down was rotated onto Left. The 
Left/Right distinction thus cannot escape the connotations attached to Up/Down, even 
though they allow for those meanings to be posed in a political form. Right retains the 
connotations of the holy, hierarchy and ‘the good’, and Left vice-versa. We see McManus 
largely agree with this, but then James Hall disputes it. We also encounter Lakoff and 
Johnson’s account of the importance of metaphors in relation to the structuring of our 
thoughts. They too suggest that Up=good and Down=bad but say nothing of substance 
about Left/Right. Nevertheless, we start to see an account of space emerge that centres 
not only around Left/Right but also around their meanings. And, with Lakoff and Johnson, 
we reach the argument that we think in terms of spatial, orientation metaphors – the 
argument that allow us to stress the constitutive role that Left/Right play in the 
constitution of political space. Again, however, a temporal dimension is missing and, 
without it, our understanding of the nature of the political space that Left/Right enable 
remains incomplete. 
I make up for this lack of a temporal dimension as I finally engage the most prominent 
account of the emergence of Left/Right in France, provided by Marcel Gauchet. I 
contextualise this with the theoretico-historical account of modernity provided by Claude 
Lefort and a theorisation of the emergence of a public subject, provided by Harold Mah. 
With them, I argue that modernity is constituted around the lack of markers of certainty 
which opens up a space for the contestation of power by ‘the people’. With an 
institutionalisation of this new democratic regime a public emerged, insofar that we 
understand this public as made up of people who were different but who nevertheless 
shared in their concern for the in-common. With this development a public subject 
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emerged. To accompany this backdrop, Gauchet engages the introduction of Left/Right as 
seating arrangement in the national assembly where supporters of the ancien régime sat to 
the right, and supporters of the revolution sat to the left. He then engages the different 
meanings that they have taken on and shows us how they change through time. Most 
interesting, however, is his account of their popularisation in public discourse. He equates 
this occurrence with the emergence of the citizen-voter – a particular form of the public 
subject. This citizen-voter, having been once removed from the doing of politics through 
the introduction of political party machinery that made it impossible to represent politics 
as a matter of the transparent will of the people, becomes in need of a map of the political 
community that they can use to identify themselves and others in relation to the whole. 
I, with Gauchet, argue that Left/Right accomplish this task of enabling the citizen-voter to 
identify with the whole because of certain qualities that they have. Notably, Left/Right are 
not caught up in signification to the same extent as Red/White or Up/Down. They also 
remain linked to politics and the early days of the revolution, as several political parties 
have Left and Right in their names. The point is that, despite retaining connotations of 
politics, the final meaning of Left/Right is impossible to ascertain. In this sense, they 
provide a map of the political community that is highly malleable. In a modernity that is 
defined by the lack of markers of certainty, perhaps ‘better’ maps could be found that 
would relate to certain periods, but as modernity is exactly marked by flux and uncertainty, 
the longevity of Left/Right is explained exactly through their link to the phenomenon of 
politics itself and nothing more. Left/Right, being fairly open to new meanings, have simply 
adapted as different issues have come to govern political discourse by subsuming those 
issues under their overarching space. I thus argue that Left/Right are tied together with a 
type of rationalism that stresses that individual parts are partial to other parts and to the 
space to which those parts belong. I.e. a type of rationalism that stresses the coming 
together of different people in, specifically, deliberation over the common good. 
As I round off, we see, from the engagement with the temporal dimension, that Left/Right 
are linked with the institutionalisation of politics and the democratic revolution. Yet, we 
still know precious little about the nature of space, which is what Left/Right constitute, and 
identity, which is both constituted in the citizen-voter in the singular but also marks out the 
ways in which the citizen-voter can express themselves in relation to the public. In the next 
chapter, I thus move to an engagement with more explicitly post-structuralist accounts of 
space and identity as I try to effect an understanding of Left/Right and their function in 
modernity more thoroughly.  
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2. Left/Right in political science  
2.1. Introduction 
Left/Right are categories that exist in the world. To many people, they are the political 
categories par excellence. As such, it is only natural that we find political scientists using 
them in order to understand the world around us. 
Here I engage Anthony Downs and William Riker, from whom we learn that politics is 
spatial. But they also present us with a vision of politics that lacks a temporal dimension. 
What this means is that they can perhaps describe the political world and its processes, but 
they cannot explain them. 
2.2. Anthony Downs and Left/Right 
Downs was an economist who sought to apply insights from that field to the study of 
politics.7 He conceptualised the voter as a rational consumer who votes for their chosen 
political party based on which parties match their preference.8 Downs conceptualised this 
idea of preference in terms of utility income: 
 
Each citizen in our model votes for the party he believes will 
provide him with a higher utility income than any other party 
during the coming election period.9 
 
The political preference of the rational voter, Downs contends, is thus determined by the 
degree to which the voter can derive a perceived personal gain. As the voter is rational, 
they will weigh up the costs to acquiring information in relation to the perceived gain that 
might be extracted from expenditure of, primarily, time and energy. With many voters 
determining that such costs might be too expensive, Downs argues that political parties not 
only appeal to voters through advertising their policy proposals, but also through pitching 
themselves ideologically: 
 
 
7 His seminal text is Downs, Anthony, 1957a, An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper & Row 
Publishers: New York. 
8 Downs, 1957a, p.5. 
9 Ibid., p.38. 
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Ideologies help him [the voter] focus attention on the differences 
between parties; therefore they can be used as samples of all the 
differentiating stands. With this short cut a voter can save himself 
the cost of being informed upon a wider range of issues.10 
 
Downs here uses the word ideology to denote a form of group identification. In other 
words, by pitching themselves ideologically, political parties create a unified image of what 
they are, and, as Downs says, this image can then be used to differentiate one party from 
another. It is with this conceptualisation of ideology that a concept of space begins to 
emerge. 
Insisting that there is uncertainty involved in the acquisition of information relating to 
voting,11 Downs argues that it is not obvious which ideology will be favoured by voters. It is 
because of this that differentiation between ideologies become possible. In order to 
compare two ideologies that portray themselves as distinct from one another, we need one 
schema in which both can be placed so that we can understand them in relation to one 
another. To accomplish such a schema, or space, Downs enlists Left and Right: 
 
To make this politically meaningful, we assume that political 
preferences can be ordered from left to right in a manner agreed 
upon by all voters. They need not agree on which point they 
personally prefer, only on the ordering of parties from one 
extreme to the other.12 
 
Relying on the work of Hotelling and Smithies,13 Downs then conceptualises Left/Right as 
opening up a space that is conceived of as a “market”.14 As we see in the quotation above, 
this space is then foundational, which enables his theory to work in a politically meaningful 
 
10 Ibid., p.98. 
11 Ibid., pp.77-81. 
12 Ibid., p.115. 
13 Hotelling, Harold, 1929, ‘Stability in Competition’, The Economic Journal, Vol. 39, No. 153, pp.41-
57; and Smithies, A., 1941, ‘Optimum Location in Spatial Competition’, Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 49, No. 3, pp.423-439. 
14 Downs, Anthony, 1957b, ‘An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy’, The Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 65, No. 2, pp.135-150, p.142. 
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way. In other words, there can be uncertainty as to individual preferences, but there 
cannot be uncertainty as to the space that individual preferences refer to in order to locate 
themselves in relation to other preferences. Downs goes on to discuss that parties, at least 
in a two-party state such as the US, will drift to the centre as they can always rely on the 
voters who inhabit the relative edges of the space closest to them to still vote for them, as 
their rival party will be positioned even further away, spatially speaking. Downs popularised 
this theory – the Median Voter Theorem15 – and with it,16 he accomplished the first 
significant conceptualisation of Left/Right as spatial markers. 
To reiterate, Left/Right enable Downs to conceptualise a political space in which voters, 
acting as consumers, can locate their preferences in relation to other preferences and 
understand ideologies in relation to other ideologies. In doing this, Downs makes at least 
two assumptions that are problematic. First, he assumes that the voter will always seek to 
act in accordance with their perceived personal gain,17 which is plainly just not true. 
Second, he assumes that Left/Right can account for ideological politics tout-court. In other 
words, while preferences need to be expressed/represented and may change because of 
an uncertainty in relation to the acquisition of information, Left/Right are beyond the realm 
of expression/representation and instead exist as an empty formal distinction that acts as a 
bedrock for individual preferences to be expressed/represented to begin with. In Downs, 
there is then no room for any kind of political expression beyond preferences, which 
Left/Right function to signify. 
2.3. William Riker and Left/Right 
Downs’ attempt to understand politics using the Left/Right spectrum sparked a cascade of 
work focused on politics more widely and the Left/Right spectrum in particular.18 I engage 
Riker because he, unlike some of Downs’ other critics, sought to question the use of space 
in relation to Downs’ conception of politics.19  
 
15 This theory was first developed in Black, Duncan, 1948, ‘On the Rationale of Group Decision-
making’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 56, pp.23-34. 
16 Downs, 1957b. 
17 Which, to Downs, is to act rationally. 
18 Many sought to create models to properly understand politics. For two such models, see Wittman, 
Donald, 1973, ‘Parties as utility maximizers’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 67, pp.490-498; 
and Robertson, David, 1976, A Theory of Party Competition, John Wiley & Sons: London. 
19 Riker, William H., 1980, Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of 
Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice, W. H. Freeman: San Francisco; and Riker, William, H., 
1986, The Art of Political Manipulation, Yale University Press: New Haven, Conn.. 
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First, Riker asserts that the preferences and ideologies to which Downs refers must be 
conceptualised as “moving”.20 Upon reviewing work that has gone into the “spatial models 
of politics”, Riker notes that: 
 
As far as I know, the candidates (or parties) and their platforms, 
or, alternatively, the motions, are all that anyone has proposed as 
moving parts. But nothing inherent in the model prevents other 
parts from moving. At the very minimum, the voters might also 
move. This means that they might change their tastes, that is, 
change the location of their ideal points.21 
 
Riker also goes further, contending that “participants (either candidates or voters) might 
change the space itself”.22 This means that, to him, a simple two-dimensional space simply 
cannot provide a solid account of how politics takes place in real life.23 To compensate for 
this, Riker introduces two different concepts: heresthetic and rhetoric. Heresthetic, a 
science invented by Riker,24 concerns the ability of participants to change the spatial 
framework in which people locate their preferences in order to make other people join 
their “spatial neighbourhood”.25 Rhetoric concerns the ability of participants to persuade 
others to relocate to their spatial neighbourhood, i.e., it does not effect the space. To 
clarify, Riker gives the example of a US senator who fought to change the US port into 
which nerve gas would be repatriated and destroyed after a leak had occurred in Okinawa. 
The senator struggled to accomplish such a policy effect as he failed to rally enough 
senators to his side. Using rhetoric, he alluded to the terrible consequences of leaks and 
argued that Okinawans were not complaining anyway. However, it was not until he used 
heresthetic – until he changed the space – that he was successful in effecting a policy 
 
20 Riker, William H., 1990, ‘Heresthetic and Rhetoric in the Spatial Model’, in: Enelow, James M. & 
Hinich, Melvin J., (eds.), Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting, Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, pp.46-65, p.46. Riker speaks to Downs on several occasions, perhaps most notably in 
Riker, William, H., 1962, The Theory of Political Coalitions, Yale University Press: London. 
21 Riker, 1990, p.46. 
22 Ibid., p.46. 
23 Ibid., p.47. 
24 Riker, William, H., 1984, ‘The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with 
Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 78, No. 1, 
pp.1-16. 
25 Riker, 1990, p.48. 
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change. To do so, he forwarded another argument relating to secret trade talks with Japan 
(in which repatriation of nerve gas was said to feature) and accused the President of not 
consulting the Senate to the extent to which he is constitutionally required. By collapsing 
the space in which the question of the port dominated into the space in which the question 
of the status of the legislative branch in relation to the executive branch dominated, he 
managed to win enough support from senators who did not care for his arguments in 
relation to terror and Okinawan acquiescence, but thought it important to be seen to stand 
up for senatorial independence. Through applying heresthetic techniques, the senator in 
question got his way: he won.26 The implication is that while preferences might be fixed, 
issue spaces certainly are not. 
What Rikerian heresthetic accomplishes is to focus space, the regular distribution of 
differences, around issues. In Riker, preferences are always related to issues and, as such, 
space is not one-dimensional, but multi-dimensional. Through this insight Riker can then 
account for how parts might “move”. It is with this in mind that Iain McClean argues that: 
 
[…] multidimensional issue space offers the potential to construct 
a new winning majority. Therefore, herestheticians have an 
incentive to increase or diminish the dimensionality of issue 
space, according to their perceived advantage.27 
 
This complicates Riker’s relationship to Downs as he not only – especially through the 
emphasis on rhetoric – starts to question some of the basic tenets of rational choice theory 
that informs Downs’ rational voter, but also challenges the idea that party ideology is the 
most important factor in relation to the agency afforded participants in the political 
process. Additionally, as Riker’s theory is only applied to liberal democracies where 
institutional norms and regulations supposedly inhibit the use of arbitrary power, it 
positions questions of winning and losing in relation to ‘getting your way’. And, to Riker, as 
politicians attempt to get their way – to win – through the application of heresthetic 
techniques, they not only calculate appeal to voters’ tastes and preferences but also seek a 
 
26 Ibid., pp.48-49. 
27 McClean, Iain, 2002, ‘William H. Riker and the Invention of Heresthetic(s)’, British Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp.535-558, pp.555-556. 
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realignment of preferences28 – a phenomenon I could not account for through Downs 
alone.  
However, certain unexplained assumptions still exist with Riker. First, while he does 
problematise the rational voter, he still only perceives political being at the level of 
preference and taste. In this sense, he remains tied to Downs in his conception of the voter 
as some sort of passive consumer, even if the degree of rationality is now questioned. 
Second, Riker understands space in terms of its dimensionality alone. This insight does 
expand on Downs’ work, but, while it provides a better account of how politicians act to 
win votes, it does not fundamentally change the argument that Downs forwards: that 
political parties should be viewed as ideological vendors in a Left/Right space that pitch 
themselves in relation to one another in order to win votes. 
2.4. What eludes Riker and Downs? 
We learn from Riker and Downs that politics is related to the distribution of preferences 
that stand in relation to one another and that this distribution of preferences is spatial. To 
them, the concept of space is needed to account for the arena where people come 
together to make decisions that effect all. We learn from Downs that there is a Left/Right 
space in which different preferences are distributed, and we learn from Riker that 
politicians can manipulate issues to place people together in the same place who would not 
otherwise be together. One can read Riker, through his singular focus on issue spaces, as 
effecting a complete dislocation of the Left/Right spectrum. However, his theory relies 
upon an overarching space. For when he refers to the ability to manipulate issue space to 
relocate preferences in different ‘spatial neighbourhoods’, he relies upon another founding 
space to which issue spaces necessarily relate. If that was not the case, there would be no 
neighbourhood to begin with. Instead we would all be floating around in different issue 
spaces, unable to relate to one another unless we both had preferences in the same 
dimensions. Instead, while heresthetic accounts for the manoeuvring of politicians, the 
founding space is what makes that manoeuvring meaningful in the first instance. For, 
ultimately, the politician must win against other politicians who compete within a liberal 
democratic framework for temporary power. While this competition may centre around 
multiple issues, it is still singular: in the end, there can be only one winner. It is in relation 
 
28 Although Riker refers to these, new, tastes and preferences as “latent”. See Riker, 1990, p.54. 
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to this one space that then opens in relation to this one competition, that the Left/Right 
spectrum once again manifests itself.29 
Furthermore, while Downs – and by implication, Riker – rely on this space, they constitute 
it as empty, as a purely formal distinction that has no content. However, Riker shows us 
that, once issues enter the equation, Left/Right also lose their emptiness. Having lost their 
radical emptiness, Left/Right cannot be said to be a purely formal, conceptual space. 
Rather, they become embedded in the world and take on meaning, and to the extent that 
issues rely on the Left/Right spectrum to form, Left/Right then also become constitutive in 
the formation of issue spaces which in turn can function to change the meaning of 
Left/Right. 
The biggest problem for both Riker and Downs, however, is that because they use this 
space as a foundation for their political science models that aim to explain politics, they 
cannot explain this Left/Right space itself.30 The space becomes foundational to their work. 
As such, the Left/Right meta-space functions as an a priori to their theories. This is because 
their theories lack a temporal dimension. It is true that Riker concerns himself deeply with 
the changing of preferences and tastes, but this remains a spatial concern rather than a 
temporal concern as it does not deal with changes to the meta-space that supposedly 
founds our politics in tastes and preferences. Riker perhaps excuses this by arguing that he 
only seeks to apply the spatial model of politics to liberal democracies,31 where he simply 
assumes that human beings are constituted through preferences and tastes alone. This is 
clearly problematic, but the fact remains that Left/Right, constituting a space in which 
some kind of difference between things is distributed, is a thing of this world. Downs and 
Riker make assumptions about Left/Right to forward spatial models of politics, but through 
Downs and Riker we will travel no further in our search for a better understanding of 
Left/Right and the space they constitute. Because of this, I now leave political science 
behind as I look to those who have sought to understand the meaning of Left and Right. 
 
29 We see this in Riker also when he writes that, for revolutionaries, losing is “almost certain in 
liberal democratic governments […] because they minimize the number of extremists”. See Riker, 
1990, p.47. The positioning of extremist already suggests an identification of a space that goes 
beyond issues and instead, somehow, connects up with liberal democracy. 
30 This is problematic because they use this understanding of politics that this unexplained space has 
provided them with to make arguments for particular political institutions. See Riker, William H., 
1988, Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between a Theory of Democracy and the Theory 
of Social Choice, Waveland Press: Long Grove, Illinois.  
31 Riker, 1990, p.47. 
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2.5. Conclusion 
In this section I engaged Left/Right from some of the perspectives of political science. I 
used Downs and Riker to exemplify two such approaches. However, both Riker and Downs 
use Left/Right to found politics. As such, they do not explain Left/Right themselves. In this 
sense, their theory establishes the importance of a spatial dimension to politics but to the 
detriment of a temporal dimension. 
3. Left/Right in sociology and anthropology 
3.1. Introduction 
Having argued above that we might think of Left/Right as constituting some sort of spatial 
framework, in this section I look at what this framework might mean. Through engaging 
various sociological and semiological approaches, I argue that Left/Right have no 
immutable or essential meanings. Instead, through looking at cognitive linguistics, we learn 
that they are orientational metaphors that enable an identification of subjects in relation to 
each other and the whole.  
3.2. Left/Right in cultural symbolism 
First, I look at people who have sought to study cultures (ancient as well as present) and 
the way in which Left and Right act as symbols within them. Jean Laponce is the most 
natural starting point. Laponce was a political scientist who, perhaps more than anyone, 
worked “to make the place of language an important subfield in political science”.32 
Standing apart from the rational choice theorists, he sought to understand politics through 
understanding the language that people use in their political lives. To this end, he wrote his 
seminal book on Left/Right: Left and Right: The Topography of a Political Distinction.33 The 
aim of the book was to better understand what Left and Right mean and do.34 
Acknowledging that “[w]e use space to give shapes to our thoughts, and in turn these 
shapes generate and constrain new ideas”,35 Laponce describes his book as “[taking] the 
 
32 Safran, William, 2018, ‘The contributions of Jean A. Laponce to political theory’, International 
Political Science Review, Vol. 39, No. 5, pp.690-701, p.690. 
33 Laponce, Jean, 1981, Left and Right: The Topography of a Political Distinction, University of 
Toronto Press: Toronto. 
34 He explicitly ties his research, not to Downs or Hotelling (whom Downs leaned upon), but rather to 
Lévi-Strauss and his structuralist tradition. See Laponce, 1981, p.9. 
35 Ibid., p.3 
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form of a series of observations, analyses, speculations, reflections and theories concerning 
one of the weakest of spatial dimensions – that of left and right.”36  
In this book, Laponce spends several chapters engaging with “rituals and […] beliefs of 
Southeast Asian primitives”,37 as well as other “old religious ideologies [… and] new 
political ones”,38 in order to find the pre-political meaning of Left and Right. He makes one 
conclusive finding: 
 
[…] the overall semantic and social context within which the 
terms left and right have been used politically since the end of the 
eighteenth century is a context that favours the right side 
inasmuch as right is congruently related to the notion of what is 
located above, and inasmuch as right, like ‘above’, is located on 
the dominant side of the polarity.39 
 
Coupled with a focus on physical factors (such as gravity) and biological factors (such as the 
head being on the top of the body), Laponce thus also outlines a vertical spacing where 
value connotations position ‘above’, or ‘Up’, as good, because it is on the side of the 
heavens, and ‘below, or ‘Down’, as bad, because it is on the side of hell. In other words, 
while there might be cultural and linguistic trends that accentuate Right over Left, the 
dominance of ‘Up’ over ‘Down’ is near universal.40 In fact, Laponce finds that the Up/Down 
dimension itself is dominant over all other dimensions as well.41 
He then goes about trying to find out how we can develop a knowledge about Left/Right 
that works in tandem with these insights. Laponce notes that Left/Right emerge in a 
political capacity with the French Revolution and, through statistical data, he show how 
dominant they have become as markers of political space.42 While describing Left/Right 
early in the book as one of the “weakest spatial dimensions”,43 Laponce later argues that, 
 
36 Ibid., p.7. 
37 Ibid., p.9. 
38 Ibid., p.9. 
39 Ibid., p.41. 
40 Ibid., p.45. 
41 Ibid., p.69. 
42 Ibid., pp.47-68. 
43 Ibid., p.7. 
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“this semantic success [of Left/Right in colonizing political space] that both clarifies and 
cripples the understanding of politics is unlikely to be accidental.”44 He finds the secret to 
the success of Left/Right in the dominance of Up/Down and its relation to Left/Right. 
Relying on Eliade, he introduces religion as a major factor, firmly aligning it (the sacred) 
with Up,45 and atheism (the profane) with Down.46 But once he has adopted this focus on 
the sacred and the profane, he also makes another finding: the sacred is also connected to 
Right.47 With this, he starts to build an understanding of the processes native to the French 
Revolution that started to align Right with Up and Left with Down. As Laponce notes that 
the factions that supported the aristocracy and the church sat on the right side of the 
newly formed national assembly, and the revolutionary forces sat on the left, he gives the 
following account: 
 
The revolution that beheaded a king physically, and a society 
symbolically, the revolution that instituted government by 
discussion, that sought universal equality and located its rituals 
and ceremonies in open fields far from the vertical spires of 
churches, required a horizontal classification. 
One can more easily say ‘left and right are alike’ than one can say 
‘there is no difference between high or low’; but left and right 
could not remain equal. The existing religious and social 
symbolism prevented them from being mere images of each 
other or mere neutral dimension for the locating of political 
actors […] God and King – concepts that were up and right 
religiously – naturally became right politically; and an inverse 
rotation led the enemies of the king – many of whom were also 
enemies of the clergy – to move from low to left. Furthermore, 
since the very aim of the revolution was not to put the social 
order upside down but to level it off, the rotation movement that 
 
44 Ibid., p.68. 
45 See Eliade, Mircea, 1959, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, translated by: 
Willard R. Trask, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt: Orlando. 
46 Incidentally, we can also see here how it is that Leszek Kolakowski, in 1968, came to represent the 
Left as the party of negation. See Kolakowski, Leszek, 2014, ‘The Concept of the Left’, South Asia 
Citizens Web, 4 Nov, viewed 19 Jan, 2019, <http://www.sacw.net/article9655.html>. 
47 Laponce, 1981, p.92 
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led from low to left did not lead further from left to high. The 
rotation stopped at the horizontal. The third estate did not want 
to replace the king; ideologically it could not. Unable to climb the 
symbolic hierarchy leading to the crown, it sought to erase that 
hierarchy. The new spatial notation of the new political order thus 
stabilized at the horizontal with king and clergy on the right, 
anticlericalism, parliamentarianism, democracy and the 
dominated on the left.48 
 
By connecting Up-Right and Down-Left, Laponce posits his contribution to the study of 
Left/Right: Right becomes good, associated with strength and religion and Left becomes 
bad, associated with weakness and atheism.49 The new political system that the French 
Revolution instilled required a new form of spatial ordering; the dominance of Up/Down 
had to go and Left/Right took their place while retaining and perhaps even strengthening 
the cultural connotations of Up-Right and Down-Left. 
Laponce goes on to focus on handedness, which tempts him to “explain an increase in the 
level of left-hand writing by an increase in social liberalism”.50 However, he never acts on 
the temptation, even if he speculates that the success of Left/Right must be found in 
relation to the physical structures of our bodies.51 Instead, he satisfies himself with the 
explanatory model that I have outlined above. He seeks to verify these hypotheses through 
survey data and notes that Left/Right has lost some of its overt religious connotations, but 
he nevertheless “feel[s] justified in concluding that the verification of the hypotheses does 
not undermine placing equality and religion at the core of the Left/Right structure.”52 This 
means that he operates with a core/periphery divide,53 where he places questions of 
equality and religion as central to the Left/Right spectrum and questions of, for example, 
the economy, as only peripherally attached to the Left/Right spectrum. 
Unfortunately, Laponce’s incursion into Left/Right is somewhat lacking. The sheer array of 
methods that he employs and fields that he engages makes it difficult for him to arrive at 
 
48 Ibid., p.92. 
49 One might argue that what is really at play here is transcendence, rather than religion, but 
Laponce does not make this argument himself.  
50 Ibid., p.113. 
51 Ibid., p.93. 
52 Ibid., p.182. 
53 Ibid., p.135. 
33 
 
solid conclusions. The squaring of psychoanalysis, which he engages on a few occasions to 
exemplify his findings,54 with questions about human nature, for example, is highly 
problematic. However, the problematic nature of his incursion into the study of Left/Right 
is also one of the book’s strengths. For if we read it as more speculative than assertive, we 
see that it opens up a number of ways in which Left/Right can be engaged. Laponce opens 
up a number of conversations – for example, about Left/Right and its relation to our 
bodies, Left/Right and the French Revolution, Left/Right and cultural symbolism and 
Left/Right and spatial metaphors – and is careful to close only a few. As I proceed with 
examining Left/Right and the way it has been thought about in the established literature, 
we come across all these conversations again. We might take what we can from them, but I 
also note that we must move past them in order to give a better account of Left/Right and 
their current political function. 
3.3. Following from Laponce 
Following on from Laponce’s opening of the conversation about Left/Right and 
handedness, Chris McManus, whose book on this subject looks at almost as many fields as 
Laponce’s,55 concurs that “always it is right that is good and left that is bad”.56 For 
McManus, this also has political implications: 
 
The symbolism means that right is the positive end of the scale, 
and hence it is more likely that people will apply it to themselves 
than apply the less positive end of the scale […] The mathematics 
therefore suggests that we should not expect left and right to be 
equally prevalent in the population, and since, as we have seen in 
other contexts, ‘right’ is the norm whereas ‘left’ is the marked 
form, then it is the left that is generally in the minority.57 
 
 
54 Ibid., pp.80-81. 
55 McManus, Chris, 2002, Right Hand, Left Hand: The Origins of Asymmetry in Brains, Bodies, Atoms 
and Cultures, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA. 
56 McManus in Robinson, Andrew, 2009, ‘Left-Right Symbolism’, The Lancet, Vol. 373, No. 9662, 
p.452. 
57 McManus, 2002, pp.263-4. 
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In this way, McManus uses the prevalence of right-handedness to argue that more people 
will be likely to identify with right over left. McManus has written extensively on this,58 
although he is not the only one.59 However, it should be noted that others working within 
the same methodological framework as McManus have sought to refute these claims. 
James Hall, with his book on Left/Right symbolism in Western Renaissance art,60 seeks to 
show “the variety of left—right distinctions in western culture, and how these are far from 
being universally hostile to the left”.61 He makes the rather damning accusation, which he 
backs up with close textual analysis, that: 
 
I draw on all these studies [that assert that Right = good and Left = 
bad] and am hugely indebted to them, yet the essential Blavatsky-
ite mindset which they have perpetuated is deeply flawed. As a 
result, modern editors and interpreters of historical texts in which 
the left hand/side is venerated tend to pass over the relevant 
passages in silence – or assume that they say the opposite. The 
situation is pretty much the same with visual images and 
aesthetics.62 
 
 As such, from an anthropological perspective, I cannot conclusively assign any intrinsic 
meaning to Left/Right, especially since anthropological studies has not looked at Left/Right 
and their meaning politically.63 That there are loose cultural connotations cannot be 
 
58 See, for example, McManus, Chris, 2004, ‘Right-Left and the scrotum in Greek sculpture’, 
Laterality, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp.189-199.  
59 For examples, see also Palka, Joel W., 2002, ‘Left/right symbolism and the body in ancient Maya 
iconography and culture’, Latin American Antiquity, Vol. 3, No. 15, pp.419-443; Guinan, Ann K., 1996, 
‘Left/Right Symbolism in Mesopotamian Divination’, State Archives of Assyria Bulletin, Vol. 10, pp.5-
10; and Bertrand, Pierre-Michell, 2008, Histoire Des Gauchers, Imago: Paris. Importantly, I must also 
recognise the work done by Robert Hertz in 1909 and Rodney Needham in 1978. See Hertz, Robert, 
1909, La preeminence de fa main droite, sociologie religieuse et folklore, viewed 19 Jan, 
2019,<http://www.anthropomada.com/bibliotheque/HERTZ-Robert.pdf>; and Needham, Rodney, 
1978, Right and Left: Essays on Symbolic Classification, University of Chicago Press: Chicago. 
60 Hall, James, 2008, The Sinister Side: How Left-Right Symbolism Shaped Western Art, Oxford 
University Press: New York. 
61 Hall cited in Robinson, 2009, p.452. 
62 Hall, 2008, p.5. 
63 On this point, we have already seen how political science often uses Left/Right as a basis for their 
understanding of political space. This means that the trouble of finding out what Left and Right 
actually mean politically is, more often than not, left to the commentariat to figure out. However, 
due to this task being carried out by the commentariat, their efforts are not only explanatory, but 
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refuted, but the extent to which we can operate with a core/periphery distinction in order 
to assign a core meaning to Left/Right seems, on the basis of the literature that I have 
reviewed so far, questionable. However, as I renew my focus on Left/Right as orientational 
metaphors and their relation to the physical properties of the brain, we start to see that 
the dominance of Left/Right has real implications for the way in which politics is conceived 
today. With Downs and Riker, I argued that Left/Right have spatial qualities. With Laponce, 
McManus and Hall, I showed that Left and Right have meaning, even if that meaning is 
difficult to pin down. As I move on, we encounter the notion that we think in terms of 
spatial metaphors that have meaning attached to them. That is, we encounter the 
argument Left/Right provide a frame for our thoughts. 
3.4. Left/Right in our brains 
McManus and Laponce note that the body plays an important part in relation to the value 
connotations that might be said to denote Left and Right. I here focus more on the work of 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, who have written much about orientational metaphors,64 
the way they frame our thinking, and how they are connected to the physical matter of the 
brain. Lakoff in particular, working in the field of Cognitive Linguistics, is widely read and 
has even exerted some influence on the Democratic Party in the US. He has been keen to 
show that progressives need to pay attention to the language they use in order to frame 
discussions in ways that are beneficial to them. 
Fundamental to Lakoff and Johnson is the idea that conceptual metaphors structure the 
way we think: “concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and 
how we relate to other people”.65 In other words, concepts, and the way we frame issues,66 
structure our political conversations, which after the French Revolution – Laponce 
reminded us – is what govern politics. This should not be mistaken for a post-structuralist 
 
also constitutive, as it is within the space that they inhabit that academic inquiry tends to look for 
the popular meaning of terms. 
64 Their most noteworthy book is perhaps Lakoff, George & Johnson, Mark, 2003, Metaphors We Live 
By, University of Chicago Press: London. 
65 Ibid., p.3. 
66 They take the concept of framing from Charles Fillmore. See his readings of Fillmore in Lakoff, 
George, 2002, Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think, University of Chicago Press: 
Chicago, p.431. Fillmore’s most explicit writings on framing can be found in Fillmore, Charles, 1982, 
‘Frame Semantics’, in: The Linguistic Society of Korea (ed.), Linguistics in the Morning Calm, Hanshin 
Publishing Company: Seoul, pp.111-138, viewed 17 March, 2018, 
<http://brenocon.com/Fillmore%201982_2up.pdf>. 
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position,67 however.68 Instead, Lakoff and Johnson call this theory “Embodied Realism”,69 
indicating that they seek to anchor their theory in (brain) matter. Specifically, they argue 
that:  
 
Embodied realism, as we understand it, is the view that the locus 
of experience, meaning, and thought is the ongoing series of 
embodied organism–environment interactions that constitute our 
understanding of the world. According to such a view, there is no 
ultimate separation of mind and body, and we are always ‘‘in 
touch’’ with our world through our embodied acts and 
experiences […] Embodied realism is not a philosophical doctrine 
tacked onto our theory of conceptual metaphor. It is the best 
account of the grounding of meaning that makes sense of the 
broadest range of converging empirical evidence that is available 
from the cognitive sciences.70 
 
Importantly, Lakoff and Johnson claim that we think in terms of metaphors because we are 
hardwired to do so, even if this view is largely derived from their work on conceptual 
metaphors rather than from scientific inquiries into the matter of the brain itself. In this 
sense, however, we can view Lakoff together with Laponce and McManus, who also sought 
to anchor metaphors in the body. Like Laponce, Lakoff and Johnson argue that “Good is Up; 
Bad is Down”.71 However, unlike Laponce, they are careful not to attribute this to some 
innate feature.72 That is, rather than explaining why ‘Up is Good’, they simply note that this 
 
67 A charge that Steven Pinker levelled against them. See Pinker, Steven, 2006, ‘Block That 
Metaphor’, The New Republic, 9 Oct, viewed 23 Sept, 2014, 
<http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu/articles/media/2006_09_30_thenewrepublic.html>. 
68 Even if many have tried to reconcile the cognitivist approach with the discursive approach. See, for 
examples, Santa Ana, Otto, 2002, Brown Tide Rising: Metaphors of Latinos in Contemporary 
American Public Discourse, University of Texas Press: Austin; and Hart, Christopher, 2010, Critical 
Discourse Analysis and Cognitive Science: New Perspectives on Immigration Discourse, Palgrave 
McMillan: Basingstoke, which seeks to speak to Critical Discourse Analysis in particular. 
69 Johnson, Mark & Lakoff, George, 2006, ‘Why cognitive linguistics requires embodied realism’, 
Cognitive Linguistics, Vol. 3, No. 13, pp.245–263. This article is itself elaborating on notions already 
set out in Lakoff, George, & Johnson, Mark, 1999, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and 
its Challenge to Western Thought, Basic Books: New York. 
70 Johnson & Lakoff, 2006, p.249. 
71 Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p.16. 
72 Johnson & Lakoff, 2006, pp.251-2. 
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is a dominant frame. The innate features of our brains are what allow us to think in terms 
of conceptual metaphors – they do not structure the meaning of the metaphors 
themselves. 
They also do not follow Laponce in saying that ‘Good is also Right’. In fact, they make very 
few remarks on Left and Right, which they do not treat as core orientational metaphors. 
Instead, when seeking to apply their theories to politics, Lakoff merely says that Left and 
Right are “inaccurate” and a false dichotomy, covering up the true divide between 
progressivism and conservatism.73 However, this is a paradoxical position. For, while he 
posits that, “what is really happening in the brains of Americans is that there are two very 
general modes of thought, one fundamentally progressive, the other fundamentally 
conservative”,74 and that the Left/Right metaphor only plays into the hands of “radical 
conservatives”,75 he essentially invokes an ordering of frames, whereby the 
conservative/progressive frame assumes a primary function and the Left/Right frame a 
secondary. This, in turn, paints the primary frame as good and the secondary as bad. 
However, while he may or may not be right about what frames are ‘really’ in American’s 
brains, in accordance with his political and philosophical project, the Left/Right frame 
should not be conceptualised as an ‘inaccurate’ frame, but as a competing frame, that has 
the potential to displace the conservative/progressive frame entirely, rather than simply 
obfuscating it, as if it has a status that is different to other frames. 
In any case, in specific relation to spatial, and orientational, metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson 
note that, “most of our fundamental concepts are organised in terms of one or more 
spatialization metaphors”.76 The degree to which this is true is too big a question to answer 
here, and as Hall showed us in the previous section, in language, visual imagery and 
aesthetics, it is not always the case that Up=good and Down=bad. But this does allow us to 
say something more about Left/Right. For insofar as they are orientational metaphors, they 
also indicate directions in relation to which one can situate oneself, that is, in relation to 
which one can identify one’s position in relation to the space that the orientational 
metaphor erects in our minds. We saw with Rikerian heresthetic that issue spaces can 
effect a relocation to different spatial neighbourhoods. With Lakoff and Johnson, we get a 
more sophisticated account of this type of ‘political manipulation’, where the concept of 
 
73 Lakoff, George, 2006, The Political Mind: A Cognitive Scientist's Guide to Your Brain and Its Politics, 
Penguin Books: London, pp.43-47. 
74 Ibid., p.45. 
75 Ibid., p.45. 
76 Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p.17. 
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issue space is replaced by the concept of framing, which, instead of effecting a relocation to 
a different spatial neighbourhood, effects one’s orientation in relation to the core spatial, 
orientational metaphors of Left and Right. 
3.5. What can we learn from this? 
Firstly, we can take the lesson that there seems to be no ultimate meaning to Left/Right. 
The scholars who have engaged the meaning of Left/Right are concerned primarily with 
thematic meaning rather than literal meaning. But this does of course not mean that 
Left/Right signify nothing at all. In one sense, we can argue that Left can mean liberal, 
socialist, social justice warrior, snowflake, communist, and many other things and Right can 
mean liberal, conservative, nationalist, egotist, fascist, and many other things. I have not 
undertaken a review of various meanings of Left and Right and nor will I – I leave this job to 
the political commentariat.  
When we stop focusing on literal translations, we see that some of the people I have 
reviewed thus far take Right to have a positive connotation and Left a negative 
connotation, but even this is not conclusive. Laponce entangled Left/Right with the notions 
of equality and religion and, as we shall see in the next chapter, Noberto Bobbio also writes 
about the relationship between Left/Right and equality. For now, the most important 
lesson we can take from our engagements with Laponce, McManus, Hall, Lakoff and 
Johnson is perhaps that we can establish Left and Right’s being as orientational metaphors. 
This means that, insofar that Left/Right are the dominant political orientational metaphors, 
people can orient and identify themselves in relation to their perceived meanings. 
We thus get one step closer to our goal of developing a larger understanding of Left/Right 
in relation to their political function. In this section we have been provided with another, 
and in many ways better, account of space and the function of space in relation to the 
constraint and production of cognition. Yet, we still lack an account of how Left/Right 
actually play out. Laponce et al. engage Left/Right in search for immutable, essential 
meanings and they come up empty handed. They treat Left/Right as given, but they are, in 
their political capacity, historically contingent on the French Revolution and as such in need 
of examination themselves. With that in mind, in the next section, I move onto Marcel 
Gauchet’s historical account of the emergence of Left/Right in France.  
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3.6. Conclusion 
In this section we, with Laponce, found that most cultures represent Up as good and Down 
as bad, with Right associated with religion and authority and Left associated with atheism 
and equality. Furthermore, Laponce argued that the French Revolution made horizontal the 
previously vertical ordering of society, turning Up into Right and Down into Left. However, 
this account was disputed by others, leaving us unable to attach any essential or immutable 
meanings to Left/Right. We also looked to Cognitive Linguistics for insights into metaphors, 
such as Left/Right, and how they might be said to structure our thinking. With Lakoff and 
Johnson, we learned to think of Left/Right as orientational, and spatial, metaphors that 
enable thought to place itself in relation to the meanings that Left and Right signify. As 
such, they enable some sort of identification to take place. However, the exact nature of 
the identification eludes us, as we still lack a historical aspect to our incursion into the 
study of Left/Right. 
4. Left/Right in history 
4.1. Introduction 
The most impressive historical account of the emergence of Left/Right is that conducted by 
Marcel Gauchet.77 Other, less thorough, accounts also exist,78 but the degree of 
theorisation in Gauchet’s account makes it by far the most interesting. He traces 
Left/Right’s influence in France from their conception to their ultimate popularisation post-
Second World War. As we shall see,79 these terms are inextricably linked with the ascension 
of modernity in the Western world. As such, we are fortunate that one of the key theorists 
of the political forms of modernity – Claude Lefort – worked closely with Gauchet.80 This 
section interweaves the account of modernity that we get from Lefort with an account of 
the emergence of Left/Right that presses us to adopt a focus on Left/Right as markers of 
division. I show how Left/Right becomes a way for the newly enfranchised members of the 
social body to represent their own divisions to themselves in order that they may appear as 
a political community, capable of administering democratic rule over themselves despite 
their divisions. Notably, this approach places Left/Right within the realm of representation. 
 
77 Gauchet, 1996. 
78 Most notable are perhaps Laponce, 1981; and Revelli, Marco, 2009, Sinistra destra: L'identità 
smarrita, Laterza: Bari. 
79 And as we saw Laponce allude to also. 
80 Lefort has written extensively on modernity. Here we rely on Lefort, Claude, 1986, The Political 
Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism, Polity Press: Cambridge. 
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4.2. The conditions of modernity and the emergence of the public subject 
For this account I rely mostly on Claude Lefort. Trained in the Marxist tradition, he was one 
of the first high-profile members in France to break from the Communist Party and insist 
that some of the ideas of more liberal thinkers should be re-evaluated.81 Reading Marx not 
as an economic determinist,82 he was able to reconceive division within the social body as 
unruly and impossible to ascertain a priori.83 He traced this division back to what Alexis de 
Tocqueville called the “democratic revolution”.84 To understand this revolution, however, 
he turned to the work of Ernst Kantorowicz,85 who examined Christian symbolism. 
Kantorowicz examined the symbolic image of the body of the King in the ancien régime. 
Underpinned by Christian mythology, Kantorowicz argued that the body of the King was a 
dual body.86 His body was both mortal and immortal, it belonged both to society and to the 
divine.87 Symbolically, society was one, only counter-posed to the divine, of which it had no 
part. This divinity, however, secured a stable symbolic order for society, exactly through 
the body of the King, which was both mortal and immortal. Symbolically, the publicity of 
the King was thus always a performance of a symbolic order that tied society together – the 
mere appearance of the king was always a representation of society to itself. 
To Lefort, modernity started with the disincorporation of this bond, symbolically 
manifested in the literal disincorporation (the decapitation) of Louis XVI. What this 
disincorporation accomplished was to rip asunder the symbolic order that the body of the 
King guaranteed. No longer was power divine. Instead, it was placed in the hands of ‘the 
 
81 See Gashkov, Sergey & Rubtsova, Maria V., 2017, ‘Cornelius Castoriadis and Claude Lefort about 
the Soviet Union Manageability: Political and Educational Dilemmas of the Left wing’, Dilemas 
Contemporáneos: Educación, Política y Valores, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp.1-16 for a description of the 
theoretical cause of this break. See Lefort, 1986, p.302 for his engagement with de Tocqueville. 
82 The term is here meant to signify historical materialism and the a priori assignation of the 
proletariat as the revolutionary agent par excellence. Lefort instead stressed the gap Marx placed 
between theory and praxis (see Lefort, 1986, p.128), thus almost reading him as a post-structuralist. 
Lefort is not the only one to read Marx as such. For example, see also Žižek, Slavoj, 2012, ‘How Did 
Marx Invent the Symptom?’, in: Žižek, Slavoj (ed.), Mapping Ideology, Verso: London, pp.296-331.  
83 “[S]ocial division is […] in a primordial way, the division between the process of socialization and 
the discourse which describes it.” Lefort, 1986, p.194. 
84 Ibid., p.302. 
85 Ibid., p.302. 
86 Kantorowicz, Ernst, 1981, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology, 
Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ.. This is also not too dissimilar from what Samuel H. Beer 
called the ‘Old Tory’ cosmology. See Beer, Samuel H., 1996, British Politics in the Collectivist Age, 
Vintage Books: New York.  
87 Lefort of course historizes this and sees the emergence of this symbolism in the secularization of 
Christian values. Lefort, 1986, p.255. 
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people’ to do with as they could.88 No longer was the social body one; instead, that which 
tied it together was gone and it now had to engage with itself in order to forge the unity 
that was lost and to represent itself to itself, even as its divisions could no longer be 
brushed over.89 Modernity, then, was the emergence of a lack of certainty – of claims to 
power and rule that no longer had to be couched in divine rhetoric but were instead set 
free to be employed in whatever way would best guarantee their success. It was in this vein 
that Lefort so famously asserted that: 
 
The legitimacy of power is based on the people; but the image of 
popular sovereignty is linked to the image of an empty place, 
impossible to occupy, such that those who exercise public 
authority can never claim to appropriate it.90 
 
This is the designation of a space that emerged from the disincorporation, and that would 
be dominated by conflict and division and which would give birth to modern (democratic) 
politics.91 Of particular interest to us is the way in which this new type of publicity should 
be conceived. Harold Mah has looked closely at the historical writings of François Furet, 
Mona Ozouf and Keith Baker, who work within the field of political-cultural history, and 
examined the way in which an emergence of a public subject emerged from the 
Revolution.92 Noting, like Lefort, that the previous symbolic order was ripped asunder and 
that uncertainty now governed, Furet et al. examined the dominant discourses in France 
shortly after the Revolution. Identifying two competing discourses, one centred around a 
reunification of the social body under a general will and another centred around the 
 
88 To be precise, for Lefort, “power is not ‘a thing’, empirically determined, but is inseparable from 
its representation, and that the exercise of it, being simultaneously the exercise of knowledge, the 
mode of articulation of social discourse – is constitutive of social identity.” See Lefort, 1986, p.188. 
89 This is an unavoidable phenomenon as “each discourse tends to set off in search of its own 
foundations”. See Lefort, 1986, p.188.  
90 Ibid., p.279. 
91 The above quote continues thusly: “Democracy combines these two apparently contradictory 
principles: on the one hand, power emanates from the people; on the other, it is the power of 
nobody. And democracy thrives on this contradiction.” Ibid., p.279. 
92 Mah, Harold, 2000, ‘Phantasies of the Public Sphere: Rethinking the Habermas of Historians’, The 
Journal of Modern History, Vol. 72, No. 1, pp.153-182. On this matter, one should also read Balibar, 
Étienne, 2017, Citizen Subject: Foundations for Philosophical Anthropology, translated by: Steven 
Miller, Fordham University Press: New York. 
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expression of social particularities, Baker found that the National Assembly settled on the 
former:  
 
[The National Assembly] was setting aside a discourse of the 
social, grounded on the notion of the differential distribution of 
reason, functions, and interests in modern civil society, in favour 
of a discourse of the political, grounded on the theory of a unitary 
general will. In the most general terms, it was opting for the 
language of political will, rather than of social reason; of unity, 
rather than of difference; of civic virtue, rather than of commerce; 
of absolute sovereignty, rather than of government limited by the 
rights of man—which is to say that, in the long run, it was opting 
for the Terror.93 
 
For the first time, French people were faced with the horror of politics, derived from the 
ashes of a now defunct symbolic order. The first real consequence of this emergence of 
politics was a development of subjects that could act politically. Without order, there was a 
fear that these subjects would tear society apart. ‘The people’, the new political subjects, 
would now rule, but who were ‘the people’? Mah notes a British example of this problem 
of representing ‘the people’ as he highlights Gilmartin’s account of a UK Member of 
Parliament from Hull stipulating that “we do not want radical reform!” only to be answered 
with the question, “who are ‘we’?”94 As we saw in the quote above, the competing 
discourses sought to answer this question of the identity of the people and to erect two 
different kinds of symbolic orders onto the newly found political landscape. The National 
Assembly ultimately chose a discourse of unity and, for Baker, Furet and Ozouf, that led to 
the Terror. 
However, Mah criticises these historians for fearing this “mass public subject” that 
according to them developed from the discourses of the Terror.95 Instead he conceptualises 
the choice of the National Assembly as a choice between two different ideals of public 
subjectivity: “The central conflict of the Revolution is not between reason and will but 
 
93 Baker cited in Ibid., p.173. 
94 Ibid., p.169. 
95 Ibid., p.168. 
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between the putative “subjects” of reason and will.”96 Central to our account is the idea 
that out of the Revolution, and out of the Terror, arose a public subject – a public 
subjectivity that was directed at acts of politics and the site of the in-common. As we see 
from Mah, this public subject was particular, rather than universal (and incidentally, we can 
see such an ideal for a particular kind of public subject in Downs and Riker as well, who 
might be said to conceptualise a public subject who acts politically solely to further their 
perceived personal gain). 
4.3. The emergence of Left/Right in modernity 
Through Lefort and Mah, I argue that the French Revolution gave birth to a public subject 
that would contest the empty place of power through acts of politics. It is by positing this 
that I move on to Marcel Gauchet, who provides the most extensive account of the 
emergence of Left/Right. Writing within the overarching field of continental philosophy 
(which allows him to focus on discourse, structure and mutability), he produces historico-
theoretical accounts of modernity. He formerly collaborated with Claude Lefort and his 
work is largely underused in Anglophone scholarship. Here I examine his long chapter from 
1996 on Left/Right,97 where he plots the emergence of Left/Right and speculates about 
their ability to provide a symbolic order for a society that is constitutively divided amongst 
itself. 
According to Gauchet, in France, shortly before the symbolic disincorporation literally took 
place, the newly emboldened National Constituent Assembly met to discuss the veto of the 
King and the Rights of Man. It is here that we first find Left/Right materialised and in the 
form which they would later take.98 The French deputies, perhaps spontaneously, perhaps 
planned, seated themselves in such a manner that those who sympathised most with the 
King and the church, seated themselves in the right of the chamber, whereas those whose 
loyalties lay with the Republic and with the liberal concepts of freedom and equality for 
(bourgeois) individuals, seated themselves on the left. Although Gauchet describes this as a 
bit of a false start and instead highlights how this positioning only became the norm after 
the restoration of 1815,99 Left/Right’s emergence is always traced back to this moment. 
 
96 Ibid., p.180. 
97 Gauchet, 1996. 
98 Ibid., p.243. 
99 Ibid., p.247 
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Symbolically, then, insofar that parliament – in place of the dual bodied king – becomes the 
representative body of society, that body is no longer tied to the divine, meaning that the 
very divisions of the social body come to be represented within it. However, as we saw in 
the previous sub-section, it took time before these divisions were acknowledged. To 
account for this, Gauchet highlights how the change in the “economy of representation” 
goes hand in hand with the proliferation of Left/Right in public political discourse.100 As for 
the economy of representation, Gauchet argues that, during most of the nineteenth 
century in France, the logic of the democratic elections of deputies was to unveil the will of 
the people.101 Echoing the findings of Furet, Ozouf and Baker, Gauchet then also notes the 
dominance of this particular kind of public subject that was centred around a singular will – 
even if he does not counterpose it to some form of politics of reason. One peculiar feature 
of a public subjectivity that seeks a unity is that difference cannot be expressed as freely in 
a political way. It is then perhaps no accident that Left/Right were not widely used in public 
political discourse during most of the nineteenth century. Gauchet remarks that this 
economy of representation – the idea that you elected deputies with the aim of unveiling 
the will of the people – did not start to change until political parties became normalised 
and the social question started to gather more potency.102  
A crucial concept emerges from this change to the economy of representation: the ‘citizen-
voter’. Gauchet remarks that, in a change that began with calls for proportional 
representation in 1902: 
 
[…] the meaning of the act of voting itself changed. It ceased to be 
simply a matter of delegating a substitute to work in behalf of the 
voter’s views and became a way for the voter to define himself, to 
identify himself, to situate himself on a political terrain whose 
salient features were recognized and understood. In other words, 
the voter became not just a participant in but an analyst of 
politics […] [Democracy’s] heart lies in the singular process of 
competitive objectification whereby each person becomes a 
spectator of a division in which he is also an actor. The citizen-
 
100 Ibid., pp.258-262. 
101 He traces this back to “the celebrated formula of Le Chapelier”. See ibid., p.244. 
102 With this change, many parties even adopted names based on the Left/Right spectrum. 
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voter is in fact a split personality, in whom political commitment 
coexists with the detachment of the observer who records results, 
evaluates their consequences, and orients himself with respect to 
the map that emerges. 
Left and Right – terms fraught with passion yet at the same time 
neutral markers – would prove to be appropriate landmarks in 
this twofold process: they made it possible to assert a clear-cut 
partisan identity while at the same time reckoning one’s position 
on the overall political battlefield.103 
 
This absolutely crucial quote is central to the overall argument of this thesis. It affirms a 
number of things. As party machinery removed the ability of the individual deputy to 
simply act in accordance with their individual opinions and beliefs, the fiction of “will of the 
people” could no longer be rendered meaningful. The party machinery was now standing 
between the deputies and the voting public, meaning that the voter, instead of realising 
their immersion into the category of ‘the people’ upon the act of voting, became once 
removed from the process. The citizen was therefore required to develop a knowledge of 
the political landscape that had been once removed from them, so that they could both 
understand it and place themselves in relation to it. According to Gauchet, it is this crucial 
occurrence that enabled Left/Right to hegemonise public political discourse. 
After this change, the voter became once removed from the symbolic unity of the nation 
and was placed in a position of observer and analyst. Left/Right, partly because they were 
already tied to the names of political parties, and partly because they were fairly neutral 
and could signify almost anything (unlike Red/White or Bourgeoisie/Proletariat which were 
steeped in symbolic signification),104 came to provide a form to this new political landscape 
that the citizen-voter had both to understand and to place itself within. 
There are a few things Gauchet does not remark upon but which I have previously 
discussed in this thesis. First, it was not only because Left/Right are “fraught with passion 
 
103 Ibid., p.264. 
104 Gauchet also speculates that they perhaps came to prominence also because they could be 
physically embodied, thus allowing for a symbolic imagery that was not too far removed from the 
symbolic unity of society signified by the dual body of the king. See ibid., p.264 & p.288. 
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yet at the same time neutral markers”105 that they became popularised. As we saw with 
Lakoff and Johnson, it was also because they were orientational metaphors that enable 
identification in relation to an orientation in a predefined space. Gauchet of course 
references the singular space which is required for identification to make any sense to 
begin with when he refers to the “overall political battlefield”, but the orientational nature 
of the Left/Right spatial metaphors undoubtedly helped as well. Second, we can helpfully 
conceptualise this citizen-voter as a new kind of public subject. That is, with the emergence 
of politics and the responsibility for conducting it delegated to ‘the people’, ‘the people’ 
gathered and represented itself to itself as ‘the public’. This representation constituted a 
public identity; a public subjectivity. We saw with Mah that this type of subject is never 
universal but always particular. He mentions two such particularities, but what we see with 
Gauchet is the emergence of another kind of public subject. And crucially, it was this public 
subject – a public subject that emphasised its internal differences – that grasped at 
Left/Right in order to constitute itself still as a singular subject. In other words, Left/Right 
enabled the citizen-voter to recognise its own partiality to the overall political landscape, 
and with the ‘spectatorship’ that this move begot, politics no longer appeared immanent to 
the public subject. In a sense, the ‘doing’ of politics thus changed and became constituted 
around practices that recognised some kind of difference. I return to the nature of this 
‘doing’ throughout the thesis. 
Another thing that I refer to throughout this is the connection between rationalism and 
Left/Right. While I am still to develop this argument, at this juncture, we can start to see 
that rationalism and Left/Right are linked historically (although, as we will see, they are also 
linked conceptually). I qualify the type of rationalism in question in Chapter Three when I 
go over the writings of Jürgen Habermas and his theory of communicative reason, but here 
we can see how pluralistic practices are, in a way, secured through the hegemony of 
Left/Right over political discourse. As it is only through specific pluralistic practices that a 
Habermasian rational consensus can come about, there absolutely exists a historical link 
between this kind of rationalism and Left/Right. 
This is the case as it is with this change in the economy of representation, that the division 
of the social body finally starts to rear its head. And it is Left/Right that emerge as our tools 
to understand that division and enable us to place ourselves within a social body that 
nevertheless remains, somehow, divided. With Left/Right, we have a dichotomy that 
 
105 Ibid., p.264. 
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accounts for the whole of the social body that also recognises that this whole is still not 
One.106 
In reference to the previous section where I discussed the impossibility of nailing down any 
final literal meaning to Left/Right, Gauchet also breaks down the many positions that were 
signified through the Left/Right dichotomy in France at the turn of the twentieth century: 
the authoritarian right (that seeks to enforce unity under a strong leader); the monarchist 
right (that seeks a return to the dual body of the king as its representative force); the free 
market liberal right (that dissolves society under individualism and consumer preference); 
the republican left (that seeks to protect the legacy of the Revolution); the communist left 
(that proclaims Left/Right to be a false dichotomy that merely covers up the real division 
centred around class);107 and the socialist left (that seeks to find a happy medium between 
communism and republicanism).108 On an abstract level too, many different Rights and 
Lefts emerged, as both moderate Left/Rights and extreme Left/Rights became thinkable.109 
With the rise of the ‘national’ question, a nationalist right also came about, coming into 
opposition with a new republican left focused on human rights.110  
We can then already see that, since Gauchet’s work is historical and based on historical 
evidence, it becomes problematic to exactly qualify what the Left/Right spectrum signifies. 
To make matters even more complicated, Gauchet also outlines how Left/Right have 
worked in relation to different phenomena at different times. In 1789 and 1815 the conflict 
that Left/Right conveyed was between the ancien regime [right] and Revolution [left]; in 
1900 it was “a choice between faith [right] and enlightenment [left], between human rights 
[left] and the nation [right]”; in 1935 it was “a confrontation between fascism [right] and 
socialism [left]”.111 
When Left/Right entered public discourse in France around the turn of the twentieth 
century, it was perhaps enabled by the above-mentioned qualities inherent to Left/Right as 
spatial metaphors: their neutrality, their metaphorical qualities, and perhaps their allusions 
to the body. Yet they also provided a degree of stability at the level of the representation of 
 
106 Ibid., p.263. 
107 This point has been made repeatedly and across history. See P.C.F. cited in ibid., p.267, but for 
more contemporary arguments to this end see also Hoare, George, 2012, Left/Right and Thinking 
about Politics, (Doctoral Thesis), <https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.552756>. 
108 Gauchet, 1996, p.277. 
109 The language of moderate/extreme in relation to Left/Right appeared very early on in their 
history. See ibid., p.249. Gauchet traces it back to at least 1818. 
110 Ibid., pp.257-259. 
111 Ibid., p.298. 
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the social body to itself. Parties were formed and named after them, and it became normal 
to understand difference and divisions within the social body as encapsulated within the 
Left/Right distinction. As such, while the Left/Right distinction both came to signify a public 
always at odds with itself, never completely united, they also allowed for structure to be 
put in place at the level of representation that made this division understandable. Lefort 
famously declared that modernity marked the dissolution of the markers of certainty.112 
While this may be true, Left/Right would always be at the forefront of society’s attempt to 
regain some semblance of certainty, without seeking to betray the legacy of the democratic 
revolution itself. 
We now start to see the rich life that the Left/Right spectrum has lived. Yet, when we try to 
construct a positive knowledge about them, the only things that really stand out are that 
they have always signified an ordered division and that they gained in popularity as the 
public subjectivity changed into a form that I have here referred to as the citizen-voter. It is 
because of this that they could not have come about prior to the democratic revolution and 
the specific change to the economy of representation that Gauchet highlights. As we have 
seen, many people have tried to qualify the Left/Right distinction, arguing that it was about 
equality,113 authority and religion,114 or that it is somehow rooted in human nature,115 but 
through Gauchet’s careful historical work, we see that the ontological question – what are 
Left/Right – is the wrong question to ask as we try to develop a knowledge about it. Or as 
Gauchet phrases it:  
 
The wonderful power of right versus left comes from the infinite 
openness of the terms, whose meaning can always be added to or 
altered. The search for an ultimate meaning is thus inevitable yet 
pointless.116 
 
 
112 Lefort cited in Mouffe, Chantal, 1994, ‘Democracy and Pluralism: A Critique of the Rationalist 
Approach’, Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 5, pp.1533-1546, p.1534. 
113 Bobbio, Noberto, 1996, Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction, translated by: 
Allan Cameron, Polity Press: Cambridge; Noël, Alain & Thérien, Jean-Philippe, 2008, Left and Right in 
Global Politics, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK; and Kymlicka, Will, 2002, Contemporary 
Political Philosophy: An Introduction, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
114 Laponce, 1981.  
115 For example, George Lakoff thinks that it is “physically in your brain”. See Lakoff, 2006, p.47.  
116 Gauchet, 1996, p.259. 
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4.4. What does the historical approach accomplish and what does it not accomplish? 
So far, I have counterposed the emergence of Left/Right with the emergence of modernity 
and the public subject. With Gauchet, I have made these two accounts work together by 
positing that the early twentieth century saw a change in the economy of representation, 
giving rise to the citizen-voter – a particular kind of public subject – who used Left/Right to 
position itself in relation to a representation of the social body. A few things follow from 
these arguments. 
First, we must rid ourselves of the Rational Choice Theory of Downs and, to a certain 
extent, Riker. As Mah remarks, the idea that a liberal public subject has privileged access to 
reason over a more unitary, willing public subject, rests not only on a misreading of 
Rousseau, but also seeks to effect a freezing in time of the kind of space in which the public 
subject is formed – an effect which is otherwise contrary to the pluralist tenets of the 
liberal public subject,117 as it entails a curtailing of new differences that could be 
encapsulated in the public subject. As we dispense with Rational Choice Theory, with its 
idea of the autonomous, rational individual, we must replace it with something else. As we 
have gleaned from Lakoff and Johnson, the answer can be found in relation to orientational 
metaphors. That is, as orientational metaphors enable the subject to place itself in a space 
and in relation to the markers of that space, it becomes possible for the subject to identify 
itself in relation to those markers. As we saw with Gauchet, this is exactly what Left/Right 
enabled the citizen-voter to do. Once it had found itself once removed from the doing of 
politics and needing a space in which to relate to others and understand itself, it grasped at 
Left/Right because they, as orientational metaphors, allowed for the subjects to construct a 
knowledge about themselves as citizens. We must therefore throw out the concept of the 
rational individual that makes political choices based on perceived personal gain and 
replace it with the concept of identity. This identity is then dependent on processes outside 
of its own immediate control. For insofar as the identity is determined by Left/Right, as 
Left/Right changes meaning (as Gauchet has shown that it frequently does) the meaning of 
the identity also becomes a site of condensed contestation. 
We can also extract an even more nuanced reading of Riker from these observations. Riker 
speaks about heresthetic techniques as a way for people to relocate to different spatial 
neighbourhoods. He remains tied to the concept of the individual subject defined by tastes 
and preferences, but if we conceive of the subject as an identity instead, whose meaning, 
 
117 Mah, 2000, pp.180-182. 
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at least partially, is derived from the Left/Right spectrum, the only way to effect a spatial 
relocation becomes to engage with the meaning of Left/Right. For example, if Left means 
both multiculturalism and environmentalism then there is a left identity that is tied to both 
of those tenets. However, if a politician wanted to enact a policy that made it cheaper to fly 
– a policy that is against the environmentalist aspects of the Left identity, they could make 
arguments referring to the value of cultural exchange in order to acquire enough support. 
They could even attempt to frame this argument in terms of individual liberty – that 
governments should not put restraints on individuals’ ability to effect cultural exchange – 
and if such a move were successful, it would effect a spatial relocation of aspects of the 
Left identity to the Right. 
One problem with this example could be that it simply is not feasible that Left should mean 
both environmentalism and multiculturalism, now that I have shown them to work against 
each other. Yet, it clearly does.118 So how is it possible that it means both things at once? 
Gauchet has already given us the answer: it is because of Left/Right’s “infinite openness […] 
whose meaning can always be added to or altered”;119 it is because they both constitute 
and are constituted within a space of contestation whose meaning is always overflowing. If 
we then view this example again, but start from the end, rather than the beginning, we can 
see that this type of heresthetic can only work because Left/Right have this “infinite 
openness” – because they provide a map of the political community that stresses 
mutability and anti-essentialism. 
Another core lesson from our engagement with the historical dimension – and which we 
also saw in our review of the anthropological literature – is that we cannot pin down the 
exact meaning of Left and Right. This has given birth to a long tradition of denouncing the 
Left/Right distinction as a very bad map of the political community and one that should be 
replaced by a more accurate one.120 What this tradition fails to understand is that, as we 
have just seen with the example about multiculturalism and environmentalism, it is 
because it is such a ‘bad’ map that a modernity based on a lack of the markers of certainty 
has taken to it so affectionately. Indeed, Left/Right are productive to modernity, as they 
 
118 See, for examples, Madood, Tariq & Dobbernack, Jan, 2011, ‘A left communitarianism? What 
about multiculturalism? A more plural approach can help to heal breaches both within the 
'multicultural community' and beyond’, Soundings, Vol. 48, pp.54-64; and Wall, Derek, 2010, The 
Rise of the Green Left: A Global Introduction to Ecosocialism, Pluto Press: London. 
119 Gauchet, 1996, p.259. 
120 Gauchet traces the first such occurrence to 1931. See Gauchet, 1996, p.266. See also Bobbio, 
1996, p.89. 
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exactly enable a confusion of meaning which, in turn, enables some kind of play and 
difference to assert itself. This is partly because they are orientational metaphors, unlike 
Red/White, but we can also read Laponce, who emphasised their horizontality,121 with 
Gauchet, who emphasised their neutrality,122 and say that no other orientational 
metaphors could have managed to encapsulate the wilderness of modernity quite so 
efficiently. 
4.5. Conclusion 
We have seen that the democratic revolution gave birth to a public subject and that this 
subject, around the turn of the twentieth in France, took the particular form of the citizen-
voter. This citizen-voter was once removed from the political process and thus needed a 
map to orient itself and identify itself in relation to the rest of the public subject, the rest of 
the political community. This map was provided by Left/Right and, through their “infinite 
openness”, they enabled an infinity of issues to flow through them, allowing for various 
identities to be associated with Left and Right at different times. Left/Right, then, 
constitute a space in which subjects are invited to identify themselves in order to become 
public subjects and participate in the construction of ‘the people’. Left/Right enable 
members of the social body to represent themselves as one political community that 
nevertheless remains constitutively divided and capable of changing form as new issues 
come to dominate the site of the in-common. 
5. Conclusion 
Since the emergence of Left/Right, political commentators have attempted to understand 
what they mean. It has remained in fashion to assert that Left/Right provide a bad or 
outdated map of the political community yet Left/Right remain as popular as ever. Why is 
that? I have argued that it is because Left/Right are so open to new meanings and enable a 
form of identification that is purely orientation that they became popularised and helped 
constitute a political space that situates itself in an entirely unpredictable terrain. In this 
sense, I have argued that they are not only products of modernity but also constitutive of 
it, because they are so discursively mobile and productive. 
However, questions still remain. I have established that we need to think about identities, 
as, following Lakoff and Johnson, I argued that spatial metaphors structure our perception 
 
121 Laponce, 1981, p.92. 
122 Gauchet, 1996, p.264. 
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of what is real, meaning that our self-image is also constituted through our engagement 
with a symbolic realm in which metaphors roam. Clearly, however, identities also exist that 
are not tied to Left/Right. I have argued that Rikerian heresthetic is in need of a conceptual 
meta-space in order to work and that Left/Right provide that. However, since Riker does 
not operate with the concept of identity, we cannot use him to move forward in our 
understanding of Left/Right and their exact relation to identification in an unpredictable 
political terrain.  
We also need to acquire new and different tools in relation to our understanding of the 
concept of space. With most of the scholars here, I have understood space in relation to a 
distribution of differences. We saw that, with Downs and Riker, we could qualify these 
differences as tastes and preferences. However, we have no way of qualifying them once 
we relinquish Rational Choice Theory. Through Gauchet, I established the primacy of the 
public subject as the citizen-voter, but we have no knowledge of it; we do not know how it 
engenders political expression. Left/Right thus constitute a space where the citizen-voter 
can position itself in relation to other citizen-voters, but how does this positioning express 
itself? Through opinion, though argument, through violence, through direct action or 
through lived experiences? Despite our efforts, and those of the scholars I have reviewed 
here, we still have not developed a satisfactory understanding of Left/Right as spatial 
metaphors. We can see that they are connected to the citizen-voter, but that is it. We thus 
have some way to go before we can establish their exact function in modernity. 
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Chapter 2: Left/Right in democratic theory 
1. Introduction 
Building on our engagement with Lefort, Gauchet and Mah, I here place Left/Right in 
democratic theory123 and contextualise Left/Right in relation to the democratic revolution 
and its focus on the principle of equality. I also further explore conceptions of Left/Right as 
spatial and identitarian markers that are constitutive of political modernity and enablers of 
an aestheticized apprehension of the political world. 
To accomplish this, I first consider Noberto Bobbio’s influential book on Left/Right, which 
centres on the concept of equality. I argue that Left/Right, while certainly containing a 
politics of equality, has a more complex relationship with the democratic revolution than 
Bobbio allows for. To better account for this complexity, I then turn to Chantal Mouffe and 
Torben Dyrberg. Mouffe argues, following Bobbio, that for equality to have meaning it 
must be qualified. However, she notes that this qualification is political, rather than 
juridical – as Bobbio would have it – and effectively causes a segregation of the social body 
by excluding certain elements of it from the representation of the political community – 
the space where the management of society takes place. Both Dyrberg and Mouffe agree, 
however, that Left/Right have positive functions in relation to liberal, democratic 
constitutional order enabling subjects to identify in accordance with terms that recognise 
some sort of political difference. But they conceive of the process of identification 
differently. To Dyrberg, Left/Right are just one of four pairs of orientational, spatial 
metaphors that structure political thought (the others are In/Out, Up/Down and 
Front/Back) and they function to qualify a political symbolic order that is freestanding from 
comprehensive doctrines and as such can channel the passions of other orientational 
metaphors and enable liberal, democratic, constitutional order to be reproduced. Mouffe, 
however, stresses the way in which Left/Right structure a political community that is 
constitutively divided amongst itself, thus making it easier for excluded parts to emerge. 
Finally, I turn to Mustafa Dikeç and Jacques Rancière to provide another account of political 
space and identity and to further our understanding of Left/Right in relation to exclusion. 
Dikeç introduces us to the ‘spatial turn’ in political theory and, with Rancière, a concern for 
the aesthetic qualities of space and identity. I focus on Rancière’s two concepts of the 
 
123 Claude Lefort is of course also viewed as a post-structuralist political theorist of sorts. We have, 
however, used him in this section as a means to which to theorise modernity while giving an account 
of Left/Right. 
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distribution of the sensible and the police and argue that Left/Right not only function to 
count available subject positions but also enable subject positions to provide an account of 
themselves that is necessarily particular. Exclusions/miscounts can thus manifest 
themselves not only in relation to the count, but also in relation to way in which political 
expression is structured.  
2. Noberto Bobbio, Left/Right and equality 
2.1. Introduction  
In this section, I examine the writings on Left/Right by Noberto Bobbio. Bobbio’s central 
claim is that Left/Right are about equality. The further to the left one moves, the more 
likely one is to emphasis sameness, whereas the further to the right one moves, the more 
likely one is to emphasise difference. He argues that there has to be limits to a ‘space of 
equals’ where the criteria for treating some people differently is decided upon and notes 
that it is the Left that always seeks to expand this space and engender more inclusion. With 
Pizzorno, I criticise Bobbio for making this move as it introduces another criterion that 
precedes questions about Left/Right and equality – the inclusion/exclusion dyad. 
2.2. Left/Right and Equality 
Bobbio’s Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction, first published in 1994,124 
was an unexpected bestseller. At that time the political landscape in Italy had recently 
shifted from a narrowing and a strengthening of the centre to a more bipolar political 
community. Bobbio used his book to argue against moves to try and displace the Left/Right 
distinction, such as those by the proponents of the third way, and for its place in a healthy, 
pluralist, democratic society.125 The book should be read in the context of Bobbio’s wider, 
normative, legal and political thought (even if his output is notoriously eclectic and without 
a guiding star to tie it all together).126 Following Thomas Hobbes,127 he adheres to an 
individualistic conception of society,128 which leads him to posit that liberalism and 
 
124 Bobbio, 1996. 
125 This book also received some attention internationally. The most productive fallout was perhaps 
Bobbio’s debate with Perry Anderson. See Anderson, Perry, 1998, ‘A Sense of the Left’, New Left 
Review, No. 231, pp.73-81 for Anderson’s initial review. See subsequently Bobbio, Noberto, 1998, ‘At 
the Beginning of History’, New Left Review, No. 231, pp.82-90; and Anderson, Perry, 1998, ‘A Reply 
to Noberto Bobbio’, New Left Review, No. 231, pp.90-93. 
126 Bobbio cited in Bovero, Michelangelo, 2005, ‘Noberto Bobbio (1909-2004). A Short Guide to a 
Great Work’, Ratio Juris, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp.271-284, p.272. 
127 Bovero, 2005, p.272. 
128 Bobbio, Noberto, 2005, Liberalism and Democracy, translated by: Martin Ryle & Kate Soper, 
Verso: London p.41. 
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democracy are necessarily intertwined.129 Importantly, however, liberalism and democracy 
are not in themselves capable of securing social rights, which is why there has to be a place 
for socialism as well.130 Modern politics then cannot rely on utopian thinking, but rests 
instead on the balancing of the great ideologies, which together serve as the foundation for 
the central concepts of equality and liberty. Bobbio thus sees Left/Right in a favourable 
light not only because they guarantee a constitutive difference within the political 
community, but also because they are about equality – one of the core democratic 
concepts.131  
In his book, Bobbio engages Marco Revelli, who has provided an extensive account of 
Left/Right in Italian history,132 to make the point that Left/Right have no literal meaning.133 
Instead, following Revelli’s examination of Left/Right’s connection to criteria such as Time, 
Space, agents involved, its relation to function and its relation to epistemology,134 he offers 
an observation:  
 
As the founding principle, equality is the only criterion that 
withstands the test of time, and resists the steady breakdown to 
which the other criteria have been subjected.135  
 
Equality is, to Bobbio, together with ‘liberty’, a founding criterion of democratic order, 
which means that Left/Right must be complemented with another axis governed by the 
criterion of freedom: a freedom/authoritarianism axis.136 However, as Bobbio focuses on 
 
129 “Liberalism amputates the individual from the organic body, makes him live – at least for much of 
his life – outside the maternal womb, plunges him into the unknown and perilous world of the 
struggle for survival. Democracy joins him together once more with others like himself, so that 
society can be built up again from their union, no longer as an organic whole but as an association of 
free individuals.” Ibid., p.43.  
130 Yturbe, Corina, 1997, ‘On Noberto Bobbio’s Theory of Democracy’, Political Theory, Vol. 25, No. 3, 
pp.377-400, p.388. 
131 Bobbio spends some time engaging Laponce and chastises him for focusing so much on religion. 
See Bobbio, 1996, pp.38-44. 
132 Revelli, 2009. Unfortunately, this document has never been translated into English. 
133 “‘[L]eft’ and ‘right’ are not words which designate immutable meanings, but can signify different 
things in different times and situations.” Bobbio, 1996, p.56. 
134 Ibid., p.59. 
135 Ibid., p.59. 
136 Ibid., pp.72-79. This is the form used to determine one’s political stance in the much-used 
‘Political Compass Test’. See The Political Compass, 2019, The Political Compass, viewed 16 Jan, 
2019, <https://www.politicalcompass.org/>. 
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Left/Right, he argues that they are about the balance between equality and difference: the 
further to the Left one goes, the more individuals tend to view human beings as 
fundamentally similar and deserving of similar treatment, whereas the further to the Right 
one goes, the more difference is emphasised: 
 
We can then correctly define as egalitarians [leftists] those who, 
while not ignoring the fact that people are both equal and 
unequal, believe that what they have in common has greater 
value in the formation of a good community.137 
 
In the previous chapter, we saw that Left/Right is a horizontal spatial dimension, which, 
Laponce argued, enables politics in modernity to function because modernity is partially 
defined by the levelling of old hierarchies. Bobbio places himself decidedly on this side of 
modernity, as a champion of equality.138 It is in this context that we should read his support 
for the Left/Right spectrum. Bobbio believes that Left/Right are centred around ‘equality, 
and that they, as such, accomplish very particular things: they systematise the differences 
that are distributed along its spatial dimension in terms of equality and ingrain the concept 
of equality into the DNA of those who use Left/Right to orient and identify themselves in 
relation to the whole. Left/Right are thus conceivable as a bulwark against anti-democratic 
institutions and practices, ensuring that equality remains a defining feature of modernity. 
However, problems emerge as Bobbio tries to further qualify this equality: 
 
I have developed the theory in this book that the distinction 
between left and right corresponds to the difference between 
egalitarianism and inegalitarianism, and ultimately comes down 
to a different perception of what makes human beings equal and 
what makes them unequal. However, the idea is so abstract that 
it can only be used to distinguish two ideal types. [… As such,] [i]n 
order not to remain an empty formula, the golden rule of justice, 
 
137 Bobbio, 1996, p.66. 
138 Bobbio considers himself a “man of the Left”. See ibid., p.82. 
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'Treat like as like, and unlike as unlike', requires an answer to the 
question, Who is alike and who is not?139 
 
We see here some interesting fissures. Now the question of justice precedes the question 
of equality and the latter demands the exclusion of elements from sharing in this equality: 
 
The question of who is equal and who unequal is a historical 
question which cannot be answered once and for all, because the 
criteria used for uniting the equal and dividing the unequal are 
constantly changing. The discovery of a difference is irrelevant to 
the question of justice when it can be demonstrated that this 
difference justifies a different treatment […] Difference only 
becomes important when it is the basis for unjust discrimination. 
However, the injustice of discrimination depends not on the 
difference, but on the recognition of the lack of good reasons for 
the unequal treatment.140 
 
Bobbio, then, does not seek to adjudicate on the just and the unjust – merely asserting that 
this question belongs to history. Instead, in order for his criterion of equality to make sense 
as a way to construct a knowledge about Left/Right and for the public subjects that use 
them to identity and orient themselves in relation to the whole, he implicitly effects an 
introduction of another criterion: inclusion/exclusion.141 To further this argument, he 
maintains that it is the job of the Left to effect an inclusion of different elements into this 
‘space of equals’ – into this space of ‘the same’. As such, when groups of people struggle 
for equality they must, as it were, struggle to be seen as similar to the rest, and it falls to 
the Left to seek their inclusion. We can find one such example of people wishing to be 
included into this ‘space of equals’ in Denmark. There, a campaign with the slogan 
 
139 Ibid., p.69. 
140 Ibid., pp.54-5. 
141 As Bobbio asserts that it is the Left that must deal with this task of showing that discrimination is 
unjust, he footnotes that: “The question of the universalist task of the left is posed in the same 
terms by the distinction between inclusion and exclusion. The left tends towards inclusion, and the 
right towards exclusion.” See ibid., p.82 & 117. 
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‘#enmillionstemmer’ works to address injustices facing disabled people, who have been 
disproportionally impacted by austerity policies. Mette Lylloff, who has both physical and 
mental disabilities, explains it like this: 
 
[Danish] Mere end en million mennesker er direkte berørt af 
handicap eller psykisk sårbarhed. Dertil kommer alle pårørende. 
Vi er under pres, men alligevel er vi nærmest usynlige på den 
politiske dagsorden. Vi ønsker at blive set og hørt. Vi vil ikke 
glemmes i systemet. Del din historie under hashtagget 
#enmillionstemmer og vis politikerne din virkelighed. 
[English] More than one million people are directly affected by 
handicaps or mental vulnerability. You can add the people around 
them as well. We are under pressure, but still we are almost 
invisible on the political agenda. We wish to be seen and heard. 
We do not want to be forgotten in the system. Share your story 
under the hashtag #enmillionstemmer and show the politicians 
your reality.142 
 
That it is the party furthest to the Left in Denmark, the Red-Green Alliance, which 
champions this cause more than any other party,143 would seem to prove Bobbio’s theory 
correct. But there is a more interesting point we can take from this. The insight comes 
when we ask one simple question: is Mette Lylloff, in her capacity as an activist for people 
with disabilities, left wing? Insofar that she also considers herself a public person – a public 
subject – she may or may not identify as left wing. But in her capacity as a disability activist, 
is she left wing?  
 
 
 
142 Lylloff, Mette, cited in Dansk Handicap Forbund, 2019, KAMPAGNE #ENMILLIONSTEMMER 
SAMLER STEMMER PÅ HANDICAPOMRÅDET, 16 May, viewed 20 June, 2019, 
<https://danskhandicapforbund.dk/da/nyheder/kampagne-enmillionstemmer-samler-stemmer-pa-
handicapomradet#gsc.tab=0>. My translation. 
143 Enhedslisten, 2019, Enhedslisten, 1 June, viewed 20 June, 2019, 
<https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=381190849159529>. 
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2.3. Left/Right and equality in relation to inclusion/exclusion 
I do not think we can identify Mette Lylloff, in her capacity as a disability activist, through 
the Left/Right spectrum, exactly because, as we saw in the previous chapter, that spectrum 
is a way for the public subject, the citizen-voter, to orient and identify itself in relation to 
other citizen-voters and the whole. What Mette Lylloff seeks is simply to be seen as part of 
the whole, to share in the equality that comes with that. In this sense, it is nonsensical for 
her to utilise Left/Right to construct her political identity. Left/Right are useful for people 
who already consider themselves parts of the whole, but need to orient and identify 
themselves in relation to others as well: Left/Right are useful for people who simply seek to 
differentiate themselves from others in a manner that allows for them to live peacefully 
together. Mette Lylloff, in her capacity as a disability activist, does not identify with the 
whole but rather with an exclusion from it. In a discourse that is all too familiar, Lylloff 
stresses that she needs a voice, that she needs to be seen, and that without those things 
she will suffer. She is expressing herself in terms of lived experience, not through 
arguments concerning universal justice or the common good. Is it not the case that the key 
division here is included/excluded, not Left/Right?  
Bobbio, in conceiving of ‘the Left’ as effecting an inclusion into a ‘space of equals’, the 
category of the “alike”,144 implicitly locates Left in relation to the already-established public 
and its subjects oriented by Left/Right. He understands that difference is there to be 
“discovered”,145 but in so doing imposes inclusion/exclusion onto the Left/Right distinction. 
In this context it is perhaps significant that Bobbio’s book was a bestseller by a public 
intellectual. Through the text he is positioned as a “man of the Left”,146 but also as one who 
is already identified as a public subject. He argues for the distinction that gives him that 
position while relegating the question of who is part of the category of the “alike” to a 
historical context. That is to say, his subordination of the inclusion/exclusion opposition to 
that of Left/Right leaves Bobbio and other political positions essentially undisturbed and 
forecloses the possibility of identifying not with the position of the Left but with the 
excluded. 
While we can then talk about Left/Right being about equality in Bobbio, they are perhaps 
more accurately describable as designating different attitudes towards equality. In Bobbio, 
 
144 Bobbio, 1996, pp.54-5. 
145 Ibid., p.54. 
146 Ibid., p.82. 
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Left/Right do not designate attitudes towards anything other than equality, but they 
remain as designators of attitudes. One way of explaining why it is then nonsensical for 
Lylloff to use Left/Right as markers of her political identity is by posing the question, who 
gets share these attitudes in public? For it is not that Lylloff has no attitude towards 
equality. She most certainly does. Rather, in this sense it is nonsensical because no one 
listens to her attitudes. Through her personal experiences, she understands that she does 
not belong to the category of the “alike” – the category of those who are listened to. 
Rather, she understands that she is instead relegated to the category of difference, the 
place from which she might be discovered as, in fact, “alike” (should she be so lucky). For 
Lylloff to construct a political identity through Left/Right then could be done, but it would 
establish her as a person with attitudes (or arguments, opinions, beliefs, etc.), rather than a 
person who experiences a form of oppression which must be acknowledged and ended. As 
we shall see, then, while her attitudes towards equality might at some point be heard, this 
form of inclusion carries with it its own problems.  
In any case, I therefore endorse Alessandro Pizzorno’s critique of Bobbio,147 that the 
question about inclusion/exclusion is of a different order to the question about equality, 
and that we must introduce the concept of “collective identities”148 before we look at the 
meaning of Left/Right. That is, if equality as a concept only makes sense when the concept 
of justice qualifies it, and if the nature of justice is decided upon by the included – but 
difference only exists to the extent that different treatment is shown to be just in relation 
to the nature of justice decided upon by the included – then we cannot talk about equality 
and hence Left/Right until we have talked about inclusion/exclusion. 
Once we accept the argument that questions of inclusion/exclusion precede questions of 
Left/Right and equality, we can ask some different questions about space and identity and 
can make the identity of the public subject, the citizen-voter, an object of study. We can 
theorise not only Left/Right but also the space it creates within which citizen-voters exist in 
relation to each other, and we can ask questions about inclusion/exclusion.  
 
 
 
147 Gnoli, Antonio, 1995, ‘Caro Bobbio, ecco dove sbagli’, La Repubblica, 7 Feb, viewed 3 July, 2019, 
<https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1995/02/07/caro-bobbio-ecco-dove-
sbagli.html?refresh_ce>.  
148 Alessandro Pizzorno cited in ibid. 
61 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
In this section we have seen, via a critical reading of Bobbio, that Left/Right have a complex 
relationship with inclusion/exclusion. To investigate this further I turn to a debate between 
two other political theorists of modernity – Chantal Mouffe and Torben Dyrberg.  
3.  Inclusion/exclusion and Left/Right 
3.1. Introduction 
In this section, I elaborate on the distinction between Left/Right and inclusion/exclusion by 
making the writings of Torben Dyrberg and Chantal Mouffe speak to each other. For both 
theorists, Left/Right have a positive function in relation to democratic, constitutional order 
as they enable modes of identification that recognise differences within the whole of the 
social body. But they conceive of identification in different ways. For Dyrberg, Left/Right 
channel violent impulses relating to other ways of identification into forms of reasoning 
that accept political difference as a precondition for entering the in-common. For Mouffe, 
Left/Right, rather than channelling violent impulses produced by other forms of 
identification, create a political space that is constitutively divided, thus disabling a 
formation of a strong ‘we’ and making it easier for the excluded parts of the social body to 
gain entrance into this space in which the management of society is conducted. 
3.2. Chantal Mouffe v. Bobbio 
Chantal Mouffe is the first wholly post-Marxist political theorist that I engage.149 Her 
prominence was established when, together with Ernesto Laclau, she wrote Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy in 1985.150 It is fair to say that all her subsequent theoretical and political 
projects can be linked back to this work. Mouffe’s scholarship, which spans decades, has 
often been specific to the state of politics in which she found herself. However, her writings 
have always been anchored in post-Marxist theory that, theoretically, sought to do away 
with class and other forms of essentialisms and, politically, stress the need for political 
actors to articulate their identities in order to win and sustain democratic, political power. 
Mouffe has spoken to Bobbio’s scholarship on a few occasions, most notably in The Return 
of the Political.151 There, Mouffe engages Bobbio’s overall normative project, which seeks 
 
149 You could possibly lump Lefort, Mah and Gauchet in this category, but their work is primarily 
historical whereas Mouffe’s work is solely situated in the realm of theory. 
150 Laclau, Ernesto & Mouffe, Chantal, 1985, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics, Verso: London. 
151 Mouffe, 1993a. 
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to combine the positive aspects of the liberal state and the democratic state.152 Her 
argument most relevant to this thesis is that Bobbio places too much emphasis on the 
individual,153 and does not pay enough attention to the way in which the individual needs 
representation through being part of a social group in order to acquire participatory rights 
in democratic decision-making: 
 
It is necessary to theorize the individual, not as a monad, an 
‘unencumbered’ self that exists prior to and independently of 
society, but as a site constituted by an ensemble of ‘subject 
positions’, inscribed in a multiplicity of social relations, the 
member of many communities, and participant in a plurality of 
collective forms of identification.154  
 
The foundations of post-Marxist theory are summed up in this revealing passage. I engage 
this much more closely later in this chapter and in Chapter Four but for the argument I am 
making here, a few points need emphasising. Mouffe is making both a theoretical and a 
political claim, in which the theoretical informs the political. Theoretically, she argues that 
the individual is a site for identification. That is, ‘we’ are constituted through acts of 
identity representation. Furthermore, these representations are collective. These 
representations are then not located with the “unencumbered” self, but in some place that 
is in-common: in discourse. 
Politically, this means that Bobbio’s normative project is a non-starter. According to 
Mouffe, Bobbio’s conception of pluralism grants an ability to the individual to live together 
peacefully with other individuals, while seeking to deepen their social and political rights.155 
Because Mouffe argues that this relies on an imperfect understanding of who we are, she 
insists that we must look at democratic politics differently. Specifically, because we are 
dealing with representations of identity, rather than immanent individuality, different rules 
apply in relation to how we can and cannot act and our focus should not be on securing 
 
152 Ibid., pp.91-101. 
153 “Without individualism, there can be no liberalism”, Bobbio has remarked. See Bobbio cited in 
ibid., p.95. 
154 Ibid., p.97.  
155 Ibid., pp.91-101. 
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rights but on the way in which identification takes place. To this end, she refers to the fact 
that meaning is relational, that all identity can only constitute itself as whole insofar as it 
defines itself in relation to what it is not. To cement this point, she turns to Carl Schmitt.  
Schmitt’s main texts were written shortly before the Second World War. He was a jurist, a 
political theorist and a prominent member of the Nazi Party. Schmitt mostly operated at 
the intersection of liberalism and democracy, attempting to prove that the two could not 
operate together.156 To contextualise this discussion, Schmitt, like Bobbio, turned to the 
concept of equality. To Schmitt, liberalism demanded equality be applied universally.157 Yet, 
he argues that:  
 
Equality is only interesting and valuable politically so long as it has 
substance, and for that reason at least the possibility and the risk 
of inequality.158  
 
In this sense, like Bobbio, Schmitt insists that abstract equality is an unworkable concept. 
As we saw, Bobbio sought to qualify this equality through allusions to justice. Schmitt 
instead uses the concepts of substance and unity.159 That is, for equality to be meaningful, 
it has to be distributed within a delimited space. While Bobbio would stress the need for 
inclusion in proper democratic procedures governing this ‘space of equals’, Schmitt 
deserves credit for making explicit the consequence of the move that comes when we start 
to qualify who equality is for and who equality is not for:  
 
Every actual democracy rests on the principle that not only are 
equals equal but unequals will not be treated equally. Democracy 
requires, therefore, first homogeneity and second - if the need 
arises - elimination or eradication of heterogeneity.160 
 
156 See Mouffe, Chantal, 2000, The Democratic Paradox, Verso: London, pp.36-59. 
157 See Schmitt, Carl, 2000, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, translated by: Ellen Kennedy, The 
MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.. 
158 Ibid., p.9. 
159 Ibid., 2000. 
160 Carl Schmitt cited in Mouffe, 2000, p.38. 
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In this particularly chilling passage, Schmitt lays the foundation for Mouffe’s later critique 
of Bobbio. The point that Mouffe tries to make, which Bobbio does not allow, is that this 
‘space of equals’ always takes the form of a substance, a unity, an identity. For Schmitt, this 
identity ends up becoming the Nation and the Race, but Mouffe stresses that it could be 
anything.161 As such, to Mouffe: 
 
What matters is the possibility of tracing a line of demarcation 
between those who belong to the demos – and therefore have 
equal rights – and those who, in the political domain, cannot have 
the same rights because they are not part of the demos.162 
  
This identity of the demos – the people – can then be structured around anything: race, 
class, gender, nation, etc. The important thing is that it becomes a collective identity. This 
means that people who share in this identity will be prone to treat each other as equals but 
at the expense of those who do not share in this collective identity.163 To Mouffe, Bobbio 
attempts to avoid this consequence through stressing that it is about individuals, not 
identities. In this way, he is able to construct a normative platform that heralds Left/Right 
because he thinks it possible for individuals, working within the right institutional 
framework, to justly decide who does and does not belong to this ‘space of equals’. 
Mouffe’s point is that Bobbio is wrong to think of being in this way: that we are a ‘site’ 
where identities constitute themselves, and that, politically speaking, we are then not a 
community of individuals, but an ensemble of identities that all require an other, in relation 
to which they identify themselves. 
To Mouffe, this logic came to fruition with Nazism: one identity successfully aligned itself 
with the identity of the democratic concept par excellence, ‘the people’. And, importantly, 
this was not an accidental occurrence. It was not simply an example of a populist rhetoric 
that swept the nation (and beyond) but an expression of a logic that is constitutive to being 
and politically constitutive to modernity. This does not mean that we are constantly faced 
 
161 Ibid., p.40. 
162 Ibid., p.40.  
163 Not to mention the relation between this particular collective identity and the state. 
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with the spectre of Nazism. Rather, it means that exclusion is a constitutive feature of 
identity and that ‘the people’, insofar as it must have some kind of meaning (some kind of 
identity) must always only be able to bestow equality onto those who share in that identity 
– and at the expense of those who do not.  
In order to tie this consideration back to our discussion on Bobbio in relation to the 
inclusion/exclusion dynamic, we need to look back to Chapter One and the work of Harold 
Mah. For Bobbio could still escape this criticism by stating that we are confusing the 
concept of identity with the concept of space. He could claim that Left/Right, as spatial, 
orientational metaphors, serve to open up a space that is constitutively divided amongst 
itself. He could remark that it provides an exceptionally bad map of the political 
community, which is why it is so well suited to protect the legacy of modernity that is 
qualified by the lack of markers of certainty. Along Schmittian lines, he could argue that, 
insofar as equality requires a unity of substance, it will not find it amid a political 
community that identifies itself in terms of Left and Right. In other words, the question of 
equality and to whom it belongs will remain open so long as these terms govern public 
discourse. 
However, with Mah, I noted the emergence of a public subject and with Gauchet, I noted 
the particular form that this subject took: the form of the citizen-voter. This subject was 
public exactly because it identified itself as a member of the public sphere – an 
identification that was made possible through the very real force that a conception of the 
public sphere exerted over political life. And it was this public sphere that laid claim to the 
concept of ‘the people’, making the identity of the public subject so politically important. 
As we saw, it was this particular public subject, the citizen-voter, that used Left/Right to 
orient itself in relation to other citizen-voters and find its place in the political community. 
It was also amongst these citizen-voters that equality was to count. The Mouffean point is 
that this citizen-voter constitutes an identity and that this particular identity is the one that 
uses Left/Right to further differentiate itself from subjects that are otherwise similar in 
name (‘public’). However, as this citizen-voter must also be said to constitute a unitary 
identity, it must necessarily be defined in relation to something that it is not. In one sense 
this something is private. Being a public subject, this particular type of exclusion comes 
naturally. But it is not only a public subject, for it has a particular form – that of the citizen-
voter. The question then becomes: what other kinds of exclusions are taking place? 
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In the last section, I briefly reviewed the case of Mette Lylloff. We now possess a few more 
conceptual tools to help us understand her case better. Physically hurt by government cuts 
to services, she, together with others, has sought to articulate an identity as disabled. 
Within this identity, she includes both mental vulnerability and physical disabilities. The 
central claim made by this identity is that it is not heard and seen in ‘the space of equals’ 
and that because of this invisibility, it does not share in the equality.164 In other words, the 
identity positions itself as excluded from public discourse. I asked if it made sense to place 
Mette Lylloff on the Left/Right scale. We can now answer in the negative. For if Left/Right 
provide a map of all the citizen-voters, if you do not identify as a citizen-voter, you cannot 
place yourself on the map. This does not necessarily mean that you do not want to share 
with this in-common, that you are simply private. It can clearly also mean, as it does in 
Mette Lylloff’s case, that you feel excluded from this particular identity of the citizen-voter.  
But how does this exclusion constitute itself? Through which means is inclusion/exclusion 
accomplished? What is Left/Right’s role in it? Bobbio remarks that, since the discovery of 
difference, it is the job of the Left to engender inclusion, but should this be conceptualised 
as an inclusion into the identity of the public subject as citizen-voter? Is this the only way 
for the Left to engender visibility and a recognition of a voice? Or, rather, by ascribing this 
role to a Left, does this in fact prescribe a specific manner in which inclusion can be 
brought about? 
In Mouffe, we find no answer to these questions and we must therefore turn our attention 
to Dyrberg. More than anyone, Dyrberg understands what Left/Right are about and 
captures the role they play in modernity. However, he engages Left/Right not from the 
post-Marxist tradition, which, as we have seen, stresses that meaning is relational and that 
the establishment of political frontiers is a constitutive feature of politics, but from the 
perspective of Lakoff and Johnson. As I have alluded to, Lakoff and Johnson present us with 
a theory that bears echoes of post-structuralist reasoning, but the dissimilarities between 
the two approaches generate an interesting debate that I now stage in relation to 
Left/Right to advance our understanding of their function in modernity in relation to 
inclusion/exclusion. 
 
 
 
164 Dansk Handicap Forbund, 2019. 
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3.3. Dyrberg on identification 
Dyrberg holds that Left/Right are spatial and orientational metaphors that structure the 
way we think. Importantly, he sees them as fairly neutral metaphors (i.e. not attached to, 
or favouring, any substantial doctrines), which allow them to channel other orientational 
metaphors such as In/Out, Up/Down and Front/Back – which are anything but neutral and 
instead have the potential to instigate violence. In this sense, Dyrberg thinks that Left/Right 
have a positive function in modernity as they allow for the social body to engage in 
reasoned argumentation over the common good without resort to modes of 
argumentation/action that are arrived at from conceiving of the social body in terms of 
more volatile orientational metaphors. 
I largely agree with Dyrberg in respect to the nature of the function of Left/Right in 
modernity, but I cannot follow him all the way, primarily because of his adoption of the 
theoretical framework of Lakoff and Johnson. Dyrberg states: 
 
Orientational metaphors are ingrained in the ways we talk, act 
and relate to each other, which means that they operate as 
structuring logics of discourses and that they are related to our 
physical, cultural and political existence.165 
 
While I am not sure that Lakoff and Johnson would necessarily appreciate this application 
of their theory to the concept of ‘discourses’, the argument presented here is recognizable: 
it is through orientational metaphors that we can understand ourselves in relation to 
others. In this sense, orientational metaphors open up a space in which differences are 
distributed. However, according to Dyrberg, the type of difference that dominates the 
discursive logic is also contingent on the type of orientational metaphor that structures it. 
Dyrberg focuses on four such metaphors: Left/Right, In/Out, Up/Down and Front/Back:166  
 
 
165 Dyrberg, Torben Bech, 2003, ‘Left/Right in the context of new political frontiers: What’s radical 
politics today?’, Journal of Language and Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp.333-360, p.336. 
166 Dyrberg, Torben Bech, 2006, ‘The democratic ideology of right–left and public reason in relation 
to Rawls's political liberalism’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. 8, 
No. 2, pp.161-176. 
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In–out concerns issues such as member–non-member and 
inclusion–exclusion […] Up–down indicates hierarchical positions 
in terms of high–low status, upper– lower classes, elites–people, 
patron–client, etc. […] Front–back measures position in relation to 
time and direction […] Right–left is the modern democratic 
polarity measuring the positions among equal opposites and 
balances them against each other.167 
 
Having established that orientational metaphors structure discourses, Dyrberg shows us 
exactly how that works: In/Out structure political thought in terms of membership of a 
community; Up/Down in terms of power; Front/Back primarily in terms of time and 
direction. Contra those, Left/Right structure political discourse in modernity by 
constructing a ‘political symbolic order’, wherein some sort of ‘political difference’ is 
tolerated by all.  
For some obvious examples of this Dyrbergian approach, we can turn our attention to the 
following. When the Danish political party Stram Kurs contested the 2019 general election 
with the slogan, “[Danish] [m]est mulig lykke til flest mulige etniske Danskere ([English] 
[m]aximum happiness to maximum amount of ethnic Danes)”,168 it sought to structure 
political discourse in terms of membership within a Danish community, that is, in terms of 
In/Out. When the UK Labour Party contested the UK general election in 2017 with its 
slogan, “For the many, not the few”, it sought to structure political discourse in terms of 
class and power, so in terms of Up/Down. When the UK Labour Party contested general 
elections while Tony Blair was the leader, it sought to structure political discourse in terms 
of Front/Back, through framing issues in terms of epochal changes.169 However, to Dyrberg, 
Left/Right are of a different category to In/Out, Up/Down and Front/Back. While Left/Right 
are still spatial, orientational metaphors, they are also in this world in a different way to the 
other metaphors. In/Out, Up/Down and Front/Back may structure political discourse 
 
167 Ibid., p.163.   
168 Jensen, Uwe Max, 2019, ‘Mest mulig lykke til flest mulige etniske danskere’, Document, 28 April, 
viewed 24 June, 2019, <https://www.document.dk/2019/04/28/mest-mulig-lykke-til-flest-mulige-
etniske-danskere/>. My translation. 
169 Dyrberg, Torben Bech, 2009a, ‘What is beyond right/left? The case of New Labour’, Journal of 
Political Ideologies, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp.133-153, p.138. 
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symbolically, but Left/Right are part of political discourse, literally. And as we shall see, 
Dyrberg thinks this is a decidedly good thing. 
We have seen that Left/Right are tied with modernity because they have certain qualities: 
they can mean many different things at the same time and they are relatively neutral. This 
is a fundamental reason why they have come to hegemonize a political discourse that 
tends to centre around freedom and equality. To Dyrberg, this means that while Up/Down, 
In/Out and Front/Back identification is penetrated by emotion and intensity, Left/Right 
identification is not. It is from within this idea that the first fruitful encounter between 
Dyrberg and Mouffe can be staged. For Dyrberg, Up/Down, In/Out and Front/Back 
identification is pre-political.170 What he means is that they all seek to structure the in-
common in ways that precede argumentation and evidence, which they accomplish as 
these types of orientational metaphors invoke emotions and intensity. In this sense, they 
are dangerous because they flare up the passions of the people caught up in those modes 
of identification, and this can lead to violent outcomes.  
As I have just argued, however, unlike those orientational metaphors, Left/Right do not 
inspire emotions and intensity. Rather, citing Claude Lefort, Dyrberg asserts that they 
allude to a strictly political terrain in which: 
 
societal unity is constituted in the face of division […] which 
means that it is illegitimate from a democratic point of view to 
base political values on a pre-political or primordial unity such as 
nation or people.171  
 
As such, Dyrberg posits that Left/Right in modernity function to channel other types of 
orientational metaphors, which inform political values in a pre-political manner. For him, 
Left/Right, as spatial, orientational metaphors open up a space, a ‘political symbolic order’, 
for democratic contestation over the nature of the in-common that is “autonomous” from 
other modes of identification.172 It is these particular qualities that Left/Right have 
 
170 Dyrberg, Torben Bech, 2009b, ‘The Leftist Fascination with Carl Schmitt and the esoteric quality of 
‘the political’’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 35, No. 6, pp.649-669. 
171 Dyrberg, 2006, p.168. 
172 Ibid. 
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(qualities that Dyrberg thinks are in part intrinsic and in part historical)173 that allows them 
to institute and regulate a political symbolic order that is “freestanding” from other types 
of orders,174 and that is what make Left/Right so valuable to modernity. As such: 
 
Right/Left does not monopolise the political symbolic order, but is 
a hegemonic device to organise and channel political orientation 
and intensity, which depends on its articulation with other 
oppositions.175 
 
By hegemonizing the political symbolic order, Left/Right can channel the passions and 
emotions stirred through other modes of identification into a productive expression that 
sees them anchored around freedom and equality and around the need to provide political 
justifications for their impulses. In other words, Left/Right “can thus be seen as a medium 
for 'defusing' political hostility by channelling and domesticating it”.176 But this also means 
that Left/Right need other modes of identification, as, if Left/Right were to be become 
completely dominant, there would be nothing to ‘defuse’. We can perhaps then also use 
Dyrberg’s thoughts to cast another light on Riker’s conception of issue spaces and their 
relation to a Left/Right meta-space, by positing that these issue spaces can be brought into 
being through spatial, orientational metaphors such as Up/Down, In/Out and Front/Back, 
even if they must refer back to the Left/Right meta-space. 
3.4. Dyrberg v. Mouffe 
Having established the ways in which Dyrberg conceives of identification through 
orientational metaphors, we can go to his critique of Mouffe. While Dyrberg is somewhat 
on the same page in relation to Mouffe’s insistence on a pluralistic politics, he has 
substantial problems with her uptake of Carl Schmitt. Dyrberg, unlike Mouffe, considers 
Schmitt a dangerous thinker, whose theoretical writings cannot be disentangled from the 
context of Nazism in which he was situated. As such, his critique of Mouffe can be read not 
only to have an academic function but also a normative function: to ensure that the 
 
173 Across his writing he quotes both historical accounts and essentialist accounts to note the ways in 
which Left/Right might be said to work in relation to other orientational metaphors. 
174 Dyrberg, 2006, p.169. 
175 Dyrberg, 2003, p.355. 
176 Ibid., p.354. 
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contemporary left does not attempt to rehabilitate a political theorist, the logic of whose 
writings justifies a far-right identity politics.177 
To begin his critique, Dyrberg engages Mouffe’s account of identity formation. As we saw in 
a previous sub-section, we could, with Mouffe, assert that there is a “constitutive 
outside”178 to all identity. We also saw that she uses Schmitt to illustrate that the 
relationship between the identity and that which is outside it tends towards a 
friend/enemy distinction. She views Schmitt as a discoverer of the place of animosity 
generated in the encounter between the ‘us’ and the ‘them’, of the place known as “the 
political”179 (although it should be noted that her politics is not Schmittian, as she posits the 
possibility of a democratic pluralism that can come to terms with ‘the political’ – something 
I return to later in the chapter). I then argued, through Mouffe’s engagement with 
Schmitt’s concept of substantive equality, that equality preceded questions about 
Left/Right and is instead tied to questions of inclusion/exclusion, creating a ‘space of 
equals’, where equality can come into play for members of the collective identity, but not 
for those outside it. 
Their difference thus relates back to their different ways of perceiving identification. 
Whereas, for Dyrberg, identification relies on the construction of a “common symbolic 
space”180 or a “political symbolic order”,181 within which individuals can think about the in-
common through dominant orientational metaphors, for Mouffe, identification relies on 
the construction of a ‘we’ that is necessarily counterposed to a ‘them’. Internal difference 
within the ‘we’ is of course always acknowledged somehow (even man and woman would 
constitute a difference), but there remains an outside, the inhabitants of which fall outside 
the scope of equality.  
For Mouffe, Schmitt presents us with a, for some, uncomfortable truth – that ‘the political’ 
is an ineradicable feature of life and that passion and intensity will thus always lurk and 
cannot simply be ignored.182 But for Dyrberg it might not be so simple. For according to his 
 
177 Dyrberg’s engagement with Mouffe spans many years. Interestingly, while he was at first largely 
sympathetic to her work (See Dyrberg, 2003) he later became much more critical (See Dyrberg 
2009b). 
178 Mouffe, Chantal, 2005a, On The Political, Verso: London, p.18. 
179 Schmitt, Carl, 1976, The Concept of the Political, Translated by: George Schwab, Rutgers 
University Press: New Brunswick, NJ.. 
180 Dyrberg, 2009b, p.662. 
181 Dyrberg, 2003, p.355. 
182 Mouffe, Chantal, 2002, ’Politics and Passions: Introduction’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 
28, No. 6, pp.156-616, p.616. 
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basic theoretical foundations, In/Out (which he takes to be Mouffe’s dominant 
orientational metaphor) is but one of many orientational metaphors. To Dyrberg, we do 
not only identify ourselves in relation to others through the In/Out orientational metaphor, 
but also, for example, through Up/Down, Front/Back and Left/Right. If we were to apply 
both a Dyrbergian and Mouffean reading to, say, the identity of the proletariat, Dyrberg 
would posit that it is an Up/Down mode of identification, which positions itself in political 
space as the dominated part in relation to the dominating part: the bourgeoisie.183 Mouffe, 
however, would maintain that the proletariat remains an identity based on what it 
excludes. That is, it is organised around some perceived essence, a sense of what it is 
(depending on the epoch, this could be wage-earner, greasy, rough, male, honest, integrity, 
etc), which would be sustained through an exclusion of some representation of something 
which it is not (depending on the epoch, this could be owner of means of production, 
conniving, rich, snob, etc.).184 
As Mouffe operates only with ‘constitutive exclusion’ she naturally develops a concern for 
that which is relegated to the outside of the identity, which is forgotten or discriminated 
against (in relation to the category of the proletariat; this exclusion could, depending on 
the epoch, be directed at women, blue collar workers, hipsters, etc.). As she is a political 
actor of the Left, it is furthermore perhaps only natural that she should place an emphasis 
on exclusion and an amelioration of it. As Dyrberg sees inclusion/exclusion as synonymous 
with In/Out, but also recognises the existence of other modes of identification, he cannot 
as easily side only with a concern for exclusion. As such, his primary concern is for the 
establishment and maintenance of a ‘political symbolic order’. It is here that his emphasis 
lies. Additionally, as his theory does not emphasise that exclusion is in fact constitutive to 
identity, the idea that a political symbolic order can ameliorate it also becomes an alluring 
prospect. 
It is in this difference in theoretical assumptions that Dyrberg finds Mouffe’s uptake of 
Schmitt and his friend/enemy distinction problematic. While Mouffe takes the 
friend/enemy distinction to exemplify the logic of inclusion/exclusion and as governing ‘the 
political’, Dyrberg, along familiar lines, thinks that for Schmitt there is more to it than that: 
 
 
183 Dyrberg, 2006. 
184 Laclau & Mouffe, 1985. Note that to both approaches, the proletariat is never constituted 
through the logic of capital, but only through identification. 
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[…] the political is modelled on the most powerful types of 
symbolic orientation: in/out as the ‘container metaphor’ marking 
membership of a given order, inclusion/exclusion, us/them; 
up/down as the vertical relationship of powerful/powerless, 
high/low status, class, etc.; and front/back which partakes in 
defining a ‘we’ temporally as passed down in history and 
instituting destiny.185 
 
He then asserts that he thinks ‘the political’ is more complex than Mouffe gives it credit for 
– as she thinks mostly in terms of inclusion/exclusion186 – and argues that she forgets how 
Schmitt himself engaged the political to further the political aims of Nazism. Dyrberg says 
that, for Schmitt: 
 
These three pairs of orientations are contrasted to the image of 
an anaemic and depoliticizing liberalism obsessed with ethics, 
rational consensus, neutrality and constitutionalism. In its place 
we [instead] get a fusion of membership (in/out), submission 
(up/down) and destiny (front/back), which historically have 
proven to be a powerful pole of identification.187 
 
As Dyrberg contends that Mouffe does not see this complexity, he also contends that she 
does not understand that by rehabilitating Schmitt and using his theory as a vehicle to 
engender political inclusion, she is in fact using a theory, and a theorist, whose work only 
serves the far right that wishes to undo the autonomy of the political symbolic order.188 In 
other words, Dyrberg understands that Mouffe is also concerned with the regulation of 
passions,189 but seeks to assert that Schmitt will not help her in her quest to theorise the 
way in which they can be ‘defused’. 
 
185 Dyrberg, 2009b, p.656. 
186 Ibid., p.657. 
187 Ibid., pp.656-7. 
188 Ibid., p.654. 
189 Ibid., p.660. He reads Mouffe explicitly this way in Dyrberg, 2003. 
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Their difference in how to understand identification also has another consequence. That is, 
we cannot ascribe the same reading of Schmitt’s notion of “substantive equality” that we 
did to Mouffe to Dyrberg. Like Dyrberg, we can understand this difference in relation to the 
twin categories of homogeneity and heterogeneity. As we saw, for Mouffe, identity 
formation is structured in terms of inclusion/exclusion. This means that there must be a 
homogeneity that holds the included together at the expense of the excluded. This 
homogeneity is, for her, held together through some sense of a substantive equality. 
Mouffe’s point is that the exact nature of this substantive equality cannot be designated 
prior to its construction, which means that it should be possible to construct a type of 
homogeneity that is itself open to an ever-growing inclusion. 
For Dyrberg, however, Mouffe misreads Schmitt: 
 
It is noteworthy that the homogeneity/heterogeneity discussion 
gets off the ground without questioning Schmitt’s definition of 
democracy as ‘substantial equality’. For leftists it might have a 
nice ring to it as it suggests that equality is substantial or real as 
opposed to insubstantial or merely formal […] However, a closer 
look at these terms reveals something very different, namely 
radical conservative identity politics: ‘substantial equality’ is a 
euphemism for sameness and relates for all practical purposes to 
race, nation and Volk, and the identity of rulers and ruled means 
the latter’s submission to the former.190 
 
In this passage, Dyrberg again lays out the problems with using Schmitt, again centring his 
critique around a failure to comprehend that one cannot simply appropriate his concepts. 
Dyrberg dryly asserts that “‘substantial equality’ is a euphemism for sameness”,191 and 
again notes that this type of sameness can be successfully invoked in many modes of 
identification that are native only to the far right. There is, however, an interesting dynamic 
in relation to homogeneity/heterogeneity that is not touched upon as much as is 
warranted. Dyrberg contends that the category of friendship functions to enforce a 
 
190 Dyrberg, 2009b, p.656. 
191 He later asserts that the translation of “Artgleichheit” into “substantial equality” is disingenuous 
as it means sameness and uniformity. See ibid., p.660. 
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homogeneity across the three pairs of orientational metaphors, aligning the citizen with 
the state, effecting a common destiny etc. But all order requires some form of 
homogeneity – the pre-political always informs the nature of the political – and Mouffe 
uses Schmitt to make this point. In the next section, we see what kind of homogeneity 
Dyrberg stresses as he seeks to ‘defuse’ the passions that the pairs of orientational 
metaphors that engender homogeneity invoke. 
Dyrberg is concerned that Mouffe seeks to rehabilitate Schmitt, but this, to Mouffe, is not 
so much the choice that Dyrberg makes it out to be.192 As we have seen, Mouffe simply 
reads Schmitt differently to Dyrberg, because she comes from a post-Marxist tradition 
while Dyrberg comes from an Embodied Realist tradition. The differences between these 
approaches are minute, but crucial. Dyrberg stresses that we establish identities on the 
basis of orientational metaphors, that they structure the way we think. In this sense, they 
precede the operation of cognition. For Mouffe, identity is established through a 
constitutive outside. This then also precedes the operation of cognition, and the 
approaches are therefore similar in this regard. But Dyrberg is wrong to simply read Mouffe 
as emphasising In/Out at the expense of other orientational metaphors, because In/Out are 
not translatable to ‘us/them’ in Mouffe. Mouffe does not emphasise the category of 
‘thought’ in the same way Dyrberg does. Or rather, the category of ‘thought’ is preceded by 
the questions, for who? whose thought? Mouffe might then very well agree with Dyrberg 
that ‘we’ should think in particular ways so as to not to be overtaken by antagonisms, but 
this still implies that ‘we’ is established prior to the entrance of the category of thought. Or 
rather, while Dyrberg stresses the degree to which identity is relational through the 
working of metaphors, Mouffe holds that the process that produces the exclusion of the 
constitutive outside – which is what enables relational identities to exist to begin with – 
must precede relational identifications, which, to her, would be the establishment of 
subject positions.  
Yet both Dyrberg and Mouffe see identification as constitutive of social formations (even if 
they conceive of its logic in different ways) and both acknowledge the existence of 
passions, emotion and intensity in relation to identification. Both also seek to theorise 
some sort of social order that can tame these passions without excluding them completely. 
As we move forward, I engage their proposals for political orders and Left/Right’s 
relationship to them. And, as we shall see, despite their similarities, they end up theorising 
 
192 Ibid., p.661. 
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the kind of homogeneity that is needed to sustain that order rather differently. Both come 
out largely in favour of Left/Right’s hegemony over political discourse, but for different 
reasons. 
3.5. Dyrberg, Left/Right and Public Reason 
Both Mouffe and Dyrberg theorise a political community that maintains some sort of 
homogeneity while still enabling some sort of internal difference. Importantly, both 
theorise this in relation to Left/Right. As we saw, Dyrberg follows Lakoff and Johnson in 
asserting that identification takes place in terms of spatial, orientational metaphors. 
Dyrberg asserts that three of those pairs of metaphors – In/Out, Up/Down and Front/Back 
– are pre-political in that they operate in accordance with values that are formulated prior 
to an engagement with the political realm that was born from the democratic revolution. 
As these metaphors also imbue identification with passion and intensity, to organise 
political space through them presents a challenge to the democratic ideology of modernity. 
As we have already seen, Dyrberg argues that Left/Right can provide a frame through 
which this intensity can be diffused. In his most important contribution to his more 
normative thoughts,193 he specifies this function of Left/Right even more closely: 
 
As a symbol of parity, right–left clears a space in which opposition 
and disagreement are legitimate and where contending forces are 
on equal political footing and can be balanced against each other. 
This assigns right–left with the overarching function of instituting 
the autonomy of the political symbolic order, and it points at that 
right–left is related to public reason as balancing different and 
conflicting claims.194 
 
From this, we can start to engage Dyrberg’s normative project. First, he notes that 
Left/Right function to distribute legitimate differences – something which Left/Right can 
accomplish because they are equal to each other (they are horizontal, so there is no 
 
193 Dyrberg, 2006. 
194 Ibid., p.167. 
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hierarchy between them).195 He also here starts to qualify the kind of difference that we 
are talking about: disagreements (I will return to this later). Second, by accomplishing this 
legitimization of disagreement between equals, Left/Right function to secure this space as 
autonomous from other modes of identification. That is, pre-political expressions 
cannot/must not be understood as political exactly because Left/Right qualify a political 
domain that is apart from them. Third, Left/Right are then connected to public reason – 
and this is of course the move I have been building up to. For Dyrberg here qualifies this 
political domain that is to be freestanding from pre-political expressions. It is the public 
domain, and he even introduces a particular conception of it – the Rawlsian conception of 
public reason.196 
This then takes us back to our engagement with Mah, Gauchet and Lefort, and we see how 
Dyrberg’s account of the function of Left/Right dovetails with their account of the 
emergence of the public subject and the specific form it takes as a citizen-voter. That is, we 
are faced with a juxtaposition between Gauchet’s concept of the citizen-voter and Rawls’ 
concept of the use of public reason. One account, Gauchet’s, seeks to describe a particular 
kind of public subject, while the other, Dyrberg’s, seeks to describe the mode of expression 
that subjects can entertain while inhabiting the political domain that, according to both 
Gauchet and Dyrberg, is structured by Left/Right. Particular to Dyrberg is his invocation of 
the use of public reason in relation to the political domain that Left/Right secure as 
freestanding from pre-political expressions. He writes:  
 
[…] public reason operates outside the state as sound judgements 
that draws on and reflects the political capital of democratic 
traditions. Public virtues can only be cultivated in a society 
governed by the democratic value of equal liberty, which 
connects the institutional and the personal dimensions of politics 
and systematises our intuitions about fairness. [Rawls] is in this 
respect outlining a democratic ideology, centred on political 
 
195 Dyrberg, following Laponce and McManus, contends that when Left and Right are coded 
culturally, Right is Up and Left is Down, but that, when they are coded politically, they are equal. See 
Ibid., p.167. 
196 Although we do not cite from it here, see also Dyrberg, Torben Bech, 2005, ‘Radical and plural 
democracy: In defence of right/left and public reason’, in: Tønder, Lars & Thomassen, Lasse (eds.), 
Radical Democracy: Politics Between Abundance and Lack, Manchester University Press: 
Manchester, pp.167-184. 
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orientation and political justification, whose task is to create a 
workable coupling between democratic regime and public culture 
so ‘that deeply opposed though reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines may live together and all affirm the political conception 
of a constitutional regime’ (Rawls 1993a: xviii).”197 
 
Here we can see exactly how Left/Right are made to work with this conception of Rawls’ 
political thought. Pre-political modes of expressions are connected to comprehensive 
doctrines, which Rawls opposes to doctrines proper to public political deliberation. This 
opposition is required because comprehensive doctrines seek to offer justifications, or 
reasons, for the intervention into the in-common that are not always in line with “the 
democratic value of equal liberty”, thus endangering the value of fairness, which Rawls 
connects to the concept of justice.198 In other words, we cannot live in a just society unless 
the political symbolic order is freestanding from substantial doctrines.  
In turn, if the political symbolic order is freestanding, Dyrberg, with Rawls, contends that it 
can breed “[p]ublic virtues”,199 which means that people will learn to identify as a public 
and accept that all people have equal liberty when making interventions in relation to the 
in-common. Upon this acceptance, people will then enter the political domain using public 
reason, thus reproducing the acceptance of the dominance of politics in relation to 
constitutional order. 
Left/Right, then, serve to differentiate between distinctly public reasons, which they can do 
because they also help institute the political symbolic order in which this type of difference 
is seen as legitimate. Left/Right, to Dyrberg, are central to the reproduction, not only of the 
democratic ideology writ large (the governing principles of modernity outlined by Claude 
Lefort) but of the liberal constitutional order that created the room for a distinctively 
political order to begin with.200 They do this because they work to produce a particular kind 
of public subject, one that gives reasons that presuppose equal liberty between people, 
 
197 Dyrberg, 2006, p.170. 
198 Rawls cited in ibid., p.170. 
199 Ibid., p.170. 
200 We do not engage more of Rawls here. This is primarily because we look at Habermas later on, 
whose theory of deliberation provides a much more fruitful example of the way Left/Right might be 
said to work in relation to the liberal constitutional order. 
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and which fill out a public realm, a public sphere, which is seen to connect civil society to 
the state. 
Giving reasons that presupposes equal liberty, to Rawls and Dyrberg, also require a 
particular type self-understanding. Rawls qualifies this through the concept of “anti-
perfectionism,”201 which Dyrberg links to Lefort’s notion of the absence of the markers of 
certainty that I discussed in the Chapter One.202 That is, Dyrberg’s normative conception of 
democracy entails a development of a public virtue that recognises the lack of the markers 
of certainty inherent to the democratic revolution and thus codes the being of its parts in 
the form of reason-giving arguments that recognise their own anti-perfectionism. Dyrberg 
argues that Left/Right accomplish the development of this public virtue that is centred 
around anti-perfectionism exactly because they encourage a recognition of partiality. In 
Chapter One, I linked, historically, a particular type of rationalism that stresses partiality 
with the emergence of Left/Right. With Dyrberg, the link becomes, not historical, but 
conceptual. Or, using the vocabulary from Chapter One, we can see how the citizen-voter, 
the public subject that embraces its own partiality; that embraces Dyrberg’s public virtues, 
is co-constitutive of, and thus linked with, Left/Right conceptually. I look at this link even 
more closely in the Chapter Three. 
But one problem remains in relation to Dyrberg’s normative project and Left/Right: that of 
inclusion/exclusion. As I argued, Dyrberg does not privilege In/Out conceptions of political 
space because he does not think political identification should be structured that way. But 
when I, with Mouffe, argue that identification in fact is structured in relation to 
inclusion/exclusions, that all identity always excludes in order to be able to define itself, the 
obvious question returns: what do Left/Right exclude? To Dyrberg, the answer is simple: 
 
Democratic public reason has to enforce limits towards 
comprehensive views to maintain its defining political 
characteristics by excluding views if they cannot be made 
accessible to all on a reciprocal basis, that is, if they violate the 
founding principles of liberty and equality. Public reason exhibits 
 
201 Ibid., pp.173-174. 
202 Ibid., p.173. 
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in this respect a dogmatism of its own: that those who violate this 
principle must be barred access to the domain of public reason.203 
 
To Dyrberg, only reasons that respect the basic rules of the game – freedom and equality – 
should be allowed in. But also excluded are expressions that, while respecting the rules of 
the game, do not take the form of reasons. It is perhaps in this sense that we can see why it 
is so difficult to place Mette Lylloff of the #enmillionstemmer movement on the Left/Right 
scale, for she does not use public reason to structure her expression; she does not engage 
in rational argumentation. She instead structures her expression in terms of lived 
experience. As I start to engage Jürgen Habermas and deliberative democracy a little more, 
I draw out the implications of this inability to place certain modes of expression on the 
Left/Right spectrum. But suffice it to say here, that while Dyrberg provides a splendid 
account of how Left/Right function to reproduce the liberal democratic constitutional 
order, he remains incapable of theorising the exclusions from it. In Dyrberg, Left/Right have 
a positive function as they secure the autonomy of the political symbolic order, but, once I 
have engaged the logic of exclusion even more explicitly, will we have to give up a belief in 
the positivity of the Left/Right spectrum, or find a way to appropriate it in order to combat 
exclusions? To approach an answer to this question, we again turn to Mouffe and agonism. 
3.6. Mouffe, Left/Right and agonism 
While Dyrberg’s account perhaps comes the closest of any approach to Left/Right in 
describing the function of Left/Right in modernity, his application of Left/Right to a 
normative approach is questionable as it cannot account for the phenomenon of exclusion 
– which is constitutive to identity formation. In this sub-section, I return to Mouffe and her 
normative political project, agonism, and the way in which it attempts to appropriate the 
Left/Right dichotomy. First, I outline her conception of agonism. I do this using mostly her 
references to Carl Schmitt and thus, at this time, forego an encounter with Marxism,204 
 
203 Dyrberg, 2006, p.174. 
204 Just as Laclau left orthodox Marxism through Althusser, Mouffe left it through Gramsci. See her 
early engagement with it in Mouffe, Chantal (ed.), 1979, Gramsci and Marxist Theory, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul: London. 
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Psychoanalysis205 and Semiotics,206 while remaining aware that Mouffe is influenced by 
those traditions as well. 
Dyrberg argues that, “[f]or leftists [substantial equality] might have a nice ring to it as it 
suggests that equality is substantial or real as opposed to insubstantial or merely 
formal”.207 He makes this argument somewhat flippantly, but for Mouffe this distinction 
between formal and real equality is very important: 
 
No doubt there is an opposition between the liberal 'grammar' of 
equality, which postulates universality and reference to 
'humanity', and the practice of democratic equality, which 
requires the political moment of discrimination between 'us' and 
'them'.208 
 
Viewing Schmitt as a discoverer of this realm of ‘the political’ where the political frontier 
between an ‘us’ and a ‘them’ is established, she here again asserts that exclusion is 
constitutive of identity and space – insofar as a space must have an identity in order to 
have meaning. It should also be noted that she does not necessarily like that passion and 
exclusion are constitutive features of politics in modernity – she simply acknowledges that 
this is the case.209 This is why you cannot simply dismiss a concern for the development of 
some kind of substantive equality, some kind of erection of a space of equals wherein 
people who find themselves represented share in an equality, but only at the expense of a 
 
205 Mouffe has recently cited Freud, arguing that we have a “libidinal investment” in the nation-
state. See Mouffe cited in Novara Media, 2018, ‘NovaraFM: For a Left Populism: Chantal Mouffe’, 
Soundcloud, 30 Nov, viewed 3 July, 2019, <https://soundcloud.com/novaramedia/novarafm-for-a-
left-populism-chantal-mouffe>. See also Wenman, Mark Anthony, 2003, ‘Laclau or Mouffe? Splitting 
the difference’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 29, No. 5, pp.581-601, p.603, which traces the 
influence of psychoanalysis in Hegemony and Socialist Struggle. Lasse Thomassen, however, also 
highlights that, even if aspects of her theory dovetail with some of the aspects of psychoanalysis, it 
would be unreasonable to label her a Lacanian – as some of her post-Marxist bedfellows profess to 
be. See Thomassen, Lasse, 2004a, ‘Lacanian Political Theory: A Reply to Robinson’, The British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 6, pp.558-561, p.559. 
206 Mouffe is particularly fond of Derrida’s concept of the “constitutive outside”. See Mouffe, 
Chantal, 2005c, ‘Which Public Space for Critical Artistic Practices’, Corc Caucus, Firkin Crane, Institute 
for Choreography and Dance, pp.149-171, p.155. 
207 Dyrberg, 2009b, p.656. 
208 Mouffe, 2000, p.44. 
209 Thomassen, Lasse, 2016, ‘Hegemony, populism and democracy: Laclau and Mouffe today’, 
Revista Española de Ciencia Política, Vol. 40, pp.161-176, p.168. 
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constitutive exclusion of people who then do not share in it. She uses Carl Schmitt and his 
friend/enemy distinction to denote the violent nature of this constitution, which is a 
constitution of antagonisms. The key argument we can take from this reassertion of the 
primacy of substantive equality, however, is that the operative concept changes from the 
abstract concept of humanity, which she, with Schmitt, asserts is not a political category,210 
to the concept of ‘the people’. That is, with Mouffe, we cannot simply erect some kind of 
public sphere wherein everyone is free and equal to express their arguments and opinions 
relating to common concerns based on some shared humanity. For, being an alleged 
political space, it requires a pre-political homogeneity to be in place for the space to 
recognise itself as one, that is, in order for that space to have meaning – even if the 
oneness of the space is never actually realised.211 In other words, being a political space, it 
requires a notion of who ‘the people’ are – which in turn requires a notion of who ‘the 
people’ are not. Thus: 
 
[…] if the people are to rule, it is necessary to determine who 
belongs to the people. Without any criterion to determine who 
are the bearers of democratic rights, the will of the people could 
never take shape.212 
 
Previously, we have seen arguments for justice as fairness as regulating this conception of 
‘the people’, but this is clearly problematic as Mouffe, with Schmitt, asserts that this 
homogeneity of ‘the people’ is established through these people’s participation in the 
political entity.213 This creates a catch-22, where it is the people who are already 
constituted as belonging to ‘the people’ who get to decide the future contours of this 
category. And remember, the invocation of abstract equality and liberty as essential, rather 
than rhetorical, categories just cannot be applied here, because they only become political 
categories upon application: they are meaningless until they are instantiated.214 
 
210 Mouffe, 2000, pp.43-4. 
211 I examine the reasons for this in Chapter Four. 
212 Mouffe, 2000, p.43. 
213 Ibid., pp.42-43. 
214 We return to this problematic in the chapter on Habermas. 
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Instead, Mouffe contends that this democratic paradox in which equality, to have meaning, 
must entail an exclusion of some people from that equality, must be embraced and, most 
importantly, acknowledged: 
 
The logic of democracy does indeed imply a moment of closure 
which is required by the very process of constituting the 'people'. 
This cannot be avoided, even in a liberal-democratic model; it can 
only be negotiated differently. But this in turn can be done only if 
this closure, and the paradox it implies, are acknowledged.215 
 
Here we start to see the agonistic model: exclusion and antagonism is constitutive of ‘the 
political’, but this does not mean that we must give up on democracy. Instead, we must 
acknowledge that perfect democracy is impossible.216 However, by articulating agonism in 
relation to liberalism we can also refer to its universalism and humanistic claims to always 
seek to engender inclusion into this category of the people. Agonism then needs liberalism, 
even if it relies on a different (meta)ontology in order to make sense of the world. 
Mouffe often expands on her agonistic project through engaging specific liberal thinkers 
whom she accuses of failing to engage ‘the political’. Perhaps her favourite target is John 
Rawls.217 As we saw with Dyrberg, Rawls theorises the possibility for a liberal order in a 
society that is at odds with itself: 
 
[Rawls’] objective is to provide a moral, albeit minimal, consensus 
on political fundamentals [… His] 'political liberalism' aims at 
defining a core morality that specifies the terms under which 
 
215 Mouffe, 2000, p.43. 
216 This is not to be confused with Rawls’ concept of anti-perfectionism. See Caney, Simon, 1995, 
‘Anti-Perfectionism and Rawlsian Liberalism’, Political Studies, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp.248-264 for an 
outline and engagement with this Rawlsian perspective. The dissimilarity rests in the fact that 
Mouffe is beholden to a Lacanian logic that stresses a constitutive negativity, while Rawls arrives at 
this principle of anti-perfectionism through other means.  
217 See, for examples, Mouffe, Chantal, 2005b, ‘The limits of John Rawls’s pluralism’, Politics, 
Philosophy & Economics, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp.221-231; Mouffe, 2000, pp.80-107; and Mouffe, Chantal, 
1993b, ‘Rawls: Political Philosophy without Politics’, The Return of The Political, Verso: London, 
pp.41-59. 
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people with different conceptions of the good can live together in 
political association.218 
 
As Mouffe sums up here, this possibility rests on decidedly moral grounds, grounds that I in 
the previous sub-section called an acceptance of the rules of the game: liberty and equality 
for all. Rawls’ pluralism sees it as fact that the public realm is headed by several substantive 
doctrines,219 which is why it is so important that all can agree on these basic principles. In 
accordance with the catch-22, these basic principles then also provide the basics for a 
conception of justice, upon which Rawls contends that all ‘reasonable’ people can agree.220 
However, for Mouffe, this move to ground a form of pluralism in morality is problematic, 
because it: 
 
[…] allows Rawls to present as a moral exigency what is in fact a 
political decision. It serves to avoid acknowledging the 
antagonistic nature of the political and the fact that no regime, 
not even a liberal one, can pretend to have a privileged claim on 
rationality.221 
 
In other words, the kind of pluralism that is on offer from Rawls, is, to Mouffe, a pluralism 
that is decidedly liberal. She argues that one may have good reason to support such a 
pluralism, but this choice could not be grounded in morality, but in politics.222 It is 
grounded in politics because it can only constitute itself through a closure – through an 
identification with something that it is not – and as such is constituted through frontiers, 
just as an identity of a space. The problem is that Rawls effects an exclusion from political 
participation. This exclusion applies to democratic doctrines such as socialism just as it 
applies to non-democratic doctrines such as fascism.223 As Mouffe sees it, this exclusion is 
 
218 Mouffe, 2000, p.23. 
219 Mouffe, 2005b, p.223. 
220 Rawls cited in Mouffe, 2000, pp.23-4. 
221 Mouffe, 2005b, p.223. 
222 Mouffe, 2000, p.25. 
223 As I have argued in the previous sub-section, and as we will greatly elaborate on in the coming 
chapters, this exclusion might also be said to apply to political modes of expressions that are not 
constituted in the form of an opinion or argument. 
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made all the more grievous through an inability on behalf of its designers to conceive of 
‘the political’. Indeed, to Mouffe, what Rawls is trying to do is to eradicate ‘the political’ 
under his rationalist, individualist and universalist banner of reason.224 But this suppression 
of antagonism, which to Mouffe persists as a feature of modernity whether Rawls likes it or 
not, only serves to make its final expressions even more powerful. Indeed, taking a look at 
the recent phenomena of US President Donald Trump and Brexit, Mouffe has argued that 
this inability to give voice to different narratives eventually sees popular support shift to 
movements that are at odds with the liberal doctrine.225 
As such, Mouffe proposes a different type of political order that acknowledges its own 
impossibility and the existence of ‘the political’, but nevertheless seeks to bind identities 
together in a space whose sole structuring principle is a recognition of its own fallibility. 
She calls this political order agonism.226  
 
My proposal is based on the acknowledgement of antagonism 
and its ineradicability, but I also state that antagonism can 
manifest itself in two ways: in the friend-enemy form, or as what I 
call ‘agonism’, which takes place between ‘adversaries’. The latter 
is a sublimated form of the antagonistic relation, in which the 
opponents know there is no rational solution to their conflict and 
that they’ll never be able to agree, but accept the legitimacy of 
the adversaries in defending their position […] In both cases there 
is a frontier, but it’s constructed differently.227 
 
224 Mouffe, 1993a. 
225 See, for examples, Mouffe, Chantal, 2016, ‘A Salutary Shock? Chantal Mouffe on Brexit and the 
Spanish Elections’, Verso, 27 June, viewed 26 June, 2019, 
<https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2732-a-salutary-shock-chantal-mouffe-on-brexit-and-the-
spanish-elections>; and Shahid, Waleed, 2016, ‘America in Populist Times: An Interview With 
Chantal Mouffe’, The Nation, 25 Dec, viewed 26 June, 2019, 
<https://www.thenation.com/article/america-in-populist-times-an-interview-with-chantal-
mouffe/>. 
226 Agonism can and should of course be traced back to Mouffe and Laclau’s joint work on radical 
democracy. See Laclau & Mouffe, 1985. That being said, Lasse Thomassen has pointed out how 
radical democracy and agonism should not necessarily be read as synonymous political projects 
defined by their homogeneity. See Thomassen, Lasse, 2005a, ‘Reading radical democracy: A 
commentary on Clive Barnett’, Political Geography, Vol. 24, pp.631-639, p.633. 
227 Mouffe, Chantal & Errejón, Íñigo, 2016, Podemos: In the Name of the People, Lawrence & 
Wishart: London, p.58. 
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Agonism, then, is based on a negativity, on the inexistence of rational solutions. Yet this 
lack of being is made to work productively to enable political actors to perceive of different 
political actors as legitimate through a recognition of their own inability to effect a perfect 
closure of the democratic space. Differences remain, but instead of manifesting themselves 
in relation to the friend/enemy dynamic, which occurs when closure is attempted, 
exclusion is emphasised and ‘the political’ is ignored, they manifest themselves through the 
dynamic of adversity.  
Agonism thus remains based on ideals of equality and emancipation, but it acknowledges 
that these can be completed only partially.228 What this theory accomplishes is to construct 
a political imaginary with holes in it – which is also decidedly historical. Through those 
holes, new differences that acquire enough momentum can manifest themselves and gain 
recognition as established political adversaries. Morality is out of the picture and, to a 
lesser extent, so is justice. Instead, what remains is a conception of political order that 
works to enable disagreement without seeking to synthesise it into a higher meaning. 
Importantly, the objective of this move is not only to avert fascist imaginaries displacing the 
liberal imaginary, but to radicalise the liberal imaginary to better enable people who 
cannot find expression within its order to announce their presence and be represented 
within public discourse.229 
While Mouffe has not written extensively on Left/Right, like Dyrberg, she generally 
perceives of Left/Right as enabling the type of adversarial politics that agonism demands.230 
During the period when protagonists of the Third Way were particularly prominent231 – 
 
228 Mouffe, Chantal, 1999, ‘Deliberation Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?’, Social Research, Vol. 66, 
No. 3, pp.748-758, p.752. 
229 This concern for the public remains intricately tied to her thinking. See, for examples, Carpentier, 
Nico & Cammaerts, Bart, 2006, ‘Hegemony, Democracy, Agonism and Journalism: An interview with 
Chantal Mouffe’, Journalism Studies, Vol. 7, No. 6, pp.964-975; and Mouffe, 2005c. 
230 She has previously called for a “genuine left” in Mouffe, Chantal, 2013, Agonistics: Thinking the 
World Politically, Verso: London, p.120, and in Mouffe, Chantal, 2005, p.157, she hailed Left/Right as 
instituting a common symbolic space where disagreement is possible. But in various places in 
Mouffe & Errejón, 2016, she speaks about Left/Right as something to be overcome and in Laclau & 
Mouffe, 1985, p.179, it is also spoken about negatively. 
231 For works of such theorists and politicians see, among many others, Giddens, Anthony, 1994, 
Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics, Polity Press: Cambridge, UK; Giddens, Anthony, 
1998, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy, Polity Press: Cambridge, UK; Gray, John, 
1996, After Social Democracy: Politics, Capitalism and the Common Life, Demos: London; Beck, 
Ulrich, 1999, World Risk Society, Polity Press: Cambridge, UK; McKnight, David, 2005, Beyond Right 
and Left: New politics and the culture wars, Allen & Unwin: Crows Nest, NSW; and Blair, Tony, 1998, 
The third way: New politics for the new century, Fabian Society: London. Bobbio calls the Third Way 
an example of his concept of the Inclusive Middle. He denounces both as attempting to transcend 
the Left/Right distinction. See Bobbio, 1996, pp.7-9. However, I would posit that the Third Way is 
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protagonists who sought to put an end to the Left/Right distinction all together,232 arguing 
that the divisions that the dyad signified were no longer pertinent,233 and that what was 
needed was just rationalism and efficiency in governance234 – Mouffe was particularly 
assertive that we needed to return to a Left/Right ordering of the political community:235 
 
I consider that the shortcomings of third way politics help us to 
understand why envisaging modern democracy as a form of 
agonistic pluralism has very important consequences for politics. 
Once it is acknowledged that this type of agonistic confrontation 
is what is specific to a pluralist democracy, we can understand 
why such a democracy requires the creation of collective 
identities around clearly differentiated positions as well as the 
possibility to choose between real alternatives. This is precisely 
the function of the left/right distinction. The left/right opposition 
is the way in which legitimate conflict is given form and 
institutionalized.236  
 
We see then that Mouffe arrives at a conceptualisation of Left/Right that is not too 
dissimilar from Dyrberg’s. Obviously, this plays into the hands of those who seek to portray 
Mouffe as overtly liberal and not particularly radical,237 but she arrives at this point for 
different reasons. For her, Left/Right simply accomplish a collective identification of 
particular subject positions with the whole. Given that this particular mode of identification 
implies a recognition of the legitimacy of disagreement, Left/Right thus lend themselves to 
a political imaginary in which the political community is constitutively divided amongst 
 
merely a more radical expression of his decision to forget about the truly political dimension of 
modernity. 
232 Giddens, Anthony, 2000, The Third Way and its Critics, Polity Press: Cambridge, UK, pp.28-9. 
233 Giddens, 1994, p.49. 
234 Dyrberg provides an excellent account of this in Dyrberg, 2009a, pp.145-6.  
235 See Dyrberg, 2003. 
236 Mouffe, 2000, p.117. 
237 Žižek is the obvious example of this. See Brockelman, Thomas, 2003, ‘The failure of the radical 
democratic imaginary: Žižek versus Laclau and Mouffe on vestigial utopia’, Philosophy & Social 
Criticism, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp.183-208. 
88 
 
itself; that is, Left/Right lend themselves to a construction of frontiers that emphasises 
adversity rather than enmity.238 
However, I consider this move to be done in haste. To recall, Gauchet and Mah identified 
the historical emergence of the public subject as the citizen-voter. It is this subject that 
grasped at Left/Right in order to identify itself with the whole in a modernity that was 
marked by a lack of the markers of certainty. Mouffe’s location of agonistic politics within 
the Left/Right spectrum fails to honour the people who cannot identify themselves with 
this citizen-voter. While I am still to qualify the exact identity of this citizen-voter – 
something which I shall not accomplish until I have engaged Habermas and Laclau – Mouffe 
has taught us that this identity can only constitute itself insofar as there is an exclusion. If I 
argue, as I shall, that Left/Right, in a sense, belong to the citizen-voter, then Left/Right do 
not only serve as a justificatory device for liberal democracy, as Dyrberg would have it,239 or 
for agonistic politics, as Mouffe would have it, but to construct a space in which subject 
positions can identify themselves with the whole. However, as this is something that can 
only take place if there is a constitutive outside to that space, that is, if something is 
excluded, then there remains a problem with Left/Right.  
This also has implications for the way we conceive of passion in relation to Left/Right when 
we, with Mouffe, accept that passion is a constitutive feature to identity. Mouffe (and, to a 
certain extent, Dyrberg) seeks to tame the violent passions that can flare up in times of 
antagonism. She employs Left/Right for this purpose – to turn enemies into adversaries. 
But what are the consequences of this removal of passion? I submit that a removal of 
passion equates to a removal of political commitment to a cause. Indeed, the excluded are 
passionate about their demands because their material conditions are precarious, but once 
the passion is removed, how can they continue a commitment to the cause? For, once we 
accept that Left/Right belong to the citizen-voter, we must also acknowledge that 
Left/Right identification is secondary to the identity of the citizen-voter – an identity which 
exactly does require affectual investment. In other words, while Left/Right might enable 
 
238 She is even on record, in a Lacanian vein, claiming that, “[Danish] Den eneste måde, man kan 
mobilisere følelser på, er ved at appellere til højre-venstre skillet [English] The only way in which you 
can mobilise passions is by appealing to the right-left divide”. See Mouffe cited in Møller, Bjarke, 
2002, ‘Midten fremmer højrefløjen’, Information, 15 Feb, viewed 26 June, 2019, 
<https://www.information.dk/2002/02/midten-fremmer-hoejrefloejen>. My translation. She has 
more recently turned to Left populism. See Mouffe, 2018. I discuss the Left/Right and populism in 
Chapters Four and Five. 
239 This particular idea that they have a justificatory function in Dyrberg is also highlighted in White, 
Jonathan, 2011, ‘Left and Right as political resources’, Journal of Political Ideologies, Vol. 16, No. 2, 
pp.123-144, p.125. 
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different citizen-voters to view themselves as adversaries, to which extent do they also 
enforce a mode of expression that is necessarily devoid of passion and commitment and to 
which extent does that impact on people who do not identify as public subjects to begin 
with? If you live an excluded and precarious life, but you are not allowed to be committed 
to its rectification, at least in any real sense, what effects does that have?  
These are question that I attempt to answer in future chapters, but for now, we might 
reconsider the case of Mette Lylloff. In her capacity as a disability activist, she can be 
identified with this place of exclusion exactly because she does not express herself through 
reason-giving argumentation but through lived experience – a mode of expression that is 
inherently more passionate. She participates in this way because her primary concern is to 
evidence her exclusion from the ‘space of equals’. However, her exclusion thus also comes 
to pertain to modes of political participation, and we cannot theorise this appropriately 
through Mouffe and Dyrberg alone. That is why I now turn to Mustafa Dikeç to introduce us 
to the ‘spatial turn’ in political theory, before I proceed to Jacques Rancière and the 
concepts of ‘the police’ and ‘distribution of the sensible’, which will help us think further 
about political space and identity. 
3.7. Conclusion 
In this section, I explored the degree to which Left/Right have a justificatory function in 
relation to democratic order. We saw that Dyrberg postulates that Left/Right can work to 
facilitate Rawls’ conception of the use of public reason. We also saw that Mouffe, taking 
issue with this particular application of Left/Right to Rawlsian political liberalism, instead 
posits a Left/Right political imaginary that is constitutively open and aimed at transforming 
antagonism into adversity. But Mouffe’s project also relies on Left/Right in order for 
adversaries to recognise each other as parts of a whole, despite her critical emphasis on 
exclusion. 
4. Identity and space in relation to Left/Right 
4.1. Introduction 
We still lack an account of exclusion that can explain how particular modes of political 
expression can be excluded from a space/identity. As such, in this last section I explore how 
space and identity are linked, enabling each other to function conceptually although both 
are undermined by the (non)being of lack/void. I examine Rancière’s twin concepts of the 
police (ac)count and the distribution of the sensible to see the ways in which the latter 
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creates a space in which subject positions are counted and made to give an account of 
themselves. Through being made to give an account of themselves, I argue that subject 
positions are required to express themselves in a manner that is particular. It is here that 
we finally find an account that can shed some light on the relationship between Left/Right, 
reason-giving argumentation/opinion and exclusion in relation to other modes of political 
expression. We thus end up with an account of identity and space that I use for the rest of 
the thesis. 
4.2. Mustafa Dikeç and the ‘spatial turn’ in political theory 
Mustafa Dikeç is one of the foremost protagonists of the “spatial turn”240 in democratic 
theory. In his work, he examines the ways in which various political theorists can be said to 
rely on a concept of space to produce their theory.241 So far, I have defined space as a site 
of differences that nevertheless share something in common. With Dikeç we can now start 
to qualify it further: 
 
Space not only gives form to and orders how this world appears, 
but also allows distinctive gatherings of beings – things and 
people – that establish relationality and open new spaces […] 
Space becomes a form of appearance and a mode of actuality, 
making manifest established orders, generating particular 
relationships to them, and providing relational domains of 
experience for the constitution of political identities.242 
 
 
240 Dikeç, Mustafa, 2012, ’Space as a mode of political thinking’, Geoforum, Vol. 43, pp.669-676, 
p.669. It should be noted that Dikeç has one foot in each of the political theory and political 
geography camps, which can at times create some confusion. For example, when Doreen Massey 
charged that Laclau consigned the social sphere, as space, to a state of stasis which rendered a 
theory of change impossible. See Massey, Doreen, 1992, ‘Politics and Space/Time’, New Left Review, 
No. 196, pp.65-84. The debate is nicely summed up and outlined in Marchart, Oliver, 2014, 
‘Institution and dislocation: philosophical roots of Laclau's discourse theory of space and 
antagonism’, Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp.271-282. 
241 For various examples of this, see Dikeç, 2012; Dikeç, Mustafa, 2005, ‘Space, politics and the 
political’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, Vol. 23, pp.171-188; and Dikeç, Mustafa, 
Clark, Nigel & Barnett, Clive, 2009, ‘Extending Hospitality: Giving Space, Taking Time’, in: Dikeç, 
Mustafa, Clark, Nigel and Barnett, Clive (eds.), Extending Hospitality: Giving Space, Taking Time, 
Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh, pp.1–14. 
242 Dikeç, Mustafa, 2015, Space, Politics and Aesthetics, Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh, pp.1-
2. 
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Most notable here is the idea that space is constitutive of appearance. If it was not already 
clear then, we are speaking in terms of apprehension – in terms of the encounter between 
material reality and the way in which we understand it. Space, then, is that which 
structures our apprehension of the material world, ties bodies and things together, places 
and orders them and imbues them with a specific form. In one sense, it is space that codes 
our apprehension of the world. Through effecting this order and giving of form, space 
establishes a relationality between people and things that is ‘particular’. It is within this 
particular constellation of relations that political identities are then constituted. Here, 
however, I should be careful to mark out the ways in which we can now theorise exclusion 
in a different way from Mouffe. Where Mouffe specifies identification as negatively 
relational or dissociative,243 in Dikeç's theory of space we find a structuralist emphasis on 
the way in which power operates to produce relationality, and through this operation, 
identification. However, if we shift focus from Dikeç to Rancière – whom Dikeç engages 
extensively anyway – we start to encounter some theoretical concepts that are extremely 
illuminating in relation to Left/Right, space/identification, inclusion/exclusion and 
rationalism. 
4.3. Rancière, the distribution of the sensible and the police (ac)count 
As Dikeç puts it: 
 
[The distribution of the sensible] is a spatial term Rancière uses to 
refer to forms and modes of configuring a sensible order that 
makes a certain perception of the world possible and sensible by 
relating what is given to the senses to ways of sense-making.244  
 
Dikeç argues that his own conception of forms of relationality can, in Rancière, be 
conceptualised as a space in which the senses are activated in particular ways. It is then 
through the senses that we apprehend the relationality of the world. The ways in which 
this apprehension is regulated is through the mechanisms of ‘the police’. This term is not to 
be confused with standard police officers, referring to something else entirely: 
 
243 Dikeç, Mustafa, 2013, ‘Beginners and equals: political subjectivity in Arendt and Rancière’, 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp.78-90, p.79. 
244 Ibid., p.82. 
92 
 
The essence of the police […] lies in a certain way of dividing up 
the sensible. I call 'distribution of the sensible' a generally implicit 
law that defines the forms of partaking by first defining the 
modes of perception in which they are inscribed. The partition of 
the sensible is the dividing-up of the world (de monde) and of 
people (du monde).245 
 
The police thus gives form to relationality in a way that is particular, in a process that 
precedes our engagement with relationality. Through dividing up the realm of the sensible 
and categorising it, it also performs a political task. It structures the “parts” of the whole of 
the society.246 In this sense, to Rancière, our relations are pre-figured by the police. It 
accomplishes this prefiguring through the “(ac)count”.247 The (ac)count is a mechanism 
through which the police effects the ordering of ‘parts’. Considered in relation to the 
phenomenon of politics, these parts are subject positions. The police, through the 
employment of the distribution of the sensible, thus makes it possible for subject positions 
to invest themselves in bodies of individuals. In this sense, identification, at the level of 
subject positions, is created by the police (ac)count. However, as the mode of relation 
between the counted parts is particular, the police also “defines the forms of partaking” in 
the in-common that are possible for these parts. In this sense there is thus an arithmetical 
and a narrative element to the existence of subject positions. They are not only counted 
but also made to give an account of themselves insofar that they wish to partake in the in-
common. 
As we look back to the previous section, we, with Mouffe, learned that exclusion is a 
constitutive feature of all space. Mouffe conceptualised this exclusion in terms of ‘us’ and 
‘them’. With Rancière, exclusion is conceptualised not as ‘us’ and ‘them’ but through the 
mechanism of the “miscount”.248 It is the miscount that generates the possibility of politics 
to take place in the first place; politics, which, for Rancière, centres around the concept of 
 
245 Rancière, Jacques, 2010, Dissensus, translated by: Steven Corcoran, Continuum Books: London, 
p.36. 
246 Rancière, Jacques, 1999, Disagreement, translated by: Julie Rose, University of Minnesota Press: 
London, pp.8-9. 
247 Espersen, Peter & Kyriacou, Michael, 2016, ‘The DisOrdered Polis: Öcalan, Bookchin & Rancière in 
International Political Theory’, 4th Annual St Andrews Graduate Conference in International Political 
Theory, St. Andrews University, 26-27 May, Unpublished, p.12. 
248 Rancière, 1999, p.6.  
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equality that acts as a presupposition249 and which is wronged by the imposition of the 
sensible order.250  
To Rancière, even the excluded are featured in the count.251 The miscount thus does not 
revolve around the exclusion in so much as it revolves around misrecognition and a lack of 
voice.252 Dikeç describes this lack of an excluded part through reference to the whole in 
which parts find themselves misrecognised and un-equal: 
 
The whole is more than the sum of its parts. The whole in 
question is a whole defined as the whole by the police order. 
Rancière’s ‘unaccounted for’ does not mean that there exists a 
hidden bunch of political subjects to turn up and disrupt the 
police order. Everybody is counted. The unaccounted for is at 
once nowhere and everywhere.253 
 
Exclusion, in Rancière, then takes on a different garb than it does in Mouffe and, with it, 
space and identity also acquire different nuances. An emphasis develops on the aesthetic 
qualities of space and identity rather than purely the names that are given to spaces and 
identities, as it becomes the aesthetic qualities that, through assigning certain practices as 
normal and common-sensical, effect the misrecognition through an inability of other 
subject positions to perform those practices – causing them to appear un-equal. This 
aesthetic dimension is then emphasised because the distribution of the sensible that the 
police (ac)count effects is particular. It is not that identity and space in Mouffe is not 
particular, but her conception of them through dissociation also downplays their aesthetic 
qualities.254 Rancière’s usefulness then comes in our ability to, through him, locate the 
dynamic between order and the ‘unaccounted for’ within the same space, and, crucially, to 
 
249 Rancière, Jacques, 1991, The ignorant schoolmaster: five lessons in intellectual emancipation, 
translated by: Kristin Ross, Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA.. 
250 Rancière, Jacques, 1992, ‘Politics, identification, and subjectivization’, October, Vol. 61, pp.58-64, 
p.59. 
251 Dikeç, 2005, p.176. 
252 Rancière cited in Dikeç, 2013, p.84. 
253 Dikeç, 2005, p.176. 
254 There, space and identity are constituted around nodal points that partially fix discourse. See 
Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.112. It is not that you cannot use this to construct a knowledge about the 
particularity of certain practices, but they are more geared towards explaining a logic of social 
reproduction. 
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do so in respect to the ways in which people are made to give an account of themselves. It 
is then with this assertion – that it is particular practices, with their particular forms of 
relationality that constitute misrecognitions and miscounts – that we can start to better 
understand the role of Left/Right in political space. 
While I have still to flesh out the exact aesthetic qualities of the space that Left/Right 
police, I have already tied it to a conception of rationalism that structures relationality in 
terms of arguments, opinions, beliefs, etc. With Rancière, I can then qualify this rationalism 
a bit further. Or rather, we can see that what, at a theoretical level, what is at stake is not 
so much the utterings of the arguments, opinions, beliefs, etc., themselves, but rather the 
prefiguring of the boundaries of rationalism that only allows certain expressions to appear 
rational to begin with. This is linked to the count of subject positions, in that only the 
expressions of certain, prefigured groups and interests can be deemed reasonable. But it is 
also linked to the form of the account given by those subject positions; a form which is 
amenable to their being. When I then argue that Left/Right are linked to rationalism, they 
are linked in the sense that they participate in the policing, or the prefiguring, of the 
boundaries of rationalism. And again, as this is a rationalism that forces subject positions to 
acknowledge their partiality to the system, it leaves subjects who consider themselves 
excluded or miscounted with no remedy to ameliorate the material situation which the 
miscount and the exclusion help engender. At least not through participation in said 
rationalism.  
4.4. Left/Right, the police (ac)count and the distribution of the sensible 
If we, with Rancière, acknowledge the validity of the (ac)count in relation to the 
distribution of the sensible, and if we explicitly adopt a focus on the space of the in-
common – the space of the public – we come to the realisation that the Left and Right, in 
Rancièrian terms, have a policing function. When we remember that I criticised Downs and 
Riker for using Left/Right to explain politics but failing to explain Left/Right themselves, this 
criticism starts to function also as an example of the way in which Left/Right function to 
police. In our example, Downs and Riker erect a knowledge about politics, but that 
knowledge is exactly contingent on the particular distribution of the sensible that 
Left/Right enable.  
With Rancière, then, we can say that Left/Right provide for an aestheticized apprehension 
of the political world. In other words, Left/Right enable us to become and identify 
members of the political community. With this argument, we can also shed some light on 
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some of the previous scholars that I have engaged. As stated, we start to see that Downs 
and Riker rely upon Left/Right to mark out a meta-space through which they can develop a 
knowledge of the voting behaviour of the whole, but we can now also understand many of 
the anthropological efforts to engage the meaning of Left/Right to be working to produce 
the means for a count of the political community. In a sense, even when Gauchet highlights 
the many different meanings that Left/Right has had in French political history, he too is 
enabling a count; and Bobbio, through whom we were first introduced to the concept of 
exclusion, also seeks to enable a count through his argument that Left/Right is about 
equality.255 What this shows us is exactly that Left/Right function to create this illusion of 
the possibility of a perfect count. As such, they are markers of the police because through 
them we get a distribution of sensibilities that relate to a strictly political realm. It is in this 
sense that Left and Right themselves also become markers of identities.256  
We have now arrived at a position that is very close to Dyrberg’s. But Dyrberg, through 
Rawls, saw this dynamic as a positive feature of modernity. With Rancière, and previously 
with Mouffe, we however cannot be so sure. This is the case because, through marking out 
a realm that claims a dominance over politics; by distributing the sensible through its police 
(ac)count,257 Left/Right effect an image of society that is absent “of void and of 
supplement”.258 Or rather, Left/Right function to annul the possibility of 
exclusion/miscounts and hence politics259 – which, within all post-Marxist theory, exists not 
in the deliberation over the nature of the in-common260 but in the putting into question of 
the very identity of the nature of the in-common, the very way in which ‘politics’261 is 
conducted.262 Mouffe tends to see Left/Right as enabling inclusion and defusing 
 
255 Even if he argues that Left/Right need to be complimented with a freedom/authoritarianism axis. 
256 Even choice of dress can mark out a left-wing person from a right-wing people. This is of course 
obvious in some cases (with high-hats, berets, suits and the khăn rằn shale). Weal, Rory, 2015, ‘Left 
wing people dress way better than right wing people – here’s why’, The Cambridge Student, 22 Jan, 
viewed 31 March, 2016, <http://www.tcs.cam.ac.uk/comment/0033612-left-wing-people-dress-
way-better-than-right-wing-people-here-s-why.html>. 
257 This is a state of affairs that is reproduced, for example, during polling where respondents are 
asked to place themselves on the Left/Right scale. 
258 Rancière, 2010, p.36.  
259 Specific to Rancière, “The main concern […] is to ‘resist the givenness of place’ […] – that is, not to 
take as natural the distributions or partitionings of established orders.” See Dikeç, 2013, p.82. 
260 Rancière, 1999, pp.9-10. 
261 Or, to Rancière, ‘policy’. See Rancière, 1992, p.58. 
262 We must remember that even the strands of post-Marxism that centre around radical 
democracy, hospitality etc., i.e. around the possibility of letting the excluded parts in, require that 
the place of the ‘in’ (the place that excludes and into which inclusion is supposed to happen) be 
defined in relation to the negativity and the void/lack/non-being. See Marchart, Oliver, 2007, Post-
Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau, Edinburgh 
University Press: Edinburgh. 
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antagonisms, but insofar as we can plausibly reconceptualise the authors that I have 
engaged with thus far to utilise Left/Right as means to produce an (ac)count of a political 
realm and distribute sensibilities to that effect,263 it is hard to see how we can comfortably 
endorse such a move.264 In fact, Dyrberg, following Bobbio, even highlights how, in 
accordance with “classic logic”, Left/Right in effect seal off a space: 
 
The Right/Left distinction follows the three laws in classical logic: 
the law of identity (A is A), the law of non-contradiction (nothing 
can be both A and not-A) and the law of the excluded middle 
(everything is either A or not-A). In other words, (1) Right and left 
are clearly defined political poles of identification; (2) poles of 
identification cannot be both right and left and (3) poles of 
identification are either right or left.265 
 
Furthermore, Left/Right, like some kind of Xeno’s paradox, are also infinitely divisible, 
meaning that a particular point can always be broken down and subdivided by using 
Left/Right as well. For example, while the UK Labour Party might be to the left of the UK 
Conservative Party, people still talk about a Labour Left and a Labour Right.266 Dyrberg later 
asserts that Left/Right can be disrupted by other orientational metaphors,267 and I have in 
the previous chapter argued that Left/Right provide for a constitutive openness to a 
 
263 This is the case for Downs and Riker and the protagonists of the anthropological approach as well. 
And that does not really include the work that Left/Right perform in much of the political science 
that is explicitly reliant upon Downs. There Left/Right structure the site of politics in accordance with 
the police (ac)count and the distribution of the sensible. For an example, see Alonso, Sonia & de 
Fonseca, Saro Claro, 2012, ‘Immigration, left and right’, Party Politics, Vol. 18, No. 6, pp.865-884.This 
reliance on Left/Right is particularly prevalent in comparative politics. For a discussion on this, see 
Jahn, Detlef, 2010, ‘Conceptualizing Left and Right in comparative politics: Towards a deductive 
approach’, Party Politics, Vol. 17, No. 6, pp.745-765. 
264 This should not be taken to mean that we endorse criticism that seeks to assert that Mouffe (and 
Laclau) ontologizes agonism/radical democracy. See Barnett, Clive, 2004, ‘Deconstructing radical 
democracy: articulation, representation, and being-with-others’, Political Geography, Vol. 23, No. 5, 
pp.503-528. Thomassen has already engaged this claim (Thomassen, 2005) and has, in part, 
attributed such readings of Mouffe (and Laclau) to conceptual divides between political theory and 
political geography, just as Marchart did when Massey criticised Laclau. See footnote 240. 
265 Dyrberg, 2003, p.338. 
266 See, for example, Meredith, Stephen, 2019, ‘‘Divided Within Itself’: The Parliamentary Labour 
‘Right’ and the Demise of Post‐War Revisionist Social Democracy in the 1970s’, Parliamentary 
History, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp.244-261. 
267 Dyrberg, 2003, p.339. 
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penetration of topics and themes. Yet, with Rancière, what is at stake is what happens prior 
to the point where modes of thinking are chosen between: the point of the distribution of 
the sensible. As I noted, Up/Down, Front/Back and In/Out are modes of thinking only. They 
are not literally in this world in the same way as Left/Right, which means that they are not 
able to effect their own distribution of the sensible. Yet, to simply argue that Left/Right 
thus have a police function and align them to all other kinds of established orders is also 
problematic, as different orders structure their terms of stability differently. In other 
words, we need to be able to theorise the extent of Left/Right’s hegemony over political 
discourse, something that we can better accomplish through the work of Ernesto Laclau. 
It is thus here that we leave Bobbio, Mouffe, Dyrberg, Dikeç and Rancière behind, as we 
have reached the point where different theorists can serve us better. We have, through the 
aforementioned theorists, acquired a deeper knowledge about space and identity and 
about the ways in which Left/Right function to construct both. Notably, we have arrived at 
the point where we need to acquire an aesthetic account of the in-common of politics. 
Dyrberg, who taught us so much, uses Rawls for such an account. To emphasise the ways in 
which justice and equality are made to work in contemporary society, I instead turn to 
Habermas, whose early work on the public sphere and later focus on deliberative 
democracy makes him a much better suited candidate to introduce us to such an account. I 
then turn to Laclau, not only to critique Habermas and engage post-Marxism more 
systematically, but also to give us an explicit account of hegemony and order so that I may 
better theorise the kind of whole of which Habermas provides us with an aesthetic 
account. 
We have learned that Left/Right, in some form or another, function to reproduce aspects of 
(liberal) democracy, but after the next chapter, we will know more about which aspects are 
the subject of the reproduction, and how they relate to the order itself – which will put us 
in a better place to understand how radical politics can engage Left/Right with the greatest 
success. 
4.5. Conclusion 
In this section, I argued that both space and identity are discursive. I thus argued that space 
structures our apprehension of the world through a distribution of sensibilities that effect a 
recognition of differences, and that identities constitute those differences, becoming 
particular forms which can be reproduced through partaking in the space that is the in-
common for those particularities. I used Rancière’s two concepts of the distribution of the 
98 
 
sensible and the police to account for the function of Left/Right in modernity. I argued that 
the distribution of the sensible is the space of relationality that structures our 
apprehension of the world and that Left/Right are markers of the police, whose job it is to 
define the relationality of the parts of the space marked out by the distribution of the 
sensible. The police, and Left/Right through it, accomplishes this by constructing and 
counting particular parts/subject positions that become inhabitable by individuals, and by 
enabling these parts/subject positions to give an account of themselves that is particular. 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I sought to engage democratic theory in order to better understand the 
ways in which Left/Right are constitutive of politics in modernity. To accomplish this, I 
examined Noberto Bobbio, Chantal Mouffe, Torben Dyrberg, Mustafa Dikeç and Jacques 
Rancière. I have argued that political space and identity are such that there is a proper form 
of political expression that subject positions must adopt in order to be counted and 
accounted for when the nature of political justice is engaged within the politics of 
modernity that is partly structured by the Left/Right spectrum. However, in order to 
partake in the in-common, subjects are made to express themselves in a manner that is 
specific. This means that exclusion can manifest itself in relation to the form of political 
expression that subject positions adopt, just as much as the way in which they may be 
consigned as other through more Mouffean conceptions of identity formations. Or rather, 
this means that the two modes of being that subject positions must relate to, the 
arithmetic and the narrative, are co-constitutive – you cannot subtract one from the other. 
If, as I have argued, Left/Right enable a count of the political community, they are then also 
caught up in the ways that subject positions are made to give an account of their being. 
Now I seek to further our understanding of the aesthetic dimensions of political space 
through an engagement with Habermas, one of the most prominent theorists of the place 
of the public. With him, we encounter an engagement both with the concept of the public 
sphere and with the political deliberation that takes place within it. We see a theory 
outlined that seeks to regulate a sphere of politics within which political expression is made 
to appear in a manner that corresponds to rational-critical debate. With Habermas, then, 
we start to see the way in which Left/Right can work to reproduce liberal, democratic order 
through regulating political expression – making subject positions account for their being in 
relation to their partaking in the in-common in a manner that is particular, and, as such, in 
a manner that also engenders miscounts/exclusions: 
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[…] it is important to recognize the vicious circle that 
characterizes political philosophy; a vicious circle located in the 
link between the political relationship and the political subject. 
This vicious circle posits a way of life that is ‘proper’ to politics.268  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
268 Rancière, Jacques, 2001, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, translated by: Rachel Bowlby & Davide Panagia, 
Theory & Event, Vol. 5, No. 3, viewed 7 June, 2019, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/32639>. 
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Chapter 3: Political space in Habermas 
1. Introduction 
Left/Right are markers that enable the social body to represent itself to itself as one 
political community. They mark out and order a political space, and in so doing enable a 
variety of ways of being political while also excluding others. This is what I concluded in the 
last chapter. In this chapter I seek to learn more about political space and the ways in 
which subject positions can express themselves within it. I do this by examining the writings 
of Jürgen Habermas. Not only is Habermas one of the most influential thinkers on the 
‘public sphere’, one of the names that I give this political space, but he also speaks to the 
categories of inclusion and exclusion as he forwards his normative theory for deliberative 
democracy. In this sense, he is the prime candidate to give us an account of political space 
that is situated within the enlightenment tradition – an account that I sought at the end of 
the last chapter. 
Habermas’ theory of democratic deliberation is centred around reason-giving arguments. 
He constructs a ‘wild’ political space that is saturated by arguments in the search for a 
rational consensus. It is rational insofar as arguments conform to the regulative ideals of 
“democracy, publicity, inclusion and egalitarianism”269. In this sense, it is a consensus that 
always sets out in search of its enlightenment foundations as it always seeks to engender 
more inclusion into the political space. This space, however, remains one as it is not only 
tied to democratic decision-making (i.e. legislation) but also because it qualifies legitimate 
political expression, requiring it to take the form of the reason-giving argument. 
In the previous chapter, through Rancière, I noted that political space is formed by the 
police effecting a distribution of the sensible. It does this by counting the subject positions 
and enabling subject positions to express themselves in a way that is particular. In other 
words, the police functions to give form to subject positions.270 In the previous chapter, I 
argued that Left/Right are categories of the police. As such, they map out the political 
space by distributing subject positions in relation to one another (arithmetic). However, as 
the police also functions to give expression to those political subject positions in a way that 
is particular (rather than universal), Left/Right then also become intertwined with this 
 
269 Thomassen, Lasse, 2008, Deconstructing Habermas, Routledge: New York, p.17. 
270 Ranciere does not actually use the phrase ‘subject position’, but in line with noted Rancierian 
scholar, Samuel Chambers, we think it can be read into his theory quite unproblematically. For 
example, see, Chambers, Samuel, 2013, The Lessons of Ranciere, Oxford University Press: New York, 
p.117. 
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mode of expression. In Habermas, this mode of expression is the reason-giving argument, 
which means that Left/Right might be said to not only structure reason-giving arguments 
but also bestow upon them a degree of legitimacy. This also means that other modes of 
expression cannot be heard equally and that the subject positions forwarding them cannot 
be counted to the same extent. Habermas then does provide us with a version of the 
interior of the Left/Right political space that I sought, yet, as we will see, we must go 
beyond him to theorise the hegemony of this space and its propensity for rupture and so 
also the ideological function of Left/Right. 
In the first two sections of this chapter, I discuss the notion of the common good in Jean-
Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant. I do this to show some of Habermas’ intellectual 
heritage and to ground the discussion in humanism, the ways in which we might be said to 
be different from each other, and how we can manifest difference in a public and political 
setting without arousing violence. I also discuss how Habermas avoids some of the more 
troubling aspects of Kant and Rousseau’s theory while remaining within a humanist 
tradition that has ‘reason’ as a viable political concept. It is also here that I outline his idea 
of communicative action as a way to guarantee difference, inclusion and reason, all at the 
same time. 
In the third section I engage the ways in which we might conceive of difference in 
Habermasian theory and note that the only really legitimate political difference between us 
can be a difference in argumentation. However, as this difference must make way for a 
consensus, the category of difference is found to be quite narrowly conceptualised. 
After this, I square Habermas’ account of the wild political public sphere with a concept of a 
constitutive open space, that nevertheless is only open to reason-giving arguments. From 
this, I integrate what we have learned about Left/Right and argue that they function well in 
relation to Habermasian political space to enable an identification of different reason-
giving arguments to the different participant to democratic deliberation. 
2. The common good in Rousseau and Kant 
2.1.  Introduction 
In this section, I locate Habermas – and the question of political space – in a wider context, 
starting with Rousseau and Kant. I highlight their contribution to the conceptualisation of 
the innate freedom of the willing individual and the innate equality between human beings. 
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These are concepts which, more than any others, structure our democratic theory and 
which, as we have seen, are closely related to the thinking of Left/Right.  
2.2.  Rousseau 
Before the social body started to represent itself to itself as a political community, before 
the advent of politics and the democratic revolution, the seeds of democracy in the West 
were being sown. As civil society started to come into its own, so too did a representation 
of those who inhabited this civil society – a new concept of the human being. Intellectually, 
Rousseau was at the forefront of these developments. He relied on a particular kind of 
humanism in his attempt to draft an early ideal of a political community. We see this with 
Kant’s famous words that: 
 
I feel a great thirst for knowledge and an impatient eagerness to 
advance, also satisfaction at each progressive step. There was a 
time when I thought that all this could constitute the honor of 
humanity, and I despised the mob, which knows nothing about 
it. Rousseau set me straight. This dazzling excellence vanishes; I 
learn to honor men.271 
  
At a time when the mob was often seen as just that, Rousseau discovered a value to the 
human in the mob. This value expressed itself through the notion of a will – a will that all 
individual human beings possessed.272 As such, his arguments foreshadowed the way in 
which political order would one day acquire its legitimacy, not from the will of God, but 
from the will of the people. Before Ernst Kantorowicz and Claude Lefort had theorised the 
ultimate separation of the dual body for the king and the emergence of the empty seat of 
power, Rousseau was effecting it. Particularly relevant to Kant, Rousseau argued that this 
‘will’ could act as a free “moral cause”:273 it was free as it resided in the human and was 
 
271 Kant, Immanuel cited in Stace, Walter T., 1949, ‘The Need for a Secular Ethic’, Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientist, Vol. 5, No. 6-7, pp.197-198, p.197. 
272 He derived this notion of will from the ideas of the divine will. See Riley, Patrick, 1978, ‘The 
General Will before Rousseau’, Political Theory, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp.485-516, p.486. 
273 Riley, Patrick, 1991, ‘Rousseau’s General Will: Freedom of a Particular Kind’, Political Studies, Vol. 
39, No. 1, pp.55-74, p.66. Rousseau was seen to take many positions on this, many of which ascribed 
the choice of the will to honour others as motived by sentiment, i.e. making it so that the will could 
not act as a moral cause in and of itself. No matter what, however, his establishment of the relative 
independence of the will was hugely significant for Kant. 
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thus not necessarily constrained by external factors and it could act as a moral cause as this 
freedom endowed it with qualities of a first mover, unaccountable to no one but itself. This 
capacity of the will was a capacity that was peculiar to the human species and endowed it 
with a status that was different to other beings.274 As such, the honouring of the will 
became of supreme importance.  
Rousseau argued that, “to deprive your will of all freedom is to deprive your actions of all 
morality”.275 With this, he tied politics to morality and the freedom of the will that it 
demanded. Yet, in Rousseau, the object of politics became to “generalize the will, so that it 
elects only law, citizenship and the common good, and avoids wilful self-love”,276 to 
establish a ‘general will’.277 Rousseau’s idea of the political community, then, became 
lodged at the intersection of freedom and equality. Free will was equally possessed by all 
human beings but had to be directed at the establishment of a general will that would be 
concerned with the common good. This general will would be devoid of discord, and 
singular. The political community of Rousseau’s dreams would then not need 
representation278 and it would not be multiple. It would be an organic one.  
The political community of Rousseau’s thinking would be one in which human beings, 
imbued with value – thanks to their willing capacities – could have their differences 
annulled through the election of the general will: the space of the manifestation of the 
public then became the space in which it manifested its sameness. In this sense, while his 
thought was influential in establishing a base for the emergence of formal democratic 
institutions – and with them, a political community, his concept of politics remained 
something to be overcome. The establishment of the general will and the common good 
was of superior importance to the allowance for (political) discord. Interestingly, we find 
Marcel Gauchet’s account of the prevalent economy of representation that characterised 
nineteenth century France echoed here. Politics was about the election of the general will, 
about the revelation of the unitary will of the people – which we, for example, see echoed 
in Rousseau’s abhorrence of factions.279 In this sense, while Rousseau was laying the 
 
274 Rousseau, after all, was one of the founders of modern Romanticism, which imbued the category 
of the human with a notion of spirituality. See Rousseau, Jacques, 1889, Emile: Or, Concerning 
Education, translated by: Eleanor Worthington, D. C. Heath & Company: Boston.  
275 Riley, 1991, p.55. 
276 Ibid., p.55. 
277 Ibid., p.55. 
278 Rousseau, Jacques, 2002, The Social Contract and the First and Second Discourses, translated by: 
Susan Dunn, Yale University Pres: New Haven, p.221. 
279 Ibid., p.173. 
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groundwork for the emptying of the place of power, he was not ready to embrace it. 
Rousseau’s idea of the public space was a place of immanence and the realisation of the 
general will; it was a place where differences were not represented, but annulled. As such, 
there would be no room for Left/Right either, as they allude to a legitimate division within 
the political community. 
2.3.  Kant 
It is from these observations, with regards to the supremacy of the will and an 
establishment of a general will preoccupied with the common good, that we can trace 
Kant’s thoughts back to Rousseau. Yet, to Kant, one factor helped clarify the notion of the 
general will: the universal nature of ‘reason’ – that is, the ability to act according to what 
ought to be, rather than acting based purely on instincts, passions or indoctrination.280 
Throughout his life, Kant modified his account of human beings’ access to Reason by 
moving from an earlier assertion that reason was just there for people to see, as a fact, to 
reason being something that was learned through socialisation.281 Here, I work mostly with 
Kant’s earlier notion of the “fact of reason”,282 as it is from this that Habermas draws 
inspiration.283 It would, however, be controversial to paint him and/or Kant as pure 
rationalists.284 
To Kant, Reason was universal and there to be apprehended as a fact. As such, it had to be 
located inside us, even if it could only be manifested in our relations to each other. Reason 
itself was not a manifest thing, but rather represented an ability to think about the 
common good, as it was through reason that one could understand that reason was 
located in all willing beings, in all human beings, and not just in oneself. It was through 
reason that the question of ‘what is good for me?’ became ‘what is good for all of us?’. 
Reason taught humility and appreciation for peace and prosperity for all.285 As such, it was 
 
280 This was one argument that Rousseau never forwarded. Reason was never universal for Rousseau 
the way in which it was for Kant. 
281 For a debate on this, see Beck, Gunnar, 2006, ‘Immanuel Kant’s Theory of Rights’, Ratio Juris, Vol. 
19, No. 4, pp.371-401. 
282 Immanuel Kant cited in Riley, 1991, p.58. 
283 Thomassen, 2008, p.19. Even though later tenets of Kant’s work are also clearly present in 
Habermas’ writings. 
284 Much of Deconstructing Habermas implicitly deals with whether or not it is fair to label Habermas 
as a rationalist, which Thomassen implicitly argues that Mouffe does. See ibid., pp.24-27. 
285 “[R]eason from its throne of supreme morally legislating authority absolutely condemns war as a 
legal recourse and makes a state of peace a direct duty”. Kant, Immanuel, 2017, Towards Perpetual 
Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, pp.1-30, p.10, viewed 13 Feb, 2019, 
<https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/kant1795.pdf>. 
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reason that taught that all human beings are equal and, in some sense, the same: one. It 
was also reason that taught that the prosperity of people, the human beings, should be the 
end, not the means, of politics.286 Like Rousseau, then, Kant was busy ensuring that the 
bond between the divine and the mortal was severed, so that the people could rule 
themselves. However, he too sought to fill the empty space with a positive concept: 
reason. 
Reason, then, became inherently intertwined with morality and imposed moral duties on 
all of us.287 These duties related to the ways in which we should relate to one another in 
accordance with the maxim that we should treat others as we would like to be treated 
ourselves, i.e. as equals. This concern could, in turn, only arise if a voluntary association of 
citizens were living together in a society free from coercion, so that the wills would be free 
to grasp the fact of reason. In this sense, the common good could only come about in a 
polis that was governed by Reason.  
Kant’s ideal political community thus became informed by a humanism that proclaimed all 
human beings to be equal and subsumable under the category of the human being ‘as 
such’. This also meant that politics, for Kant, became a realisation of this freedom and 
equality between all human beings. The human being became his political subject, and it 
 
286 Kant, Immanuel, 2006, ‘Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective’, in: 
Kleingeld, Pauline (ed.), Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and History, 
translated by: Pauline Kleingeld, Yale University Press: New Haven, pp.3-16. 
287 Reason, however, while being both there as a fact to the younger Kant and learned in the older 
Kant, required “understanding” to be grasped. Understanding, in Kant, is, “our active faculty for 
relating the data of intuition by thinking them under concepts”. See Guyer, Paul & Wood, Allen, 
1998, ‘Introduction’, in: Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by: Paul Guyer & Allen 
Wood, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, pp.1-80, pp.6-7. As such, in The Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant describes the ways in which human understanding exists, before external stimuli 
encounter it, as an a priori. Kant writes: “We can have synthetic cognition a priori about objects of 
experience, if [it] consists of principles of the possibility of experience”. Cited in Guyer & Wood, 
1998, pp.62-63. This meant that there are elements, be they cognitive or otherwise, which enable an 
understanding of external forces. This is a necessity for any sort of, not only order, but coherence. 
Importantly though, at least in the Kant of The Critique, things cannot be known outside of our 
sensibility. Yet, while we thus must have faculties that enable knowledge about external forces, the 
knowledge can only take shape qua the existence of our faculties. Importantly as well, these 
faculties are shared and present in human cognition as such. Equality and freedom are then, in both 
Kant and Rousseau, deeply intertwined and cannot be realised separately from one another. 
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took on this role qua the equal autonomy of our wills and our ability to reason.288 We 
became the animal that can reason.289  
Again, as with Rousseau, there is a problem in relation to the recognition of difference. 
Again, the political community in which the public was to manifest reason became one in 
which it realised and represented sameness, not difference. It follows that, again, 
Left/Right, would be meaningless signifiers in such a public community. As all would be 
subsumed under the rubric of the human being who is capable of reason, the political 
community – within which equality and freedom are to be realised – would, on a 
conceptual level, be a political community that relied on an a priori. In other words, it is 
already defined by Kant before it would have a chance to realise its own incongruence, 
leaving any deviance from the Kantian ideal a mistake, rather than a legitimate difference. 
If we look back at the previous chapter, we see that questions of identification, upon which 
Chantal Mouffe and Torben Dyrberg focused so heavily, are made null and void in Kant, as 
identification relies on representation while the reason of Kant’s human being is immanent. 
This means that Kant (and Rousseau) also cannot theorise any sort of exclusion from the 
political community. 
We can, of course, also still see Gauchet’s description of the nineteenth century economy 
of representation echoed in this, as Kant’s political community is one in which equality and 
freedom become subsumed under an underlying sameness that is asserted through his 
philosophical reasoning. There is no need for Left/Right as there is no difference. Left/Right 
work to legitimise a type of difference and make it intelligible in relation to a whole, but 
whatever difference that might exist in a Kantian world must be negated by objective moral 
principles. The place for politics that I opened with Lefort, Harold Mah and Gauchet is thus 
rapidly closed by Kant as people become enveloped in the immanence of reason. 
 
 
288 Yet different emphases are placed on either the autonomy of the will or the ability to reason, 
depending on whether one looks at the earlier or the later Kant. In the earlier Kant, reason is not 
learned through socialisation, it is just there as a fact. In the later Kant, as socialisation begins to 
imply an accumulation and perfection of reason over a progression of time, reason itself becomes a 
driving force of history, rather than the human beings who tap into it every so often. It is also in this 
sense that the notion of the Enlightenment, or Aufklärung, acquires two different meanings; one is 
individual and one is social. See Riley, 1991. For an example of a later reading, see Kant, Immanuel, 
1784, What is Enlightenment, translated by: Mary C. Smith, viewed 1 Sept, 2017, < 
http://www.columbia.edu/acis/ets/CCREAD/etscc/kant.html>.  
289 Kant, 2006, p.5. 
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2.4.  Conclusion 
In this section, we learned that Rousseau sees morality as dictating that we are all equal, 
but that this equality can only be realised if our wills are also free from coercion. Rousseau 
therefore strives for a community in which people will elect a general will. Expanding on 
this, Kant stresses the importance of reason. He argues that we have moral duties to treat 
others as we would want to be treated ourselves, that we all have a priori cognitive 
faculties that enable us to understand that. As such, he argues that politics should serve to 
advance the general prosperity of the human race. Both Rousseau and Kant thus saw 
politics, conceived as some kind legitimate discord about the in-common, as something to 
be overcome.  
3. The common good in Habermas 
3.1.  Introduction 
In this section, I start to engage Habermas. I first discuss the problems with the 
Rousseauian and Kantian approach in relation to the degree to which reason simply 
becomes a tool for the powerful to enforce norms. We then see Habermas acknowledge 
these shortcomings, but nevertheless seek to salvage the emancipatory potential of 
reason. He does this by stating that reason can only manifest itself intersubjectively, 
through communicative processes that seek to protect ‘the forceless force of the better 
argument’. I nevertheless critique Habermas for failing to break decisively enough from the 
Kantian tradition, as his political subject, the emancipation of which becomes the goal of 
his imagined political community, remains located outside representation, and thus 
immanently graspable. That subject is the human being, defined through its ability to 
participate in the creation of a rational consensus. 
3.2.  The problems with reason 
In Kant, the political subject was the human being. Human beings were now generating 
value, rather than their value being derived from something other. We all mattered 
innately and equally, and this made the establishment of a public reason the political (and 
moral) task par excellence. However, while adherence to reason leads us to a common 
good – at least insofar that we can ensure that it thrives – the question becomes one of 
whose common good that is. Is it only the smartest of us who are able to see reason most 
clearly, and if so, is it only the smartest of us who rule? If we do not all see reason in the 
same way, who is right and how is it decided? History is littered with cruel representations 
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and treatments of people who could and would not conform to what was deemed 
reasonable. In Kant, one could argue that reason promised to annul our differences as we 
learned the truth of it, yet, as the cruel treatment between supposed equals around the 
globe has shown, either human beings have failed to grasp reason satisfactorily and are 
thus still some way off the state of perpetual peace,290 or Kant’s theory requires 
modification.291 Kant’s political community that would be immanent to itself, without the 
need for representation, has then palpably failed to materialise. But even if it could, would 
we want it to? 
Habermas does not deviate significantly from Kant’s position, as the autonomous will has 
to remain for morality to still be a workable term.292 For Habermas, it is only through Kant 
that we are able to avoid abject nihilism293 and remain within the humanist tradition. 
Habermas, then, like Kant, subsumes politics under morality. Specifically, this means that 
his work is normative, and that he grounds his political theory in something on the basis of 
which knowledge can develop, but which knowledge also cannot explain: the sanctity of 
the human being. This grounding takes place within the realm of communication and 
language and sees his Kantian heritage take on an explicitly deliberative form. It does this 
so as to overcome the extreme rationalism that is arguably present in Kant and try to find a 
place for reason in a political community, without reason simply being what those who 
dominate say it is. In this sense, he attempts to insert a degree of representation into the 
 
290 Kant, 2017. 
291 These questions were clearly not lost on Kant, as he himself developed extremely racist ideas and 
sought to formulate them into coherent theory. See, for example, Kant, Immanuel, 2007, ‘Of the 
Different Races of Human Beings’, in: Louden, Robert (ed.), Anthropology, History, and Education, 
translated by: Günter Zoller & Robert B. Louden, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, pp.82–97. 
There is some debate over whether Kant’s views on race implicated his philosophical insights. See, 
for example, Cash, Mason, 2002, ‘Distancing Kantian Ethics and Politics from Kant’s Views on 
Women’, Minerva: An Internet Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 6, pp.103-150. Pauline Kleingeld also 
contends that he changed his mind as he got older. See Kleingeld, Pauline, 2007, ‘Kant’s Second 
Thoughts on Race’, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 229, pp.573-592. However, Bernard 
Boxill convincingly shows that it was no accident that these views sprang from Kant’s writings. See 
Boxill, Bernard, 2017, ‘Kantian Racism and Kantian Teleology’, in: Zach, Naomi (ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook on Philosophy and Race, Oxford University Press: New York, pp.44-52. His views on 
women, sex and marriage has also appeared to some to reveal a “deep-seated conservative 
misogyny”. See Cash, 2002, p.103. This has led Charles Mills, paraphrasing Schröder, to argue that 
Kant “arguably defines his terms so that being male is a prerequisite for full personhood”. See Mills, 
Charles W., 2005, ‘“Ideal Theory” as Ideology’, Hypatia, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp.165-184, p.179. 
292 Habermas, Jürgen, 2007, ‘The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free 
Will: How can epistemic dualism be reconciled with ontological monism’, Philosophical Explorations, 
Vol. 10, No. 1, pp.13-50, p.15. This does not mean that he views Rousseau unproblematically, 
however. See Habermas, Jürgen, 1992a, ‘Further Reflections on the Public Sphere’, in: Calhoun, Craig 
(ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere, The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA., pp.421-461, p.445. 
293 Habermas cited in Thomassen, 2008, p.19. 
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Kantian conception of the political community, while nevertheless retaining reason as a 
workable concept. 
Habermas accomplishes this adaptation of Kantian theory to a more discursively focused 
theory by asserting that reason can only manifest itself in communication that presupposes 
the inherent freedom and equality between its participants. In this sense, we cannot say 
what is reasonable prior to the establishment of the deliberative consensus.294 While the 
sanctity of the human being remains beyond reproach, in Habermas, it is no longer possible 
for the philosopher to decree the level of reason that any given person has obtained. 
Reason can now only be manifested in language, i.e. intersubjectively, which means that 
human beings are no longer privileged because we can access reason, but because we can 
access language. The human being morphs from the animal that can reason, to the animal 
that can communicate. As this happens, a notion of plurality and difference also emerges 
from this type of “detranscendentalization”, as: 
 
[…] the transcendental subject loses its position outside time and 
space and is [instead] transformed into a multitude of subjects 
capable of speech and action.295 
 
It is in this sense that, in Habermas, political difference truly comes into its own in relation 
to Kantian theory. Certainly, speech must honour the freedom and equality of the human 
being to be considered capable of bringing about a rational consensus and it must adhere 
to the principle of universalisation,296 but Habermas still breaks with the Cartesian subject-
centred philosophy that otherwise held Kant (and Rousseau) back. In this sense, he can be 
perceived as being somewhat aligned with more recent post-structuralist thinkers who 
otherwise critique him for being too rationalist.297  
 
294 Habermas maintains that there is an always-already, implicitly formed background consensus 
within which we interact with each other. Here, meaning is established before the willing individual 
encounters it. 
295 Habermas, Jürgen, 2001a, ‘From Kant’s “Ideas” of Pure Reason to the “Idealizing” Presuppositions 
of Communicative Action: Reflections on the Detranscendentalized “Use of Reason”’, in: Rehg, 
William & Bohman, James (eds.), MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, pp.11-40, p.16.  
296 Habermas, Jürgen, 1990, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, translated by: Christian 
Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen, Polity Press: Cambridge, p.116.  
297 For two such readings see Mouffe, 2005, pp.83-89, and Laclau, Ernesto, 1997, ‘The Death and 
Resurrection of the Theory of Ideology’, MLN, Vol. 112, No. 3, pp.297-231, pp.307-308.  
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It is in and through language that the political community must realise the promises of 
freedom and equality. This, of course, does not mean that Habermas only thinks that one 
discursive space exists, or that there can be no exclusion from this space.298 Indeed, the 
political space that presents itself as the political community is never neutral as it is always 
informed by an already established consensus. As such, we enter communication, not from 
a vacuum, but from within a background consensus that contains within it its own rules and 
its own notion of morality – in the sense that notions of right and wrong are embedded 
within it – and its own ethics – in the sense that certain worldviews have more prevalence 
than others.299 Members of the political community, then, do not enter into 
communication from disparate positions but from a consensus about the world which 
human beings must continue to inform an understanding of and influence through more 
communication.300 For his political community, this of course has the peculiar effect that 
the human species must be one before it can scatter and become different. In other words, 
difference is not constitutive of the human species. Rather, humans are the same before 
we can even begin to talk about our differences and we would have to be the same in order 
to talk about them to begin with. 
3.3.  The way past the problems: communicative reason 
We then start with a consensus, but through speech acts, this consensus is also disrupted 
and disputed. Notably, Habermas contends that speech acts contain validity claims,301 
understood primarily as claims to truth and moral rightness.302 These validity claims both 
originate within and break from the consensus, even if they, qua their being as speech acts, 
also point towards a renewed consensus.303 Importantly, for Habermas, engaging J. L. 
Austin, these speech acts can be illocutionary, meaning that they can be formed with a 
“communicative intent”,304 where “the meaning of what is said”305 forms the basis of the 
communication. This means that a sincerity is inherent to the act. To Habermas, the making 
 
298 Habermas, 1992a, p.425. 
299 Insofar as this does not refer to his work on the linguistic necessity of this assumption, see his 
work on the lifeworld/system distinction that he develops fully in Habermas, Jürgen, 1987, The 
Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 2., translated by: Thomas McCarthy, Polity Press: Cambridge. 
300 Ibid., p.220. 
301 See Niemi, Jari I., 2005, ‘Habermas and validity claims’, International Journal of Philosophical 
studies’, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp.227-244 for a discussion. 
302 Thomassen, 2008, p.17. 
303 Ibid., p.17. 
304 Habermas, Jürgen, 1984, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 1., translated by: Thomas 
McCarthy, Heinemann: London, p.289. 
305 Ibid., 1984, p.289. 
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of these speech acts is normative in nature, as they then presuppose a reciprocity on behalf 
of the people who are also engaged in the communication.306 The adjudications of social 
norms and morals can thus be removed from the purview of philosophers, as they can still 
find reasonable resolutions insofar that the communication in which that takes place is in 
accordance with ideal procedures.307 Reason, which remains tied to morality, can then find 
expression intersubjectively, because the use of language has some particular features that 
are tailored towards unprejudiced mutual understanding.308 
For this type of discourse ethics to be workable, however, some more concrete features 
also remain. For example, it still involves some form of reason-giving account for validity 
claims. A consensus cannot be reasonable if it has not been formed by reasons. The extent 
to which this consensus is rational, however, depends on the quality of the reasons given. 
Habermas elaborates in the following on the ideal procedures required for such a rational 
consensus to come about: 
 
Whoever takes part in moral argumentation must be able to 
assume that certain pragmatic presuppositions are sufficiently 
fulfilled, that is, that the practice of reaching understanding is 
public, is universally accessible, is free of external and internal 
violence, and permits only the rationally motivating force of the 
better argument.309 
 
In order for a rational consensus to develop, certain procedures for communication must 
then be met. Lasse Thomassen refers to these as “democracy, publicity, inclusion and 
egalitarianism”.310 These are then regulative ideals that provide the grounding for a vision 
of society in which communication between all informs power, rather than “money and 
 
306 Habermas, 1990, p.130. 
307 Ibid., 1990, p.122. 
308 While we do not get into the philosophical roots of this argument here, we can note that 
Habermas maintains that, “the moral point of view is already implicit in the socio-ontological 
constitution of the public practice of argumentation, comprising the complex relations of mutual 
recognition that participants in rational discourse ‘must’ accept (in the sense of weak transcendental 
necessity)”. Habermas, Jürgen, 1995, ‘Reconciliation Through the Public use of Reason: Remarks on 
Rawls’s Political Liberalism’, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 92, No. 3, pp.109-131, p.127. 
309 Habermas, Jürgen, 1996, Between Facts and Norms, translated by: William Rehg, Polity Press: 
Cambridge, p.182. 
310 Thomassen, 2008, p.17. 
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administrative power”311 deciding how the ‘lifeworld’ should be organised. Habermas’ 
vision for the political community is thus a democratic vision that circumscribes a notion of 
the common good through the ability for all to decide what is good for all.312 
We therefore find the notion of the common good lodged in relation to the notion of 
communication. Communication should ideally fulfil certain criteria, but the common good 
is realised, when the political public sphere, the sphere of communication where the 
political community is manifested, produces communication that enables “new problem 
situations” to be perceived,313 which can then be acted on politically. This implies a 
structural relationship between the legislative sphere and the political public sphere – or, 
the sphere of political communication – in which the legislative sphere is supervised and 
overseen by the political public sphere rather than being beholden to money or 
bureaucracy. We might even qualify this legislative sphere as forming an institutionalised 
aspect of the public sphere, which secures that the otherwise wild and unruly public sphere 
can have an impact on decision making.314 
However, Habermas’ vision of the common good remains focused on the realisation of the 
political community as a one, not only because – despite talk of the political public sphere 
as being wild and unruly – he still refers to it in the singular,315 but also because his theory 
of communicative action remains couched in the belief that consensus is generative and 
difference derivative – a belief derived from the conceptualisation of the human being as 
necessarily the same. Habermas criticised the noted Kantian scholar, Dieter Hamann, for 
forwarding an unapologetically subject-based philosophy and, in the process, disregarding 
the critique levelled against Kant by the champions of the primacy of language (and 
discourse).316 Yet, the political subject, for Habermas, remains located outside of discourse 
and immanently present; it is the human being. This is the case as the human being, unlike 
all other animals, always-already exists as part of a community of language users – as part 
 
311 Habermas, 1992a, p.444. 
312 Much of Habermas’ writing is lodged at the intersection of law and democracy as we need law to 
protect and enable democratic processes, but at the same time we require for those laws to be 
democratically decided upon. This apparent conundrum is not explicitly discussed here, but it has 
caused ample debate in many other places. See, for example, Habermas, Jürgen, 2001, 
‘Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?’, translated by: William 
Rehg, Political Theory, Vol. 29, No. 6, pp.766-781.  
313 Habermas, 1996, p.308. 
314 Ibid., p.307. 
315 This is evident throughout his writings. 
316 Velkley, Richard L., 1994, ‘Introduction’, in: Velkley, Richard L. (ed.), The Unity of Reason: Essays 
on Kant’s Philosophy, translated by: Jeffrey Edwards, Louis Hunt, Manfred Kuehn & Guenter Zoeller, 
Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA., pp.1-16, p.5. 
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of a community within which a code of ethics, a worldview, is defined intersubjectively. 
There may be more than one community and people can co-exist in many communities at 
once, yet the human being remains located outside of language (and discourse). Habermas’ 
political project thus becomes one of emancipation of human beings. It is a deeply 
humanist project. Yet, it is a project in which the finer nuances of that emancipation must 
remain democratically defined.317 He lodges the common good in communication and 
posits a theory of communicative action that raises a regulative ideal for rational 
arguments that can lead to rational consensuses. However, those consensuses can only be 
rational insofar that they are children of the contexts within which they have been 
formulated (and, as such, will always be in need of reformulation once the context 
shifts).318 Habermas’ political community, while requiring representation in order to make 
sense of the world, and while requiring language and discourse in order to come to an idea 
of what the political community is, must then be steered towards a particular type of 
language via the regulative procedures that I outlined above, in order to be rational and 
good. Importantly, the criteria for this goodness remains located outside language, outside 
representation, and is instead immanently present in the form of the physical 
manifestation of the human being, who simply is.  
One repercussion of this idea – locating the political subject outside of discourse – is that it 
implies a notion of difference that, while pivotal to rational communication, is ultimately 
subsumed by a forced designation of the human being as the political subject.319 In this 
sense, difference is always only a pathway to consensus, a flaw that is necessary only 
because it enables clarity. Despite the focus on communication and deliberation, difference 
remains a mistake to be corrected.  
Within the problematic that I outlined with Lefort, we might then argue that Habermas 
struggles to come to terms with the emptiness of the place of power as he, in forwarding a 
 
317 This also leaves him with a peculiar definition of progress, which raises further doubt as to the 
extent to which one can place him in a liberal camp. For it sees him ascribe to the necessity of an 
idea of progress, yet denounce the implicit notion of an increased perfection inherent to the idea of 
progress.  
318 See Habermas, 1996, pp.132-193. We subsume a rather substantive amount of Habermas’ 
thought in this brief sentence and quote. As this thesis is focused on Habermas’ notion of 
deliberative democracy in relation to its spatial dimensions, an engagement with the gap between 
legality and legitimacy is simply beyond its scope. 
319 See Wagner, Gerhard & Zipprian, Heinz, 1991, ‘Intersubjectivity and critical consciousness: 
Remarks on Habermas's theory of communicative action’, Inquiry, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp.49-62, for how 
Habermas fails to complete the discursive turn and some of the consequences this can be said to 
have. 
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specific conception of the human being vis-à-vis language, effects an identification of the 
procedures necessary to bring about the immanence of ‘the people’ – the political category 
par excellence. This allows us to productively map Habermas onto our discussion about 
Left/Right. For, in one way, Left/Right emerged under the condition of the empty place of 
power that engendered a constitutive division within the political community. In this sense, 
Left/Right require difference in order to function. In another way, however, Left/Right 
enable an identification with a whole; they refer to an overarching totality, just as 
Habermas refers to inter-subjective reason as bridging the gap between difference and 
constituting the human being. 
3.4.  Conclusion 
In this section, we saw how Habermas moves past Kant’s subject-centred philosophy to 
establish that reason can only be manifested intersubjectively. In doing so, he envisions a 
political space in which the public can come together to define the contours of human 
emancipation. Habermas makes room for representation to a different degree than 
Rousseau and Kant as he asserts that any consensus to deliberation must adhere to the 
overall mantra that only the forceless force of the better argument should rule. However, 
as I noted that he still locates the source of this rationality in a conception of the human 
being that is established outside of discourse itself, and is thus beyond reproach, his 
political theory comes to a halt at that point. Most notably, this shows us that the concept 
of difference, while necessary for reason to be inter-subjective, must have a limit to be 
viable.  
4. Difference in Habermas 
4.1.  Introduction 
In this section, I argue that political difference, in Habermas, manifests itself in at least two 
different senses in his theory of communicative action. In the first sense, difference can be 
articulated in terms of ethical worldviews, or, taking from John Rawls, as comprehensive 
doctrines.320 In the second sense, within the formulation of the rational consensus, it is only 
through difference (or negation) that consensus, viewed as a synthesis, can be 
accomplished. This second difference is a difference between arguments. Overall, 
Habermas only allows for political difference in the political community to express itself 
 
320 Habermas, 1995, p.124. Habermas here uses the term ‘worldviews’ in place of Rawls’ 
‘comprehensive doctrines’ in a discussion otherwise revolving around the consequences of using the 
term ‘reasonable’ to qualify validity claims. 
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insofar as it takes the form of reason-giving arguments, arguing that reasons derived from 
ethical worldviews must be translated into political reasons in order to engender a rational 
consensus. 
4.2.  The difference between worldviews 
In Habermas’ theory of communicative action, there might be said to be two distinct types 
of differences. This is important as we need to excavate a notion of difference to be able to 
give a Habermasian reading of the Left/Right spectrum. The first difference can be said to 
be differences between ethical worldviews – which are comprised mainly of religions and 
cultures. These worldviews, beyond the fact that “they offer interpretations of the world as 
a whole”,321 create values which take as their political subjects something that is at odds 
with the political subject as the human being itself: 
 
It belongs to the religious convictions of a good many religious 
people in our society that they ought to base their decisions 
concerning fundamental issues of justice on their religious 
convictions. They do not view it as an option whether or not to do 
it.322 
 
As such, religious reasons often limit the scope of who counts (i.e. non-believers often 
count less than believers). In narrowing their concept of the political subject in this way, 
they fall foul of the ideal of universalism that Habermas takes from Kant (and the 
Enlightenment more broadly) and that acts as the bedrock upon which freedom and 
equality work. To be rational, the political community must be a community of equals, the 
forwarding of whose freedoms and equality must be the object of the conversation.  
In his later writings, Habermas acknowledges the validity of the existence of these types of 
differences, and even argues that religious reasons must be accepted in the political public 
sphere.323 However, as the political public sphere links up with other democratic 
institutions, such as parliaments, which must remain neutral in relation to different 
 
321 Ibid., p.126. 
322 Wolterstorff cited in Habermas, Jürgen, 2006, ‘Religion in the Public Sphere’, European Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp.1-25, p.8. 
323 Habermas, 2006, p.10. 
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conceptions of ‘the good life’, it is important that these reasons are also translated into 
“post-secular” reasons,324 and that this is done in the political public sphere itself.325 In 
other words, reasons must eventually be given that address the common good on the basis 
of a common equality and freedom: they must be political reasons, not cultural or religious 
reasons. In this first sense, then, difference might be conceptualised as a difference in 
values (or ontologies). Within a Habermasian conception of the common good, however, 
these differences must ultimately not be political; they may not carry undue weight in the 
search for a rational consensus. Unlike Rawls, then, Habermas does not seek the exclusion 
of religious reasons from the political public sphere, even though he does establish a 
hierarchy between modes of reasoning.326  
4.3.  The difference between arguments 
In the second sense, within the formulation of the rational consensus, it is only through 
difference that the rational consensus can be accomplished. As much as rational consensus 
– the synthesis of arguments – is the goal of communication, it can only come about 
through arguments – arguments that necessarily express different things. This is not a 
difference between people or between values, it is a difference in arguments – a difference 
that holds the promise of its negation. Indeed, in Habermas, difference would be worthless 
without this promise. Yet, even if I speak here about this difference in terms of arguments, 
in a ‘real world’ context, this does not express itself in clearly delineated conversations. For, 
contrary to Habermas’ earliest writings,327 he later argues that the political public sphere 
(which is the name for his idea of the political community) is not neatly structured with 
everyone expressing themselves in a similar fashion. Indeed, he rather more recently 
claimed that the political public sphere is “wild”: 
 
The currents of public communication are channelled by mass 
media and flow through different publics that develop informally 
 
324 See Habermas, Jürgen, 2003, The Future of Human Nature, translated by: William Rehg, Max 
Pensky & Hella Beister, Polity Press: Cambridge, pp.101-115 for further discussions on the post-
secular society. 
325 Habermas, 2006, p.10. 
326 Thomassen, 2006, pp.74-75. 
327 Habermas, Jürgen, 1992b, The Structural Transformation of the Bourgeois Public Sphere, 
translated by: Thomas Burger & Frederick Lawrence, Polity Press: Cambridge. 
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inside associations. Taken together, they form a "wild" complex 
that resists organization as a whole.328 
 
It is wild in the sense that there are many different publics that express themselves 
differently and do not necessarily engage in formally structured conversations, but instead 
“[resist] organisation as a whole”. Yet, of course, the arguments must still conform to a 
communicative reason that is regulated by the ideals of ‘democracy, publicity, inclusion 
and egalitarianism’ that I outlined in the previous section.329 
This conceptualisation requires that we think in a more nuanced way about what it means 
to ‘argue’ or ‘give reasons’. Indeed, both civil disobedience and newspaper punditry could 
be conceptualised as containing reason-giving political arguments.330 Focusing on civil 
disobedience, Thomassen thus argues that, to Habermas: 
 
Civil disobedience is an extension of public deliberation with 
different means, and the act of civil disobedience should, 
according to Habermas, be understood on the model of a public 
argument.331 
 
This form of ideal political participation (the argument) merits further investigation, for it is 
the form that Habermas proposes that the political community should take. For example, 
an argument is different to an ‘opinion’, a ‘belief’, etc. One thing that makes ‘the argument’ 
stand out is its ability to convey rational-critical reasons. The ideal of the rational consensus 
thus implicitly demands that engagement with the political public sphere must take the 
 
328 Habermas, 1996, p.307. 
329 It is also through these tenets that we can legitimately exclude systemically distorted 
communication. See Habermas, Jürgen, 2008, ‘On systematically distorted communication’, Inquiry, 
Vol. 13, No. 1-4, pp.205-218. 
330 For the most sustained account of Habermas’ thoughts on civil disobedience, see Habermas, 
Jürgen, 1985, ‘Civil Disobedience: Litmus Test for the Democratic Constitutional State’, translated by: 
John Torpey, Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Vol. 30, pp.95-116. 
331 Thomassen, Lasse, 2007, ‘Within the Limits of Deliberative Reason Alone: Habermas, Civil 
Disobedience and Constitutional Democracy’, European Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 6, No. 2, 
pp.200-218, p.202. 
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form of arguments;332 we can be heard and be justly evaluated in the political community if 
we can supply (good) reasons.  
There exists some secondary literature specifically in relation to civil disobedience and the 
extent to which, in Habermas, “civil disobedience is simply an additional device that helps 
the consensus machine grind up the rough material of political life”.333 This debate is 
centred around the constitutional context that rational deliberation must reconstruct and 
the degree to which civil disobedience is a participant in this process or marks a break from 
this process through seeking to “interpret the system of rights better”334 than the 
aforementioned ‘context’ allowed.335 While engaging, this debate is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Habermas also construes of civil disobedience as “a symbolic appeal to a 
majority which is of a different opinion”336 – thus identifying some sort of participation in 
rational discourse with an expression that is symbolic and not necessarily argumentative – 
but civil disobedience remains an outlier in relation to the ideal function of the public 
sphere.337 As such, I do not see it as an overly problematic assertion that Habermas’ ideal 
political community is structured around reason-giving arguments emanating from a ‘wild’ 
public sphere.338 
 
 
332 This why Thomassen refers to this problem of the conceptualisation of the argument in relation 
to that of civil disobedience as a source of ambiguity in Habermas that reveals an aporia in 
Habermas’ normative writings. See Thomassen, 2007 & Thomassen, 2006, pp.113-116. 
333 White, Stephen K. & Farr, Robert Evan, 2012, ‘“No-Saying” in Habermas’, Political Theory, Vol. 40, 
No. 1, pp.32-57, p.40. This is a reply to Thomassen, 2007. See also Thomassen, Lasse, 2013, 
‘Communicative Reason, Deconstruction, and Foundationalism: Reply to White and Farr’, Vol. 41, 
No. 3, pp.482-488; and White, Stephen K. & Farr, 2013, ‘Reply to Thomassen’, Political Theory, Vol. 
41, No. 3, pp.489-491. 
334 Habermas cited in Thomassen, 2007, p.205. 
335 See footnote 312. 
336 Habermas cited in Nielsen, Torben Hviid & Habermas, Jürgen, 1990, ‘Jürgen Habermas: Morality, 
Society and Ethics: An Interview with Torben Hviid Nielsen’, Acta Sociologica, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp.93-
114, p.108. 
337 This relates to the degree to which we should read Habermas as an agonist. See footnote 375. 
White & Farr, 2012 argue that even though Habermas only speaks rarely to civil disobedience, it is 
actually a central concept to his theory, which is why they read him more as an agonist. However, as 
Habermas has had ample opportunity to address civil disobedience and yet has remained relatively 
silent, to represent it as central to his writings seems a stretch. 
338 This is, of course, a different way of viewing argumentation than how it was portrayed in The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. There, argumentation took place in the coffeehouses 
and salons, and in the political journals; i.e. it had a formal character. In that book, Habermas 
asserted that the capitalist mode of production, along with the extension of the suffrage to the 
working class, together with a commodification of media content, caused the public sphere to 
degrade and the process of rational reason-giving to be obfuscated. See Habermas, 1992b, pp.181-
235. 
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4.4.  The limit to difference 
To Habermas, the human species, existing always-already within a linguistic community, is 
made up of individuals. These individuals then engage in arguments that are rational to 
various degrees and have ethical beliefs that may or may not be favoured in a Habermasian 
conception of rational deliberation. Individuals may have different opinions, but individuals 
themselves are not different. Rather, they are the parts that make up ‘the people’, the 
category that furnishes democracy with legitimacy. It may be that the conception of the 
human being has changed a bit from Rousseau to Kant to Habermas, but the human being 
remains One, definable and knowable qua the a priori. To Habermas, if it was not so, it 
could not fulfil its purpose as the political subject. A negation of this understanding cannot 
be considered rational in a Habermasian system of rational deliberation as it undermines 
the assumption that underpins the whole framework.339 As such, while this definition 
should be democratically negotiable, the framework would collapse if it was eroded.340 We 
are thus left with the only conceivably legitimate difference as being one of a difference 
between arguments. Those different arguments must in turn be seen as enabling their own 
negation through the establishment of consensus, leaving the realm of politics devoid of 
difference altogether.  
In one sense, different ways of being are thus acknowledged, in the form of ethical 
worldviews, but only to be told that they must translate their reason-giving incursions into 
the public sphere into distinctly political reasons, while in another sense, another kind of 
difference is artificially erected (in the form of arguments), but only so that it can forge a 
one – in which difference disappears once again. It may be that consensuses will always 
need to be renewed, but the syntheses of arguments remain the goal of every discussion.  
As we shall see, Left/Right, operating at the level of representation, provide a way for us to 
distinguish between different arguments made by people who are otherwise similar and 
immanently present. But this particular conception of political difference also comes with 
some problems, as it makes us unable to think of exclusion as constitutive – as I did with 
Mouffe and Rancière in the previous chapter. For insofar that the political community is 
one, it will also have an identity. To Habermas, this identity is a humanist one, yet, as 
William Connolly remarks, we must reject the drive to “equate concern for human dignity 
 
339 Framework should here be read in the softest of ways. 
340 Habermas, in a roundabout way acknowledging this, asks that we must envision a founding 
peace, in which the founders of this constitutional project agreed on things in a perfectly equal and 
free context. See Habermas, 2001. 
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with a quest for rational consensus”,341 as it makes us unable to think of the other of the 
representation of the identity – of which, as we shall see, rational consensus has a few. 
4.5.  Conclusion 
In this section I discussed the two differences relative to Habermas’ working on 
communicative reason and the democratic project embedded within it. The first difference 
was related to ethical worldviews. This is a difference between values and acknowledged as 
valid in Habermas’ ideal political community, even if argues that those values must 
translate into political reasons in the political public sphere. The second difference is the 
difference between arguments that conform to the principles of communicative reason. 
These arguments strive for understanding and lead to engagement that ultimately 
engenders consensus. This is not a permanent consensus but one that changes as the 
contexts in which they are formed change. 
5. The political public sphere as political space 
5.1.  Introduction 
In this section, I engage Habermas’ concept of the public sphere. When it comes to a 
conception of the public sphere, Habermas wrote the most influential book about it – the 
seminal The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962). This section engages this 
book along with his newer thoughts on the public sphere, published in 1992. I sum up his 
key arguments before I reconceptualise the public sphere as political space. 
5.2.  Habermas’s political public sphere 
In The Structural Transformation, Habermas provides a very critical account of the public 
sphere. Nevertheless, according to Habermas, the public sphere got off to a promising 
start. Following from the introduction of the public sphere of letters, the political public 
sphere developed. It was mostly comprised of bourgeois men, who met as private 
individuals in coffeehouses and salons to form a critically debating public. The main 
function of this gathering was for the participants to assert themselves as the people, 
demanding their concerns be judged as the legitimising function of the political order. Yet 
this was, of course, a fantasy, as many groups of people could not participate in this public 
sphere due to a lack of status. Habermas writes that: 
 
341 Connolly, William, 1991, Identity Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, 
University of Minnesota Press: Minnesota, p.x. 
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The fully developed Bourgeois Public Sphere was based on the 
fictitious identity of the two roles assumed by the privatized 
individuals who came together to form a public: the role of 
property owners and the role of human beings pure and 
simple.342 
 
What he here remarks upon is the way in which the universality of the human is eroded 
through the qualification of this being as property-owning. It is in this sense that it was 
fictitious. However, this fiction could be excused since that public had a function in relation 
to the emerging democratic order: 
 
The acceptance of the fiction of the one public […] was facilitated 
above all by the fact that it actually had positive functions in the 
context of the political emancipation of civil society from 
mercantilist rule and from absolutistic regimentation in general. 
Because it turned the principle of publicity against the established 
authorities[.]343 
 
We thus encounter the concept of publicity again, which also features heavily in The 
Structural Transformation. As we remember from Ernst Kantorowicz, and which Habermas 
also highlights, the body of the king was equated with the people through his publicity, his 
immersion in ritual practices presented to the masses. It is in this sense that Habermas first 
saw a real value to the establishment of a public sphere. For it staged another practice – 
public deliberation – which eroded the ability of the body of the king to be identified with 
the conversing crowd, because the deliberation was about the common good and was 
conducted by members of the public, and not by the king. To be sure, this political public 
sphere was a deliberative space filled with private individuals, not communities, but it was 
also a sphere dedicated to asserting itself as the sole legitimizing organ.  
 
342 Habermas, 1992b, p.56. 
343 Ibid., p.56. 
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Habermas later goes on to chart its erosion as he argues that, since the introduction of 
expanded and then universal suffrage, what made rational-critical debate in the public 
sphere possible had been undermined and slowly replaced by a public sphere in which 
news stood in for debate; in which people were spoken to – the words of the speech 
consumed and consequently forgotten; in which publicity was no longer strived towards by 
private citizens, but rather by groups, institutions and the state in order to make 
institutional interests palatable to the citizenry – the mass: 
 
The mass press was based on the commercialization of the 
participation in the public sphere on the part of broad strata 
designed predominantly to give the masses in general access to 
the public sphere. The expanded public sphere, however, lost its 
political character to the extent that the means of “psychological 
facilitation” could become an end in itself for a commercially 
fostered consumer attitude.344 
 
As a result, it became “a public sphere in appearance only”,345 where individuals would 
consume its products to satisfy leisurely needs, which coincided with publicity being 
“generated from above, so to speak, in order to create an aura of good will for certain 
positions”.346 As such,”[c]ritical publicity [became] supplanted by manipulative publicity”.347 
It is difficult not to think of Gauchet’s concept of the citizen-voter in relation to Habermas’ 
deprecating comments on the erosion of the public sphere. In Gauchet, the citizen-analyst 
emerged once the citizen, with the advent and legitimisation of political parties, became 
once removed from the doing of politics. Gauchet did not seem concerned about this 
development as we instead saw in it a move towards a more identity-based politics. 
Habermas, however, decries the passivity that it engendered in individual citizens.348 As 
such, without a return to a critical publicity on behalf of a rational-critical debating public, 
 
344 Habermas, 1992b, p.169. Habermas was of course working in the tradition of the Frankfurt 
School, which he references frequently. For example, see Habermas, 1996, p.377, where he notes 
the continued relevance of the culture industry. See Adorno, Theodor W., 1991, The Culture 
Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture, Routledge: London. 
345 Habermas, 1992b, p.171. 
346 Ibid., p.178. 
347 Ibid., p.179. 
348 Ibid., p.217. 
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Habermas bemoans the prospects for domination and power ever becoming completely 
subjected to what he deems a substantive notion of democracy – a notion of democracy 
that is decidedly deliberative. This difference between Gauchet (and Mouffe and Rancière 
for that matter) and Habermas can, however, be read also in terms of their different 
approach to the concept of representation. To Gauchet, who has embraced the discursive 
turn, identity takes the place of the human being – and identity is always a representation. 
As such, there is no humanist utopia in sight for Gauchet as we instead live in a world that 
is made of conflict and where the best we can hope for is a representational space in which 
difference can be allowed to express itself as free from oppression as possible. For 
Habermas, we must conceive of representation in more conventional terms in the form of 
people’s representatives, as members of parliaments, or deputies of the National 
Constituent Assembly. He would of course not subscribe to a notion of the will of the 
people – as Gauchet claims was inscribed in the economy of representation that preceded 
the one from which the citizen-voter emerged – but his theory remains tied to the idea of 
consensus and the idea that difference between human beings is ultimately a 
misrecognition. Representation is thus seen more as a mode through which consensus can 
be acted upon than a part of discourse itself. In Habermas, questions of representation of 
identity are thus also consigned to the realm of the non-political and must not be brought 
to bear on political reason-giving. This is the case as: 
 
The identity of a group refers to the situations in which the 
members can utter an emphatic "we"; it is not an ego identity 
writ large but rather supplements the individual's identity. How 
we make our native traditions and forms of life our own by 
selectively developing them determines who we recognize 
ourselves to be in these cultural transmissions – who we are and 
would like to be as citizens. Serious value decisions result from, 
and change with, the politicocultural self-understanding of a 
historical community. Enlightenment over this self-understanding 
is achieved through a hermeneutics that critically appropriates 
traditions and thereby assists in the intersubjective reassurance 
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or renovation of authentic life orientations and deeply held 
values.349 
 
With Mouffe, we learned that the individual was a site for collective identification: the ego-
identity was never autonomous from ideology. With Habermas, however, the individual 
has agency beyond that. As we see here, Habermas leaves a lot more room for the ability of 
individuals to be critical in relation to cultural traditions,350 as the collective identity 
supplements the identity of the individual rather than constituting it. It is this move that 
allows for the possibility of the individual to enter into a deliberation that is rational in 
order to self-realize an understanding of ourselves as human beings.  
Despite their differences, however, the subject of Habermas’ political public sphere and 
Gauchet’s citizen-voter have much in common. Notably, both recognise their partiality to 
an overarching system and as such acknowledge a lack of immanence to their political 
expressions. To Gauchet, this system is simply the political landscape of which the citizen-
voter is both a part and an observer. To Habermas, this system is the political public sphere 
and its procedures. The point is that the procedures of Habermas political public sphere 
engender a similar type of political expression from its subjects as Gauchet’s citizen-voter – 
even if Gauchet does not qualify this system to nearly the same extent as Habermas does. 
For in both cases, there is a recognition of a difference to one’s own expression. If you 
forward a reason-giving argument, there is a recognition of disputing arguments. This is as 
necessary for the rational consensus as it is for the ability of the citizen-voter to place itself 
on the political landscape that the arguments fill out. It is in this sense that the expressions 
are not immediately immanent to the system but instead depend on expressions with a 
different content.  
Indeed, this is why Gauchet’s citizen-voter reached for Left/Right, it is why we can read 
Left/Right into Habermas’ writings and, incidentally, also why Dyrberg used Rawls, with his 
focus on anti-perfectionism, to account for a politics to work with Left/Right.351 We might 
argue that the subject of Habermas’ deteriorated political public sphere is most akin to 
 
349 Habermas, 1996, p.160. Habermas makes a similar observation in Habermas, Jürgen, 1974, ‘On 
Social Identity’, Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary, Vol. 19, pp. 91-103, p.102. 
350 See also Anderson, Joel, 2014, ‘Autonomy, Agency and the Self’, in: Fultner, Barbara (ed.), Jürgen 
Habermas: Key Concepts, Routledge: London, pp.91-112, for a treatment of the place of the 
individual in relation to inter-subjectivity and society writ large. 
351 Dyrberg, 2006, pp. 173-4. 
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Gauchet’s citizen-voter as they are both positioned as spectators to politics – something 
Habermas counterposes to the rational-critical debating subject. But both the subjects of 
the rational-critical public and the deteriorated public recognise their partiality to a system 
– albeit in different ways. What interests us is the nature of these ‘ways’. Gauchet satisfies 
himself with asserting the partiality and the lack of immanence, but in Habermas we find 
these characteristics expressed in specific ways. This is why I argued that he provides a 
particular aesthetic account of political space. We might then read Habermas into Gauchet 
and argue that Habermas provides us with a particular account of a type of politics that 
befits the citizen-voter – a type of politics that establishes political being as instantiated in 
reason-giving argumentation.  
5.3.  Habermasian rationalism 
Habermas very much sees himself as continuing the project started by the founders of 
democracy.352 The enlightenment tenets of reason and rationalism thus find central roles to 
play in his theory. However, as I have shown, Habermas does not just straightforwardly 
adopt them from their 18th century usage, but modifies them to account for the realisation, 
or the discovery, of difference. When speaking about rationalism then, difference plays a 
crucial part in its realisation. 
In Chapters One and Two, I made the argument that a particular type of rationalism, which 
favours modes of expressions that recognise their own partiality to a system, is tied both 
historically and conceptually to the Left/Right spectrum; that Left/Right in fact help police,  
or prefigure, what counts and doesn’t count as rational expression. With Habermas’ 
rational consensus we can now begin to flesh out an example of this type of rationalism 
even further. 
Let us consider the debate around marriage equality as it plays out in Australia. In 1961, the 
Marriage Act 1961 was passed by the Australian parliament which outlined that a marriage 
was between two people and to the exclusion of all others. The definition of marriage was 
further clarified in an amendment in 2004 which stressed that marriage was between a 
man and a woman and that it was not to include same-sex relations. However, as marriage 
equality started to gain traction across the western world, calls for actionable policy to 
have the Marriage Act 1961 amended once again started to appear. This translated into 
Kevin Rudd, the then leader of the moderately left wing Australian Labor Party, declaring 
 
352 Habermas, 2001. 
126 
 
ahead of the 2013 election that if his party was elected, they would legalise same-sex 
marriage. They did not win the election and same-sex marriage was not legalised until 
2017. I look here briefly at the debate over the public vote about the issue in 2017 and 
examine a particular debate that took place on Australian national television in the popular 
program entitled Q&A.353 
The debate was centred around four panellists and a moderator and the question under 
debate was simply whether or not same-sex marriage should be legal. This reflected the 
question faced by the public in the public vote. Two of the panellists were religious figures, 
although they came down on different sides. One panellist, Karina Okotel, representing the 
right wing, was a politician for the liberal party and argued against same-sex marriage, 
while the last panellist, Magda Szubanski, representing the left wing, was an actor, author 
and activist and argued for same-sex marriage. She also identifies as a lesbian. Tweets from 
the general public also appeared on the screen regularly and audiences fielded questions 
occasionally. Noticeably, even if the debate used to be marred by religious rhetoric,354 this 
had largely been cut out of the debate at this point. Instead, the arguments forwarded by 
the panellists centred around rights rhetoric, with the no-side arguing that adoption rights 
lead to a conflict between this right and the right of religious freedom, freedom of speech 
and those of children to know their biological parents.355 
If we view this debate as a microcosm of the larger public deliberation around this issue, 
and as the public vote delivered a resounding yes to the question at hand, we might 
conceptualise the legalisation of same-sex marriage as a rational consensus in the 
Habermasian sense. We can do this for several reasons. Not only is it a result of the public 
exposition of reason-giving arguments, but the arguments have also been largely translated 
from religious arguments in political arguments. Additionally, we can see how consensuses 
are always temporary when we view this debate together with, not only debates from a 
few years prior to 2017, but also with debates leading up to the 2004 amendment. And 
finally, we can see how this might be conceptualised as a rational consensus as it is, at least 
partially, brought about by the inclusion of affected people, which in the panel is 
manifested by Magda Szubanski. 
 
353 abcqanda, 2017, ‘Q&A Same Sex Marriage Debate | 23 October’, YouTube, 23 Oct, viewed 8 
March, 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xgcbZbI0AKk>. 
354 See for example ABC News (Australia), 2013, ‘Rudd launches passionate gay marriage defence’, 
YouTube, 2 Sept, viewed 8 March, 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CdU3ooAZSH8>. 
355 Karina Okotel in abcqanda, 2017, 33:20.  
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Habermasian rationalism then manifest itself in consensuses and requires difference in 
order to renew them. The arguments that make up the deliberation are thus required to be 
different to the other parts in order for arguments to flourish in the first place, for if they 
were not different, we would be dealing in absolutes and universalities: a type of unified 
messaging that we see in state broadcasts in the most authoritarian regimes – where this 
type of rationalism (being inter-subjective) could never thrive. For these different 
arguments to thrive in the first place, however, they must then, in turn, respect the rules of 
the game by acknowledging that they represent only parts of the whole and not the whole 
itself.356 They accomplish this, not by their content,357 but by the very form they take. For 
the exposition of arguments, opinions, beliefs, etc., when uttered in public, automatically 
lend themselves to contestation and as such inherently acknowledge their partiality to the 
system in which their exposition takes place. They acknowledge their partiality to the 
overarching system and, as such, they are the units of Habermasian rationalism.  
We can then take from this example, insofar that it is emblematic of Habermasian 
rationalism, not only that rationalism requires some form of translation of religious reasons 
into political reasons, but also that this translation engenders a particular form of 
relationality. That is, sexuality and marriage become debatable issues. This is only the case 
because a certain type of rationalism governs the space: a rationalism that stresses that the 
different parts to its whole must be made up of arguments, opinions, beliefs, etc. I.e. forms 
of expression that recognise their own partiality to the whole, rather than seeking to usurp 
it in any way. 
5.4. Exclusion/inclusion in relation to the political public sphere  
There have been several critiques of Habermas’ conception of the political public sphere. 
Perhaps most notably, Nancy Fraser argues that it relies on the constitutive exclusion of 
women.358 The private individuals were not only property owners but also men, as they 
could only gather because women performed the unpaid labour that enabled the men to 
engage in political deliberation to begin with. In this sense, their exclusion was a 
precondition for the emergence of the political public sphere. Habermas later recognised 
this,359 and one can read his more recent thoughts on communicative reason and the 
 
356 Habermas has of course written extensively about this through his problematisation of tolerance. 
357 Modernity is littered with examples of political actors purporting to speak for everyone. 
358 See Fraser, Nancy, 1990, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually 
Existing Democracy’, Social Text, No. 25-26, pp.56-80. 
359 Habermas, 1992a, pp.427-428. 
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debate around law and legitimacy as an attempt to get beyond this constitutive 
exclusion.360 
We might say that Habermas is primarily concerned with a permanent move to an inclusion 
of marginalised groups into the political public (sphere).361 In fact, when he erects his 
regulative ideals relative to communicative reason (democracy, publicity, etc.), he does so 
because reason stipulates that individuals from marginalised groups are equal to 
individuals from dominant groups.362 We might then categorise Habermas, much as we saw 
Noberto Bobbio categorise himself in the previous chapter, as ‘a man of the Left’.363 
Likewise, when he posits the need for always renewing the consensus emerging from the 
ideal public sphere, he does so not only in acknowledgement of his own fallacious position 
as a philosopher, but also in acknowledgement of the very impossibility of a final and 
perfected political public sphere. The world in which we live will always change and with 
this change a correction will always need to be made to allow for more inclusion. The 
change in context that will require the rational consensus to be renegotiated might then 
very well be engendered by the emergence of an other – an other that did not participate 
in the making of the previous consensus, and thus require a renegotiation in order for the 
consensus to reacquire a semblance of rationality. 
Habermas’ concern for ‘the inclusion of the other’364 has seen him renege on his otherwise 
very individualist conception of the public sphere and assert that the public sphere is, and 
 
360 Habermas does, however, make distinctions between exclusions that are constitutive (gender) 
and exclusions that are not (class). See ibid., p.428. 
361 This is the reading we must make of Habermas. See Dahlberg, Lincoln, 2005, ‘The Habermasian 
Public Sphere: Taking Difference Seriously?’, Theory and Society, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp.111-136. 
362 However, as we shall see in the next chapter, he cannot follow Laclau in asserting that force is a 
constitutive component to meaning and consensus and cannot be wished away. Geoff Eley provides 
a good account of how this “ideal of critical liberalism […] remains historically unattained”. See Eley, 
Geoff, 1992, ‘Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century’, 
in: Calhoun, Craig (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere, The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA., pp.289-
399, p.289.  
363 Much has been written about Habermas’ public engagement with the student movements in the 
1960. Habermas himself wrote that, “[t]here are several signs indicating […] that the potential of the 
youth movement is growing. If this potential does not inhibit itself self-destructively and if we of the 
older generation do not react without comprehension, it may become the motive force of a long-
term process of transformation that prevents foreseeable catastrophes on an international scale and 
makes possible a measure of emancipation domestically.” Habermas, Jürgen, 1989, Toward a 
Rational Society, translated by: Jeremy J. Shapiro, Beacon Press: Boston, p. 48. While he speaks 
critically of the student movements and his characterisation of ‘the left’, he then also clearly 
harbours some sympathy towards their projects. 
364 Habermas, Jürgen, 1999, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, Polity Press: 
Cambridge.  
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perhaps should be, “wild” and constituted by sub-publics rather than just individuals.365 
Importantly, however, this acknowledgement that there exist groups of people who are 
excluded from deliberation and whose inclusion must be strived for by the political public 
sphere, does not dislocate the centrality of the ideal of the political public sphere. It is wild, 
but it is still one. Difference in political reason-giving still takes place in the political public 
sphere. In Habermas, this sphere is constituted as a sphere in the singular, as opposed to 
the sub-spheres and counter publics that might be said to exist within the public sphere. 
This is the case, exactly because it is structurally related to the sphere of legislation and 
representation.366 In the end, to Habermas, there can be only one conversation that is 
actually public and political. 
It is in this sense that we can understand the objections of the hypothetical deliberative 
democrat to the imagined activist’s means of public expression in Iris Young’s staged 
encounter between the two.367 There, the activist engages in “demonstration and direct 
action”,368 which the deliberative democrat attempts to police because it falls foul of some 
kind of reasoned debate. The deliberative democrat performs this policing because of the 
recognition that the political public sphere remains structurally tied to law. Difference 
within the political public sphere is allowed, but it must conform to a certain type of form, 
or else the political public sphere might not function to promote human dignity through an 
establishment of a rational consensus. 
We might then conclude that, contrary to Habermas’ earliest writings in The Structural 
Transformation, the political public sphere is not neatly structured with everyone 
expressing themselves similarly. Rather, it is now wild in the sense that there are many 
different publics that express themselves differently and do not necessarily engage in 
formally structured conversations.369 This conceptualisation requires that we think in a 
more nuanced way about these different ways of giving reasons – even if they must still be 
taken as arguments. This is not always acknowledged by some of Habermas’ critics,370 yet 
this does not make him a post-structuralist. For, as I have exemplified with Young’s staged 
 
365 Habermas, 1996, p.307. 
366 Habermas was, of course, initially criticised by Nancy Fraser, along with others, for “idealizing” 
the liberal public sphere and neglecting the non-liberal publics. See Fraser, 1990, pp.60-61, yet it is 
worth remembering the function Habermas gives this sphere in relation to the projection of 
publicity and its function as the legitimizing organ of democratic order. 
367 Young, Iris Marion, 2001, ‘Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy’, Political Theory, Vol. 29, 
No. 5, pp.670-690. 
368 Ibid., p.670. 
369 Unlike in the days of the salons and coffeehouses. 
370 Again, for two such readings, see Mouffe, 2005, pp.83-89; and Laclau, 1997, pp.307-308. 
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interaction between the deliberative democrat and the activist, Habermas’ ideal political 
community still demands that expression take a certain form, a form that is particular. It is 
in this sense that modes of expression that do not conform to actions that can be read as 
reason-giving arguments are excluded from deliberation. There clearly is some room for 
civil disobedience, but this is an outlier to Habermas’ theory. As I move on to conceptualise 
the political public sphere as a space along the lines that I outlined with Rancière in the 
previous chapter, I also engage exclusion more explicitly as I argue that we, with Habermas, 
are presented with a vision of a particular political space, the possibility of which rests on 
exclusions and miscounts.  
5.5.  The political public sphere as political space 
In Habermas’ normative conception of a democratically structured society, political 
deliberation emanates from the wild political public sphere. Although this thesis has 
already determined that the operable concept is space and not sphere, we should be 
careful not to simply collapse the two terms into one another. However, as the concept of 
space, which I elucidated in the previous chapter, functions to order differences by 
providing them with a form through which they can be counted and account for 
themselves, through distributing differences in a space in which they stand in relation to 
one another, spatialising Habermas’ public sphere is not as difficult as it might seem.371 The 
spatialisation of the public sphere along these lines is not native to Habermas’ writings, but, 
as we look back to my argument that he conceives of the political public sphere as one, we 
start to see how we can make this translation of his concept of the political public sphere.  
I argued that Habermas continues to place the identity of the human being outside 
discourse, on the basis of which he constructs his normative theory. Working within the 
Enlightenment tradition, he seeks to construct a vision for a political public sphere that is 
governed by the norms of rational consensus, on the back of which the Enlightenment 
project of freedom and equality for all can continue. It is because it is the human being, 
conceived as the animal that can participate in intersubjective communication, that is his 
political subject, that he can forward his normative theory in relation to the regulation of 
political communication. 
 
371 Which is why it is such a popular undertaking. Mah outlines the way in which historians have 
accomplished this. See Mah, 2000. 
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It may be that Habermas focused too much on the bourgeois public sphere372 at the 
expense of, for example, the proletariat and/or women,373 but that is not the issue here. 
The issue is that we can conceive of Habermas’ political public sphere as a space because it 
has a theoretical origin in something that is located outside discourse. This is what gives it 
its normative, prescriptive bend, and it is this prescription, this structuring of differences, 
that allows us to conceptualise the “wild” political public sphere – that Habermas perceives 
as nevertheless being one – not as one sphere, but one space. It becomes a space because I 
– through critiquing its claims to universality – have argued that it relies on particular, not 
universal, modes of expression, and that this particularity engenders exclusions and 
miscount on the parts of those who cannot or will not express themselves through reason-
giving arguments. We saw one example of this in Young’s staging of an interaction between 
a deliberative democrat and an activist. This also means that Habermas’ ideal of the 
political public sphere is only one space among many, even if only few would doubt its 
reach and influence. Conceptions of alternative political public spheres can therefore be 
thought of as different spaces, in which participation is structured differently. However, I 
must also maintain that the kind of liberal political public sphere that Habermas comes to 
describe has a different relationship to the making of law than those alternative public 
spheres.  
As I thus argue that Habermas’ political public sphere constitutes a space in which different 
reason-giving arguments can be forwarded in search of a rational consensus, the question 
becomes: what is its other? 
There is some debate about this, as some maintain that Habermas should be read more as 
an agonist along the lines of Hannah Arendt, whose agonistic politics is fairly similar to 
Mouffe’s, even if Mouffe has remarked that Arendt’s agonism is an “agonism without 
antagonism”.374 This line of argument is especially prevalent in Richard Bernstein, whom 
Dana Villa takes to argue that: 
 
 
372 Eley, 1992, p.303. 
373 See, for examples of this, Ryan, Mary P., 1992, ‘Gender and Public Access: Women's Politics in 
Nineteenth-Century America’, in: Calhoun, Craig (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere, The MIT 
Press: Cambridge, MA, pp.259-288; and Ranciere, Jacques, 2012, Proletarian Nights: The Workers' 
Dream in Nineteenth-Century France, translated by: David Fernbach, Verso: London.  
374 Mouffe, 2005c, p.160. 
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Arendt's depiction of the public realm in terms of plurality and 
equality results in a normative conception of politics that is 
virtually indistinguishable from that of Habermas.375 
 
Villa himself also emphasises the extensive similarities between the two,376 and Patchen 
Markell argues that “Habermas’s and Arendt’s models of the public sphere are neither 
opposed nor identical, but complementary”.377 To further this, Markell remarks that, contra 
Villa’s slightly more critical reading of Habermas: 
 
In a “post-conventional” society in which every settlement ought 
in principle to be open to further contestation and in which no 
issue, not even the rules of discussion themselves, can be 
excluded from the political agenda, it would be a mistake to 
interpret the “orientation toward agreement” as a standard that 
can justify the exclusion of “spontaneity, initiation, and 
difference” from a regularized and normalized public sphere. 
Indeed, […] the existence of a vigorous public sphere 
characterized by agonistic political action is among the very 
conditions of the possibility of democratic legitimacy.378 
 
Markell argues that Habermas, not unlike Mouffe, constructs a vision of society which is in 
some sense always open to new incursions, and that it in fact relies upon these. This line of 
argument is of course contrary not only to those who read Habermas as a strict rationalist, 
but also to some who, while reading him with a touch more nuance, maintain that there 
remain others to Habermas’ theory. We can count Young in this category, but Thomassen 
has also sought to make these others explicit. Reviewing the work of various scholars, he 
 
375 Villa, Dana R., 1992, ‘Postmodernism and the Public Sphere’, American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 86, No. 3, pp.712-721, p.714. See also the debate between James Johnson and Villa at Johnson, 
James & Villa, Dana R., 1994, ‘Public Sphere, Postmodernism and Polemics’, American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2, pp.427-433. 
376 Villa, 1992. 
377 Markell, Patchen, 1997, ‘Contesting Consensus: Rereading Habermas on the Public Sphere’, 
Constellations, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp.377-400, p.378. 
378 Ibid., p.379. 
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argues that Habermas has several others, such as power, difference, aesthetics and 
contingency, and that: 
 
We can think of these challenges as Habermas’s ‘‘Others:’’ those 
things that he has […] excluded from consideration in order that 
they not muddy his rationalist conceptual framework.379 
 
Elsewhere, in dialogue with Young and in specific relation to our engagement with 
Habermas, Thomassen also addresses civil disobedience. Referring to the gap between law 
and legitimacy, and following Habermas, he argues that “civil disobedience gets its force 
from being simultaneously included and excluded”,380 but that Habermas does not take this 
seriously enough. In this sense, he argues that: 
 
A more extensive notion of deliberation […] [stresses] the 
importance of political culture and practices that are not only 
deliberative and argumentative in Habermas’s sense but may 
have an ‘actionistic’ form that cannot easily, if at all, be translated 
into deliberative validity claims.”381 
 
We might then relate this particular other of Habermasian deliberation – ‘actionistic’ forms 
of political expression, i.e. forms of direct action, demonstrations, etc. – to my engagement 
with Rancière in the previous chapter. There I emphasised the aesthetic dimensions of 
space, which stipulate a mode of political expression that is particular. Rancière is 
concerned with the policing of political space, and with his concept of the distribution of 
the sensible he accomplishes an identification of theoretical tools that can describe modes 
of policing. He argues that the police (ac)count effects a distribution of the sensible and 
allows for particular subject positions to be counted and account for themselves in 
particular ways. ‘Real politics’ consists in moments of wrong, when those who are 
 
379 Thomassen, Lasse, 2004b, ‘Habermas as his Others’, Polity, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp.548-560, p.558. 
380 Thomassen, 2008, p.115. 
381 Ibid., p.115. 
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miscounted due to their inability to inhabit legitimate subject positions and/or express 
themselves in legitimate ways (i.e. the excluded), break through, showing their equality to 
the other subjects of the space. 
With these tools, we can argue that reason-giving arguments, in Habermas, constitute 
legitimate modes of political expression, and that those who are capable of forwarding 
them also become countable by the police and vice versa. Matheson Russell and Andrew 
Montin also, following Rancière,382 use this logic to exemplify miscounts due to structural 
inequalities that prevent certain groups of people, such as workers (in relation to bosses) 
and students (in relation to teachers), from participating in intersubjective communication 
through the forwarding of reason-giving arguments.383 They argue that students and 
workers are effectively denied opportunities to engage in the process of finding a rational 
consensus because they are already counted as less than their teachers and bosses. In this 
sense, these groups of people appear “incapable of rational speech”.384 
In this example, people are denied access to rational deliberation because they are already 
subject to a miscount, which in turn reinforce their exclusion. But it can work the other way 
as well: exclusion can be engendered through an inability to participate in rational 
deliberation to begin with. That is, insofar that rational deliberation is the norm, those who 
do not participate are simply “unintelligible”385 and unable to participate in the 
“achievement or production”,386 not the a priori, of the category of “the human”387 and the 
place in which that category manifests itself as a political entity: the dominant political 
space (or Habermas’ political public sphere). As such: 
 
 
382 Rancière, 1999, pp.43-60. See also Rancière, Jacques & Panagia, Davide, 2000, ‘Dissenting Words: 
A Conversation with Jacques Rancière’, Diacritics, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp.113-126. 
383 Russell, Matheson & Montin, Andrew, 2015, ‘The Rationality of Political Disagreement: Rancière’s 
Critique 
of Habermas’, Constellations, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp.543-554. 
384 Ibid., p.546. 
385 Butler, Judith, 2004, Undoing Gender, Routledge: London, p.30. This may seem at odds with our 
assertion in the previous chapter that, to Rancière, even the poor are subject to the count. It is, 
however, important to note that the poor are still only constituted through acts of politics: “when 
Rancière speaks of ‘the poor’, he points to a potential mode of political subjectivation. The poor in 
this sense do not exist in the order of classes prior to the interruption of politics. Thus, in one 
important sense, ‘the poor’ do not even exist at all. That is, within the police order, there may be 
‘poor people’, but ‘the poor’ is (one of) Rancière's name(s) for the demos that only emerges when it 
makes its very claim to be counted.” See Chambers, 2013, p.103. 
386 Chambers, Samuel & Carver, Terrel, 2008, Judith Butler and Political Theory: Troubling Politics, 
Routledge: London, p.126. 
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Learning the rules that govern intelligible speech is an inculcation 
into normalized language, where the price of not conforming is 
the loss of intelligibility itself.388 
 
That is, if you do not conform to the norms of rational deliberation, you are excluded from 
political space. It is because of these observations that we observe that in Habermas’ 
political public sphere, for subject positions to give an account of themselves, they must 
participate in the in-common in the form of the reason-giving argument. 
We can helpfully reintroduce Mette Lylloff and her advocacy for disabled people at this 
point. I have argued that deliberation takes place within a ‘space of equals’. As we have 
seen, we can, with Habermas, qualify the parts proper to this space as reason-giving 
arguments. To what extent is there room for Lylloff in the Habermasian public sphere? In 
one sense, communicative reason dictates that deliberation involve everyone who is 
affected. And it should always be open to new incursions. As such, there might be room for 
her. However, as she does not engage in reason-giving argumentation directed at 
regulation of the in-common but instead expresses herself in terms of lived experience, to 
what extent is she “intelligible” to the in-common to begin with? I would argue: to a very 
little extent. Lylloff, and the identity she represents, are excluded, not only because of the 
ableist conception of the public subject, but also because of the dominant mode of 
‘political’ expression. As such, while communicative reason should include her in the 
conversation, it simply cannot.  
We might argue that her expressions can be translated into ‘proper’ reason-giving 
arguments – just as the utterings of the religious person can be translated. But to which 
extent does that make her a part of the count? Or does that merely create a caricature of a 
part? In this thesis, I not only argue that the latter is more correct than the former, but that 
this translation comes at a cost. We can engage this cost as we look at the rationalism in 
Habermas’ writings. For when this translation takes place from an expression of lived 
experience that demands to be acknowledged and not contested into an argument that 
becomes contestable through its very being and thus partial to the system to which it 
belongs, the absolute character of the original expression which demands an 
acknowledgement of power and truth is lost. As such, when Lylloff’s expression is 
 
388 Butler, Judith, 1999, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, Routledge: London, 
p.xvii. 
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translated we might be able to reach some sort of consensus, but how rational will it be, 
when the included arguments are made to give up their being; when the inclusion is 
forced? In other words, to which extent is the realisation of Habermasian rationalism 
dependent on irrationalism? To which extent is a rational consensus only possible when the 
type of new incursions that it requires is regulated prior to their incursion and, as such, not 
new or challenging at all? While I do not wish to adjudication on the degree of rationalism 
in Habermasian rationalism, I, following people like Thomassen, do wish to argue that 
Habermasian rationalism maintains others and that expressions of lived experience that 
seek acknowledgement of some type of truth are a type of one such others.  
Notably, then, when we read political space into Habermas, it becomes the space for 
different arguments that revolve around a concern for the in-common. Though it might be 
physically instantiated, it is constituted in argumentation. Habermas might bemoan the 
state the political public sphere is in, as he does in The Structural Transformation, but his 
belief in its existence and its potential remains. Notably, to Habermas, it is one space. It 
might be wild, but it is still one, as it exists in a structural relationship with the state and 
civil society and is founded on an a priori: the human being as the animal that can 
participate in intersubjective communication. 
5.6.  Conclusion 
In this section, I engaged Habermas’ conception of the public sphere and translated it into a 
notion of political space. I showed that Habermas argues that the emergence of the public 
sphere forced rule to legitimise itself through it, even if its claim to represent ‘the people’ 
was, and remains, fictitious. As he became concerned with the marginalisation of people 
and the need to accomplish their inclusion into the public sphere, a conception of political 
space could begin to be formulated, one that is for arguments but one that is also ‘wild’. 
After translating Habermas’ concept of sphere into space, I, with various critics, argued that 
Habermas, despite his concern for inclusion, still retains others – namely those who cannot 
(be heard to) forward reason-giving arguments. It is the central claim of this chapter that 
the Left/Right spectrum helps order this political space.  
6. Left/Right in Habermasian political space 
6.1.  Introduction 
In this final section, I articulate an explicitly Habermasian reading of Left/Right. I argue that 
Left/Right, through enabling a count of the subject positions proper to political space, also 
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legitimate a particular mode of expression. I come to the conclusion that a Habermasian 
reading of Left/Right would come to their defence as ordering markers that enable 
members of the social body to participate in the in-common in a way that codifies the 
political community as both wild but also saturated by arguments over the common good, 
made by people who are all the same: human beings ‘as such’.  
6.2.  Political difference and the Left/Right spectrum: a recap 
As we saw in a previous section, Habermas’ normative project allows for two kinds of 
difference. Here, I focus explicitly on what might be termed his political difference and its 
relation to Left/Right. First, let us recap our arguments from the previous chapters. In the 
first chapter, I traced the emergence of the public subject with Mah. When the social body 
gathered to engage the in-common, the site of the individual, as Mouffe put it, was 
occupied by a public subject position. Then, with Gauchet, I gave a particular form to this 
public subject: the citizen-voter. It was this citizen-voter that grasped at Left/Right as 
markers of the political community after it had become once removed from the doing of 
politics. This was done as Left/Right enabled citizen-voters to place themselves in relation 
to each other and the whole so that they could analyse the relationality of the political 
community – something that Gauchet argued was not needed before. While through 
Bobbio I conceptualised this Left/Right space of relationality as being about equality, with 
Mouffe, I argued that there was also a constitutive exclusion from that space. Most 
notably, however, I engaged Dyrberg’s work on Left/Right. While Dyrberg could not follow 
Mouffe on exclusion, he provides an account of political identification that posits that 
Left/Right enable other forms of identification to be channelled through them and thus 
allow for a political symbolic order to be freestanding in relation to comprehensive 
doctrines (ethical worldviews) – a politics which he used Rawls’ concept of the use of public 
reason to qualify.  
6.3.  Left/Right in Habermas’ normative theory 
When we now look at what I have taken Habermas to argue, we can see several 
commonalities with these scholars. Just as Gauchet posits that the citizen-voter became 
once removed from the doing of politics, Habermas, in line with the Frankfurt School 
tradition, notes the deterioration and commercialisation of the public sphere. But, as I also 
showed, this does not mean that Habermas seeks a ‘doing’ of politics – or what we, with 
Thomassen and Young, can perhaps think of as a more ‘actionistic’ approach to politics. 
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Instead, Habermas seeks an establishment of regulative conditions on speech in the public 
sphere to engender a rational consensus. 
This focus on rationality has led many to liken Habermas to Rawls, who, like Habermas, 
works within the tradition of liberal theory. At the end of the last chapter, however, I 
argued that Habermas is better placed to give us an aesthetic account of the public sphere, 
now conceptualised as a political space, because of his focus on regulative speech and the 
way in which it gives form to the political expression of subject positions. As I, through 
Rancière, argued that Left/Right function as categories of the police, Left/Right are then 
intertwined with the political expressions of subject positions in the sense that they can 
legitimise a particular form. This is accomplished because they enable a count of the 
political space itself – which always has both an arithmetic and narrative component, 
meaning that a count depends on a form of expression by the counted subject positions. In 
Habermas, Left/Right might be said to function to mark off a political space that relies on a 
constitutive difference. It does this because, as we saw, there must be a difference in 
reason-giving arguments for rational consensus to work and the rational consensus itself 
must always be renegotiated as more parts of the social body gain inclusion into the 
political space of equals. While it then does not quite constitute an engagement with ‘the 
political’, à la Mouffe, it certainly also does not indulge in the fetishization of 
managerialism that we see from the proponents of the Third Way. It is in this sense that 
Left/Right can be said to work so well in accordance with Habermas’ normative project, for, 
as we saw, Left/Right guarantee a constitutive difference between its parts, not only 
because of their polarity but also due to their abstract nature, which allow left and right to 
signify various things at the same time. This means that Left/Right often effect 
misunderstandings between subjects and, as such, help prevent a closure of political space 
and guarantee avenues for changes inside it. 
Additionally, as Left/Right also qualify a particular mode of political expression, we might 
say that, despite the constitutive openness of the space that they police, the openness is 
conditioned on the adoption of the form of the reason-giving argument, which then, at 
least at the best of times, ensures that the space remains one. In this sense, we might 
transpose Left/Right onto Habermasian political theory and argue that Left/Right offer a 
way through which the otherwise wild public space might be recognisable to itself. It 
becomes a meta-space within which all the ‘wild’ sub-publics can engage, but the 
wilderness is made legible through the police function of Left/Right. By hegemonizing 
political discourse, Left/Right thus allow for a categorisation of different kinds of rational, 
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reason-giving arguments. In this sense, Left/Right serve the purpose of enabling a 
conceptualisation of a landscape, a map of different political arguments. Left/Right allow 
for members of the social body to not only understand their own, and others’, opinions and 
arguments, but also to have an opportunity to have political voice to begin with. As such, 
they give shape to both the political space and to the parts of the social body that engage 
with it. This conceptualisation of the Left/Right spectrum, as an ordering framework for 
political deliberation, then renders Left/Right indispensable as they secure avenues for 
difference and inclusion – even if the difference and inclusion is secondary to consensus. As 
such, within a Habermasian framework, they must be taken to be a good thing. 
However, to what extent are Left/Right in Habermasian space only a good thing for some? 
In the previous section I noted that Mette Lylloff, identifying herself with a place of 
exclusion, did not forward reason-giving arguments. I argued that this only served to 
cement her exclusion, as reason-giving arguments constitute the form of the parts in 
Habermasian political space. In the previous chapter, I argued that we could not place 
Lylloff, in her capacity as an activist for people with disabilities, on the Left/Right scale. In 
this chapter, I have tied this organising capacity of Left/Right with a conception of 
rationalism that we get from Habermas by arguing that Habermas qualifies a mode of 
expression that is particular and proper to the political public sphere and in line with the 
rationalism of Gauchet’s citizen-voter. Thus, if Left/Right function to reign in the otherwise 
wild public subjects by enabling them to exist within a whole, then, qua Lylloff’s othering, I 
cannot place Lylloff within this ‘whole’ without translating her expressions to an extent that 
they become caricatures of themselves. In this sense, while Left/Right might have a 
democratic function in relation to Habermasian political space that enables some kind of 
recognition of difference, this comes at a price. 
6.4.  Conclusion 
In this section I related Habermas’ thoughts on communicative reason to the Left/Right 
spectrum. I argued that Left/Right structure a constitutively open, explicitly political, space. 
With this in mind, I noted that, to Habermas, political difference is a difference between 
reason-giving arguments. And, as I, with Rancière, remembered that Left/Right, through 
structuring political space, both effect a count (arithmetic) of the subject positions within it 
and demand an account (narrative) of their being, I argued that Left/Right construct a map 
in which subject positions can place themselves in relation to others (arithmetic), but in 
doing so also get caught up in a particular mode through which the subject positions must 
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give an account (narrative) of their being. Thus, when Left/Right are applied to a 
Habermasian account of political space, they take on a positive feature through their ability 
to mark out an explicitly political space that is open to inclusion, but on the condition that 
the included participate through the form of the reason-giving argument. Left/Right then 
combine the narrative and the arithmetic aspects of the police function in a way that 
favours Habermasian democratic deliberation. 
7. Conclusion 
Habermas forwards a theory for democratic deliberation that seeks to legitimate reason-
giving arguments as political difference. He notes that the democratic project of subjecting 
rule to the good of mankind can never be completed, but that we, through the 
establishment of regulative ideals to political communication, can bring about temporary 
forms of rational consensuses. These consensuses will, however, always be limited to the 
context in which they are formed. As such, as more people gain inclusion into the political 
space within which the old consensuses were formed, contexts change, and a new 
consensus must be found. These consensuses are rational insofar that they adhere to the 
regulative principles of ‘democracy, publicity, inclusion and egalitarianism’ – principles that 
are derived from the immanence of language itself. 
Habermasian political space, then, functions to distribute different reason-giving 
arguments that search for a rational consensus. It is a space that is constitutively open to 
new voices, as long as the new voices appear in the form of reason-giving arguments. I 
have asserted that Left/Right function as a map of the political community within which 
public subjects can place themselves in relation to each other and the whole. In Habermas, 
Left/Right thus might be said to function to order political space and, in so doing, enable a 
count of the subject positions that inhabit it. However, as I also asserted – with Rancière – 
that political space provides a form to the subject positions as well as counting them, 
Left/Right order not only subject positions, but subject positions appearing as people with 
reason-giving arguments. 
First, I engaged Rousseau and Kant to establish Habermas’ intellectual heritage in an 
Enlightenment humanism that wrestles with the concept of reason and its place in 
democratic rule. I established that Habermas’ political subject is the human being ‘as such’, 
conceived of as the animal with access to language, but that we must reject a subject-
centred philosophy that stresses the immanence of reason. Instead, we must look to inter-
subjectivity for the location of reason, which can be manifested through communicative 
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action that adheres to the regulative principles of ‘democracy, publicity, inclusion and 
egalitarianism’. 
Next, I engaged the ways in which we can think of political difference in relation to this 
ideal of communicative reason. I noted that Habermas speaks of a difference between 
ethical worldviews that has a place in communicative action but must be translated into 
strictly political reasons before being subjected to democratic decision-making. This kind of 
difference is politically secondary to reason-giving arguments that already adhere to the 
regulative principles, which are the primary units for the establishment of a rational 
consensus. However, as the world changes, new voices become necessary for the 
consensus to renew its degree of rationality, and as such, difference is constitutive to 
Habermas’ theory of democratic deliberation, even if the difference is qualified. 
Having then established this conception of legitimate political difference in Habermas, I 
effected a translation of his concept of the political public sphere to political space. The 
Habermasian political public sphere is ‘wild’, yet it remains one space as it is tied to 
democratic decision-making and as it is founded on a conception of political difference that 
is particular – not universal. In this sense, it is a meta-space that brings all the sub-publics 
together yet forces them to adopt a particular mode of expression insofar that they want 
to have agency in relation to democratic decision-making. Habermas’ political public sphere 
thus functions to distribute legitimate forms of political difference, yet only functions on 
the basis of a constitutive exclusion of, for example, more ‘actionistic’ modes of expression. 
In this sense, following from our account of political space in the previous section, 
Habermas’ political public sphere constitutes a space. 
Finally, I argued that Left/Right, when read together with this Habermasian concept of 
space, can be said to facilitate a count of the subject positions within them and enable 
those subject positions to express their being in a way that is particular. In this sense, I 
argue that Left/Right, in Habermas, function to order reason-giving arguments in a space 
that is otherwise wild. Left/Right guarantee its status as meta-space, by bringing a 
coherence to it, thus securing its status as one and its ability to structure a mode of 
difference that is explicitly political. 
As we move on, I seek an account of politics that stresses the ineradicability of force (that 
which must not manifest itself in democratic deliberation) and its place in relation to 
hegemony. In that quest, I engage Ernesto Laclau and his notion of politics as hegemony. 
There, I seek an account of how spaces achieve hegemony in order to understand the 
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mechanisms through which the political public sphere, now conceived of as a space that is 
always, in some form or another, particular, can reproduce its dominance over society and 
effect a structuring of politics. Through this, I formulate an account of Left/Right that casts 
their function as depoliticising and obscuring political demands – the base units of radical 
politics (conceived of as Laclauian populism). 
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Chapter 4: Political space in Laclau 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we saw that Habermasian political space comes to be occupied by 
different public subjects who nevertheless all have to give an account of their being 
through reason-giving arguments that conform to the principles of ‘democracy, publicity, 
inclusion and egalitarianism’. Located within the liberal democratic order, Left/Right can be 
conceived as enabling a(n) (ac)count of reason-giving public subjects. 
In this chapter, I argue that this Habermasian political space is a hegemonic project. With 
politics constituted around a lack of the markers of certainty, Habermas attempts to reign 
in this uncertainty through an identification of ‘difference’ with ‘different arguments’. As I, 
with Ernesto Laclau, conceptualise radical politics with an accumulation of unmet demands 
into a constitution of a popular subjectivity – ultimately presenting itself as ‘the people’ 
and thus effecting a radical antagonism – I argue that Habermasian political space 
essentially effects a depoliticization of ‘the social’. As every order is founded on exclusion 
and identification requires radical, affectual investment, power is tied into the fabric of 
social practices. These are some of the reasons why many demands go unmet. 
Habermasian political space cannot conceptualise this instance of power and exclusion and 
thus fails to provide avenues for their rectification. Insisting on rational debate, it seeks to 
tame the ways in which rectification can come about (for example, through the 
development of the popular subjectivity) and, as such, works counter to radical politics. As 
Left/Right are caught up in this policing of Habermasian political space, radical politics will 
find it hard to appropriate the category of ‘the Left’, even if this is often attempted. I 
further argue that it should not even be attempted, as the emergence of the popular 
subjectivity entails an identification of its protagonists with the whole, with ‘the people’, 
which Left/Right cannot accomplish as they legitimise a constitutive opposition to political 
space. 
In this chapter, I first engage Laclau’s intellectual heritage, where I argue that he is a 
fervent anti-essentialist, who cares for identity rather than reason and who theorises a 
constitutive lack/void in all identity that enables an untameable ‘play’ with meaning and 
representation. I go on to theorise the lack/void more explicitly as I argue that order, 
located within the realm of the ‘ontological’, effects an institution and subsequent 
sedimentation of practices within the realm of the ‘ontic’. This sedimentation entails a 
forgetting of the contingency of the practices and as such effects a closure of the ontic. 
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However, as the institution relies on exclusion, a lack/void opens within the identity of the 
ensemble of practices that constitute the order. In terms of representation, order is 
centred around dominant nodal points, yet the further towards the limits of that order one 
goes, the more the representation of order, qua lack/void, begins to break down. It is at 
these limits that the moments of institution can be reactivated, and it is at these limits that 
the excluded can find rectification through the establishment of antagonisms.  
Laclauian populist politics enters at this point. Centred around demands, it brings together 
disparate struggles that have had their demands rejected or unheard by the system into a 
chain of equivalences. Yet the further stretched this chain becomes, the more it starts to 
lose its particularity, until it, in the end, finds itself representable only by a name for an 
‘empty signifier’. This is the moment of populism and the moment of radical politics. 
Finally, I utilise Laclau to argue that Habermasian political space structured by Left/Right 
effects a depoliticization of ‘the ontic’. I argue that the reasons why Left/Right function so 
well to police this space are also the reasons why radical politics should not try to 
appropriate ‘the Left’, as Left/Right tend to kill affectual investment in politics and institute 
a legitimate opposition in relation to political space that is inimical to the emergence of the 
popular subjectivity, which must represent itself as the whole – as ‘the people’. 
2. On political space: moving from reason to identity 
2.1.  Introduction 
This section functions as the first bridge from the political writings of Habermas to those of 
Laclau. These two very different thinkers do not speak directly to each other. However, 
there are interesting philosophical differences between the two concerning the 
theorisation of the ways in which we can engage with meaning in politics. This section 
shows how, contra Habermas, Laclau locates meaning within discursive structures. As such, 
in Laclau, one cannot ascertain the nature of a political subject apart from its discursive 
articulation through acts of hegemony and this is a good thing insofar as it radicalizes the 
scope for who or what can possibly count as political subjects. 
2.2.  The meaning of meaning 
In the previous chapter, we encountered a political vision that sought to introduce reason 
into the process of communication and consensus. Noting that it is reason that dictates 
that we are all equal and free, Habermas reifies a particular notion of humanism that holds 
that the key to emancipation lies in the rational consensus. To Habermas, people are 
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always-already equal because all have access to language. As such, as long as language and 
the creation of consensuses seek a continual inclusion of disparate voices; as long as the 
conversations that people have about the common good and the regulation of civic life 
continue to reach out to ever more people, especially to those whom conversations affect; 
and as long as the reasons adhere to the regulative principles of ‘democracy, publicity, 
inclusion and egalitarianism’, reasonable politics is taking place. However, not every answer 
is to be found within regulative principles to communication. For Habermas asserts the 
idea that it is the human being (the animal with access to language) who is equal and free, 
the human being who is the object of the universalism of the Enlightenment – which he 
pitches his intellectual project as situated within. This acts as an a priori to his theory of 
communicative action.  
In this chapter, I utilise Laclau to criticise the Habermasian political space centred around 
principles derived from the immanence of language. To kick this off, I note Laclau’s 
somewhat different theoretical heritage. Instead of Kant and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
Laclau is influenced by the Althusserian and Gramscian interventions into Marxism,389 the 
post-structuralist intervention into the study of the text,390 and Lacanian psychoanalysis.391 
This leads Laclau, following many of his post-structuralist and post-Marxist predecessors, to 
develop an interest in the concept of ‘meaning’, and assert that political meaning cannot 
be established extra-discursively – as it is in Habermas:  
 
The political meaning of a local community movement, of an 
ecological struggle, of a sexual minority movement, is not given 
 
389 This can be seen rather clearly in Laclau, Ernesto, 1977, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, 
New Left Books: London. In this, his first, book, he was starting to formulate his brand of post-
Marxism, but as he acquainted himself more with Lacan and other post-structuralist writers, he 
became able to formulate his theory using both psychoanalytic and linguistic terms. He makes this 
ability (and possibility) explicit in Laclau, Ernesto, 2006, ‘Why Constructing a People Is the Main Task 
of Radical Politics’, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp.646-680, p.651. 
390 He outlines the workings of this logic in Laclau, Ernesto, 2003, ‘Philosophical roots of discourse 
theory’, University of Essex, viewed 8 Dec, 2017, 
<https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/30927087/Laclau_-
_philosophical_roots_of_discourse_theory.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expire
s=1512738516&Signature=hJtj09RUASVUFWZ1WEfoZEArjgY%3D&response-content-
disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DPhilosophical_roots_of_discourse_theory.pdf>. 
391 See, among others, Laclau, Ernesto, 1987, ‘Psychoanalysis and Marxism’, translated by: Amy G. 
Reiter-McIntosh, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp.330-333. 
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from the beginning: it crucially depends upon its hegemonic 
articulation with other struggles and demands.392 
 
As we shall also see elsewhere in this chapter, meaning – and its representation – thus 
becomes the operable concept vis-à-vis Habermas’ regulative ideals. Through this move, 
we can further problematise the Habermasian concern for the rational consensus as I 
highlight the degree of force that is present in all establishment and representation of 
political meaning. Indeed, through this move, the temporal dimension is brought to bear on 
meaning and representation and introduces us to a notion of politics that evolves around 
the hegemonic articulation of meaning. As we shall see, it is this move that allows us to 
conceive of, and critique, Habermasian political space as a hegemonic project that was 
never immanent to communication itself but always reliant on a contingent forms of 
representation. 
2.3.  Laclau in linguistics and Marxism 
In linguistic terms, Laclau problematizes the concept of the sign.393 According to Ferdinand 
de Saussure, meaning is embedded in the sign and as such is made to reside not with 
individuals but in language itself.394 However, Jacques Derrida and his contemporaries 
emphasise that there is an endless deference embedded within the signifying system, 
meaning that the signified is always but another signifier.395 Language is thus opened up to 
play as no ultimate meaning can be found. As meaning is then no longer always-already 
present in language, as it is in Habermas, Laclau adopts a focus, not on the way language 
(and discourse) begs to be understood through the use of language itself, but on the 
impossibility of a final understanding (the lack of essence) and the consequent possibilities 
opened up for (de)articulation of meaning:396 
 
392 Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.87. 
393 On this he follows Derrida. See Derrida, Jacques, 1966, Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse 
of the Human Sciences, [lecture], translated by: N/A, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, 21 Oct, 
viewed 8 May, 2018, <http://www2.csudh.edu/ccauthen/576f13/DrrdaSSP.pdf>. 
394 de Saussure, Ferdinand, 1915, Course in General Linguistics, translated by: Wade Baskin, 
McGraw-Hill Book Company: New York. 
395 Derrida, Jacques, 1968, ‘Differance’, bulletin de la société française de philosophie, translated by: 
N/A, Vol. 62, No. 3, pp.278-301. 
396 Laclau often compares his theory to Derrida’s. See, for examples, Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.112; 
Laclau, 1999; and Laclau, Ernesto, 1995, ‘The Time is out of Joint’, Diacritics, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp.86-96. 
See also, Calcaro, Matther R., 2000, ‘Derrida on Identity and Difference: A Radical Democratic 
Reading of The Other Heading’, Critical Horizons, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.51-69, where Calcaro also likens 
147 
 
Society and social agents lack any essence, and their regularities 
merely consist of the relative and precarious forms of fixation 
which accompany the establishment of a certain order.397 
 
This “open[s] up the possibility of elaborating [on a] concept of articulation”,398 thus 
subjecting meaning to “play”,399 and, in this way, “open[ing] the way to new liberating 
discourses”.400 In relation to Left/Right, it is clear to see that, with Laclau, we certainly 
cannot ascribe to them any sort of essential meaning. Yet the extent to which they open up 
a space for play is still unclear. 
In Marxist terms, which is another way in which Laclau exemplifies his thought – and the 
critique of which had already been elaborated on by Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser 
(and others before them)401 – the category of the proletariat is seen to harbour a special 
place within the broader theoretical (and theatrical) framework:  
 
In the structuring of this narrative, the laws of capitalist 
development are the plot, while the characters, with perfectly 
assigned roles, are the proletarian and capitalist classes.402 
 
In this Marxist narrative, real political action is action directed against the capitalist system, 
which itself creates the class that is destined to usher in its own demise: the proletariat. As 
such, within orthodox Marxist theory, politics is seen as the privileged task of the 
proletariat. Meaning is thus once again constructed outside discourse as the essence of 
politics is established a priori in accordance with the laws of historical materialism.403 
 
deconstruction to radical democracy. To Derrida, to learn to live with ghosts amounts to learning to 
live with (Laclauian) limits. See Derrida, 1994, pp.xvi-xxi. 
397 Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.98. 
398 Ibid., p.98. 
399 Laclau, Ernesto, 2007, Emancipation(s), Verso: London, p.7. 
400 Ibid., p.2. 
401 For an example, see Althusser, Louis, 2006, ‘Marx and his Limits’, in: Matheron, Francois & 
Corpet, Oliver (eds.), Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings, 1978-87, translated by: G. M. 
Goshgarin, Verso: London, pp.7-162. 
402 Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.50. 
403 This started changing after the second international, when the laws of historical materialism 
started to become disputed: “In the writings of Plekhanov and Axelrod the term ‘hegemony’ was 
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The post-Marxist intervention consists in the problematization of the privileging of the 
proletariat and the establishment of the class a priori to its articulation.404 What this 
intervention accomplishes is to bring into question the identity of the political subject. It is 
no longer something that can be determined from outside discourse, invigorating politics 
and imbuing the radical political struggle with new energy. No longer is ‘the worker’ always 
already a member of the proletariat. No longer are the actions of the proletariat 
predetermined. Instead discourse, through political acts, comes to structure identities. For 
political space, this means that the space of the factory work floor is replaced with the 
discursive space in which meaning can be articulated and acted upon through hegemonic 
practice. This concept of hegemony is what, for Laclau in particular, comes to signify politics 
itself. It explicitly adopts a focus on meaning and discourse, foregoing concerns for 
universal laws (or consensus and communication, for that matter). 
It is also here we find the repudiation of the old communist argument that Left/Right 
merely cover up the otherwise real distinction between people – class: 
 
Right-wing capitalists and left-wing capitalists are the same […] 
Behind two masks, one face: On May 11 you will not be faced 
with a single National Bloc: there will be two, one on the right, the 
other on the left.405 
 
This argument is echoed in the work of George Hoare who, through Fredric Jameson, 
argues that, “Left Versus Right may be the capitalist political division par excellence”.406 The 
argument is beholden to the idea that real political action is that which is played out 
between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. However, as that distinction would have to be 
 
introduced to describe the process whereby the impotence of the Russian bourgeoisie to carry 
through its ‘normal’ struggle for political liberty forced the working class to intervene decisively to 
achieve it.” See Ernesto & Mouffe, 1985, p.49. 
404 See DeLuca, Kevin, 1999, ‘Articulation Theory: A Discursive Grounding for Rhetorical Practise’, 
Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp.334-348, for an in-depth engagement with this concept of 
‘articulation’ that is also especially prevalent in Laclau & Mouffe, 1985. Unfortunately, DeLuca fails 
to mention that it was Althusser who pioneered the concept. 
405 P.C.F. cited in Gauchet, 1996, p.267. 
406 Hoare, George, 2010, ‘Telling Stories About Politics: the concept of political narrative and “Left 
Versus 
Right”’, CPI Graduate Workshop, ‘Politics in Strange Places: Breaking the Boundaries of the Definition 
of the Political’, 18 Sept, University of Oxford, pp.1-15, p.14. 
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arrived at from outside discourse – because it places the social relations of production as 
somehow freestanding from the logic of discourse – I certainly cannot assign such a reading 
to a Laclauian perspective.407 
In Habermas the political subject was the human being with access to language, because 
reason was immanent to language. For Laclau, however, when the concept of the political 
subject is conceived of in this way, it goes hand in hand with the concept of essence. As 
such, there can be no transcendental political subject. But this is a cause for celebration, as 
a world without essences guarantees that any excluded part can, in principle, lay claim to 
politics. To claim politics then amounts to a claim to be the political subject. But this is a 
claim to an identity, to a representation of a meaning, and as meaning is without essence, 
it is a claim to represent something that is, in principle, irrepresentable. While this has led 
some to argue that there is a normative deficit in Laclau, the point of Laclauian politics 
becomes to represent the irrepresentable – or that which the dominant political order 
renders other. I look closer at this kind of politics, which Laclau names populism, later in 
this chapter. 
2.4.  Conclusion 
In this section I argued that Laclau locates meaning within discursive structures. He is 
distinguished from Habermas in that he also asserts that morality and politics are products 
of discursive manoeuvring rather than universal categories that enable discourse to form. 
In the next section, I examine this difference further by engaging with the more 
philosophical arguments made by Laclau. I argue that Laclau outlines what I shall call ‘a 
logic of lack’. 408 
3. The logic of lack: the constitutive openness to identity 
3.1.  Introduction 
In this section, we see that Laclau makes a differentiation between the realm of the ontic 
(that which appears) and the ontological (that which is). I note that there is a gap between 
 
407 Laclau, Ernesto, 1990, New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time, Verso: London, p.25. 
408 It is a universal logic that he unveils. As Laclau humorously asks Butler, when she objects that his 
theory takes no account of contextual differences, “is performativity an empty place to be variously 
filled in different contexts, or is it context-dependent, so that there were societies where there were 
not performative actions?” Laclau, 2000a, p.189. See also Laclau, 1999, p.101, where he, with 
refence to psychoanalysis, states that, “we are no longer speaking about a regional logic but about 
something universally present, which systematically distorts the workings of the symbolic order. The 
crucial point is that this distortion is not a random phenomenon but an orderly drifting away: it has 
itself its own logic.” 
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these two realms, which guarantees that the ontological can never be collapsed into the 
ontic. I conceptualise this gap as lack/void and argue that it is constitutive to all meaning. In 
this landscape, order anchors itself by partially fixing itself through the establishment of 
nodal points. This establishment also necessitates an exclusion and a representation of 
others as pure negativity. This, however, also enables the construction of ‘empty signifiers’.  
3.2.  A matter of ontology 
One of the major philosophical differences between Laclau and Habermas is Laclau’s 
uptake of Heidegger’s notion of the ontic/ontological difference, which he combines with 
Husserl’s notion of institution/reactivation and sedimentation.409 In a sense, it is this 
philosophical difference that is at the root of his subsequent disagreements with Habermas 
over the location of meaning and the nature of the political subject. To Laclau, the 
ontic/ontological difference divides the philosophical account of the experiential world into 
two distinct planes: the ontic (that which appears) and the ontological (that which is). This 
division generates an ability to think of the experiential world as contingent on something 
altogether deeper, on something that orders our engagement with the world: 
 
[There is a] distinction between ordering and order, between 
changing and change, between the ontological and the ontic – 
oppositions which are entirely contingently articulated through 
the investment of the first of the terms into the second.410 
 
Much like Rancière, Laclau conceives of something (ontological) that precedes our 
engagement with the world (ontic). Rancière thinks of it as a (re)distribution of the 
sensible, while Laclau thinks of it as a simple ‘ordering’. As Habermas places reason as 
immanent to language, he also imbues deliberation with a normative content – a move 
that Laclau cannot make. That is not to say that there is no normative bend to Laclau’s 
theory, but because Laclau is a theorist of meaning and representation, and not of 
immanence, he must consign deliberative practices to the realm of the ontic, to the realm 
 
409 See Marchart, 2014, for a more in-depth discussion of the philosophical underpinnings to Laclau’s 
theory. 
410 Laclau, Ernesto, 2000b, ‘Identity and hegemony: The role of universality in the constitution of 
political logics’, in: Butler, Judith, Laclau, Ernesto & Žižek, Slavoj (eds.), Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, Verso: London, p.85. 
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of contingent practices. This division between the ontic and the ontological we also saw 
manifested in the second chapter with Mouffe, who used the term ‘the political’ to 
designate the realm of antagonism, a term that she uses in counter position to the concept 
of ‘politics’ which takes place in the realm of ‘the social’ – a distinction that Laclau also 
employs. We might think of the ontic/ontological distinction as more philosophical and the 
politics/political distinction as more political, but they can be read together:411 
 
[…] given that the process of grounding/ungrounding must be 
conceived of as an intrinsically political one, and that ontology 
must necessarily be conceived of as political ontology, the 
difference between the ontological and the ontic will [in Laclau] 
necessarily be reframed in terms of the difference between ‘the 
political’ and ‘politics’.412 
  
Together with this framework, Laclau argues, through Husserl, that those practices that 
reside at the ontic plane are practices that have been instituted by the underlying 
ideological order.413 To further this concept, Laclau argues that this institution often 
precipitates a subsequent sedimentation.414 This sedimentation accounts for the ways in 
which the contingently instituted practices at the ontic plane acquire a common-sense 
quality, which masks the fact that they are contingent. In other words, sedimentation 
accounts for the way in which a ‘closure’ of ‘the social’ begins to form; it marks a 
fundamental forgetting of the institution: 
 
The moment of the original institution of the social is the point at 
which the contingency is revealed […] [However], [i]nsofar as an 
 
411 Mouffe of course also engages Heidegger’s concepts of ontic and ontological. For example, see 
Mouffe, 2005a, p.8. 
412 Marchart, Oliver, 2007, p.149. 
413 The concept of ideology is used somewhat flippantly here. We do not mean to imply that there is 
an outside to ideology from where we can examine it. It merely refers to a set of partially fixed nodal 
points. For an in-depth discussion of the concept of ideology, see Laclau, 1997. I use the concept of 
the ‘underlying ideological order’ to name ‘orderings’. One such name is provided by Badiou when 
he refers to “capitalo-parliamentalism”. See Badiou, Alain, 2008, Conditions, translated by: Steven 
Corcoran, Continuum Books: London, p.166.  
414 Laclau speaks to the concepts of institution and sedimentation in detail in Laclau, 1990, pp.33-36. 
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act of institution has been successful, a ‘forgetting of the origins’ 
tends to occur […] In this way, the instituted tends to assume the 
form of a mere objective presence […] [As] objectivity is based on 
exclusion, the traces of that exclusion will always be somehow 
present. What happens is that the sedimentation can be so 
complete, [that its original dimension of power does] not prove 
immediately visible.415 
 
Power, then, manifests itself in relation to the institution and sedimentation of the social. 
This means that the practices that constitute the realm of the social and the norms that 
govern politics are not only particular but rely on an exclusion that is both inherent to the 
institution of the order and is effected upon, what I have called, the representation of the 
social body to itself as a political community.416 This is the case as the sedimentary 
practices, upon enactment, are always part of the logic of the institution itself, or as Laclau 
takes Ludwig Wittgenstein to argue, “the instance of the application has to be part of the 
rule itself”.417 We can again liken this to Rancière’s concept of the distribution of the 
sensible, which, to him, is also always a (re)distribution.418 In short, according to Laclau, to 
think of radical politics, we must acknowledge the dimension of the ontological, the 
dimension whose engagement can effect antagonisms and rupture of instituting orders. It 
is from within this dimension that power and exclusion originate. However, as we shall see 
now, to address this power and exclusion, one cannot simply disengage from the 
dimension of the ‘ontic’, as it exists in a necessary relationship with the ontological.  
3.3.  Lack/void: radical negativity and its guarantees 
While lack/void is a big part of Laclau’s writing, especially qua his Lacanian heritage, 
lack/void has perhaps been engaged most systemically by Alain Badiou (who is also 
influences by Jacques Lacan), who claims that “void is the name of being”.419 By this, Badiou 
 
415 Ibid., p.34. 
416 For a discussion of Laclau as a theorist of representation, see Thomassen, Lasse, 2019, 
‘Representing the People: Laclau as a Theorist of Representation’, New Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 
2, pp.329-344. 
417 Laclau in Butler, Judith & Laclau, Ernesto, 2004, ‘The Uses of Equality’, in: Critchley, Simon & 
Marchart, Oliver (eds.), Laclau: A Critical Reader, Routledge: London, pp.329–344, p.344. 
418 See Rancière, 2010, p.54, for a discussion on why this is the case. 
419 Badiou, Alain, 2005, Being and Event, translated by: Feltham, Oliver, Bloomsbury Academic: 
London, p.59. 
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effects an understanding of void as a gap between the ideological order of the ontological 
and the practices of the ontic.420 This gap is constitutive of all social formation.  
Laclau himself largely agrees with this as he, together with Lilian Zac, writes that,  
 
nothingness is the very condition of access to Being. For, if 
something were mere, unchallenged actuality, no ontological 
difference would be possible: the ontic and the ontological would 
exactly overlap and we would simply have pure presence.421 
 
In Laclau, this gap then manifests itself in a failure of the ideological order to achieve total 
hegemony: 
 
The failure of the ontological absorption of all ontic content opens 
the way to a constitutive ‘ontological difference’ that makes 
power, politics, hegemony, and democracy possible.422 
 
Additionally, “this moment of failure […] cannot elude the field of representation”.423 This is 
the case because ideological order reproduces itself through representation. The process of 
representation is then never entirely faithful to that which is being represented. This is a 
philosophical necessity as, if complete fidelity were possible, the social world would be 
immanent to itself and there would be no need for representation to begin with.424 Failure 
in representation is thus constitutive, but it is a productive failure, in the sense that it is 
exactly this feature that opens up the avenues for ‘play’ and ‘liberating discourses’. As I 
argued, it is through representation of sedimentary practices that exclusion is practised, 
 
420 It is from within the same logic that Derrida derives a notion of the interpretive gap. See Derrida, 
Jacques, 1976, Of Grammatology, translated by: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press: Baltimore, pp.157-164. 
421 Laclau, Ernesto & Zac, Lilian, 1994, ‘Minding the Gap: The Subject of Politics’, in: Laclau, Ernesto 
(ed.), The Making of Political Identities, Verso: London, pp.11-39, p.30. 
422 Laclau in Butler & Laclau, 2004, p.338. 
423 Laclau in ibid., p.338. In Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, a floating signifier is termed an element while its 
activation – its becoming an antagonism – is termed a moment. See p.134 specifically. 
424 Laclau, 1990, p.35. 
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but it is also due to the constitutive failure of representation that the excluded possess the 
possibility to rectify their exclusion. This is what Laclau refers to when he notes that the 
failure makes “power, politics, hegemony and democracy possible”: reactivation of the 
institution of the social necessarily constitutes an engagement with “the ontic content”,425 
but does so in a way that brings into question its “sedimented forms of ‘objectivity’”,426 
thus effecting an engagement with the ontological. In that sense, the two dimensions are 
co-dependent, even if they cannot be collapsed into each other due to the constitutive 
lack/void that separates them. 
In this sense, “void is the name of being”, as it is constitutive for the possibility of 
contingent being. It is not a positive entity around which an ontology can form, but rather a 
productive absence and a failure of representation. As such the (non)existence of lack/void 
functions as the guarantor that the (re)presentation of the social body to itself as a political 
community can never be entirely faithful; or rather, it undermines the identity of the 
political community from within, just as it undermines all the relational identities that exist 
within that community. But this is then a cause for celebration, as it is this undermining 
that (potentially) allows for the political community to change contours and/or open itself 
up to the intrusion/inclusion of new identities and new ways of being – even if this failure is 
also constitutive of exclusion in the first place.  
In relation to politics, with the (non)existence of lack, we can then establish that order is 
not full: exclusion is constitutive. In that sense, one cannot logically account for boundaries 
to (discursive) order, as the closure of the social (the forgetting of its contingency) depends 
on the exclusion of lives and modes of expression that do not match the particular 
practices governing the dominant order. Instead, Laclau (and Mouffe) contends that orders 
can only be thought of in terms of (a) centre(s) or (a) nodal point(s) that partially fix 
meaning: 
 
Any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field 
of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a 
centre. We will call the privileged discursive points of this partial 
fixation nodal points. [However] [s]ociety never manages to be 
identical to itself, as every nodal point is constituted within an 
 
425 Laclau, Ernesto, 2005, On Populist Reason, Verso: London, p.87. 
426 Laclau, 1990, p.35. 
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intertextuality that overflows it. The practice of articulation, 
therefore, consists in the construction of nodal points which 
partially fix meaning; and the partial character of this fixation 
proceeds from the openness of the social, a result, in its turn, of 
the constant overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude of 
the field of discursivity.427 
 
If we start from the bottom of that quote, “infinitude” signifies lack/void in the sense that it 
is engendered through it. The alternative to lack/void is a positive presence, which would 
serve to qualify discourses operating in the social. This qualification would, in turn, limit the 
scope of possible discourses, meaning that the social itself would not be open, but closed. 
Lack/void then guarantees an impossibility of an ultimate fixation, but it also guarantees 
the necessity of a fixation of “discursive points”, of nodal points, to begin with. This is the 
case as a discursive system must be in place within which the meaning of one thing can 
relate to the meaning of other things. Nodal points then work as ‘privileged’ signifiers to a 
signifying system that serve to anchor the system in a terrain that is otherwise governed by 
lack/void; ‘the name of being’. It is in this sense that a system, or order, is structured 
around centres and not borders. Borders, with their exclusion, must instead be 
conceptualised as the limits to order and encounters with them signify its contingency: 
 
The limits of signification can only announce themselves as the 
impossibility of realising what is within those limits – if the limits 
could be signified in a direct way, they would be internal to 
signification and, Ergo, would not be limits at all.428 
 
However, as all order, qua its anchorage through nodal points, has a positive being, it must 
also ward off the constantly corroding effects of the “bottomless sea”429 of lack/void. 
Others come into play to effect this warding off as they serve to hold and signify the place 
of lack/void; to signify “pure negativity”;430 to signify everything that the order is not. That 
 
427 Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, pp.112-3. Italics in original. 
428 Laclau, 2007, p.37. 
429 Michael Oakeshot cited in Marchart, 2007, p.3. 
430 Laclau, 2007, p.38. 
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is, others reside at the limits of order. However, this also allows for the emergence of 
empty signifiers. “An empty signifier is, strictly speaking, a signifier without a signified”,431 
and emerges exactly in relation to an encounter with limits. In this sense, the empty 
signifier is not a simple signifier attached to the system in a differential capacity, but a 
signifier that has been emptied:432 
 
As […] all the means of representation are differential in nature, it 
is only if the differential nature of the signifying units is subverted, 
only if the signifiers empty themselves of their attachment to 
particular signifieds and assume the role of representing the pure 
being of the system – or, rather, the system as pure Being – that 
such a signification is possible.433 
 
This means that it is not possible to challenge order and signification from the outside, but 
that a politics of the excluded and a politics of the other must establish itself through a 
subversion of the inside. In democracy, rule is for and by ‘the people’. It is in this sense that 
Laclau can adopt a populist stance and claim that the excluded must identify itself with ‘the 
whole’,434 for in doing so it subverts the being of democracy itself; it presents the system 
with its limits; it marks a moment of radical antagonism (a reactivation of the political) 
within which radical difference emerges and exclusion is given a chance to be rectified. To 
accomplish this, however, one must engage in politics, or hegemony, as Laclau calls it. 
3.4.  Conclusion 
In this section, I introduced the ‘logic of lack’. I argued that lack/void is ‘the name of being’ 
in the sense that it is constitutive to historical change. It cements the place of the social as 
constitutively open, which forces order to anchor itself in partially fixed discursive points: 
nodal points. These nodal points create the possibility for discursive systems/orders but 
they also create the conditions for an encounter with limits of the system/order. In 
 
431 Ibid., p.36. 
432 Lasse Thomassen helpfully argues that this is always a tendential emptiness and never a complete 
emptiness, as there is always a mutual contamination between the ontic and the ontological. See 
Thomassen, Lasse, 2005b, ‘Antagonism, hegemony and ideology after heterogeneity’, Journal of 
Political Ideologies, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp.289-309. 
433 Ibid., p.39. 
434 Laclau, 2005, p.111. 
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Laclauian politics, this entails a possibility for an encounter with an empty signifier which 
undermines the order from within through an identification with the whole.  
4. Politics as hegemony 
4.1.  Introduction 
In this section, I explain how the logic of lack translates into a political logic. I argue that 
Laclau, through a focus on social movements, sees the demand as the base unit and 
particularities arise from the articulation of demands.435 If a demand is not met, it may give 
rise to an antagonism, which is an articulation of an identity that is opposed to the system. 
Finally, if multiple particularities, through hegemonic action, link together in a chain of 
equivalences, they can construct a radical antagonism, a popular subjectivity, and present 
themselves as the name of ‘the people’.436 I then engage an example of this logic before we 
finally encounter some critique of Laclau. 
4.2.  Articulation 
In the second chapter of this thesis, I argued that order is spatial, in the sense that 
differences are distributed in relation to one another based on a particular rationality. Our 
reference to ‘order’ in this chapter thus constitutes an engagement with space. As we also 
saw in Chapter Two, order has an identity while also enabling subject positions (i.e. other 
identities) to be formed within it – and in relation to an exclusionary frontier/limit. To move 
towards a discussion of hegemony, we must start with this dynamic. 
In Emancipation(s) (1996), Laclau outlines the way in which subject positions, or 
particularities, function within an order: 
 
A first effect of the exclusionary limit is that it introduces an 
essential ambivalence within the system of differences 
constituted by those limits. On the one hand, each element of the 
system has an identity only so far as it is different from the 
others: difference = identity. On the other hand, however, all 
these differences are equivalent to each other inasmuch as all of 
them belong to this side of the frontier of exclusion. But, in that 
 
435 Ibid., p.224. 
436 It is in Emancipation(s) that he first starts playing with the idea of the “radical” antagonism. See 
Laclau, 2007, p.35. 
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case, the identity of each element is constitutively split: on the 
one hand, each difference expresses itself as difference; on the 
other hand, each of them cancels itself as such by entering into a 
relation of equivalence with all the other differences of the 
system.437 
 
Here I operate with familiar terms. The system constitutes an order which functions on the 
basis of a constitutive exclusion. The subject positions within the order are however 
divided: in one sense, they are different to each other, and in another sense, they are the 
same. Laclau calls these two logics the logic of difference and the logic of equivalence.438 
Difference must exist for the identity of subject positions to exist while equivalence must 
also exist for order to be present in the first place (without which there would be no 
difference): 
 
This totality is [then] an object which is both impossible and 
necessary. Impossible, because the tension between equivalence 
and difference is ultimately insurmountable; necessary, because 
without some kind of closure, however precarious it might be, 
there would be no signification and no identity.439 
  
One important lesson we can take from this is that the identity of a subject position (or, the 
subject), is constitutively divided. As such, Laclau also describes this process of the logic of 
difference as a process of alienation from the totality: 
 
What we thus have is an operation of alienation and 
internalization: a subject is alienated in an identity-as-objectivity 
 
437 Ibid., p.38. 
438 Laclau, 2005, p.78. 
439 Ibid., p.70. 
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which is part of an objective system of differences, that is, the 
Law, which is internalized in the same movement.440 
 
To further this discussion, we must bring in the concept of lack/void that I discussed in the 
previous section. Applied to this discussion, the lack/void comes to reside in this alienation. 
For, as I argued, lack/void signifies the failure of order to hegemonize the social. In terms of 
identity, lack/void then signifies the failure of total identification of the subject with the 
totality – a failure that comes about because the subject is constitutively divided between 
the logic of difference and the logic of equivalence. We know that this is a necessary and 
constitutive failure, but it remains a failure nevertheless. For with this failure, the spectre 
of “the subversion of objectivity (identity) becomes ineradicable”.441 We are then left with 
a situation in which the stable representation of subject positions is never a foregone 
conclusion. 
If treated semiotically, we can relate this uncertainty of the representation of subject 
positions that is introduced by lack/void to the notion of articulation. All subject positions 
are in need of signifiers. In representing themselves they represent their signifiers. These 
signifiers are attached to signifieds and enjoy a stable relationship with other subject 
positions and the whole insofar that everyone knows what the signifiers allude to – this 
then also relates to our discussion of nodal points. Laclau exemplifies this through the 
example of the traditional vote of protest in France.442 There, the signifier of the protest 
vote was attached to the signified of the Communist Party. However, as the Communist 
Party withered away, the signifier was floated (more so than it normally is), leaving it open 
to an articulation that was different to that of the past. “This was translated into a 
considerable movement of former Communist voters to the National Front”, which also 
sought to position itself as anti-system, writes Laclau.443 The National Front was able to 
articulate the meaning of the protest vote to a different “chain of equivalences”444 than 
that which it was articulated to previously. While the protest vote used to be articulated 
together with an anti-capitalist, anti-exclusionist chain of equivalences – that is, while the 
protest vote (the difference) used to be located within the communist camp (the system) – 
 
440 Laclau & Zac, 1994, pp.31-2. 
441 Ibid., p.32. 
442 Laclau, 2005, pp.87-8.  
443 Ibid., p.88. 
444 Ibid., p.93. We return to this concept shortly. 
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its floating enabled the protest vote (the difference) to be articulated to another camp (the 
system). 
This means that articulation is an ineradicable feature of politics, or, “[t]he social is 
articulation insofar as ‘society’ is impossible”.445 All order structures difference within it, 
but this is a difference that is always articulated to it. And, given that the difference will 
always be alienated, it relies on representation to reconstitute the initial articulation again 
and again, in fear that its contingent nature becomes apparent; in fear that its connection 
to the system – the relation between the signifier and the signified – is dislocated; in fear 
that the initial institution will be reactivated. 
4.3.  Hegemony 
Laclau (and Mouffe) calls the articulation of the difference to the system the logic of 
hegemony. To Laclau, hegemony is politics. As I argued in the previous sub-section – and 
have done throughout this thesis – difference is constituted through its relation to a 
system. But as we have now also seen, this relation is contingent on the articulation of the 
difference to that system. This process in which the difference is partially fixed through 
reference to a system and other differences within that system is a hegemonic process. 
However, it is important to note that this system, while already incapable of being whole 
and achieving fullness, is itself a difference (a particular).446 For if it was not, it would 
already be established prior to discourse. In this sense, the concept of hegemony does as 
much to highlight the articulatory play that is inherent to the social as it does to highlight 
the degree of power that necessitates the articulation of differences to a whole: 
 
[…] there is the possibility that one difference, without ceasing to 
be a particular difference, assumes the representation of an 
incommensurable totality. In that way, its body is split between 
the particularity which it still is and the more universal 
signification of which it is the bearer. This operation of taking up, 
 
445 Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.114. 
446 We have not here explicitly engaged the explanation of the paradox of order using the categories 
of the particular and the universal, as we have done it with other terms instead. For an engagement 
with the categories of the particular and the universal, see Laclau, 2007, pp.20-35. 
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by a particularity, of an incommensurable universal signification is 
what I have called hegemony.447 
 
As hegemony involves the representation of a particularity as a totality, hegemony is then 
also constitutive of antagonism. For as hegemony deals with an establishment of totality, 
and as totality relies on exclusion, hegemony not only serves to articulate differences to a 
totality, but also to erect a frontier inside the social whereby various elements are either 
incorporated into its structure or cast outside it. However, as we have seen that order 
(which hegemony creates) must be conceptualised in terms of centres and not borders, this 
frontier is blurred and open to contestation. To protect this frontier, order is required to 
represent the other as pure negativity. But this is of course more than a simple 
representation. For, to protect the frontier – to prevent a complete blurring – it must also 
prevent a disarticulation of the signifier of the particular other. As such: 
 
[…] there is already a discursive organization in constructing 
somebody as an enemy [a particular form of the other] which 
involves a whole technology of power in the mobilization of the 
oppressed.448 
 
The exact nature of the mobilization however also depends on the type of particularity that 
has assumed the function of the universal. It is not simply the case that all orders are alike. 
For example, a fascist order centred around, say, the nodal points of corporatism, the 
traditional family and the nation is different from a liberal order centred around the nodal 
points of “individualism, and the rigid distinction between public/private, etc.”.449 Because 
the discursive construction of others is different, there is then also a difference in the type 
of application of technologies of power that is employed against the excluded. 
 
 
447 Laclau, 2005, p.70. 
448 Laclau in Worsham, Lynn & Olson, Gary A., 1999, ‘Hegemony and the Future of Democracy: 
Ernesto Laclau’s Political Philosophy’, JAC, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp.1-34, p.9. 
449 Laclau in Butler & Laclau, 2004, p.334. 
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4.4.  Laclauian politics: the construction of the people 
Laclauian populism is the representation of the ‘plebs as the people’.450 This is a political 
construction which conceives of itself as an “ideal totality”,451 an impossibly just imaginary 
that seeks to negate the structuring principles of order. Or, as I argued in the first section of 
this chapter, it is a representation of the irrepresentable itself. It marks a moment of radical 
antagonism and serves to open up the central democratic category of ‘the people’ to ‘play’. 
For example, in Habermasian rationalism, ‘the people’ is the entity that is embodied by the 
constellation of individuals with reason-giving arguments coming together as ‘the public’. 
‘The people’ works as a foundation for ‘the public’. However, when we take difference and 
exclusion seriously and acknowledge that some people, for whatever reasons, cannot 
appear in ‘the public’, the excluded might seek to reactivate the foundation that the public 
is built upon. This reactivation essentially consists in making this foundation apparent and 
then turning it on its head, proclaiming that ‘we are the people!’ and that ‘the public’ is 
nothing but a charade for elite interests. Notably, though, this is a politics that relies on the 
category of ‘the people’ being foundational, not only to Habermasian rationalism, but to 
modernity. It seeks less to destroy modernity and more to imbue it with new energy. It 
certainly conceives of itself as an ‘ideal totality’, and, at least to a certain extent, it must 
manifest itself as some kind of concrete entity, as it cannot represent lack directly. 
However, it also represents itself as an ‘ideal totality’ because the purpose of Laclauian 
populism is to reactivate the concept of ‘the people’ itself, and to do so requires the 
construction of an antagonism. You cannot get this with the mere assertion that ‘we are 
also the people’, which seeks to remedy exclusion rather than to make apparent the 
contingent practices upon which the current and latent conceptualisation of ‘the people’ is 
negotiated. When we liken the construction of an antagonism with Habermasian 
rationalism, we might argue that the exclamation, ‘we are also the people’, can account for 
the reason-giving arguments of hitherto excluded peoples, while the exclamation, ‘we are 
the people’, seeks to make the practice of reason-giving argumentation as the emblem of 
political agency apparent in its contingent form. It is in this sense that Laclauian politics 
seeks to negate the structuring principles of order and represent the ‘plebs as the people’.  
 
450 Laclau, 2005, p.86. 
451 Ibid., p.94. 
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The construction of ‘the people’, however, always has humble beginnings. It starts with the 
request.452 This request is made by particular social actors to the dominant system. Laclau 
often uses the example of housing.453 In the case of the request, the addressee is easily 
identifiable. This request is either met or not. If it is met, nothing more comes of it and the 
identity of the people making the request is re-articulated to the dominant relational 
system. However, if the request is not met, it can turn into a demand and may, insofar as 
the people making it see themselves as bearers of rights, turn into a claim:  
 
[…] the frustration of an individual demand transforms the 
request into a claim as far as people see themselves as bearers of 
rights that are not recognized.454 
 
This then marks the beginning of the engagement with the category of ‘the people’, for the 
claim is made based on a recognition on the part of the claimers with the democratic 
category par excellence: the people, itself. However, there are still two avenues that the 
demand can take. It can be a democratic demand or a popular demand. A democratic 
demand is one that remains “in isolation” from other demands,455 while a popular demand 
is one that articulates itself together with other demands and thus forms a ‘chain of 
equivalences’. 
In the case of housing, people seeking a betterment of their living conditions can retain the 
status of their demand as a democratic demand. This enables them to identify the 
addressee, be that the town hall or the appropriate ministry, and thus design specific 
strategies to enable them to accomplish their goals. The NGO sector is placed within the 
realm of democratic demands.456 However, if sufficiently frustrated, they can also look 
around and identify other groups of people who are equally frustrated and ‘link up’ with 
them. When this happens, the addressees of the individual demands become blurred. This 
means that the engagement with the category of ‘the people’ changes. From being a 
 
452 Laclau, 2005, p.73. See also Laclau, 2006, pp.653-657, for a discussion on the nature of the 
demand. 
453 See, for example, Laclau, 2006. 
454 Ibid., p.655. 
455 Laclau, 2005, p.77. See also Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.131. 
456 See Choudry, Aziz & Shragge, Eric, 2011, ‘Disciplining Dissent: NGOs and Community 
Organizations’, Globalizations, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp.503-517, for an interesting take on NGOs and their 
effect of depoliticising the social. 
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positive claim, it instead becomes a negative claim. From being we are ‘also’ the people, it 
becomes we are ‘the plebs as the people’. This negativity manifests itself as the linking up 
of disparate demands into a chain of equivalences and entails an emptying of the particular 
contents of the individual demands. In the case of housing, the people advocating for it 
must change the nature of their demand. For, upon entering the popular chain with, say, 
advocates for health care, education etc., the individual demand also allows itself to be re-
enrolled in a system and, as such, must constitute itself as a divided subject (part difference 
and part whole). However, the popular system – the popular counter-hegemonic 
construction – is not a normal system. Since it is constituted negatively, it is not colonized 
by a particular, but instead relies on an emptying of the contents of the individual demands 
that enter into its hegemonic construction. The more demands that enter into this chain of 
equivalences, the emptier of meaning it becomes. In this sense, what starts as a demand to 
have better housing becomes a demand to incorporate ‘the people’. Finally, this 
construction spills over into public places and effects a radical antagonism.457 Famously, the 
Spanish political party Podemos, carrying the torch of the indignados, locate themselves 
within this populist theory.458 
Laclauian populism is then not dissimilar to Rancièrian politics,459 whose operable term is 
equality, as it centres around an antagonistic relationship between the system and a name 
which comes to stand in for the excluded.460 Through exclusion, the people occupying 
certain social movements are rendered as plebs, yet, through the adoption of the popular 
identity, they claim “to be the populus”.461 In this sense, the excluded parts come to 
identify themselves as the whole,462 but this is not a conceptual identification but a nominal 
one. This means that the popular identity, while being tendentially empty, is centred 
around a name – which is necessary as “there is no populism without affective investment 
in a partial object”.463 As I reviewed in Chapter Two, all identity is engendered through 
 
457 Lasse Thomassen, however, argues that it would be a mistake to name antagonisms either 
radical, normal, or simply not antagonistic. Instead, he encourages us to think of antagonisms as 
constituted in degree. See Thomassen, 2005b, p.305. 
458 Mouffe & Errejón, 2016, p.8. 
459 See Bowman, Paul, 2007, ‘The Disagreement is Not One: The Populisms of Laclau, Rancière and 
Arditi’, Social Semiotics, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp.535-545, for a comparison between Laclau and Rancière. 
Rancière is perhaps the contemporary democratic theorist whose work most resembles that of 
Laclau. Laclau discusses him both in Laclau, 2005 and in Laclau, Ernesto, 2001, ‘Can Immanence 
Explain Social Struggle’, Diacritics, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp.3-10. 
460 See Laclau, 2005, pp.67-128. 
461 Ibid., p.116. 
462 Ibid., p.111. 
463 Ibid., p.116. 
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affectual investment. The populist identity is no different. As such, a pure name – but not a 
concept – must remain as the empty signifier. However, this name cannot carry any sort of 
a priori content. Instead: 
 
[…] precisely because that name is not conceptually (sectorially) 
grounded, the limits between the demands [of movements] it is 
going to embrace and those it is going to exclude will be blurred, 
and subjected to permanent contestation.464 
 
The popular chain of equivalences then has no grounding and is at least in principle, ‘for 
all’. The binding together of social movements into a popular identity then transforms into 
a type of universality that is defined in the negative through an expulsion of essence, rather 
than defined in the positive through, for example, Habermasian regulative principles to 
democratic deliberation derived from the immanence of language itself: 
 
[…] in an equivalential relation, demands [of movements] share 
nothing positive, just the fact that they all remain unfulfilled. So 
there is a specific negativity which is inherent to the equivalential 
link.465 
  
‘Liberating discourses’ come about through these emergences of popular identities which 
always bring to the fore the claim that the excluded are ‘the people’.466 In other words, the 
Laclauian political subject identifies itself with the democratic tradition – an identification 
that Habermas also seeks, but through different means – and always seeks to deepen and 
widen the scope and definition of liberty and equality.467 
 
 
464 Ibid., p.118. 
465 Ibid., p.96. 
466 We are not talking about an origin, but about an emergence. See Foucault, Michel, 1984, 
‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, in: Rabinow, Paul (ed.), The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to 
Foucault’s Thought, Pantheon Books: New York, pp.76-100.  
467 Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.178. 
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4.5.  The Peronist movement in Argentina – an example 
Being Argentinian, Laclau often used the Peronist movement as an example to explain his 
logic in action. Juan Perón served as president for Argentina for three terms but saw his 
tenure interrupted by a coup d’état in 1955. In Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory 
(1977) and On Populist Reason (2005), Laclau examines the hegemonic activities that 
enabled Peron to first ascend to power and then to return for a final term in 1973. 
In reference to the turning of the demand into an antagonism, Laclau writes that: 
 
To the extent that Argentinian Liberalism, restored in 1955, 
demonstrated its complete inability to absorb the democratic 
demands of the masses and resorted more and more to 
repression the potential antagonism of popular interpellations 
could develop to the full.468 
 
He wrote this in 1977, so before he had formulated his thoughts in regard to the demand 
and the claim. He was also still using the Althusserian concept of interpellation in order to 
refer to the articulation of identity, which would of course change with Hegemony and 
Socialist Struggle. Laclau later examines the way in which Perón lent his name to the chain 
of equivalences that would hegemonize the various particularities in the society and 
construct the radical antagonism. In particular, he stresses the way his name became an 
empty signifier, able to hold all the diverging demands within one signifier, because the 
signifier had been completely detached from its signified: 
 
[…] there was a permanent chasm between Perón’s acts of 
enunciations (which were invisible [because he was in exile and 
not allowed to make official political remarks]) and the contents 
of those enunciations. As a result of this chasm, those contents – 
in the absence of any authorized interpreter – could be given a 
multiplicity of meanings […] As a result, Perón’s word lost none of 
 
468 Laclau, 1977, pp.190-1. 
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its centrality, but the content of that word could allow for endless 
interpretations and reinterpretations.469 
 
It was because of this that the hegemonic chain of equivalence could extend to both: 
 
[…] the right-wing trade-union bureaucracy, on the one hand, and 
the Peronist youth and the ‘special formations’ on the other, 
[even though they] had nothing in common.470 
 
Yet, as the empty signifier signals, the coming together of these groups in the same chain of 
equivalences signifies a structuring principle that is based not on a dominant particularity, 
but on the principle of emptiness itself. Laclau’s condonement of this type of politics is why 
Oliver Marchart describes his thought as post-foundational.471 But confusion also enters 
the picture when we conceive of this project in more ‘radical democratic’ terms.  
4.6.  Critiques of Laclau 
‘Radical democracy’, as a concept, is developed in Hegemony and Socialist Struggle. There, 
Laclau and Mouffe describe how radical democracy can come about: 
 
[…] through the irreducible character of […] diversity and plurality, 
society constructs the image and the management of its own 
impossibility. The compromise, the precarious character of every 
arrangement, the antagonism, are the primary facts, and it is only 
within this instability that the moment of positivity and 
management take place.472 
 
 
469 Laclau, 2005, p.216. 
470 Ibid., p.220. 
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Here we start to see talk of management of society, which introduces some ambiguity into 
the language I have so far examined in Laclau’s more populist writings.473 This ambiguity 
between the concept of populism and radical democracy has led some, including Slavoj 
Žižek, to argue that “I agree with populism, but not with radical democracy”.474 But Laclau 
disputes this and instead argues that: 
 
I think that they [populism and radical democracy] coincide 
entirely because by radical democracy I do not understand a 
political system. By radical democracy I understand that the 
expansion of the equivalencial chain beyond the limits which are 
admitted by a certain political system.475 
 
Laclau then contends that Žižek mistakes radical democracy as instituting a dominant 
particularity, when what Laclau merely wishes to account for is the logic of spatialization 
and identification itself, how that logic is political and how we can conceive of some sort of 
‘good’ action in relation to it. He is not a political philosopher. However, when one looks at 
some of Laclau’s other writings, one can excuse Žižek for being confused. For, elsewhere, 
Laclau, describing his ideal “democratic society”,476 writes that: 
 
For me, a radically democratic society is one in which a plurality of 
public spaces constituted around specific issues and demands, 
and strictly autonomous of each other, instils in its members a 
civic sense which is a central ingredient of their identity as 
individuals. Despite the plurality of these spaces, or, rather, as a 
consequence of it, a diffuse democratic culture is created, which 
gives the community its specific identity. Within this community, 
the liberal institutions – parliament, elections, divisions of power 
 
473 The difference between radical democracy and populism has of course been touched on by 
others as well. For examples, see Nielsen, Rasmus Kleis, 2006, ‘Hegemony, Radical Democracy, 
Populism’, Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp.77-97.  
474 Slavoj Žižek cited in Avgitidou, Athena & Koukou, Eleni, 2008, ‘The Defender of Eventuality: An 
Interview with Ernesto Laclau’, Intellectum, Vol. 3, No. 5, pp.85-95, p.89. 
475 Laclau cited in ibid., p.89. 
476 Laclau, 2007, p.120. 
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– are maintained, but these are one public space, not the public 
space.477 
 
Elsewhere, he and Mouffe also maintain that: 
 
The alternative of the Left should consist of locating itself fully in 
the field of the democratic revolution and expanding the chains of 
equivalents between the different struggles against oppression. 
The task of the Left therefore cannot be to renounce liberal-
democratic ideology, but on the contrary, to deepen and expand it 
in the direction a radical and plural democracy.478 
 
Here we start to see how populism and radical democracy run counter to one another. 
Earlier, we encountered a notion of populism wherein the chain of equivalences was 
expanded to the degree that it could be embodied by a name only, by an empty signifier. 
There was no talk of its relation to liberal democracy. Instead the emphasis was on the 
emergence of a radical antagonism between ‘the people’ and ‘the system’.479 Here, 
however, the expansion of the chain of equivalences instead functions to create a vision of 
“the image and the management of [society’s] own impossibility”,480 which is “what every 
project for radical democracy should set out to institutionalize”.481 While populism and 
radical democracy might operate according to the same logic, they clearly put different 
emphases on the location of political action. In populism, the emphasis is on the 
construction of a popular subjectivity which must be counterposed to ‘the system’: it aims 
at the establishment of a moment of radical antagonism and as such functions at the place 
of exclusion. In radical democracy, the emphasis lies on constructing a Left that ties in all 
 
477 Ernesto Laclau cited in Marchart, Oliver, 1999, Art, Space and the Public Sphere(s), European 
Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies, viewed 17 Feb, 2016, 
<http://eipcp.net/transversal/0102/marchart/en>. Here you can also find an account of the 
difference between Laclauian space and the Habermasian ‘wild’ public sphere. 
478 Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.176. Italics in original. 
479 Or what others have termed “the event”. See Badiou, 2005, for the best account – and an 
account that is perfectly compatible with the populist account, no matter Laclau’s objections. See 
Laclau, 2005, p.262. 
480 Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.191. 
481 Ibid., p.190. 
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the disparate democratic struggles so that it may win elections and institutionalise (not 
institute) a society based on the acknowledgement of its own impossibility. In this sense, 
radical democracy is located, not explicitly with the side of the excluded, but with the side 
of (a constitutively open) order. The question then becomes if an empty signifier can 
function not just to enable the emergence of a populist moment but also to effect an 
institutionalisation of the impossibility of society. It is, however, somewhat beyond the 
scope of this thesis to provide a systematic answer to this question, even if, as we shall see, 
we might be forced to look at Left/Right differently, depending on if I conceptualise radical 
politics as populist or radically democratic. 
Furthermore, Simon Critchley has argued that there is a “normative deficit in the theory of 
hegemony”.482 Critchley’s main question relates to the possibility for distinguishing 
between orders that are democratic and orders that are not: 
 
My objection to Laclau can be most succinctly stated in the form 
of a question: what is the difference between hegemony and 
democratic hegemony?483 
 
Critchley worries that Laclau is unable to think ethics properly, which would entail an 
inability to act and direct action in a political manner. Or rather, his critique regurgitates 
the old complaint against any philosophy that breaks with Descartes – that ‘relativism = 
quietism’484 – but in a more sophisticated form. Critchley hints at the role that lack/void 
plays in Laclau, but Laclau, in answering the criticism, stresses that lack/void is central to 
ethics: 
 
For me, the notion of the ethical is linked with the notion of an 
empty signifier, whereby an empty signifier is that option to 
which no content would correspond. […] [The ethical experience] 
is related to the experience of the unconditional in an entirely 
 
482 Critchley, Simon, 2004, ‘Is there a Normative Deficit in the Theory of Hegemony?’, in: Critchley, 
Simon & Marchart, Oliver, (eds.), Laclau: A Critical Reader, Routledge: London, pp.113-122, p.121. 
483 Ibid., pp.116. 
484 See Thomassen, 2004a, for a response to one such claim against a particular form of ‘relativism’; 
Lacanian political theory. 
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conditioned universe. And this experience of the unconditional is 
the kernel of any notion of ethics. If we say that there is a radical 
distinction between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’, this distance between 
the two is precisely what constitutes the space of ethics. But this 
distance is experienced through a certain breech, or gap, which 
cannot be ultimately filled. Because of this the transition from the 
ethical to the normative is going to have the characteristic of a 
radical investment.485 
 
Unhappy to collapse normativity and ethics and instead favouring a deconstruction of the 
distinction, Laclau then proposes that lack/void engenders a radical investment. The 
normative is present in this investment and, to Laclau, what Critchley terms democratic 
hegemony exactly constitutes such an investment. Moreover, it is the only type of 
investment that itself serves to make clear the very possibility of radical investment to 
begin with, as it is the only type of political project that seeks an exposition of the inherent 
openness to the social. It is in this way that Laclauian politics is not just descriptive but also 
normative (a feature it shares with most of post-Marxist theory). 
4.7.  Conclusion 
In this section, I outlined Laclauian politics. Having already engaged his ‘logic of lack’, I 
engaged the concepts of hegemony and articulation and argued that social agents 
construct identities through the articulation of demands. When demands articulate 
themselves together, a chain of equivalences emerges. Laclauian politics consists of the 
widening of the chain until the hegemonic particularity at the heart of it is emptied, and 
instead becomes representable by a pure name only, an empty signifier. This hegemonic 
chain of equivalences in turn represents itself as the whole, as the people, and marks an 
emergence of a radical antagonism between it and the system. 
 
 
 
485 This particularly Badiouan passage is from Laclau, Ernesto, 2002, ‘Ethics, Politics and Radical 
Democracy – A Response to Simon Critchley’, Culture Machine, Vol. 4, pp.N/A, viewed 17 Jan, 2018, 
<https://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/view/268/253>. For Badiou’s take on ethics 
and his prescription to “keep going!”, see Badiou, Alain, 2012, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding 
of Evil, translated by: Peter Hallward, Verso: London. 
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5. Towards a Laclauian critique of Habermasian political space 
5.1.  Introduction 
In this, final, section, I first give a definitive account of Laclauian space. Having done this, I 
critique Habermas for constructing a meta-space where sub-publics must engage in order 
to be counted as political. As this meta-space is structured by the alleged immanence of 
reason to discourse, Laclauian politics has no place in it. Habermasian political space then 
depoliticizes ‘the social’ by insisting that demands express themselves as reason-giving 
arguments, no matter the extent to which they go unmet. Finally, I discuss the extent to 
which Left/Right can be used by radical politics. I argue that, since Left/Right, as spatial 
metaphors, are largely devoid of passions, they are tools used only by public subjects. As 
such, they effect a constitutive recognition of their opposites, and thus cannot and should 
not be engaged by radical politics, especially insofar that radical politics involves a part that 
presents itself as the whole. 
5.2.  Laclauian space 
In the previous chapter, I made the metaphor of sphere correspond with the category of 
space, and in Chapter One, I engaged Mah whose account of the public subject is tethered 
to a concept of space that enables the public subjects to stand apart from one another. In 
Mouffe, we found an account of space that is a ‘space of equals’ and counterposed to an 
excluded part which does not and cannot share in that equality. With Laclau, we can tie all 
of these accounts together. The key to accomplishing this lies in Laclau’s discussion on the 
emergence of ‘publics’ as a viable category in mass psychology: 
 
[…] a homogenizing ‘communion of ideas and passions’[486] — the 
equivalence that this communion brings about - operates not only 
in the case of crowds, but also in that of publics.487 
 
Several interesting features emerge here. First is the notion of public in the plural, to which 
I will return later in this section. Second, which I will deal with now, is the tying of the 
concept of equivalence with the concept of the public. As I have already discussed, in 
 
486 Laclau later translates these features into a concern for identification. See Laclau, 2005, p.54. 
487 Ibid., p.52. 
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Laclau, the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference operate to produce a divided 
subject: one that both identifies with the system but also identifies as different from other 
subjects. Equivalence injects sameness into subjects, whereas difference injects 
“autonomy”.488 Laclau (and Mouffe) also relate this to the concept of political space: 
 
[…] the logic of equivalence is a logic of the simplification of 
political space, while the logic of difference is a logic of its 
expansion and increasing complexity.489 
 
We find then that the logic that governs space also governs identification. Importantly, it is 
here we can find our concept of the ‘space of equals’ – ascribed to Mouffe – elaborated in 
relation to the concept of equivalence and difference. Mouffe’s ‘space of equals’ becomes 
a space of ‘more of less’ sameness. However, for that space to remain one, for that space 
to be able to institute sameness, it requires a representation of an excluded outside. In 
other words, equivalence depends on exclusion.  
It is in this way that we can understand the emergence of populism. For the popular subject 
position is conditioned by the refusal of its initial democratic demands. That is, the refusal 
of the demands’ claim to obtain equal rights lead the subjects making the claims to realise 
that they fall ‘outside’ the ‘space of equals’ – the space that is more or less complex 
depending on the strength of difference vis-à-vis equivalence. 
But as I noted with the quotation above, the concept of publics can also be understood in 
relation to the logic of equivalence. This means that identification is enabled through the 
participation in publics, which also entails that the category of the public is decidedly 
spatial. To Laclau, however, there is not one but multiple publics. This means that, on the 
face of it, we are talking about multiple chains of equivalences and thus multiple 
substantially differentiated identities. However, Laclau still qualifies this difference in terms 
of publicness. All these publics then beget public subjects, even if they might somehow 
express their publicness in different ways.490 The fact that all of these different spaces then 
fall under the same rubric (they are all qualified as ‘public’) then forces us to return to one 
 
488 Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.182. 
489 Ibid., p.130. 
490 We should of course read this contra Habermas as an acknowledgement of a more radical 
difference at the level of the public. 
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space: the public. Clearly, Laclau’s conception of ‘the public’ is different to Habermas’ as 
Laclau is much keener to express the radical difference between identities, but the point is 
that an overarching concept of ‘the public’ is still very much thinkable within Laclauian 
thought.  
As I noted, the logic governing space also governs identification: both can be collapsed into 
a subject – understood in a grammatical sense. This both spatialises identity and identifies 
space. In this sense, it might be best to define a Laclauian notion of space in terms that are 
neutral to both processes. As such, Laclauian space is the articulation of particulars to a 
hegemonic chain of equivalences that is structured around partially fixed nodal points 
inherent to a dominant particularity that presents itself as a universality. While Laclau’s 
popular space seeks to negate this logic, it remains a concept of space that is not entirely 
dissimilar from Rancière’s, who I argued posited space as a distribution of the sensible 
according to the police (ac)count. Rancière allows us to think more aesthetically about the 
exact forms the particularities articulated to the chain of equivalences can take, but Laclau 
allows us to think this whole process more politically. 
This particular way of thinking about the process in terms of politics enters as I focus on the 
first (as opposed to the second) interesting feature in our initial quotation: the articulation 
of publics (in the plural). As ‘the social’ is constitutively open, discursive spaces traverse it 
in manners that are entirely undecidable. As I noted, publics are based on exclusion. But 
does this mean that, as there are many publics, that there are many exclusions and, as 
such, that all publics are political? For reasons relating to the way in which the public is still 
thinkable as singular in Laclau, I think not. For Laclau makes clear the difference between a 
totality that defines itself in relation to another positive element and a totality that defines 
itself in relation to an excluded other.491 In this sense, we might differentiate between the 
public of, say, a small-town community and a public constituted over the internet around, 
say, an interest in gardening. The small-town community will relate its being, not to a 
constitutive outside, but to other small-town communities or those of cities or villages, just 
as the internet gardening community will relate its being to different internet communities 
or gardening communities that meet in real life, rather than a constitutive other. I 
therefore cannot argue that antagonisms constitute themselves in relation to these types 
of publics.  
 
491 Laclau, 2005, pp.69-70. 
175 
 
However, insofar that these publics can define themselves in relation to each other, they 
must tendentially be part of a larger structuring system. It may be that these systems are 
themselves also parts of larger systems but eventually we reach a system that does not 
define itself in relation to another positive entity but to a pure negativity. In modernity, this 
system is manifested in the nation state.492 It is at this level that all the sub-publics share 
their publicness. As exclusion also manifests itself at this level, Laclauian politics evolves 
around sub-publics finding their demands unheard (demands forwarded to various 
instances of the state), becoming counter-publics and constructing popular chains of 
equivalences that bring about antagonisms. 
This conception of politics, however, clearly clashes with Habermasian politics and it is 
indeed unclear as to how we should conceptualise the public sphere from it – insofar that 
the notion of ‘the public sphere’ carries real weight in this world. Can there be such a thing 
as a public sphere of demands? And if so, does it exist today? With this, I move onto a 
Laclauian critique of the Habermasian public sphere. 
5.3.  Laclauian critique of Habermasian political space governed by Left/Right 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Habermas constructs a political space that consists of 
different reason-giving arguments. They are not necessarily neatly structured but Left/Right 
function to make them intelligible to each other. As such, a type of rationalism emerges 
from my reading of Habermas that stresses political being as reason-giving argumentation 
forwarded in public and aimed at regulating the common good. However, this is a 
rationalism that is tied together with Left/Right, as Left/Right provides the space for these 
arguments to constitute themselves.  
The implication of this normative conception of political space is that it structures a domain 
for ‘politics proper’ and thus consigns other modes of engagement with the in-common to 
being apolitical. In the previous chapter, I critiqued Habermas for this move as I outlined 
some of the others to this conception of politics. Most notably, I found it hostile to more 
‘actionistic’ modes of engaging the in-common. 
As I engage an explicitly Laclauian critique of this conception of political space, we can echo 
this criticism. But Laclau, through his emphasis on hegemony, also opens another avenue 
 
492 Certainly, there are also supra- and international systems, such as the international norms of 
human rights and the UN, the EU, etc., but at the end of the day, the monopoly of violence still 
resides with the modern nation state. It may not always have to be so, but this is generally the case 
at the moment. 
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for criticism. To explicate this, I turn my attention to Marchart. Marchart, in engaging the 
relevance of the category of time in relation to the category of space, argues that, in 
Habermas: 
 
[…] all partial public spheres, being interpermeable, refer to one 
all-embracing overall public sphere […] [To Habermas], there is 
but one "democratic" or "autonomous" public sphere that does 
not coincide with the public spheres of mass culture, but rather in 
which citizens [can] communicate about the regulation of public 
affairs.493 
 
In this sense, Marchart argues that Habermas forwards a conception of the public sphere as 
a ‘meta-space’ and, in the process, “hypostasises” it.494 Marchart’s primary argument is 
that we should assert that this space is not ontologically privileged, but that we may have 
good reason to support it nevertheless. However, for the purpose of this thesis, the most 
relevant points are the fact that Habermas’ political space is not ontologically privileged 
and that his hypostatisation of it thus constitutes not a philosophical intervention, but a 
political intervention. Through a Laclauian lens, this then means that Habermas, with his 
political theory, attempts to articulate a hegemonic project; that is, he presents a 
particularity as a universality. This particularity is the immanence of reason to discourse 
and it seeks to construct and regulate a system of particulars as reason-giving arguments; it 
seeks to construct a chain of equivalences in which the sameness that is embodied in the 
particular subject positions is their status as reason-giving beings. The point is, through a 
Laclauian lens, this is a political project first, and a philosophical/theoretical project second, 
as it becomes a hegemonic articulation to particulars that aspire to obtain a political status. 
To make matters all the more urgent, Habermas works decidedly from within the liberal 
democratic tradition and is taught widely across universities. On Habermas’ 80th birthday, 
Ronald Dworkin asserted that, “Jürgen Habermas is not only the most famous living 
philosopher on earth. His fame itself is famous.”495 It may then be the case that, far from 
 
493 Marchart, 1999. 
494 Ibid. 
495 Ronald Dwoking cited in Müller-Doohm, Stefan, 2016, Habermas: A Biography, translated by: 
Daniel Steuer, Polity Press: Cambridge, p.N/A. 
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simply taking issue philosophically with Habermas’ writings, we need to treat them as a 
hegemonic political project that appeals to those who already consider themselves, qua 
Mah, as ‘public subjects’, and who can appropriate Habermas’ writings to bestow the 
emblem of ‘reasonable’ upon themselves; who can appropriate Habermas’ writings to ward 
off the failures inherent to self-representation that the public subjects would otherwise 
incur. In other words, Habermas, though perhaps inadvertently, effects a closure of a space 
in which public subjects exist. His theory then functions not only to name ideal speech 
situations, for it also becomes an ideal to be appropriated by public subjects. 
This is arguably doubly true due to the ease with which Left/Right slot into Habermas’ 
theoretical framework. In the first chapter, I argued that Left/Right enable the public 
subjects as citizen-voters to differentiate themselves from each other, while maintaining a 
relation to the whole. Additionally, in the previous chapter, and to a certain extent in our 
discussion of Dyrberg, I argued that Left/Right can be made to work quite productively in 
Habermas insofar that Left/Right enable a self-understanding of a deliberative public and 
thus help effect a closure of it. In this sense, in a world partially governed by Left/Right, it 
becomes easy for more ‘progressive’ public subjects especially to further qualify their 
procedures through an adoption of the Habermasian ideal of the public sphere.496  
For Laclau, this is obviously problematic as this project is not based around the principle of 
emptiness but structured around intersubjective reason. Additionally, Laclau stresses the 
primacy of the demand in relation to the construction of ‘the people’, but Habermas’ 
political space has no room for demands. It is a space for deliberation and for reason-giving 
arguments based on the principles of ‘democracy, publicity, inclusion and egalitarianism’.  
Habermas presents his political space as a space for the forceless force of the better 
argument, but to Laclau, persuasion exactly requires force.497 Habermas presents it is a 
space for sincerity, but in Laclau, the concepts of the will (which to Habermas must be 
autonomous in order for sincerity to carry any weight)498 must be made to give way to the 
concept of identification which is always instrumental in the sense that it functions to ward 
off failure to ego-identification. Finally, Habermas presents it as a space of openness and 
 
496 For a discussion about the relation between progressivism and ideology, see Freeden, Michael, 
2014, ‘Progress and Progressivism: Thoughts on an Elusive Term’, Political Studies Review, Vol. 12, 
No. 1, pp.68-74. The point, of course, is that progressivism is not ruptural. 
497 Laclau, 1999, p.95. 
498 Habermas, 2007. 
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inclusivity, but to Laclau, exclusion is constitutive, so there must be something that cannot 
and must not be included. 
Insofar that the demand is applied forcefully, be that in acts of civil disobedience, 
demonstrations or strikes, it finds limited space in Habermas’ space. Insofar that the 
demand seeks not to regulate civil society but to assert a claim to equality that is being 
denied, it must also adopt a strategic dimension and as such is not necessarily sincere 
(alternatively, the demand is translated into an opinion, belief or argument and thus made 
a caricature of itself, in which case sincerity is also lost). Finally, as the demand is based on 
an initial exclusion, in the form of its populist being, it must effect an identification of itself 
as the whole; it must create an antagonism, which necessarily pitches itself against ‘the 
caste’, ‘the power-bloc’, ‘the establishment’ or ‘the system’ and thus cannot conform to 
the regulative ideal of inclusion and openness. Even if the popular demand itself operates 
in accordance with a radically democratic logic, its manifestation at the level of the state – 
which Habermas’ political public sphere is intrinsically connected to – must be antagonistic. 
In this sense, the Habermasian political space is anathematic to Laclau. In fact, if politics is 
centred around the demand and the possibility for the emergence of the populist empty 
signifier that it engenders, Habermasian political space has a function of depoliticising the 
social. Laclau maintains that politics requires and engenders affectual investment; affect 
cannot be subtracted from the demand. Yet, this is exactly what Habermas arguably 
attempts to effect: by asserting that only reason-giving arguments must be counted – 
arguments that must acknowledge their own partiality and fallibility – affectual expression 
is less likely to find expression, rendering Habermasian political space void of demands. 
In Chapter One, I engaged Gauchet and found the argument that it was the citizen-voter, 
once removed from the doing of politics, that grasped at Left/Right to understand 
themselves in relation to other citizen-voters and the whole. In Chapter Two, I engaged 
Dyrberg and saw him use Left/Right to exclude comprehensive doctrines and guarantee an 
autonomy on behalf of a strictly political realm. Left/Right enable these moves because 
they allude to an inherent equality between different parts and because they are fairly 
neutral in relation to comprehensive doctrines (i.e. they are not derived from any particular 
comprehensive doctrine). However, in being so neutral, they also render affectual 
investment in them quite difficult. In my vocabulary, we might say that identification 
through Left/Right entails an acknowledgement of a partiality to an overarching system and 
as such lessens your commitment to the particular Left/Right identity. This further explains 
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why Dyrberg views them as a good thing, as comprehensive doctrines rely more on other 
modes of identification than Left/Right and are thus further imbued with affectual 
investment which makes the recognition of fallibility and partiality difficult. The problem is 
that Dyrberg throws out the baby with the bath water. For Left/Right, especially in a liberal 
political space that we encounter so very often in modernity, function not only to exclude 
religious and cultural reasons, but also to exclude many political demands, because these 
are driven by affectual investment; because these are forwarded with such commitment.  
If I bring back the disability activist, Mette Lylloff, I note that she appeals to the in-common 
through the form of lived experience. She doesn’t seek to regulate the common good, but 
lay claim to the place of the in-common to begin with. She does this because she seeks to 
lay claims to equal right; she seeks to be seen as a member of the ‘space of equals’ that is 
governed by Left/Right. However, in a dominant political space that relies on disinterested 
reason-giving arguments expressions that are imbued with commitment and that do not 
acknowledge their own partiality are excluded. As such, there is no room for her political 
being and nor is there room for the more ‘actionistic’ approaches she might adopt in 
relation to the in-common. For both the lived experience and the ‘actionistic’ approaches 
rely on and appeal to emotion and unrelenting commitment. Furthermore, as the 
construction of the demand entails a construction of an identity, the affective dimension 
and commitment only increases as the demand turns antagonistic.499 In this equation, 
Left/Right not only function to effect a(n) (ac)count of reason-giving subject positions, but, 
as they are similarly divested of affectual investment, they also do not lend themselves to 
identification. As such, insofar that subjectivity is entangled in Left/Right, for to be partial 
to a system is still to exist within the paradoxical play of the logic of difference and the logic 
of equivalence, the required affect is invested with the public subject as the citizen-voter. 
But as I have alluded to above, Left/Right, instead of bringing out this investment, function 
to cover up the presence of passion and prevent its expression.  
In the previous chapter, I also talked about how Lylloff’s expression could be translated into 
an intelligible part of the hegemonic political space that Left/Right structure. We now see 
the costs that this entails. First, it entails a complete disentanglement of her potentially 
antagonistic identity, for the commitment to the antagonistic identity has to be forsaken 
entirely. Instead there needs to be an acknowledgement of partiality to an overarching 
 
499 We see this echoed in Badiou’s assertion that the mantra of the militant of truth is “keep going!” 
See Badiou, 2012, p.52. 
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system. In the case of Lylloff, who makes claims based on a shared humanity, we might 
argue, following Bobbio, that if she is drafted into the political space in which the public 
subject reigns, her political being will be translated into a Left identity. But this entails a 
recognition of a Right identity and an overall acknowledgement that both identities belong 
to a system wherein expressions take the form of arguments, opinions, beliefs, etc., for 
only those expressions acknowledge the equality, or equivalence, between her identity and 
the Right identity. When I then argue that Habermasian political space, or the space of the 
public subject, is a hegemonic political space, I do this because, in seeking to incorporate 
Lylloff’s politics, the space translates this politics and effective sucks out everything that 
made it potentially radical: the commitment and the forceful exclamation that power and 
exclusion are real, and fall outside the realm of communication. With the help of 
Left/Right, the space articulates Lylloff’s potentially antagonistic identity to itself and thus 
averts a potentially threatening confrontation. 
This is a problem for demands to equality. It is also a potentially significant claim, and one 
that has implications beyond the realm of disability activism, for it relates directly to the 
ability of radical politics to appropriate Left for itself, something that has been tried 
countless times and a practice that, as we shall see now, Laclau himself was deeply 
involved with. 
5.4.  Laclau and Left/Right 
I elaborate on the way in which radical politics should engage Left/Right in the next and last 
chapter, where I also present a few examples to back up our arguments. However, as we 
are now dealing with Laclau – whose conception of populism I largely take to be 
synonymous with radical politics – I will first critique his approach to Left/Right. Laclau has 
on several occasions pitched his political project (what Critchley called democratic 
hegemony) in relation to Left/Right. This was most notable in some of his earlier writings. 
In the previous section, we already saw how he, along with Mouffe in Hegemony and 
Socialist Struggle, viewed it as a task for the Left to construct ‘democratic hegemony’: 
 
[…] the Left should [locate] itself fully in the field of the 
democratic revolution and [expand] the chains of equivalents 
between the different struggles against oppression. The task of 
the Left therefore cannot be to renounce liberal-democratic 
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ideology, but on the contrary, to deepen and expand it in the 
direction a radical and plural democracy.500 
 
In New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time (1990), Laclau also dedicates a chapter to 
a discussion of ‘building a new Left’,501 after which he also describes his political affiliation, 
in his youth, to the left faction of the student movement and his membership of the 
Argentinian Socialist Party of the National Left.502 Laclau then, at least during the early 
parts of his career, operated within the Left identity, but even if he since then lowered the 
frequency with which he spoke to his political project as located within the Left, he still did 
so on occasion.503 What can be done, then, is not only to read Laclau against Habermas, but 
to read Laclau against himself as well; to critique Laclau on the basis of his own writings. 
Mostly, Laclau uses the term(s) unproblematically,504 simply placing radical democracy in 
the Left camp; that is, he utilises them as the public subject would: as a map of the political 
community. We know that radical democracy is an opening up of spaces and has more to 
do with the processes inherent to ‘democratic hegemony’ than to any sort of positive 
political project. As such, Laclau clearly does not mean to qualify Left more than to say that 
Left needs to mean a lot of things at the same time. It is unclear exactly how he wishes to 
proceed from there, though. Is the point to create antagonisms with the Right? If so, is the 
Left the category through which ‘the people’ flows and the Right the category of ‘the 
system’? If that is the case, then I have already argued that the Left/Right dichotomy 
functions to secure a political space that is free from affective investment and serious 
commitment, which would make it difficult for ‘the Left’ to play a productive part in the 
emergence of ‘the people’.  
However, there are not just strategic, but also theoretical problems with radical politics 
seeking to appropriate the concept of ‘the Left’. For, as Laclau argues: 
 
 
500 Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.176. Italics in original. 
501 Laclau, 1990, pp.177-196.  
502 Ibid., pp.197-8. 
503 See, for examples, Laclau, 2005, p.246, and Laclau, 2000a. 
504 In Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.179, he and Mouffe categorise them as inhabiting the realm of family 
resemblances to assert that “there is not one politics of the Left” (italics in original). That is the 
closest we get to a problematization of the terms in Laclau. 
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A true political intervention is never merely oppositional; rather, 
it is one that displaces the terms of the debate, that rearticulates 
the situation in a new configuration.505 
 
Not only are Left/Right, as categories of the police, already involved in the ‘articulation of 
the situation’, but if “a true political intervention is never merely oppositional”, then it 
would be difficult for the Left to facilitate this, as it relies on the concept of the Right to be 
meaningful, even if its concrete content is never even remotely stable. It is in this sense 
that the Left can never signify an antagonism, because it refers to a closed opposition. It 
may be that we can think of the ways in which Left relates to Right in different ways, but it 
remains an opposition that is already involved in articulating the situation. As such, 
Left/Right, far from signifying the possibility of antagonism, rather signify its negation. If 
that is correct, that Left/Right function to enable the political community to understand 
itself as one, then the channelling of an antagonism through the prism of Left/Right 
functions to prevent a ‘rearticulation of the situation’, and instead to preserve the present 
articulation. If Left/Right function to enable self-understanding on behalf of the political 
community and antagonisms are the rupture of that understanding, then radical politics 
must work to effect a rupture of the Left/Right distinction, not to reinforce it by seeking to 
channel the affective investment through it. 
Additionally, Laclau maintains that, in populism, “we are dealing with a part that attempts 
to incarnate the whole”,506 yet the Left, by definition, does not attempt to incarnate the 
whole, but only a part of it, the rest of which must be seen to be a legitimate adversary. 
Therefore, Left/Right may function to secure some kind of agonistic/radical democratic 
institutionalised order, but as Laclau specifies that this is not the trajectory that radical 
politics must follow, then we do not see how radical politics can successfully appropriate 
the Left/Right dichotomy. 
To a certain extent we can understand that if it is true that Left/Right structure our political 
self-understanding, then it is also true that we must work within Left/Right to effect a 
dislocation. But, clearly, the strength of Left/Right is that their “ontic content”507 is very 
malleable. As I explained in three previous chapters, Left/Right function mainly to enable a 
 
505 Laclau, Ernesto, 2014, The Rhetorical Foundations of Society, Verso: London, p.176. 
506 Ibid., p.N/A. 
507 Ibid., p.115. 
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count of the subject positions in a political community that is forever changing contours, 
while they, in the process, become intertwined with modes of expressions that are also 
particular. As such, I am not sure exactly how much ‘ontic content’ there is to them, which 
means that the extent to which they structure our self-understanding is more procedural 
than it is substantive. This means that (at least in a Habermasian ideal of political space), 
primarily, they enable an understanding of certain kinds of differences; reason-giving 
arguments, while they only secondarily enable an understanding of the specific content to 
those arguments. This means that an advancement of a new argument can never 
constitute an antagonism in itself and that the very dislocation of the place of the 
argument in relation to the in-common is needed. Laclau, of course, understands this 
perfectly, but he does not see that the place of the argument is guarded by Left/Right. In 
other words, Left/Right function as the confused attempt by public subjects to understand 
themselves in relation to each other and the whole. However, as they must do this within 
‘the social’, which is constitutively open, this is a very difficult task. Left/Right accomplish 
this understanding because they enable a subsumption of substantive differences under 
procedural differences: you can be whatever you like, as long as you can express it is in 
reason-giving argument. 
Because Laclau primarily seeks to problematise the substantive signification to the Left, he 
fails to develop an understanding in relation to their procedural capacity. Laclau, in his 
eagerness to break from orthodox Marxism, chastises the Left for essentialising ‘the social’ 
through economisation and thus failing to link up struggles that cannot be perceived 
through the prism of the economy.508 But in doing so, he fails to grasp that ‘the Left’ is the 
operable term of public subjects only and that people who think of themselves as falling 
outside the ‘space of equals’ in which the public subjects are constituted have little use for 
them. To link up their struggles to ‘the Left’ then amounts to an insistence that they 
express themselves in reason-giving arguments only, for this is the type of expression that 
Left/Right, in their capacity as markers of the police, provide for. In other words, we might 
argue that Laclau seeks to name a populist chain of equivalences ‘the Left’ – a name that 
stands in for the lack/void of the counter-hegemonic chain of equivalences. But it is 
impossible to engender affectual investment and commitment in that name, not only 
because it is partial (and thus at least partly conceptual), but also because it would force 
the protagonists of the counter-hegemonic chain of equivalences to express themselves in 
 
508 Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.177. 
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terms of arguments directed at other public subjects rather than in terms of a popular 
demand. This would not constitute a radical politics as the subject positions that would be 
articulated to that chain, would necessarily have to be people who already have a part in 
the public. The idea of a Left populism is thus an oxymoron. 
Before we move onto the last chapter, where I will forward a performative theory of 
political space so that we can see Left/Right at work more directly, we might then give a 
tentative answer to my principal research question: How should radical politics engage with 
Left/Right?  
The first thing to note is that I have argued that Left/Right are both conceptually and 
historically linked to a particular type of rationalism which codes political being as 
expressions that recognise their own fallibility and partiality, i.e. as opinions, beliefs, 
arguments, etc. I qualified one such version of rationalism as Habermasian which has 
allowed me to offer a conception of the public sphere which, in most democratic societies 
today, is linked to the state. The gist of the argument is then that in these societies 
Left/Right structure partial and fallible expressions by public subjects as citizen-voters that, 
ideally, allow the participants in the discussion(s) to regulate the in-common, including the 
state and the material reproduction of society that it, and only it, has the means to enforce. 
In this sense, Left/Right are thus intertwined the state. 
However, insofar that radical politics necessarily entails “a part that attempts to incarnate 
the whole”, radical politics can never emerge through the Left/Right spectrum: “Left” can 
never become the empty signifier. This is the case as, while parts of its ‘ontic content’ may 
be emptied, its form, which also remains particular, ties it together with a recognition of 
another, relational, entity. Furthermore, as I have also argued that Left/Right have a 
specific function in modernity, which is to ensure an evacuation of radical investment in 
politics from the in-common, the likelihood of a successful appropriation of ‘the Left’ is 
very low. Finally, as ‘the Left’ is a category native to the public subjects and not to the 
excluded parts, the insistence on its use amounts to a betrayal of the place of the “organic 
intellectual” in radical politics – which radical politics must remain tied to.509 Radical politics 
consists in the linking up of disparate struggles to effect a radical dislocation of the 
dominant political space. But as the dominant political space is intrinsically tied to the state 
 
509 Laclau, 1990, p.195. 
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in most democratic societies, the radical dislocation must also interfere with the running of 
the state and the way in which it effects and enforces the material reproduction of society.  
While Left/Right are categories of the police in relation to this space, they do not saturate 
the in-common. There are other ways to engage it, be that through notions of equality, 
freedom or comradeship, etc., all of which provide much better and more natural avenues 
for constructing ‘the people’. 
To be clear, this does not mean that I am advocating for some sort of return to a pre-
political era à la Rousseau. In the age of post-Marxism, radical politics is not a political 
philosophy, but practices effecting ruptures in political space. Radical politics manifests 
itself in moments in time. It relies on an account of hegemonic space, but it is not spatial in 
the sense that while it relies on a construction of counter-hegemonic space, in its final 
stage it expresses itself as historical rather than spatial; as an emergence of the excluded 
parts as ‘the people’. In this sense, when the counter-hegemonic chain of the excluded 
parts seeks to represent itself as the whole, this is not an anti-democratic gesture, but an 
attempt to embody the very paradoxical nature of democracy itself. It is not the 
establishment of a new regime; it is a rupture of the old. In relation to my previous 
discussion of the state, radical politics then seeks a rupture both with the dominant 
political space and the state, as the two are intrinsically tied together. The state, then, in its 
current configuration, relies on the dominance of the public subject as the citizen-voter and 
the Left/Right political space to which the citizen-voter belongs, to account for its 
democratic being. This means that radical politics, in seeking to effect a rupture of the 
existing regime, necessarily seeks to effect a rupture not just with the state and its capacity 
for material reproduction but also with the dominant political space and the subject that is 
articulated in relation to it (the public subject as the citizen-voter). As such, and perhaps 
most importantly, radical politics cannot be practised from the perspective of order, which 
seeks only to effect (ac)counts. It can only be practised from the perspective of exclusion, 
which seeks to manifest the democratic deficit in all such (ac)counts. 
5.5.  Conclusion 
I first outlined Laclauian political space and argued that it is constituted in a chain of 
equivalences that is structured around nodal points inherent to a dominant particularity. I 
used this to critique Habermas for seeking to construct a space to structure how ‘politics’ 
should be conducted on the basis of reason-giving arguments. I argued that this 
conceptualisation functions to depoliticise ‘the social’ as it insists that excluded parts must 
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engage with the in-common through forceless reason-giving argumentation, even if force is 
constitutive to their exclusion. Finally, I contended that radical politics should not engage 
the Left/Right spectrum as, not only is it tied up in this situation, but also because 
Left/Right legitimise a constitutive opposition between parts occupying the same space. 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I outlined the main tendencies in Laclau’s political writings. I argued, with 
Laclau, that there is a constitutive lack/void to all identity and space and that this 
necessitates an exclusion from within the subject to signify its radical negativity; to signify 
everything that it is not. With Laclau, I furthermore argued that radical politics is 
engendered by this ‘logic of lack’. The subject, by which I mean to refer to both space and 
identity, is held together through a dynamic between a logic of equivalence and a logic of 
difference. It is tied together with a system and as such is equivalent to other subjects 
within that system. However, qua being a distinct subject, it is also different from other 
subjects. As such, the subject is always divided. This division at the heart of the subject is 
caused by lack/void and enables a rearticulation of the degree of equivalence that the 
subject has to a particular system. Precisely, radical politics is conceived as a manifestation 
of a subject that exists at the limits of a particular system. Finding itself excluded, it seeks 
to construct a popular subjectivity that pitches itself against ‘the system’. To do this, it 
attempts to articulate itself to other subjects and create a chain of equivalences between it 
and them, thus creating a rival hegemonic system. The further this chain of equivalence 
stretches, the more individual subjects will have to empty themselves of their particular 
content to the point where they become empty. At this point the popular identity is 
achieved. The particular subjects present themselves as the whole, as ‘the people’, and 
thus constitute a radical antagonism vis-à-vis the system. 
From within this logic, I also discussed the prospect for radical politics to channel itself 
through ‘the Left’. I noted that Left/Right function to police Habermasian political space, 
which is very much conceived of from within liberal constitutional order. Because of this, I 
argued that we should conceive of Habermasian Left/Right structured political space as a 
hegemonic project that seeks to demarcate a political space in which subject positions are 
constituted as different reason-giving beings – in the next chapter I look to find examples of 
performances of these ideals of Habermasian political space. I argued that Left/Right 
function much as Dyrberg and Gauchet contend: to remove the subject from the doing of 
politics and to defuse affectual investment in politics. However, based on this, I argued that 
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radical politics should not seek to appropriate ‘the Left’. For not only is it a category of the 
already included within the ‘space of equals’ and thus functions to effect a depoliticization 
through a removal of affectual investment in the political space that it helps police, but, 
perhaps most crucially, because it also legitimises a constitutive division between 
opposites, between a Left and a Right, when the popular subject emerges on the condition 
that it identifies itself with the whole, with ‘the people’. It may be that in a left-wing 
institutionalised liberal democracy, Left/Right can engender some sort of constitutive 
openness to ‘the social’, but Laclau explicitly argues that this is not what he has in mind 
with his populist project. To tentatively answer our principal research question, then: 
radical politics should not channel itself through the Left/Right spectrum. 
In the next and final chapter, I look to exemplify some of the arguments made in the thesis 
thus far. As I do this, I develop a performative theory of political space. I tie in the relevant 
arguments that I have made in relation to the function of Left/Right in Habermasian 
political space before I engage Jeffrey Alexander and argue that the Habermasian political 
space is ritualistically performed, primarily by the figure of the journalist. I then engage a 
few examples of these performances to bring the structuring capabilities of Left/Right to 
the fore. This situates our argument not just in, and as a friendly critique of, democratic 
theory, but also as a form of ideology critique.  
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Chapter 5: Left/Right and the performance of the public subject 
1. Introduction 
I have argued that Left/Right function to depoliticise the social. With Ernesto Laclau, I 
argued that radical politics entails an affective investment in an empty signifier that 
represents excluded parts as the whole. Left/Right depoliticize because they rely on 
dispassionate expressions that recognise the legitimacy of competing perspectives. In this 
chapter, I outline this argument in more detail and consider some examples showing how 
this depoliticization takes place and demonstrating why radical politics should refrain from 
channelling itself through ‘the Left’ metaphor. 
To do this I first outline the exact ways in which Left/Right function in political space. I 
argue this function is twofold. They enable a formation of subject positions that can be 
counted in relation to the whole and they qualify the expression that those subject-
positions can make. To make this argument I place the ‘citizen-voter’ front and centre. This 
citizen-voter is once removed from the doing of politics and as such can express itself in a 
number of ways, be that in forms of opinions, arguments, beliefs etc. But what those 
modes of expressions have in common is that they all conform to a mode of doing politics 
that recognises that one opinion, argument, belief, etc. is relative to other, different, ones. 
I exemplify this by engaging an example from the ‘left-wing’ blogger Thomas Clark who 
attempts to change the ontic content of ‘the Left’. Clark identifies with ‘the Left’ and thus 
reproduces the category amid his intervention into its ontic content. However, I also note 
that Clark seeks to economise the Left/Right distinction, but in a way that relates it to 
beliefs about the proper management of the economy rather than to reflect a partition of 
the social in terms of class. In this sense, even if Clark attempts to further polarise the 
social, he does not engage the public subject as the citizen-voter and thus does not engage 
the realm of the ontological – only the realm of the ontic. 
On the basis of this illustration, I make the argument explicit that Left/Right function to 
connect the ontic content to an ontological form. The ontic content is the different types of 
beliefs, opinions, arguments etc., that one can have, whereas the ontological form are the 
beliefs, opinions, arguments etc. themselves. This means that there is no room for modes 
of expression that do not conform to the nature of the citizen-voter in the Left/Right-
ordered hegemonic political space. Left/Right then both function to ensure that no issues 
can, in principle, be excluded from the political space, and to call upon the whole to debate 
the issue in a manner consistent with the nature of the citizen-voter. I argue that this also 
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explains why parts of the Green movement is so difficult to place, as they, rhetorically, 
aligns themselves with scientific truth, which means that it does not recognise its own 
partiality. 
Finally, upon noting that the hegemonic political space can be staged, I argue that this 
staging takes the form of a ritual performance. With Jeffrey Alexander, I outline the 
features of ritual performances and then show what a Habermasian Left/Right political 
space (one kind of political space native to the citizen-voter that is centred around 
arguments) would look like. I also argue that this performance is always an extension of the 
performance of the identity of the figure of ‘the journalist’. Noting this, I engage two 
examples where panels are assembled. There we see how they ensure an exposition of a 
variety of arguments but delimit the role for the excluded parts to evidence their lived 
experiences, their subjective truths. Instead, when they find expression, they are made to 
forward dispassionate arguments that recognise their own parity to other arguments, 
which means that they cannot effect a dislocation of the category of the citizen-voter 
through a participation in the performances of the Left/Right-ordered hegemonic political 
space, by channelling its affectual intensity through the category of ‘the Left’. 
2. Left/Right and the politics of the social/ontic 
2.1.  Introduction 
In this section, I reintroduce the concept of the ontological difference and emphasise our 
argument that Left/Right constitute subject positions and a mode of relations that is 
centred around the citizen-voter. To make this point I engage an example from the blog, 
Another Angry Voice, that seeks to economise the social but nevertheless order it via 
Left/Right. 
2.2.  Politics of the social/ontic 
As we saw in Chapter Two, Chantal Mouffe conceptualises a realm of ‘the political’ which, 
we later learned, she counterposes to a realm of the social. As we saw in Chapter Four, 
Laclau, following Heidegger, conceptualises a realm of the ontic and a realm of the 
ontological. Both Mouffe and Laclau aim to distinguish conceptually between spatial 
politics and temporal politics. The realm of the social, or the ontic, is the realm of 
sedimented practices. Disputations can occur in this realm but none that can shake the 
foundations of those practices. Antagonisms, on the other hand, can shake these 
foundations. As such, they are different to mere disputations. While disputations then take 
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the form of sedimented practices, antagonisms call into question sedimented practices. 
While antagonisms are then of the social, they nevertheless function to disrupt it. The 
disputations of the social, while potentially important in relation to the emergence of an 
antagonism, are disputations that serve mostly to reproduce society and thus beget a 
forgetting of the contingency of society’s practices. As we saw more clearly in Laclau, the 
politics of the social still contains differences, but it is a difference that falls within the 
confines of the hegemonic discursive system, within which individual differences are 
meaningful in relation to the system itself. One of the central claims of this thesis is that I 
consider this system in terms of spatiality, or, rather, I equate ‘the system’ with the concept 
of a discursive, political, space. 
In one sense, we can thus think of difference within a discursive system in terms of 
subjectification. For, insofar as that space enables a count of different parts, it also enables 
an identification of persons with those parts. However, through Laclau, we cannot think 
this via the Althusserian concept of ‘interpellation’, where subjectification entails a hailing 
by ideology.510 Rather: 
 
Interpellation is the terrain for the production of discourse, and 
[…] in order to produce subjects successfully, the latter must 
identify with it […] Interpellation is [thus] conceived as part of an 
open, contingent, hegemonic-articulatory process.511 
 
Mladen Dolar encapsulates this difference between Louis Althusser and the theorists of 
lack as he argues that, “for Althusser, the subject is what makes ideology work; for 
psychoanalysis, the subject emerges where ideology fails”.512 This means, as I argued in the 
previous chapter, that identification is always failing, but that this is a constitutive and 
productive failure. Failed subjectification is thus a constitutive feature of discursive space. 
 
510 Althusser, Louis, 2012, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’, in: Žižek, Slavoj (ed.), 
Mapping Ideology, Verso: London, pp.100-140, pp.128-136. 
511 Laclau, 1990, p.210. 
512 Dolar cited in Žižek, Slavoj, 2000, ‘Class Struggle or Postmodernism? Yes, please!’, in: Butler, 
Judith, Laclau, Ernesto & Žižek, Slavoj (eds.), Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary 
Dialogues on the Left, Verso: London, pp.90-135, p.115. 
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In short, this means that the concept of subjectification remains an ineradicable feature of 
ideology, even if we must nuance it in order to account for its constitutive failure. 
In another sense, subjectification entails a mode of relation between subjects/subject 
positions. So, as I have argued, there is a count of subject positions where they are named, 
and there is an account of subject positions, where they are to express their relationality. 
Let us first look at the count in relation to Left/Right. 
2.3.  Left/Right in relation to subjectification 
I have argued that Left/Right are categories of the police count, providing for a way in 
which subject positions can be counted and are enabled to give an account of themselves. 
Left/Right might not be the only categories of the police, but that they are largely 
hegemonic in relation to the ordering of political space is beyond dispute. 
We see one such example of the way in which they order political space in the writings of 
Downs, the political scientist that I engaged in the first section of Chapter One. In Downs’ 
writings, Left/Right mark out an ideological marketplace, in which vendors (political parties) 
can set up shop and attract consumers based on their location within the spectrum. In 
Downs, then, Left/Right constitute and order political space in a manner that allows for 
vendors, but also consumers, to identify each other.  
As Gauchet argues, Left/Right provide a map of the political community in which people 
can place themselves and be placed in relation to other members of the political 
community. What we saw with Laclau, however, is that such placing, such representation, 
also becomes a reconstitution of a political identity. In other words, when we define 
ourselves in relation to Left/Right, we also reproduce our own identities as structured by 
Left/Right. It is in this sense that Left/Right, as markers of a political space, enable 
subjectification – on the basis of which the space and its subject positions also reproduce 
themselves. 
We see this logic at work in the many problematics surrounding the meaning of ‘the Left’. 
For example, in a piece on Another Angry Voice – one of the extremely popular blogs 
supporting Jeremy Corbyn, current leader of the UK Labour Party – Thomas Clark explains 
why he is “proud” to be a “lefty”.513 First he qualifies the Left/Right distinction: 
 
513 Clark, Thomas, 2017, ‘Why I’m a “lefty” and proud of it’, Another Angry Voice, 26 Oct, viewed 26 
Oct, 2017, <https://anotherangryvoice.blogspot.com/2017/10/why-im-lefty-and-proud-of-
it.html?fbclid=IwAR2K2kDHijQKIbkJ7rwrvAVKoABWiVLrHfFIPtFCy9NqxAfUXESOjNZvj4M>. 
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“The more left-wing a person is the more they believe in public 
ownership, and the more right-wing a person is the more they 
believe that private individuals and corporations should run 
everything for their own profit.”514 
 
Having qualified the distinction through an economisation, he moves on to running specific 
issues through Left/Right, arguing that a left-wing position entails a support for the 
democratic organisation of public services, but not for a planned economy. Beyond that it 
entails a support for workers’ rights and for social liberalism in general. Mostly, though, it is 
a defence of the concept of ‘the Left’ and functions as a call to wear the name Left proudly. 
What Clark accomplishes is a representation of ‘the Left’ as a subject-position – a 
‘hegemonic-articulatory’ operation as he seeks to qualify the content of ‘the Left’. In this 
sense, he is attempting to effect a subjectification of his readers in order to make them 
identify with ‘the Left’. However, this identification is also tied up in a mode of relation 
between the different parts of the Left/Right space. I turn to that now. 
2.4.  Left/Right in relation to deliberation 
In this example, Clark argues that Left/Right relate to the economy and that if you are on 
the Left, you support public ownership etc. and vice versa. He attempts to articulate the 
hegemonic category of ‘the Left’ to his brand of social liberalism and thus effect a 
subjectification of his readers. However, as there is also a mode of relationality involved in 
subjectification, things take an interesting turn. For while he seeks to economise the 
distinction – he seeks to ‘make it about’ the economy – he does not seek to replace it. He is 
not saying that the social is really divided in accordance with the social relations of 
production; rather, he is saying that the social is divided in relation to arguments and 
opinions over the proper place for the state in relation to the economy. 
If we look at the quotation above, we see that the operable word is not, then, ‘public 
ownership’ or ‘profit’, but the word ‘believe’. Human beings, in this example, are 
constituted as individuals with beliefs. Clark attempts to qualify the contents of those 
beliefs, but the category of ‘belief’ has a foundational role and functions to relate the 
different parts of Clark’s political community to each other. 
 
514 Ibid. 
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Here, then, we start to see some of the qualities that Left/Right have. With Gauchet, I 
argued that they are constitutively open to new meanings. The fact that Clark can even 
attempt to qualify their content is testament to that. However, with Jacques Rancière, I 
argued that space not only names and counts parts, but also effects a mode of relationality 
between parts that is particular. We can now cement my argument that Left/Right function 
as Torben Dyrberg described.  
Clark seeks an economisation of the political community. However, by constituting the 
political community through Left/Right, he effects a form of the parts (the subject 
positions) of the community as centred around the concept of belief. I have engaged others 
who have sought to effect an economisation of the political community, but they have 
simultaneously sought to constitute the political community explicitly around the markers 
of class. There, the relationality is centred around objective interests and the immanence 
of the social relations of production, but in Clark, it is centred around ‘the belief’. Clark 
pens his piece in the context of ‘lefty’ being used as a slur, as a style choice or an 
affectation. As such, he does not strictly seek to articulate his intervention to an explicitly 
deliberative stance. However, the effects are the same, by invoking Left/Right, he channels 
the interests relating to the social relations of production, into beliefs.  
In other words, the concept of class, which Dyrberg contends alludes to the strong 
up/down mode of identification, is neutered once it is channelled through the Left/Right 
spectrum as its subjects become opinionated members of a public rather than, for 
example, striking militants. As I described in the previous chapter, the demands inherent to 
the subject positions constituted around class then also lose their political edge, as they are 
instead made to take the form of the belief/opinion. 
Finally, once we translate the notion of ‘belief’ into the notion of ‘opinion’, we start 
forming the building blocks for ‘arguments’. This is the end point for the political 
community envisaged by Clark’s attempted subjectification of ‘the Left’: a political 
community constituted by Left/Right in which different subject positions engage in reason-
giving argumentation and deliberation. We might then reiterate the argument I forwarded 
in the previous chapter through Laclau: Left/Right effect a depoliticization of the social. 
Left/Right may enable a constitutive openness to their meaning, their content, but they 
also function to suck out passion – which is a necessary feature of the emergence of the 
popular subjectivity particularly and identification more generally – by subjecting the 
content to a particular form that corresponds to the nature of the citizen-voter. In other 
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words, Left/Right subjectification is a partial subjectification in the sense that it primarily 
begets an identification with the public subject as the citizen-voter, who it is that 
determines the relationality between Left and Right subject positions. The passion 
necessary to sustain identification is then invested in the identity of the public subject, 
rather than in a ‘lefty’ identity, meaning that no popular subjectivity can emerge from the 
category of ‘the Left’. 
We can now also tie in some of the other scholars I have engaged thus far. First, we can 
note how our transposition of a Left/Right meta-space onto Riker’s work on issue-spaces 
now makes perfect sense. In Clark, we see an identification of issues – public ownership, 
workers’ rights, etc. – in relation to which individual preferences can be formed. In Chapter 
One, I argued that, counterposed to this, there must be a meta-space onto which issues 
can be mapped and I qualified this meta-space via Left/Right. Clark briefly attempts to 
teach heresthetic techniques, as he argues that, “it's actually highly likely that the person 
trying to insult you for being a lefty has economically left-wing views too”,515 insinuating 
that left-wingers, rather than trying to change a preference strictly in relation to Left/Right, 
could attempt to change it by tying it to another issue. However, the important thing here 
is that Riker’s mode of relationality is tied to the concept of ‘preference’, which is not miles 
apart from Clark’s concept of ‘belief’. Riker, and some of his political science colleagues, 
clearly understand something about the work that Left/Right do in modernity – they might 
even have assisted in effecting it – even if exclusion remains elusive to them.  
We might also relate this example to the writings of Gauchet. Gauchet notes that a 
different economy of representation allowed for the citizen-voter to take the form of part 
participant and part observer of the political process. While his account is particular to 
French history, it speaks to an economy of representation in which the public subject 
becomes once removed from the political process and takes on the particular form of the 
citizen-voter. I have already likened this economy of representation to Habermas’ account 
of democratic deliberation structured around the reason-giving argument. With Clark, we 
can now see how this conceptualisation of the public subject plays out today. It entails 
Clark – writing for a blog that has had a major role in the ‘re-polarisation’ of the political 
community516 – embodying a particular public subject position constituted by Left/Right 
 
515 Ibid. 
516 Guardian Staff, 2017, ‘25 most-shared articles about UK election are almost all pro-Labour’, The 
Guardian, 1 June, viewed 1 June, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/01/25-
most-shared-articles-about-the-uk-election-labour-jeremy-corbyn>.  
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and telling of a relationality between Left and Right conceptualised in terms of ‘the belief’, 
and in doing so, advocating a mode of politics that effectively removes the subject from the 
more ‘actionistic’ approaches to the in-common. In other words, Left/Right are caught up 
in a matrix of practices that centre around the ability of subject positions to represent 
themselves as belonging to political space through acting as citizen-voters.517 Left/Right 
enable a rearticulation of the content of arguments (ontic), but they also tether the in-
common to a particular form of expression (ontological). 
2.5.  Conclusion 
In this section, I engaged an example in order to show how Left/Right enable 
subjectification of citizen-voters.  
3. Left/Right in time, in space and in ‘stagings’  
3.1.  Introduction 
In this section, I argue that Left/Right are dependent on Claude Lefort’s conception of 
modernity; they structure a political space that is constitutively open to new issues, but 
also effects a closure of the social. As such, Left/Right are historical categories that connect 
the contingent practices of the social with an underlying order of the political. Finally, I 
argue that we can think of political space in terms of ‘staging’. 
3.2.  Left/Right in political space 
Left/Right were not always discursive markers for political space. Political space itself owed 
its emergence to the political event that was the French Revolution. Left/Right are then 
contingent upon the existence of a certain type of order. In particular, they are contingent 
on the democratic order that revolves around Lefort’s empty place of power.  
In the Chapter Four, I considered Laclau’s logic of lack. This logic stresses that the material 
world cannot be immediately grasped by the faculties of understanding but must instead 
be channelled through discourse, through representation – which in turn structures 
materiality. Relatively stable representation is guaranteed by a dominant system, a 
universal, in relation to which particularities can relate their difference to each other. The 
problem is that, as the universal cannot relate its identity through deferral to a higher 
authority, it must instead eject one of its parts and treat it as its own radical negativity – as 
 
517 This is what Badiou refers to as he argues that opinions are the mode through which order is 
reproduced. See Badiou, Alain, 2005, Metapolitics, translated by: Jason Barker, Verso: London, p.24. 
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everything that the system is not – in order to represent itself. To Laclau, this logic 
manifests itself most clearly in political space. 
Political space is of a categorically different nature to other discursive spaces. This is the 
case as it is tied to the state and thus constitutes the enforcement of the means of social 
and material reproduction: it regulates the legitimate use of violence. Being political space, 
it also revolves around the empty place of power and must insist that design for rule be 
justified through allusions to the abstract category of ‘the people’. This is why the political 
public sphere is, to Habermas, infinitely more important than other types of public spheres, 
for it seeks to embody ‘politics’. We saw this when I first engaged Harold Mah and Gauchet 
to note the emergence of the political public subject and with Habermas as he asserts that 
the bourgeoisie attempted to ‘fill’ the concept of ‘the people’ through its immersion in the 
political public sphere. There the embodiment of ‘the people’ was accomplished exactly 
through an alignment of particular beings with the public. This is why the democratic issue 
par excellence, for Habermas, regards regulatory principles to ensure inclusion, sincerity, 
etc. in public deliberation. The point is, in our democratic order, to embody ‘the people’ 
and bestow democratic rule with legitimacy, you must exist in the political public sphere.518  
As such, political subject positions are identities insofar as they can be embodied in 
something that exists in the material world. However, when political space needs 
something to represent itself in relation to, this form of representation also must be 
embodied by something. It is here that the question of exclusion gains its prominence in 
relation to political space. For, we all depend on the system: 
 
[…] as located beings, we are always elsewhere, constituted in a 
sociality that exceeds us. This establishes our exposure and our 
precarity, the ways in which we depend on political and social 
institutions to persist.519 
 
To Judith Butler, we are all precarious, depending on the system for our persistence, but 
political space bestows agency onto ourselves and thus lets us master our own precarity. 
 
518 Laclau, Ernesto & Mouffe, Chantal, 1987, ‘Post-Marxism without Apologies’, New Left Review, No. 
166, pp.79-106, pp.82-3.  
519 Butler, Judith, 2015, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, MA., p.97. 
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The problem then comes for the excluded – especially the ones who function as a 
representation of the radical negativity of the identity of the political space – as they are 
not only denied that agency but find their precarity exposed through deliberately 
constructed apparatuses of oppression designed to (d)eliminate the existence of the other. 
This is why the concept of political space is so important, because it is there that the 
system, the sociality, manifests itself. 
In this thesis, I have argued that Left/Right function to represent this political space (to 
itself), to police the distribution of sensibilities and the (ac)count of subject positions within 
it. This is a space that functions in accordance with the logic of lack and, as such, while 
things may be excluded at any one point, they can, through hegemonic struggle, secure 
inclusion. The empty place of power ensures that no system is ever locked in time, but that 
it is always viable to change. As we glimpsed with the example in the previous section, 
Left/Right might then be said to facilitate this logic, because they are always open to new 
meanings. As such, we can read Clark’s intervention as an attempt to secure a place for 
certain beliefs about the economy within the dominant political space, to represent a 
person with those views as a political public subject. But Clark’s intervention constitutes a 
preoccupation with the social/ontic, and as I have argued, while Left/Right might facilitate 
a change in content, they also become intertwined with a mode of expression that befits 
the nature of the citizen-voter – a problematic which Clark fails to engage.  
3.3.  Left/Right in relation to form and content 
This mode of expression that is particular is then conceptualizable as form whereas the 
particular utterances are conceptualizable as content. Content belongs to the realm of the 
ontic whereas form belongs to the realm of the ontological. Using the terms that I have 
operated with thus far, we can conceptualise content as particularities and form as the 
universal; content as particular practices and form as the system which makes those 
practices both legible and imbued with legitimacy. With Mouffe, we might then say that a 
dispute over content is a dispute of politics whereas a dispute over form is a dispute over 
the political. This has the purpose of designating the site of antagonism in relation to form. 
The point of radical politics is to bring forth the failure to representation, to expose the 
ways in which the ontic is overdetermined, to reactivate the moment of institution. It is 
situated within the democratic revolution as it relies on an emergence of ‘the people’. 
However, we have learned that Left/Right are involved with the closure of the social. In 
that sense, they are both constitutive of modernity and function to reign in its more radical 
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nature. They enable a closure of the social because they (1) seek to account for the whole 
and (2) enable a mode of relationality between the parts of the political community that is 
particular. They are constitutively open to new meanings and contents, but on the 
condition that the content takes a form compatible with the citizen-voter. 
Radical politics, however, engages form, not content. It is in this sense that it must turn its 
back on Left/Right. For Left/Right function to prevent a reactivation of a particular type of 
political space – a political space that is thoroughly hegemonic. They might facilitate an 
ever-increasing amount of opinions, beliefs, arguments, etc.; they might seem to be paired 
so well with the radical impulses of modernity, but they run counter to the ideals of 
democratic hegemony. They police others – like Mette Lylloff (the disability activist from 
the previous chapters) – who are excluded from the sociability of the system because its 
mode of relationality is simply not for them. Subject to oppressive practices, Lylloff appeals 
to a discourse of equality by evidencing her truth, her lived experience. But such mode of 
expression is not heard. Instead, in the Left/Right space, she is told to be a citizen-voter or 
simply not be. Truth, subjective or objective, has no currency in this space. 
A politics that engages form, then must engage the mode of relationality that this space 
engenders, and which Left/Right play a part in enabling. But, as I have argued, it is not 
Left/Right that constitute this form in the last instance – that is the citizen-voter. Radical 
politics then must engage the citizen-voter, but not necessarily Left/Right. Left/Right, 
function to bestow a common-sense quality to the space that they police. In their capacity 
as spatial, orientational, metaphors Left/Right constitute this space, but in the last instance 
the mode of relationality is determined by the citizen-voter. They then function to deepen 
the sedimentation of this particular political space. But, like the space they police, they 
have a past (the early days of the French Revolution), they have a present (whatever we 
wish to call the current ideological order centred around the citizen-voter), and they will 
have a future – they are not timeless. Something came before Left/Right and, some day, 
something will come after them. 
A question however arises as to whether this ‘after’ will only come about when the empty 
place of power is no more, and political space dwindles back into the nothingness, or if it is 
possible to construct a different political space with room for more ‘actionistic’ expressions 
of ‘the people’? I will not answer this here, but whatever the answer may be, this political 
space, constituted around the citizen-voter who is once removed from the doing of politics, 
is so thoroughly hegemonic that it is unlikely to happen anytime soon. As such, the many 
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hollow claims that Left/Right are a topology of a bygone era will continue to be proven 
wrong, just as the protagonists of The Third Way look remarkably stupid today: 
 
Crudely put, the left – and most liberals – were for modernization, 
a break with the past, promising a more equal and humane social 
order – and the right was against it, harking back to earlier 
regimes. In the conditions of developed reflexivity which exist 
today, there is no such clear divide.520 
 
Seeing only content in Left/Right and not form, they confuse the issues that come and go 
with the fundamental ways in which we relate to one another as political beings – and the 
exclusions that engender. In other words, they cannot see beyond the citizen-voter. 
Interestingly, we can in this example also see why parts of green politics is so hard to relate 
to Left/Right. Anthony Giddens argues that a politics beyond Left/Right should embrace 
green politics521 and we can see the affinity. For Giddens, the point is to adopt a pure 
managerialism – in other words, to sever the tie between the public subject and politics 
even further. Parts of green politics can be thought within such a framework, because they 
constitute themselves through evidence and the category of truth (a bit like Lylloff). 
One example of this we find in relation to the movement known as extinction rebellion, 
which was founded in 2018 in the UK. This movement engage in direct action, but also has 
representatives that go on tv to explain their motives and demands, one of which is the 
establishment of a citizen’s assembly on climate and ecological justice. On 9 October, 
Rupert Read, one of Extinction Rebellion’s spokespersons, appeared on the BBC Politics 
Live talk show, where the topic of conversation involved extinction rebellion and climate 
change.522 Among others, a politician from both Labour and the Conservative party were 
also present. Facing hostility for the types of political expression that extinction rebellion 
had adopted (direct action), Read was asked if his approach would bring the two politicians 
‘on board’. To this Read replied that, “we are here to tell the truth … you can’t negotiate 
 
520 Giddens, 1994, p.49. Badiou, and Sartre, incidentally, also do not look too good. See Badiou, 
Alain, 2008b, The Meaning of Sarkozy, translated by: David Fernbach, Verso: London, p.25. 
521 Giddens, 1994, p.211. 
522 Extinction Rebellion, 2019, BBC Politics Live | Dr. Rupert Read | Extinction Rebellion, YouTube, 9 
October, viewed 2 Jan, 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zl0qMuF6ec0>. 
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with the atmosphere”.523 In other words, Extinction Rebellion’s politics, much like that of 
the advocates of the Third Way, seeks to do away with division and refuses to subsume 
itself as but another partiality beholden to an overarching system. It is a politics of 
(scientific) truth that does not acknowledge legitimate difference and its own partiality, as 
what is at stake is our survival as a species.524  
To be clear, then, the politics of this particular green movement is not one of negotiation; 
of compromise; of talk and reasoned debate. It is not a politics that values the peculiar 
dialectic in which competing arguments generate enlightened resolutions and rational 
consensuses. Its basis lies beyond the argument, opinion, belief, etc., for those expressions 
not only presuppose an inherent fallibility on behalf of its subjects but also a belief in the 
amelioration of that fallibility through inter-subjective exchange. Its basis lies instead with 
(scientific) truth and thus lies outside public discourse itself. It is located within the world of 
academic discourse, which has produced conclusive consensuses on the trajectory of the 
planet. This is why this politics cannot be thought within Left/Right political space, as 
Left/Right structures public expressions that recognise their partiality to the space of the 
citizen-voter, and thus cannot make sense of expressions that refuse to do so.525 
3.4.  Left/Right as channelling issues 
I have argued that Left/Right function to order the political community. As such, they 
represent the whole. However, as the relationality of the space that it orders often centres 
around deliberation, this ‘whole’ manifests itself in relation to issues.  I exemplified this in 
Clark’s intervention into the meaning of ‘the Left’, which I explained through Riker’s 
thoughts on issue-spaces. Insofar that we can also conceptualise parts of green politics as 
an issue, then, rather than an attempt to represent the whole without acknowledgement 
 
523 Ibid., 11:36. 
524 See Swyngedouw, Erik, 2011, ‘Whose environment?: the end of nature, climate change and the 
process of post-politicization’, Ambiente & Sociedade, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp.69-87; and Alain Badiou 
cited in Feltham, Oliver, 2008, Alain Badiou: Live Theory, Continuum: London, p.139. 
525 While scientific truth rarely features in mainstream politics, we recently saw another attempt at 
bypassing politics through rhetorical alignment with scientific truth in the case of the coronavirus 
pandemic in 2020. During this time, the British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, repeatedly justified his 
government’s decisions by claiming that it was just doing what science told him to do. As such, he 
sought to do away with politics (this, of course, also enabled a forgetting of the fact that the 
scientific method exactly relies on conflict and division to form). Incidentally, the Danish Prime 
Minister, Mette Frederiksen, explicitly said that her government’s decisions during this same 
pandemic were political decisions, which invited opinions to be formed about them and dissent to 
manifest itself legitimately. 
201 
 
of its own partiality, it can be located both on the Left and on the Right,526 depending on 
how it is articulated.  
We can understand this by going back to Dyrberg. Dyrberg argues that Left/Right are 
spatial, orientational metaphors that function to channel other modes of identification, 
such as Up/Down, In/Out and Front/Back. Specifically, Dyrberg notes how issues engender 
the activation of one or more of these other orientational metaphors527 (i.e. immigration is 
In/Out). As, to Dyrberg, Left/Right channel these other modes of identification (which can 
then be conceptualised as relating to issues), into a political symbolic order that is 
‘freestanding’, they also engender a specific space within which issues are addressed. In 
reference to parts of green politics, then, insofar as it is an issue that seeks to articulate 
itself to the Left/Right dichotomy, it lends itself to a reconstitution as something that 
people can have an opinion or belief about and thus surrenders its claim to truth. To 
reiterate, then, to place on the Left/Right spectrum, you must recognise your own partiality 
to the system, which engenders modes of expression native to the citizen-voter. When 
partiality is not recognised, and a truth value is instead assigned to the expression – be that 
scientific truth or some form of subjective truth – the expression cannot place and thus 
cannot be intelligible.528  
We can further explain the dynamic between issues and the whole through reference to 
the concept of debate. In Habermas, I noted the prolificacy of validity claims in 
communication and if we conceptualise Left/Right, not as a spectrum but as a polarity, we 
can see that Left/Right, beyond enabling a form of deliberation, specifically enable debate 
– debate organised around propositions (validity claims). Left/Right enable politics to be 
thought in terms of divisions. Insofar that Left/Right channel Up/Down etc., they 
accomplish a representation of various divisions within society as issues for debate – where 
Left/Right mark out sides that subject positions can both identify with and reproduce 
through the expression of arguments, opinions, beliefs, etc. In other words, we see that we 
can perhaps qualify the concept of deliberation further by noting the prevalence of ‘the 
debate’ – which in turn also allows us to align this idea of the function of Left/Right more 
 
526 See Gray, John, 1993, Beyond the New Right, Routledge: London. 
527 Dyrberg, 2006. 
528 Interestingly, we might also conceive of the work of truth and reconciliation commissions as 
somewhat other to Left/Right as they are about “acknowledgement” of ‘subjective’ truth rather 
than debate aimed at consensus. See Tutu, Desmond cited in wildebees, 2009, ‘Tutu and the TRC’, 
YouTube, 10 Dec, viewed 26 Aug, 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ujOL8FS2wv4>. 
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closely with Habermas’ concern for the consensus, as debates often have propositions that 
are voted on by the end of the session. 
3.5.  The ‘staging’ of political space 
From the coffeehouses and the salons, it is now Left/Right that, in some way, instantiate 
the politics of the social. It is now the deliberative practices that can, in principle, be had 
anywhere, that bring political space into being. Certainly, there are various attempts to 
undermine Left/Right as markers of political space through the staging of publicity in 
manners that do not conform to deliberative practices. We might find one such example in 
Butler’s Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly (2015), where she, in a very 
Laclauian vein,529 argues that publicity is always embodied, and thus can be played around 
with through alternative movements of bodies: 
 
[…] acting in concert can be an embodied form of calling into 
question the inchoate and powerful dimensions of reigning 
notions of the political. The embodied character of this 
questioning works in at least two ways: on the one hand, 
contestations are enacted by assemblies, strikes, vigils, and the 
occupation of public spaces; on the other hand, those bodies are 
the object of many of the demonstrations that take precarity as 
their galvanising condition.530 
 
Examples of these types of ‘stagings’ of publicity were perhaps most on display in relation 
to the occupy movements,531 but they have a rich history. While they may then seek a 
disruption to the orderly function of the capitalist system,532 they also challenge the 
hegemonic political space that Left/Right police. As such, they are interesting attempts at 
constructing counter-hegemonic political spaces. We might conceptualise these events as 
 
529 Butler, 2015, p.4. 
530 Ibid., p.9. 
531 Žižek, Slavoj, 2011, ‘Occupy first, Demands come later’, The Guardian, 26 Oct, viewed 7 Aug, 
2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/oct/26/occupy-protesters-bill-clinton>. 
532 See Oliver Marchart cited in theevent asca, 2013, ‘Oliver Marchart, The Breach: Art, Dance, and 
Political Intervention, Part 1’, YouTube, 6 Dec, viewed 8 March, 2017, 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lcAujtXOKY0>; and Marchart, Oliver, 2013, ‘Dancing Politics. 
Political Reflections on Choreography, Dance and Protest’, in: Siegmund, Gerald & Hölscher, Stefan 
(eds.), Dance, Politics & Co-Immunity: Thinking Resistances, Diaphenes: Zürich.  
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‘stagings’ of counter-hegemonic political space, as artistic happenings taking place in a 
particular time and place.  
But this has the effect of designating a place for stagings of the hegemonic political space 
as well. In fact, we can see multiple examples of stagings of the hegemonic political space 
online. In some places, such as in Facebook comments, debate takes a somewhat trite form 
and rarely escapes the expressions of ‘beliefs’ coupled with mockery and insult. In other 
places, the citizen-voter comes to a, perhaps, fuller expression as arguments are exchanged 
and systemically categorised. One such place is Kialo – an online debating platform. There, 
people can make propositions, based on which others can chime in and respond either in 
the negative or the affirmative – responses that can in turn be answered either in the 
negative or the affirmative.533 The European Union, finally heeding Habermas’ call for a 
European public sphere,534 has also established an online portal to facilitate debate 
between different people,535 and in various places, people can even challenge each other to 
debates via webcam, which other people can view and judge.536 These stagings all have in 
common a compatibility with the mode of expression of the citizen-voter – beliefs, 
opinions, arguments, etc. All fall under this category. It may be that Habermas stresses the 
importance of engaging in rational-critical argument and bemoans the ‘current’ state of the 
public sphere,537 but the point is that all conform to a basic mode of expression by the 
citizen-voter – the dominant form of the public subject.  
Through Laclau, I argued that this has an effect of depoliticising the social. We can qualify 
this depoliticization even further with Alain Badiou: 
 
What do the sovereignty of the spectator and the absolute 
primacy of public debate actually mean? That ‘politics’ is the 
name of what concerns, not determinant judgement, but reflexive 
judgement […] [Politics comes to be found] in a public judgement 
 
533 For one such example, see Kialo, 2018, ‘Is undocumented immigration into the United States a 
problem?’, Kialo, 17 Oct, viewed 5 Aug, 2019, <https://www.kialo.com/is-undocumented-
immigration-into-the-united-states-a-problem-
21749?path=21749.0~21749.1&active=~21749.1&action=comments>. 
534 Habermas, Jürgen, 2001b, ‘Why Europe Needs a Constitution’, New Left Review, No. 11, pp.5-26.  
535 European Youth Portal, 2019, Online Debates, N/A, viewed 5 Aug, 2019, 
<https://europa.eu/youth/erasmusvirtual/activity/online-debates_en>. 
536 For one such example, see, Edeb8, 2019, ‘Debate Now’, Edeb8, N/A, viewed 5 Aug, 2019, 
<http://www.edeb8.com/debate>. 
537 Habermas, 1992b. 
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which states whether this – which is not an object, but an 
appearing, a taking place – pleases me or displeases me, and is 
exercised in the debate of such judgements.538 
  
In relation to Left/Right, while these debates always revolve around issues – such as 
immigration, the economy, education, etc. – they can take place only on the basis of a 
discursive landscape wherein they are all part of the whole. As I have argued, it is Left/Right 
that account for this whole and thus enable the debate to take place to begin with. While 
Left/Right are only occasionally referenced in these debates, they thus help structure the 
agonistic relationship between the participants, enable the audience to make sense of the 
terrain and the players in the debate, and, finally, facilitate a form of adjudication based on 
reflexive judgement. 
These stagings can take place wherever and whenever. I have used examples from the 
internet, but they happen regularly in various setting when people get together, be it 
within the confines of their homes or in various communal setting. They morph their 
participants into citizen-voters and instantiate the hegemonic political space that always-
almost lays claim to the empty place of power.  
3.6.  Conclusion 
In this section, I argued that Left/Right function to effect an openness of content but a 
closure of form. In this sense, they function to reign in some of the more radical tendencies 
of modernity. They accomplish this by channelling issues into topics for debate.  
4. The performance of Left/Right political space 
4.1.  Introduction 
In this section, I engage the cultural pragmatics of sociologist Jeffrey Alexander to make the 
argument that stagings of political space can be conceptualised as ritual performances of 
the Left/Right hegemonic political space. I dissect the hypothetical features of such 
performances and note how they are often an extension of the performance of the identity 
of the figure of the journalist. 
 
 
538 Badiou, 2005, p.16. Italics in original. 
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4.2.  The theory of (ritual) performance 
Alexander has developed a sociological theory that he refers to as “cultural pragmatics”.539 
It relies on many of the more theoretical insights that were forwarded by the proponents 
of the ‘discursive turn’, but, being sociological, also enables us to identify texts, with which 
pure theoretical contributions rarely concern themselves. 
To Alexander, (Western) society has undergone a change during the last few hundred 
years. “Contemporary societies revolve around open-ended conflicts between parties who 
do not necessarily share beliefs,” he writes.540 He stresses that while what came before this 
was often conceptualised as being heavily imbued with ritual communication, it would be a 
mistake to think that we now live in a world devoid of this. Instead, echoing Lefort, he 
argues that, as society has become more complex, the symbolic realm has become “de-
fused”.541 De-fusion is then a defining feature of our time and assigns a feeling of 
contingency and artificiality to social practices that always threatens to undermine stable 
representation of the world. 
When we read this with Lefort, this de-fusion becomes the de-capitation of the body of the 
king. In Alexander, the way in which this is ameliorated is through the proliferation of ritual 
performances that seek to “re-fuse” the symbolic realm. We can easily square this with 
some of the theory that I have engaged so far. For example, the Laclauian concept of 
representation accounts for how identity can beget a forgetting of its own contingency and 
fuse itself into an easily comprehensible being. The Rancierian concept of the 
(re)distribution of the sensible also functions to suppress ‘void and supplement’.542 The 
point is, to continue with these more sociological terms is not to depart from the 
theoretical work that I have already done. It is simply to complement it with work that 
enables us to identify and categorise concrete texts of political space in a more systematic 
manner.543 
 
539 Alexander, Jeffrey C., 2004, ‘Cultural Pragmatics: Social Performance Between Ritual and 
Strategy’, Sociological Theory, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp.527-523. 
540 Ibid., p.528. 
541 Ibid., p.529. 
542 Rancière, 2010, p.36. 
543 Alexander himself traces his work back to that of Durkheim, who was of course also occupied 
with the way in which society could become possible. See Alexander, Jeffrey C., 2016, ‘Performance 
and Politics: President Obama’s Dramatic Reelection in 2012’, The Drama Review, Vol. 60, No. 4, 
pp.130-142, p.131. 
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To move on, then, the goal of the ritual performance in modernity is to fuse the otherwise 
fractured symbolic landscape, to create performances that re-instil a confidence in 
authenticity (of political space). To explain this, Alexander also engages Habermas, but he 
derides him for begetting a misrecognition of political space tout court with one of its 
stylized expressions: the public sphere. Alexander argues that modernity has given rise, not 
to a public sphere, but to a public stage and that this is a symbolic forum in which social 
actors can perform their reasons: 
 
Rationalist philosophers (Habermas 1989 [1962]) speak of the rise 
of the public sphere as a forum for deliberative and considered 
debate. A more sociological formulation would point to the rise of 
a public stage, a symbolic forum in which actors have increasing 
freedom to create and to project performances of their reasons, 
dramas tailored to audiences whose voices have become more 
legitimate references in political and social conflicts.544 
 
While this is a rather unsophisticated reading of Habermas, the diagnosis is true, insofar as 
social actors can engage politically in all kinds of ways that they might deem advantageous. 
Importantly, however, their performances must seem authentic in order for them to effect 
a ‘re-fusing’ of the symbolic space. As such, we might say that the emergence of this public 
stage is what prescribes the possibility for articulation and hegemony. It is what makes 
deliberation possible, just as it is what makes strikes and occupations possible. But this 
does not mean that we can all exist in radically free ways and perform however we would 
like. For not only must performances seem authentic to be effective, but, as, Laclau 
reminded us in the previous chapter, there is nothing outside ideology; there is nothing 
outside the social. We must work to subvert ideology through engaging its limits, through 
engaging its ‘interpellative failures’. As such, the manner in which we can ‘perform our 
reasons’ is also circumscribed by the nodal points proper to the hegemonic Left/Right 
political space – nodal points that converge around the citizen-voter.  
However, as I showed in the previous section, there are also other ways to perform political 
space; there are other traditions that centre around more ‘actionistic’ modes of expression. 
 
544 Alexander, Jeffrey C., 2011, Performance and Power, Polity Press: Cambridge, UK, p.49. 
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Radical politics must embrace those spaces and work to get more people to participate in 
them. As I shall exemplify, to perform reasons within the hegemonic political space is to 
surrender the part of oneself that is radical. It is a self-defeating endeavour. It is to 
participate in the modes of exclusion that render the lives of others precarious. 
4.3.  Beyond the performances by social actors to performances of the political 
community 
So, social actors can perform their reasons on the public stage – a stage which they are free 
to instantiate because of the nature of modernity. In our vocabulary, such a performance 
would be a performance of an identity.545 However, in the previous section, I argued that 
Left/Right are markers of the whole political space. As such, through staging 
communicative practices with the aid of Left/Right, a dominant conception of political 
space can itself be performed, within which individual subject positions can be free to 
express their differences (in relation to the system). As we will see later, this performance 
is itself often an extension of a particular performance by a particular social actor – the 
journalist – whose identity is tied to notions such as impartiality and objectivity,546 but it 
remains a ritual performance nevertheless. 
We can see this as we look at the elements that Alexander uses to identify a ritual 
performance. These elements are (1) actor, (2) collective representation, (3) means of 
symbolic production, (4) mise-en-scene, (5) social power, and (6) audience.547 A ritual 
performance is made of up (1) actors, in that it must be embodied in some sense. It also 
contains (2) a language or a mode of appearance that the actors can use to signify various 
ideas and movements. After this, it requires (3) actual material objects – props – that are 
themselves infused with meaning. It also possesses (4) a sense of direction – the actions 
are not just random but planned. This means that the physical and discursive space within 
which the performance takes place is imbued with a sense of direction. Penultimately, (5) 
social power is a factor, in that one not only sometimes needs material wealth in order to 
produce a fused performance, but one also needs hermeneutical access to the system of 
 
545 Alexander’s theory is not far from Butler’s theory of performativity and he speaks to her on 
several occasions. See, for example, Alexander, 2011, p.54. For Butler on performativity, see her 
first, and best, intervention into the matter at Butler, Judith, 1988, ‘Performative acts and gender 
constitution: An essay in phenomenology and feminist theory’, Theatre Journal, Vol. 40, No. 4, 
pp.519-531. 
546 Bogaerts, Jo, 2011, ‘On the Performativity of Journalistic Identity’, Journalism Practice, Vol. 5, No. 
4, pp.399-413, pp.407-409.  
547 Alexander, 2011, pp.83-84. 
208 
 
signs that enables one to enact a mode of appearance that is understandable to many. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the performance must have (6) an audience. If there 
is no audience, Alexander maintains, it is not a performance.548 
Here we thus have the building blocks for ritual performances. I have argued that the 
dominant political space requires performance in order to re-fuse the symbolic forum. With 
Laclau, we might conceptualise the performance as a representation of the hegemonic 
political space. From this, we can argue that this is an inherently hegemonic-articulatory 
practice as it seeks to place subject positions within it through actively featuring them in 
the performance. In a very literal sense, the performance of the political space embodies 
the subject positions and makes them very apparent. I have argued that the dominant 
political space is structured around the citizen-voter. That is, the hegemonic political space 
effectively bars its subjects from ‘actionistic’ political expressions and instead structures 
‘politics’ around what Badiou refers to as reflexive judgement. In Chapter Three, we looked 
at one such account of political space – Habermas’. There we understood political space as 
centred around reason-giving argument. But I also argued that, even though Habermas 
worked from within liberal constitutional theory, his political space should be read as an 
ideal, an ideal that can be invoked and performed. With that in mind, let us look at what a 
performance of a Habermasian space might look like. 
(1) In terms of actors, it requires human beings who engage in reason-giving arguments. 
Insofar that Left/Right structure this performance, they function to separate bodies that 
present different arguments to each other. 
(2) In relation to language and appearance. The Habermasian space is a place for 
dispassionate argumentation undertaken in accordance with communicative reason. This 
means that it requires quite a formal setting in which participants have equal access to the 
resources, hermeneutic or otherwise, in order to make their points. There is no swearing. 
Importantly, subjects do not interrupt each other and back up their words with reasons. 
Being a performance of an essentially liberal space, subjects also speak as individuals, not 
as representatives of groups. Subjects also acknowledge their own partiality.  
 
548 This is one aspect where Alexander breaks with Butler, who adopts the Arendtian notion of the 
“space of appearance” which can be called upon in even the most obscure circumstances. See 
Butler, 2015, pp.72-98 and Arendt, Hannah, 1958, The Human Condition, University of Chicago Press: 
Chicago, pp.199-206. 
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(3) Insofar that it is, in a substantial sense, an audio-visual performance, one also needs 
props. As this performance is often undertaken in association with the journalistic media, 
these include microphones and name tags, although items that indicate that people are 
debating each other in a rational-critical manner also feature, such as notepads and visual 
manifestations of statistics. 
(4) It is in relation to direction that we can start to locate the actual performers of the 
public sphere, for it is with this that we see that the people who embody the subject 
positions within the space that is now performed as public are not the people who also 
direct it. The directing instead exists in the total production of the ritual and thus also 
manifests itself in the work that has been done prior to the actual performance, work that 
most importantly frames the conversation and identifies relevant perspectives. Actors can 
possibly assume direction during the performance through strategic interventions,549 but 
they will need to be identified as relevant actors before they can accomplish that. This 
direction/production is embodied by the moderator or interviewer. 
(5) As power is one of Habermas’ others, the access to material and hermeneutic power 
that enables an authentic performance of his ideal political space must necessarily be 
hidden. The Habermasian political space can in principle be performed by anyone; the 
whole can be brought together in communicative reason anywhere, but a “[s]uccessful 
performance depends on the ability to convince others that one’s performance is true”.550 
It is thus normally only performed by those who have material and hermeneutic power, i.e. 
big news corporations.  
(6) Finally, in terms of audience, as Habermasian political space idealises inclusion, it is 
likely to feature audience participation. This participation should be structured in terms of 
reason-giving arguments. However, insofar that the performance is hegemonic, what 
matters is that the performance reaches as many people as possible. The more people who 
bear witness to the performance, the more people are likely to recognise the mode of 
 
549 Hall, Stuart, Connell, Ian & Curti, Lidia, 2007, ‘The ‘unity’ of current affairs television’, in: Gray, 
Ann, Campbell, Jan, Erickson, Mark, Hanson, Stuart & Wood, Helen (eds.), CCCS Selected Working 
Papers, Vol. 2, Routledge: Oxford, pp.326-364. Jonathan White, whom we would be amiss not 
mention, thinks of Left/Right as discursive resources to be employed by social actors to forward 
their interests. In this sense, they enable actors to assume direction as well. See primarily White, 
2011, but also White, Jonathan, 2012, ‘Community, transnationalism, and the Left-Right metaphor’, 
European Journal of Social Theory, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp.197-219; and White, Jonathan, 2010, Left, Right 
and Beyond: the Pragmatics of Political Mapping, LEQC Paper No. 24, viewed 12 April, 2019, 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS%20Discussion%20Paper%20Series/LEQSPaper24.pdf
>. 
550 Alexander, 2011, p.28. 
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expression as legitimate and see themselves in one of the actors in the performance and in 
relation to the whole structured by Left/Right. 
Having identified these criteria, we can now look at examples of performances of the 
hegemonic political space. But first, I would be remiss not to expand on the role of the 
figure of the journalist in relation to this performance – even if an incursion into journalism 
studies is beyond the scope of the thesis. Not only does the figure of the journalist often 
manifest itself in big news corporations and thus has access to power and resources, but 
the very identity of the journalism is geared towards a performance of the whole. In the 
critical journalism literature, Nico Carpentier, relying on Laclau and Mouffe, has outlined 
different modes of doing journalism. Common to the dominant (liberal) modes is that:  
 
[…] media organizations are deemed to be crucial in the 
distribution of information, which enables citizens to exercise 
formal (through elections) and informal (through ‘public opinion’) 
control over the state as a watchdog or fourth estate.551 
 
He argues that, on the basis of this function, the journalistic identity is constituted around 
four nodal points, one of which is objectivity.552 Nevertheless, as objectivity is a difficult 
thing to prove, it is sometimes sold as impartiality instead.553 In other words, as the figure 
of the journalist sees itself as a vital cog in the “democratic process”,554 it falls to the 
performance of this identity to ensure that ‘the whole’ is represented within their coverage 
of events/issues. Impartiality, then, functions to give all parts of the political community an 
equal say. It functions to ensure that there is no bias towards one part over another. 
 
551 Carpentier, Nico, 2005, ‘Identity, Contingency and Rigidity: The (Counter-)Hegemonic 
Constructions of the Identity of the Media Professional’, Journalism, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp.199–219, 
p.202. See also Vos, Tim P., 2012, ‘“Homo Journalisticus”: Journalism Education’s Role in Articulating 
the Objectivity Norm’, Journalism, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp.435–449; Carpentier, Nico & Trioen, Marit, 
2010, ‘The particularity of objectivity: A post-structuralist and psychoanalytical reading of the gap 
between objectivity-as-a-value and objectivity-as-a-practice in the 2003 Iraqi War coverage’, 
Journalism, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp.311-328; and, of course, Bogaerts, 2011. 
552 Carpentier, 2005, p.201. 
553 See Zelizer, Bonnie, 2017, What Journalism Could Be, Polity Press: Cambridge, UK, p.84; and 
Tuchman, Gaye, 1972, ‘Objectivity as Strategic Ritual: An Examination of Newsmen's Notions of 
Objectivity’, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 77, No. 4, pp.660-679, p.666. 
554 Unsworth, Fran, 2019, ‘Critics of the BBC should stick to the facts’, The Guardian, 1 June, viewed 
10 June, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2019/jun/01/bbc-news-coverage-has-faults-
but-its-not-broken>. 
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However, as I have been at pains to describe in this thesis, this performance then also 
necessarily glances over the part that “has no part”.555 
The performances of the hegemonic political space are thus often extensions of the 
performances of the identity of the journalist,556 which is why I look at journalistic 
programmes for our examples. Also, we might further elaborate on our choice of examples 
by categorising them as belonging to the particular genre of “structured panel 
discussion[s]”,557 which function most vividly to give form to impartiality and inclusion, 
while also clearly separating different perspectives. 
4.4.  Conclusion 
In this section, I engaged Alexander who supplied us with the tools to dissect ritual 
performances of the Left/Right-ordered hegemonic political space. I then noted how this 
performance is often an extension of a performance of the journalistic identity. This 
performance puts a particular focus on the norm of impartiality, which enables a count of 
the whole at the cost of the ‘part that has no part’ in the whole. 
5. Examples and findings 
5.1.  Introduction 
In this section, I engage two examples of performances of the Left/Right ordered 
hegemonic space. I argue that radical politics should not seek to channel itself through the 
category of ‘the Left’, as this makes it seem as if excluded parts share in the equality of the 
political space on the basis that they must surrender their ability to evidence their 
exclusion by making their expression dispassionate and by recognising that their exclusion 
is not in any way a truth, but merely one perspective among many. 
5.2. Example 1: KCRW’s ‘Left, Right and Centre’ 
We are now finally at the place where we can exemplify the function Left/Right have in 
political space. First, I take a look at one of the most obvious examples: the very popular 
American radio show and podcast ‘Left, Right and Centre’. I have identified this program on 
the basis of its conformity to ritual performances of Habermasian space and because it 
 
555 Rancière, 1999, p.9.  
556 Over concerns for brevity and focus, we have not engaged Butler’s concept of performativity here 
– which is what Bogaerts relies on. See Butler, 1988. She popularised the approach in her most 
famous work. See Butler, 1999. 
557 Patrona, Marianna, 2012, ‘Journalists on the news: the structured panel discussion as a form of 
broadcast talk’, Discourse and Society, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp.145-1962, p.147. 
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most vividly exemplifies the work Left/Right do. Pitching himself as occupying the centre, 
journalist Josh Barro invites guests to represent the Left and the Right, in order to stage a 
“civilised yet provocative” confrontation.558 I here look specifically at an episode that 
addresses whether Left or Right ‘does freedom best'.559  
First, I note the ways in which it conforms to a Habermasian performance. There is an 
inclusion of voices based on the Left/Right spectrum. Felicia Wong and Gene Sperling 
represent the Left and Kenneth Hersh and Rich Lowry represent the Right. Wong appears 
to be the most Left whereas Lowry appears to be the most Right. The conversation they 
have is also largely uninterrupted, and all the actors provide reasons for their arguments. It 
is furthermore quite professionally set up and performed live at a conference. Barro 
moderates the discussion, through which the principles of communicative reason find some 
expression. However, while it does not seek a consensus, even if one of the panellists 
would prefer it if it did,560 the discussion remains centred around some sort of 
acknowledged parity between perspectives and various participants often oblige the nature 
of the citizen-voter by qualifying their arguments with “to me”,561 “I think”,562 “I feel”,563 
etc. 
The discussion itself centres around freedom. However, as this is not a neutral discussion 
but instead one framed by the journalist (both through the questions that Barro asks and 
qua his choice of guests), discussions of freedom quickly start to revolve around the 
difference between negative and positive freedom and how issues around “economic 
freedom” fits into it.564 Thus, economic freedom, with its assignation of the human being as 
a consumer, eventually comes to qualify the discussion, to the detriment of other ways of 
conceptualising freedom. For, there are of course many other ways of conceptualising 
freedom,565 but few can be placed so solidly within the liberal constitutional tradition, 
 
558 KCRW’s Left, Right and Centre, 2019, ‘Left, Right and Centre’, KCRW, N/A, viewed 15 July, 2019, 
<https://www.kcrw.com/news/shows/left-right-center>. 
559 Barro, Josh, 2019, Bonus Episode: Right or Left — Who’s Best For Freedom?, 3 May, viewed 15 
July, 2019, <https://www.kcrw.com/news/shows/left-right-center/bonus-episode-right-or-left-2014-
whos-best-for-freedom>. 
560 Hirsch in ibid., 47:00. 
561 Hirsch in ibid., 14:45. 
562 Wong in ibid., 21:55. 
563 Sperling in ibid., 16:00. 
564 Ibid., 38:48. 
565 See, for example, Lacan, Jacques, 2001, Écrits: A Selection, translated by: Alan Sheridan, 
Routledge Classics: London, p.5, where “freedom [...] is never more authentic than when it is within 
the walls of a prison”. 
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which is caught up in the performance. It is also noteworthy that the word ‘poverty’ does 
not feature even once. 
As their conversation turns onto the topic of choice in relation to health care provision – 
and the implication of freedom in relation to that choice – something interesting starts to 
occur. Both Lowry566 and Sperling567 (neither are black) start talking about what black 
people would ‘prefer’, which goes unchallenged by Barro. This is interesting, as we can read 
Habermas’ emphasis on inclusion as an argument that those who are affected by the 
conversation should have voice. As such, we might argue that the conversation takes an 
anti-Habermasian turn. However, Left/Right function to disguise this seemingly obvious 
example of exclusion. They do this by presenting the political community as fractured, but 
a fractured whole, while constituting its parts as arguments, opinions, beliefs etc. In that 
sense, one does not need black people to construct arguments about what ‘black people 
want’, as people are not constituted through their lived experience, but through 
arguments. What is important then, from the perspective of inclusion, is that all arguments 
are presented – and a panel consisting of representatives from the Left and the Right 
functions to make this appear to be the case, as all the fractured parts of the whole can 
presumably be represented through it.  
We might further elaborate on this critique by examining KCRW’s promise to perform 
“civilised” confrontations. One critical reading of Habermas, assigned to Rancière, stresses 
the degree to which various people, through being immersed in power structures, are 
deemed “incapable of rational speech”.568 We might argue that this is the work that the 
concept of the “civilised” is doing in relation to the exclusion of black voices in this 
example: Barro seeks to qualify a conversation that is aloof from the petty disputes taking 
place in, for example, Facebook comment threads, but in doing so enforces a restrictive 
embodiment of ‘the civilised’ which is linked to those people who are deemed to already 
understand how to construct dispassionate reason-giving argumentation – people whose 
lived experiences do not engender demands around which affectual investment takes 
place; people whose commitment to the debate out trumps their commitment to the 
excluded. In other words, as Barro performs the dominant political space with the aid of 
Left/Right, he also relies on a mode of expression that is particular to the citizen-voter – a 
mode of expression that assumes an absence of force and its structuring effects. As such, 
 
566 Lowry in Barro, 2019, 27:48. 
567 Sperling in ibid., 44:25. 
568 Russel & Montin, 2015, p.546. 
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he invites bodies onto the stage who are already fluent – and perceived to be fluent – in 
this type of expression. Importantly, they are already fluent in this type of language 
because they have training and experience in embodying the public subject. They have 
been included in this category for a long period of time and do not experience any systemic 
violence or force around which a political identity can form. In that sense, we are in a realm 
that depoliticises the social. Had KCRW dared to invite poor black people onto the panel, 
these guests could have evidenced their lived experiences and laid claim to the space of 
equality that Barro performs. But Left/Right enable KCRW to avoid this daring in their 
function to identify the relevant citizen-voters to mark a democratic debate. 
To sum up then, KCRW’s ‘Left, Right and Centre’, performs the dominant political space in 
which the common good is discussed dispassionately and in a ‘civilised’ manner. This 
performance is only possibly because it takes place through the Left/Right metaphor, as 
Left/Right, both historically (as I showed through Gauchet) and conceptually (as I showed 
through Dyrberg) is linked to the exact type of (dispassionate) rationalism that prescribes a 
structured difference in order to realise the rational (albeit always imperfect) consensus. As 
I argued in Chapter Two, Left/Right, as concepts of the police, enable a count of the 
different parts of society, thus forming an appearance of a fractured whole, by constituting 
a space where different parts can be compared with one another, from the extreme Left to 
the extreme Right. Additionally, they enable an account to be given by those parts, which, 
crucially, must acknowledge their partiality and thus express themselves in terms of 
arguments, opinions, beliefs, etc. 
5.3.  Example 2: BBC’s ‘Question Time’ 
If we look at another example of the performance of the dominant political space, we can 
see the dynamic at play even more clearly. In one sense, BBC’s Question Time is not as 
good an example of the structuring role of Left/Right in relation to the count of subject 
positions as ‘Left, Right and Centre’, as it does not explicitly identify the participants as 
Left/Centre/Right. However, as the BBC is exposed to an incessant flow of criticisms for 
being either too left-wing or too right-wing, the producers (subsumable under the figure of 
the journalist) are perfectly capable of picking participants based on this categorisation.569 
In any case, there are instances of people counting participants in Question Time on the 
 
569 James Harding in Plunkett, John & Martinson, Jane, 2015, ‘BBC news chief derides allegations of 
leftwing bias’, The Guardian, 2 June, viewed 10 June, 2019, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/jun/02/bbc-news-chief-politicians-funding-james-
harding>. 
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basis of their positions on the Left/Right spectrum, so it does not always matter how the 
performer envisions it,570 in relation to Left/Right’s capability to structure political space. 
BBC’s Question Time is also a panel discussion programme. It takes place once a week. To 
ensure inclusion, the show frequently has members of the BAME community on the panel 
and representation from people affected by the topic under discussion. The show also 
changes location every week to ensure geographical inclusion, as audience members 
participate in the staged deliberation. There is also a moderator. In some ways it is then 
more Habermasian than the previous example, as, for example, arguments about ‘what 
black people want’ are arguably more sincere and honest when coming from a person who 
is also black. However, there are also more interruptions so, by emphasising inclusion in 
relation to representation more so than the previous example, the discussion also becomes 
less streamlined. 
The specific example we concern ourselves with here is broadcast from 4 October 2018 and 
concerns the degree to which ‘the UK is racist’. After George Mpanga (GM), who is from 
the BAME community, asserts that he thinks many British people ‘carry xenophobia in their 
hearts’, the microphone goes to an audience member (AM1), before another audience 
member (AM2), who is from the BAME community, chimes in. David Dimbleby (DD), the 
moderator, is also present, and you hear various shouts from other audience members 
(OAM) as well. I reproduce the exchange here: 
 
AM1: George, have you actually looked at the numbers? The UK is 
one of the least racist societies actually across Europe. 
GM: Oh Phew! Thank you so much. So I didn’t get stopped by 
police, sitting outside my mum’s house earlier this year – that 
didn’t happen to me? Oh thank you! I should have just explained 
that to the police officer who accosted me... 
 
570 For one such example, see Burton-Cartledge, Phil, 2015, ‘Is there left or right-wing bias on BBC 
Question Time?’, New Statesman, 17 Sept, viewed 10 June, 2019, 
<https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/media/2015/09/there-left-or-right-wing-bias-bbc-
question-time>. 
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AM1: But they are talking about ending preferential treatment for 
Europeans, so we can take people from Singapore, Malaysia and 
Thailand to come in… 
GM: Oh Phew. Thanks, bro. 
DD: The woman waving there… Then I’m gonna take two more 
points and then we will go to another question. 
AM2: It’s funny that you are a white man saying that. It is actually 
hilarious. You are a white man saying that there is no racism in 
this country… 
AM1: I never said there was no racism… 
AM2: How are you going to experience it? You’re a white man. 
You are saying that British people are the least racist… 
OAM: Racist! 
AM2: Hold on. How am I racist? 
OAM: You’re being racist… 
AM2: How am I racist? You’re not the one walking down the 
street and being screamed at. That’s not happening to you. You’re 
not a young black man walking across the street being stopped by 
the police. 
OAM: Calm down! 
AM2: Don’t tell me to calm down. I don’t need to calm down, 
because you’re not experiencing that, and that’s why you don’t… 
[blurry]571 
 
There are a few things worth noting here. First, we can see that the two modes of 
expression used by GM and AM1 are different. AM1 makes an argument that is based on 
statistics. It is dispassionate and reasoned. On the contrary, GM and AM2, like Mette 
 
571 Fun Factory, 2018, ‘Racism in UK debate gets heated’, YouTube, 5 Oct, viewed 10 June, 2019, 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hz7W5j6paVw>. 
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Lylloff, offer arguments based on lived experience. They are claims to a kind of subjective 
truth. They are impassioned. They are not open to refutation. This is especially clear in the 
arguments of AM2, who is told to ‘calm down’. 
We can here find some of the features of the hegemonic political space on naked display. 
To re-cap, to Laclau (and Mouffe), identity is necessarily impassioned. Passion, or 
commitment, is an intrinsic component to identification. However, as I argued with 
Dyrberg, Left/Right function to suck out the appearance of passion in expression. This is 
why the public subject, as the citizen-voter, has adopted them to (ac)count (for) its being – 
because the public subject is once removed from the doing of politics. It is once removed 
from the doing of politics because it has a home within the hegemonic political space. It 
does not suffer the yoke of objective violence.572 Its precarity and reliance on sociability is 
not immediately apparent. In Laclauian terminology, the requests of citizen-voters are most 
often met, which means that political identities (identities articulated in opposition to ‘the 
system’) – which exactly entail affective investment and commitment to some kind of 
demand – are not generated from them. Affectual investment in that identity is of course a 
given, but this is only apparent when its hegemony is threatened.573 In other words, when 
the hegemonic political space is not threatened, the subject positions that belong to it can 
account for their being in ways that are completely understandable to the other subject 
positions who also belong. However, when the hegemonic political space is threatened and 
these subject positions now, in some form or another, must engage others who do not 
understand them, their commitment to that political space, which secures their being to 
begin with, necessarily shows as the inclusion of those others would change the nature of 
the political space and thus change them. As much as the citizen-voter is then wedded to 
this peculiar type of dispassionate rationalism, it betrays itself when having to justify the 
rationalism upon the display of its contingency.  
Now, obviously, the less accommodating the hegemonic order, the more political identities 
can arise, but that is not the point here. Rather, the point is that the performances of the 
hegemonic political space are not the place where this lack of accommodation expresses 
itself directly. Instead, they constitute attempts by the hegemonic space to ‘re-fuse’ the 
 
572 I borrow this concept from Žižek. See Žižek, Slavoj, 2008, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, 
Picador: New York. 
573 See , for example, Greenwald, Glenn, 2019, ‘Beyond BuzzFeed: The 10 Worst, Most Embarrassing 
U.S. Media Failures on the Trump-Russia Story’, The Intercept, 20 Jan, viewed 8 Sept, 2019, 
<https://theintercept.com/2019/01/20/beyond-buzzfeed-the-10-worst-most-embarrassing-u-s-
media-failures-on-the-trumprussia-story/>. 
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social.574 In other words, these performances do not function to expose their own 
contingency, but to hide the fact that it is contingent to begin with. 
Insofar that these performances then constitute attempts to ‘re-fuse’ the whole, Left/Right 
become entangled in them. As we saw elsewhere, the Left/Right spectrum assumes an 
equality between Left and Right575 – an ideal that is intrinsic to the liberal constitutional 
order. Left/Right tell a story about our world that is palatable to the public subject.576 
Indeed, the story constitutes the public subject. This is why the expressions of GM and AM2 
are so problematic. They do not acknowledge a parity between arguments, and they are 
impassioned. They do not acknowledge parity because they are attempting to lay claims to 
the political space, the ‘space of equals’ itself. They thus engage this space in a different 
way to the citizen-voter. Additionally, they express themselves passionately because their 
identity is not constituted in terms of Left/Right but in terms of exclusion, injustice and 
unfairness. Their identity is constituted through a lived experience of disempowerment and 
oppression. They are acutely aware of their exclusion from the sociability of the system. As 
such, they have the potential to disturb the performance of the hegemonic political space 
because their mere presence undermines the identity of, especially, the Habermasian 
variant of the citizen-voter. This is the case as they can attest to the fact that equality, per 
Mouffe and Schmitt, is always substantial. While performances are thus carried out to re-
fuse political space, we might argue that they can be appropriated and made to serve other 
purposes. If we relate this to our discussion of the difference between ontic/ontological, 
and Laclau’s insistence that ‘there is nothing outside ideology’, we might even say that 
these kinds of subversive performances which refuse to conform to the norm, provides the 
only platform for a politics that is concerned with the radical exposition of (the mechanisms 
of) exclusion. 
We might also argue that GM and AM2’s appearance on Question Time shows that the 
hegemonic political space is changing or not as rigid as I have laid out here; that subject 
positions within it can account for their own being in a myriad of ways and that GM and 
 
574 If we read this in relation to the example from Another Angry Voice, we can see that the 
‘mainstream media’ currently has a problem representing the Left/Right-structured hegemonic 
political space authentically. See also Wright, James, 2017, ‘Someone counted how many right-
wingers appear on BBC Sunday Politics. Bloody hell.’, The Canary, 19 Dec, viewed 28 March, 2018, 
<https://www.thecanary.co/uk/2017/12/19/someone-counted-many-right-wingers-appear-bbc-
sunday-politics-bloody-hell-tweets/>. As alternative Left media tries to appropriate ‘the Left’ and 
economise it, the journalists are failing to keep up, which leads to allegations of bias. This is a 
different problematic than the one we are pursuing here, though. 
575 To Bobbio, they are even about equality. 
576 Hoare, 2010. 
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AM2 far from being excluded from it actually belong to it. However, it should be noted that 
while GM and AM2 make claims to subjective truth, they feature within a context where 
those claims to truth are counterposed to other arguments. They are acknowledged as 
participants in deliberation, but through that very participation their expressions are 
rendered partial to other expressions and thus robbed of their value as subjective truths. 
They appear on Question Time, but when they attempt to perform their identity fideliously 
they are told to ‘calm down’. The question then becomes one of how they are represented 
within this performance of political space. For if participation entails a ‘calming down’ and 
a recognition of equality between participants, even if they are differentiated by power, to 
what extent do they lose their radical expression? To what extent does the fact that 
equality is substantial become apparent through the performance? In other words, if GM 
and AM2 surrender their particular performances to the laws of intelligibility (the laws 
dictated by the citizen-voter), to what extent does that constitute an articulation of a 
potentially political identity to the hegemonic system and thus constitute a denial of the 
mechanisms of power – rather than their exposition – that beget their precarity to begin 
with? 
We might here recall my argument from Chapter Three on Mette Lylloff’s predicament. 
While her example is not from a panel deliberation, like the two examples in this section, 
like GM and AM2, Lylloff seeks to lay claim to the hegemonic political space through the 
exposition of some sort of truth. In that chapter, I argued that her inclusion into this space 
was a faux exclusion, based on a translation of her expression into an expression that 
recognises its own partiality; based on a translation of her demand into an argument. 
The examples in this section serve to clarify exactly how this translation, and subsequent 
depoliticization, takes place. Both Lylloff and GM and AM2 seek to beget a recognition of a 
truth of their situation. However, as GM and AM2 immerse themselves in performances of 
the hegemonic political space, rather than being simply caricatured into the debate (or ‘the 
conversation’) by others (much like black people are the first example of this section), we 
see the mechanisms of the translation more clearly. AM2 is actively told to be quiet, as this 
is a space for strictly ‘civilised’ debate and GM is having his reasons derived from lived 
experience contested by statistical reasons, which essentially equates the two and leaves 
them both partial to each other and to the overall logic of argumentation. The result is that 
the radical potential of the identities that Lylloff, GM and AM2 represent is neutered and 
made to appear as equal to the other identities involved in the debate. 
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The point I have argued is that this apolitical articulation happens when radical politics 
seeks to channel its demands through ‘the Left’ metaphor. Notably, GM and AM2 appear in 
the space, but they only seek to make their expression intelligible to a certain extent.577 
They speak in a dialect that is understandable to people, but they do not position 
themselves as public subjects: they do not speak on the basis of a shared belonging and 
history and they do not seek to take up ‘the Left’ metaphor. Indeed, there is not a single 
mention of ‘the Left’ in any of Mpanga’s political podcasts.578 He understands perfectly that 
his being is excluded from the hegemonic political space.579 As I have already noted, he 
shares in this observation with Lylloff. The point for radical politics is the linking up of these 
kinds of struggles. And this cannot play out in performances of the hegemonic political 
space, as the formation of a popular subjectivity relies on processes that are other to the 
hegemonic space.  
5.4.  Left/Right depoliticise the social 
The two examples above indicate how Left/Right function in political space. As I argue that 
they function to depoliticise the social, let us first remember the radical politics of Laclau, 
which I use to counterpose to the function of Left/Right. Laclauian populism revolves 
around the empty signifier. It consists in the unmet demands of various groups, which, as 
they start to see themselves as excluded from the system, link up and transform their 
disparate democratic demands into one popular demand: to represent ‘the people’ tout 
court and re-establish democracy. This is a process of articulating different demands 
together and thus creating a counter-hegemonic chain of equivalences. What marks out a 
populist chain of equivalences (as opposed to a ‘normal’ one), however, is that it does not 
centre around a dominant particular that poses as a universal, but that it instead leaves the 
place of the universal empty. It is then this emptiness that is injected into the identities of 
the groups making the demands. Importantly, this emptiness is represented by a pure 
name (Laclau uses the example of ‘Peron’), which enables affectual investment in the 
identity of the popular demand. This investment leads to the forceful attempt by the 
popular identity (an excluded part) to represent itself as the whole: the popular identity 
represents itself as the embodiment of ‘the people’ in its totality and counterposes itself 
 
577 George Mpanga understands perfectly what is needed to be intelligible. See Channel 4 News, 
2019, ‘George the Poet on youth violence, representation, and limitations of government’, YouTube, 
24 July, viewed 12 Aug, 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pKwpjsWN80w>, 26:00. 
578 George the Poet, 2019, ‘Have You Heard George’s Poetry’, George the Poet, N/A, viewed 12 Aug, 
2019, <https://www.georgethepoet.com/podcast-library>.  
579 Mpanga in Channel 4 News, 2019. 
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only to power – the phenomenon that seeks to delimit and restrain the people from self-
government. To Laclau, after the populist moment has materialised, there is no utopia in 
sight. Laclau is not a political philosopher. As such, he has never categorised a regime as 
populist,580 adopting a focus on movements instead. 
We have counterposed this ideal of populism to the current hegemonic liberal 
constitutional order, which constitutes political space on the basis of specific practices. I 
have argued that this constitution centres around the public subject as the citizen-voter – 
who both participates in and observes politics – and to whom Left/Right are invaluable 
markers of the political space. To qualify this space even further, I have engaged Habermas 
and argued that he presents us with one ideal of a political space that is situated around 
the citizen-voter. I have argued that this political space is saturated by reason-giving 
arguments, which Left/Right function to order so that they can conform to the principles of 
‘democracy, publicity, inclusion and egalitarianism’. Left/Right purport to accomplish this 
as they allude to an equality between participants while also being fairly neutral – which 
means that it is difficult to invest passion into an identification with Left/Right; which 
means that it is difficult to engender political commitment in an identity that must consider 
itself as partial to identities that have their demands met. I have thus argued that the 
hegemonic political space functions to depoliticise the social in the sense that it, through 
employing Left/Right, makes gestures towards representing ‘the whole’, while insisting on 
a relationality between subject positions that is particular and unhelpful for the investment 
of passion.  
We can specify the problem with this gesture when we relate it back to our discussion on 
the relationship between radical politics and the state. In the previous chapter, I argued 
that radical politics necessarily must relate itself to the state, because demands are most 
often material and the material reproduction of society is enforced by the state. However, 
when excluded parts appear (or are caricatured in) on performances of the hegemonic 
political space, their demands are turned into partial arguments in which they are equal 
parts to other arguments, which is how the political subject position is configured within 
this space. In other words, these performances beget an appearance of political equality 
without ever problematising the role of the state in the material reproduction of society.581 
 
580 This has not stopped others from applying Laclau’s work to so-called populist regimes. See 
Waisbord, Silvio, 2013, ‘Democracy, journalism, and Latin American populism’, Journalism, Vol. 14, 
No. 4, pp.501-521. 
581 In relation to Marx’s critique of Hegel, for this political space, not only does the state become “of” 
civil society, it is dissolved in it. See Artur, C.J., 1970, ‘Editors Introduction’, in: Marx, Karl, 1970, The 
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The state becomes dissolved into the debate in which only the forceless force of the better 
argument supposedly prevails. This makes the exposition of the exclusionary power 
wielded by the state impossible to conduct as power, insofar that it rests with the state, is 
expelled from the conversation. 
Our research questions revolved around the extent to which radical politics should seek to 
channel itself through ‘the Left’ metaphor. On the basis of this description of Left/Right’s 
function in the hegemonic political space and on the basis that Left/Right allude to a 
recognition of parity between Left and Right, I argue that radical politics should not seek to 
take up the Left metaphor, because radical politics consists in a part that represents itself 
as the whole. When seeking to channel its impulses through Left/Right, radical politics is 
thus made to give up the things that make it radical.  
In this chapter, I have, with the help of Alexander, argued that the Left/Right-ordered 
hegemonic political space can be performed (as an extension of the performance of the 
identity of the journalist). On this basis, I have engaged two examples. Both examples 
conform largely to the Habermasian ideal of political space – most notably because both 
examples seek an inclusion of reason-giving arguments. Left/Right are articulated explicitly 
in the first example, which thus most vividly exemplifies the notion that Left/Right enable a 
representation of the political space as a representation of ‘the whole’. Arguments are 
presented as either left- or right-wing. There is nothing beyond the two markers. Yet, there 
are two people representing ‘the Left’ (one of whom even talks about Hannah Arendt582) 
and two people representing ‘the Right’, evidencing a concern to include different 
arguments within both camps. In the second example, the emphasis on the representation 
of the whole lies more on Question Time’s movement around the country and the 
programme’s constitution of a panel, even if, as I mentioned, others do read Left/Right into 
the performance. Inclusion, on the other hand, is brought to the fore more vividly as 
people directly affected by the issues being debated are given a voice, and through the 
input from the studio audience. Furthermore, in the Question Time example, we saw most 
clearly the way in which the expressions within the performance must conform to the 
dispassionate and partial, reason-giving argument – as I noted that subjective truths 
 
German Ideology: Part One, Lawrence & Wishart: London, pp. 4-34, p. 11. Habermas, of course 
engages Marx and Hegel in some detail in Habermas, 1992b. 
582 Wong in Barro, 2019, 12:45. 
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uttered by GM and AM2 were made partial to other expressions and that AM2 was told to 
‘calm down’.  
Here, we experience directly the way in which equality, upon application, must be 
substantial. For, as the excluded parts are included, they must give up something of their 
own particularity in order to absorb the particularity posing as a universality – in this case, 
they must express themselves in certain ways. In other words, for GM and AM2 to be equal 
to the others on the panel and in the studio audience, they must become something else, 
something specific; they must absorb the substance of equality. This then also has an effect 
on how we might conceive of difference. In Chapter Three, I argued that Habermas 
conceives of political difference in terms of reason-giving arguments only. Both examples 
show this logic at work, but the second especially shows how a radical difference between 
identities is tamed through the appearance of the different within the performance of the 
hegemonic political space.  
This is also where it becomes most interesting in relation to the depoliticising function of 
Left/Right political space. Radical politics starts with an unmet demand and a subsequent 
identification with a place of exclusion. We know, from looking at Mpanga’s political 
podcasts, that he very much views himself, as a black man from the London estates, as 
excluded. He does this because his demands (in the very specific example that I engaged 
here, this might relate to the stop-and-search powers of the police, which are part of a 
“whole technology of power in the mobilization of the oppressed”)583 have gone unmet. He 
can then see that the state upholds the equality of certain identities, but that this equality 
is not for him. As he is invited into the performance of the hegemonic political space, it is 
with a promise to effect a rectification of the exclusion. The performance, and the 
Habermasian citizen-voter, must have inclusion. The identity of the Habermasian citizen-
voter demands it. However, as the inclusion is premised on the adoption of a particular 
mode of expression, the inclusion also curtails a possibility to evidence the ‘technology of 
power’ that effects the exclusion to begin with. Instead, Mpanga can appear as forwarding 
a belief that this technology of power exists, but he must accept that others are of a 
different opinion. He must give up his identity and become the public subject, even if he, as 
soon as he leaves the building, will experience that the substantial equality is not for him. 
The state, then, cannot be made to appear in the conversation as the state has been 
dissolved into it. This is the power of the hegemonic political space: it makes itself 
 
583 Laclau in Worsham & Olson, 1999, p.9. 
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immanent to the state. Mpanga, of course, knows better. He knows full well that the 
bodies of the excluded feel the power of the state in other ways than through forceless 
arguments, but the material sensation of objective violence cannot feature as a political 
expression within the hegemonic political space without at least incurring the gesture of 
translation.  
It is in this sense that the Left/Right-ordered hegemonic political space depoliticises the 
social, because, through its insistence on inclusion, it articulates itself to the excluded parts 
and invites them to identify with it in order to enjoy being equal to all the other parts. In 
other words, it uses inclusion to effect an illusion of a complete count of all the parts of 
society (even if we know that society is always betrayed by a constitutive lack). However, 
this is a faux equality that is based on the excluded adapting their expressions to those of 
the hegemonic political space and a forgetting of the fact that their demands go unheard – 
the importance of which they cannot evidence due to the very nature of the expression 
that they are made to adapt. 
To be clear then, radical politics must not channel itself through Left/Right and the 
dominant political space that they police, not only because radical politics seeks a 
representation of a totality and not a partiality but also because radical politics necessarily 
engages the power of the state. However, simply adding voice within the hegemonic 
political space does not beget such an engagement with the state, as that voice is not only 
unable to evidence the objective violence of the state, but also begets an appearance of 
equality for all where there, in any meaningful way, is always only an equality for some. 
5.5.  Left/Right and a Laclauian critique of Mouffe/Laclau 
Mouffe has recently contended that there are three different kinds of politics of ‘the Left’: 
 
Within the spectrum of what is usually understood as ‘the left’, 
one could […] differentiate three kinds of politics. The first is a 
‘pure reformism’ that accepts both the principles of legitimacy of 
liberal democracy and the existing neoliberal hegemonic social 
formation. Second is the ‘radical reformism’ that accepts the 
principles of legitimacy but attempts to implement a different 
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hegemonic formation. Finally, ‘revolutionary politics’ seeks a total 
rupture with the existing sociopolitical order.584 
 
Mouffe pitches radical politics as belonging to the category of radical reformism, specifying 
the way in which it is multi-pronged and manifesting itself in various “public spaces”.585 Yet, 
it can be argued that her juxtaposition of these kinds of politics is lacking. One Mouffean, 
and perhaps also Laclauian, objection to what I have written thus far might be that, as 
there is nothing outside ideology, we can never contest a hegemonic formation from the 
outside. As such, our insistence on the corrosive effects of the participation of radical 
politics in performances of the Left/Right-ordered hegemonic political space is misplaced. 
Instead, the point should be to participate, but to do so in such a way that brings about a 
crisis in the ego-identification of the citizen-voter – so that groups of people can be 
articulated to a counter-hegemonic project instead. 
But the type of politics that Mouffe proposes – radical reformism – suggests that it can be 
carried out only by people who already have a part in the system. Otherwise it would not 
be categorizable as ‘reformism’. This is why it can be assigned to a type of politics of ‘the 
Left’ – because ‘the Left’ has a part in the whole. Yet, we are hard pressed to ask the 
excluded to conduct the reform, which is what this is doing once we connect ‘the system’ 
to the being of the citizen-voter (and not just to neoliberalism)586. A ‘reformist’ agenda of 
the excluded parts would entail a subversion of the performance of Left/Right-ordered 
hegemonic political space. However, the fact of the matter is that the ritual performances 
of the Left/Right-ordered hegemonic political space curtail specific performances by 
specific identities that are designed to bring about a crisis in the ego-identification of the 
citizen-voter. The specific performances instead feed into the ego-identification of the 
citizen-voter as it demands inclusion and thus co-opt the otherwise radical potential of the 
excluded parts.  
Laclau and Mouffe forwarded their own conception of radical democracy in Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy, in which the point, as I argued above, is to appeal to people in many 
different public spaces and in many different ways. This is in order to effect a recognition of 
 
584 Mouffe, 2018, p.46. 
585 Ibid., p.47. It is worth noting that Habermas also called for a “radical reformism”. See Habermas, 
1989, p. 49. 
586 Ibid., p.11. 
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radical difference and a lack of ontological foundation to order. To further this project, 
Mouffe has also sought to speak to the performers of the hegemonic political space, in her 
venture into critical journalism studies. In an interview, she thus argues that: 
 
Ideally, the role of the media should precisely be to contribute to 
the creation of agonistic public spaces in which there is the 
possibility for dissensus to be expressed or different alternatives 
to be put forward.587 
  
Mouffe qualifies this further as she argues that: 
 
There are always different interpretations, different aspects, and 
different perspectives. It is important for journalists to be able to 
show those differences, to make people think by themselves, and 
not telling them: this is what you should think. It is important to 
give them enough elements to be able to see the complexity of 
the situation and to think by themselves. For that you need to 
have as much facts as possible, but at the same time you also 
need to be aware of the different positions that one can take with 
respect to those facts and events.588 
 
Mouffe problematises the journalistic norm of objectivity,589 but in doing so only reinforces 
the norm of impartiality.590 As such, when she argues that journalists must make audiences 
aware of the “different positions that one can take with respect to those facts and events”, 
she asks for nothing that the performers of the dominant political space do not already do. 
For when adopting a focus on impartiality, they exactly do seek out the representation of 
the different parts of society. As I have argued, Left/Right enable this representation as 
they constitute a political space of differences that are nevertheless part of a whole. This 
 
587 Carpentier & Cammaerts, 2006, p.974. 
588 Ibid., p.974. 
589 Ibid., p.974. 
590 Zelizer, 2017, p.84; and Tuchman, 1972, p.666. 
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begs the question of the degree to which radical democracy does in fact engender the 
emergence of new differences.  
I have argued that Left/Right, as they are tied to a form of rationalism, prefigure specific 
differences, namely arguments, opinions, beliefs, etc. as rational, political expressions. I 
have also argued that the dominant political space that Left/Right structure seeks out 
inclusion and orders the included on the basis of Left/Right as arguments, opinion, beliefs, 
etc. As such, when Mouffe calls for the journalist to identify new ‘positions’, she asks for 
something that the journalist already does and thus fails to account for the fact that what 
she calls for only functions to reproduce the dominant political space, rather than to 
undermine and subvert it. In this sense, far from effecting an engagement with the 
ontological realm, which is what the pluralism of radical democracy strives for, it merely 
reproduces the practices of the ontic realm. That is, it merely further saturates the space 
with arguments, opinions, beliefs, etc.  
To her credit, Mouffe of course stresses that hegemony plays out across the field of culture 
and that the journalist, while important in the operation of hegemony, is not the only 
gatekeeper to ‘the public’. However, radical politics, or democratic theory, must develop a 
stronger understanding of performances of the hegemonic political space, how they are 
conducted and on what premises. If it does not, the radical tendency that we find with the 
discovery of the logic of lack risk going unexploited and the plight of the oppressed 
unaddressed. Democratic theory must remember that the oppression experienced by the 
excluded is an oppression that is material and ultimately reproduced by the state. Just 
adding hitherto unheard opinions or arguments to public discussion will not do the trick. It 
will not engender an “ethical experience”591 and it will not enable any form of popular 
demand to emerge. Radical politics must focus on the state, which is where demands are 
either met or denied. Of course, there will always be the need engage culture in order to 
extend the counter-hegemonic chain of equivalences, but when inclusion into the 
dominant political space is only an inclusion of arguments and opinions, radical politics 
should be conscious about how it engages culture and in which particular mediums it seeks 
to articulate unmet demands to it. 
We might now, then, tie this back to my opening claims in the introduction, where I 
position this thesis as a friendly critique of democratic in its many shades. I have now 
argued that radical democracy necessarily fails to do what it sets out to do; to enable 
 
591 Laclau, 2002. For a discussion on the ethical experience, see pages 170-1 in this thesis. 
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ontological difference to emerge; to foster a post-foundational political space in which 
different people can express their difference and ameliorate their lived conditions. I have 
argued that radical democracy fails to accomplish this because not enough light has been 
shed on public subjectivity and the structuring effects of Left/Right. At the end of the day, 
the difference enabled by the Left/Right hegemonic political space in which public subject 
as the citizen-voter reigns supreme, is a limited, prefigured type of difference. This is the 
case as it enables rational, political expression but also prefigures it and, as such, polices 
and casts aside expressions that do not conform to its ideal of rational, political being. 
Radical politics, understood in the populist Laclauian sense as the emergence of the 
popular demand and the radical antagonism, and despite being itself based on post-
foundational order, cannot satisfy itself with a quest to make the citizen-voter more 
reflexive. It must work towards the forwarding of the popular demand. This necessitates an 
engagement with the state, not the journalist, whose relationship with the state it 
subsequently calls into question. Only this way can the plight of the excluded be addressed, 
as only this way do we disrupt the practises of the ontic. Just as Laclauian populism then 
needs radical democracy to construct its own counter-hegemonic chain of equivalences, so 
too must the proponents of radical democracy learn from Laclauian populism and the role 
of Left/Right and the hegemonic political space that it orders. For, upon ignorance of these 
processes, radical democracy is simply not radical enough and can too easily be co-opted 
by the hegemonic political space. 
Finally, then, if I am correct, then performances of Left/Right-ordered political space are 
ritualistic performances aimed at ‘re-fusing’ the social. They occur because the social is 
constitutively open, because the lack/void between the ontic and the ontological always 
prevents a closure. In order to beget a forgetting of this lack/void we require 
representation and performance. The ritual performance then constitutes this attempt at 
closure, at ‘re-fusing’. If radical politics is to bring about the emergence of ‘the people’, it 
must effect a dislocation of the identity of citizen-voter. Yet, this cannot be done directly 
within the ritual performances wherein the citizen-voter (always-almost) re-constitutes 
itself. Instead, it must happen in all those space that are not patrolled by the figure of the 
journalist, whose own performance begets the ritual performances to begin with. As 
Mouffe and Laclau have done so much to point out, radical politics must manifest itself in 
all kinds of discursive spaces – local, regional and national, online and in real life, etc. (all of 
which exists because the social is constitutively open) – and it must take all kinds of 
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expressions.592 But it must refuse to be directly recognisable to the citizen-voter and it 
must refuse to play its games of faux inclusion performed on the basis of a forgetting of 
institutionalised oppression. Because of this, it must refuse to channel itself through ‘the 
Left’, which is the category that the citizen-voter uses to directly recognise the parts of 
society and thus constitute them as arguments, opinions, beliefs, etc. 
5.6.  Conclusion 
In this final section, I engaged two examples of ritual performances of the Left/Right-
ordered hegemonic political space. I argued that they exemplified our thesis that Left/Right 
function to depoliticise the social by granting inclusion to dispassionate, reason-giving 
arguments only, while expressions of lived experience are translated into partial 
statements. However, as radical politics forms through passionate demands on the basis of 
claims that refuse partiality and asserts that the claimers are excluded from the ‘space of 
equals’, participation in the Left/Right hegemonic political space only functions to take the 
energy out of politics and make it appear as if the excluded are in fact equal – even when 
they are not. Radical politics should then avoid channelling itself through the category of 
‘the Left’. 
6. Conclusion 
Central to the Left/Right-ordered hegemonic political space is the public subject as the 
citizen-voter. I traced its emergence in Chapter One and have since sought to find the ways 
in which exclusion is constituted in relation to it and how Left/Right is caught up in it. In this 
chapter, I have argued that Left/Right function to constitute the social so that it is always 
open to content amenable to the nature of the citizen-voter. Specifically, this means that 
Left/Right enable a variety of arguments, opinion, beliefs, etc. to be formed about any 
number of issues. Exclusion constitutes itself in relation to this mode of expression. 
Specifically, this means that modes of argumentation that seek to attest to some kind of 
truth, such as evidence of lived experience, are inadmissible or translated into partial 
expressions. This represents an irreconcilable conflict between radical politics and the 
Left/Right hegemonic space of the citizen-voter. 
I used two examples to show this dynamic at work. In the first, we were presented with 
arguments from ‘the Left’ and arguments from ‘the Right’. This gave the impression of the 
 
592 George Mpanga’s poetry is a good example of another form of expression. See George the Poet, 
2019. 
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presence of ‘the whole’ of the political community constituted in arguments, which allowed 
the panellists to speak about the perceived wants and needs of groups of excluded people 
without featuring them. In the second example, Mpanga was present on the panel, but his 
expressions were made partial to other arguments and AM2 was told to ‘calm down’ as she 
sought to evidence her lived experience, perfectly exemplifying the dispassionate nature 
that deliberation in the Left/Right-ordered hegemonic political space must take. 
I argued that the result of this was that their opportunities to rectify their exclusion were 
stripped from them through their participation in this performance. This is the case 
because the performance gave the sense that they were already equal to the other 
panellists and studio audience members, simply because they were heard on an equal 
footing. However, as soon as those people left the building, the cameras stopped filming 
and the journalists went home, the excluded would once again have found themselves in 
precarious situations, whereas the others would not.  
This is how Left/Right and the political space that they order depoliticise the social. 
Through featuring the claims of the excluded but insisting on their participation through 
argumentation, they articulate the excluded to the hegemonic space in a manner that 
channels what should be a demand into an argument made on unequal footing. It 
constitutes a faux inclusion that may enable the citizen-voters to sleep better at night but 
does very little to ameliorate the conditions that the excluded parts experience. This is why 
radical politics should refuse to let itself be co-opted by Left/Right. It should refuse to 
portray its proponents as public subjects when they do not share in the equality that public 
subjects enjoy. Instead, it should engage all the spaces that exist around the hegemonic 
political space that are beyond the purview of journalistic performances and work to 
articulate disparate demands together.  
I have then not used this thesis to outline exactly how radical politics should forward its 
aims. Due to the dearth of literature on Left/Right and their function in modernity, the 
focus of this thesis has been to first help develop such a knowledge and on the basis of this 
provide some recommendations as to how radical politics should engage Left/Right. Based 
on our arguments I have recommended that protagonists of radical politics should not seek 
to channel themselves through the category of ‘the Left’. The follow up question 
necessarily reads, ‘what then?’ Sadly, I cannot answer this here. This is partly because 
hegemonic-articulatory practice is complex and constituted in a myriad of realms that are 
all different and thus require different strategies which simply cannot be dictated by a 
231 
 
single person, and partly because our focus has been on contributing to a broadening of 
our understanding of Left/Right rather than delving too deeply into debates around the 
constitution of radical politics. Radical politics has a rich tradition with a vivid imaginary 
constituted around strikes, occupations etc. These types of happenings might prove much 
more fertile breeding grounds for the emergence of the popular subjectivity, than 
performances of the Left/Right-ordered hegemonic political space.  
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Conclusion 
1. History revisited 
On 26 August 1789, as the deputies of the National Constituent Assembly organised 
themselves from left to right in St. Louis Church in the Versailles, they created a spatial 
dichotomy that would come to constitute political discourse in societies of universal 
suffrage. Unbeknownst to them, their voting on the Rights of Man and the Veto of the King 
– the subject matter at hand – was not the only important feature of their gathering. The 
form that the body of the assembly had taken was to become just as influential. 
This is a good story. Left/Right, such important features of political modernity, were birthed 
in the fires of the democratic revolution. It is also a true story. But perhaps people put too 
much emphasis on the specific gathering in St. Louis Church. If the deputies had not 
organised themselves from left to right, would Left/Right not define political space as they 
do today? Would modern politics be decidedly different? As I noted in the Introduction, it 
made sense for the deputies to organise themselves from left to right because the 
democratic revolution was based on equality, which would not be well represented 
through an Up/Down or Front/Back ordering of deputies. It also made sense for the newly 
constituted public (as an extension of the National Constituent Assembly) to organise itself 
this way. When it comes to the origins of Left/Right in modernity, we should thus focus less 
on 26 August 1789 and more on how basic features of Left/Right connect with and perhaps 
express the main tenets of the democratic revolution. That is why I have argued that 
Left/Right structure a hegemonic political space that is centred around a public subject, 
which I call, after Marcel Gauchet, the citizen-voter. 
2. Left/Right and their other 
The argument of this thesis has been that spatial metaphors would always have been 
needed to order public subjects in a relationship to each other imagined to be one of 
equality. However, from the perspective of democratic theory, we also know that no thing, 
including equality, is ever complete. All things are haunted by a lack. The deputies ordered 
themselves in accordance with Left/Right, rather than Up/Down or Front/Back. But another 
spatial metaphor is also applicable. For while Left/Right ensured a signification of equality 
between the deputies, they were all inside that building, making decisions, while most of 
the nation was outside. The ‘space of equality’ was for some and not for others. I named 
this ‘some’ public subjects. And, as I have argued, while the public subjectivity is, in 
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principle, available to everyone, its mode of expression, as Gauchet shows, is centred 
around opinion, argument, belief, etc. and a recognition of its own partiality to a system. 
Gauchet then shows us that Left/Right are historically tied to a type of rationalism that 
stresses equality between different people, while enabling those people to function as one 
people. To further this line of thought, I also engaged Torben Dyrberg, through whom I 
forwarded the argument that Left/Right are not only historically tied to rationalism but also 
conceptually tied to it. In other words, the form of the citizen-voter is particular and 
political public being is only intelligible through it. I have argued that this effects an 
othering, primarily of modes of political expression that are more ‘actionistic’ and modes of 
expression that seek to evidence exclusion through a collective acknowledgement of a 
truth of precarious being – modes of expression that typically arise from subjects who do 
not share in the equality of the public subjects. 
Radical politics, inspired by Laclauian populism, is located in relation to the phenomena of 
exclusion that manifests itself in relation to the fact that all things are never complete. The 
question then emerges as to how radical politics should relate to the Left/Right spectrum 
that orders the political space of the citizen-voter. 
3. Research questions and answers 
My principle research question was: 
➢ How should radical politics engage with Left/Right? 
I argued that I could only answer this question once we became aware of how Left/Right 
effect a count of subject-positions and enable them to give an account of their being that is 
particular. As such, a second research question was: 
➢ How do Left/Right create a political space and what kinds of political expressions 
emerge from it? 
As radical politics is concerned with exclusion, another question that I posed was: 
➢ How are things excluded from the Left/Right political space in which the public 
subject is constituted, and on what grounds does this exclusion take place? 
Answering these questions necessitated a larger engagement with theories of Left/Right 
and with critical theories of democracy.  
In Chapter One, through reflecting on Anthony Downs, William Riker, George Lakoff and 
Mark Johnson and others, we saw how Left and Right are devoid of ultimate meanings and, 
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as spatial metaphors, structure the way we think and thus also enable identification. I also 
engaged Claude Lefort, Harold Mah and Marcel Gauchet. In Lefort, we found an account of 
political modernity as centred around the empty place of power. With Mah, I argued that 
this gave birth to a public subject who embraced the empty place of power and sought to 
embody the politics that emerged through it. Finally, with Gauchet, I characterised the 
public subject as the ‘citizen-voter’ – a subjectivity that is once removed from the doing of 
politics and that relies on Left/Right to understand both itself and other citizen-voters in 
relation to each other and to the whole. Through Gauchet, I also argued that Left/Right are 
historically tied to a particular type of rationalism that stresses equality in difference but 
also resolution of differences through the constitution of political being in terms of 
arguments, opinions, beliefs, etc. I thus argued that Left/Right create space through their 
quality as spatial metaphors and create a political space through their adoption by public 
subjects in accounting for their political identities.  
In Chapter Two, we saw how Noberto Bobbio’s ‘space of equals’ does not contain everyone 
and read Chantal Mouffe against Torben Dyrberg to find a place for exclusion in relation to 
Left/Right. With Mouffe I argued that all identification is imbued with affectual investment 
and commitment and has other(s) that represent(s) its own radical negativity. However, 
Dyrberg, who, perhaps together with Gauchet, is the only person to have written about 
Left/Right in relation to democratic theory, instead focuses on the ability of Left/Right to 
channel other orientational metaphors that engender more affectual investment (such as 
Up/Down, In/Out and Front/Back), effectively enabling those who identify through 
Left/Right to communicate in a manner that subtracts affect and passion. Through Dyrberg, 
I thus showed that Left/Right are not only tied to rationalism historically, but also 
conceptually. I then argued that Left/Right are not a primary means of identification, but 
secondary to the identity of the citizen-voter. While identification thus takes place through 
Left/Right, Left/Right belong to the citizen-voter. The place of exclusion then comes to be 
in relation to the citizen-voter, rather than to Left/Right directly. With Jacques Rancière, I 
then conceptualised Left/Right as categories of the police count, in the sense that they 
enable a count of subject positions within a given space. However, as the police count also 
dictates a relationality between the counted, discursive space takes on an aesthetic 
component. While I then had some idea of how to think exclusion in relation to the 
aesthetic qualities of the discursive space, I lacked an account of this space.  
In Chapter Three, I sought an aesthetic account of the type of political space, of the type of 
rationalism, that the citizen-voter engenders through the writing of Habermas. Habermas 
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popularised one spatialised form of political space: the public sphere. I complemented this 
account with his writings on communicative reason to produce an account of political 
space that I called Habermasian. I argued that this space, conceived of from within the 
liberal tradition, is a space for reason-giving arguments aimed at consensus – even if it can 
never be final. Such consensus is rational insofar as it has been arrived at through ideal 
speech situations that regulate communication in accordance with the principles of 
‘democracy, publicity, inclusion and egalitarianism’. However, I also argued that modes of 
expression that do not correspond to partial, reason-giving argumentation lack a place 
within this Habermasian political space and are thus, in effect, rendered other. Using this, I 
can provide answers to research questions two and three.  
In answer to the question ‘How do Left/Right create a political space and what kinds of 
political expressions emerge from it?’, I can now say that Left/Right constitute political 
space in modernity through their allusion to an equality between different public subjects 
conceived as citizen-voters. As Left implicitly recognises a Right and vice versa, they enable 
subjects to identify as different to other subjects while still remaining within one 
overarching system. Political expressions emerge from this space that acknowledge their 
own partiality to the system and the lack of immanence to politics. Examples of expressions 
are opinions, reason-giving arguments, beliefs, etc., and one particular space native to the 
citizen-voter is the Habermasian political space. Left/Right are thus categories of the police 
(ac)count.  
That leads us onto Research Question 3 which asked ‘How are things excluded from the 
Left/Right political space in which the public subject is constituted, and on what grounds 
does this exclusion take place?’ I can now answer that things are excluded from this space, 
not on the basis of content (issues), but on the basis of form (modes of expression). 
Specifically, this means that modes of expression that do not acknowledge partiality are 
either excluded or translated into partial expressions. This not only others more ‘actionistic’ 
ways of doing politics (such as strikes, occupations etc.) but also expressions that seek to 
evidence exclusion and lived experience. This is the case as those expressions, which seek 
to assert the truth of power, are translated into arguments, opinions, beliefs, etc. In this 
space, unequal parts then have no recourse to rectify their inequality through Left/Right as 
they instead cover up the facts of power and inequality. 
In Chapter Four, I turned to Laclau for an account of radical politics and a critique of 
Habermas. Laclau outlines a ‘logic of lack’, whereby meaning is always only partially fixed – 
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always excluding something to represent as its own radical negativity. All meaning (or 
identity) is then always lacking something. But this is a productive lack as it enables play 
and contestation of meaning/identity. All identity relies on a tension between a logic of 
difference and a logic of equivalences: for identity to exist, beings must be partially the 
same and partially different. However, as identity is betrayed by a constitutive lack, 
exclusion is inevitable. Laclauian populism articulates excluded parts, constituted as 
demands to the state, to a counter-hegemonic chain of equivalences, but it leaves the 
place of the universal empty – representable only by the name of an empty signifier. This 
manifests itself in a moment when the populist chain of equivalences comes to incorporate 
so many disparate demands that it spills over into the streets and starts to represent itself 
as the whole of ‘the people’ – counterposed only to power, ‘the system’, ‘the oligarchy’, 
etc. 
Radical politics, then, relies on the articulation of unmet demands to its popular chain of 
equivalences. However, as we saw in Chapter Five, this is frustrated by the Left/Right-
ordered hegemonic space of the citizen-voter, which obscures power and exclusion by 
granting inclusion of voices on the condition that they cannot speak the truth of power and 
exclusion. By dissolving the state and the way that it reproduces the material conditions –  
on the basis of which demands are made in the first place – into the supposedly rational 
discussions between different Left/Right ordered citizen-voters, the demands, which are 
inherently powerful and imbued with affective investment and commitment, are turned 
into arguments that acknowledge their own partiality. This move effectively subtracts 
power, and the state, from political being, as its evidencing is rendered a mere opinion, 
argument, belief, etc. But power is real as it is inherently related to the universal logic of 
lack. Politics cannot, and must not, treat it as if power and the state are only topics for 
discussion. This move which the Left/Right ordered hegemonic space then effects amount 
to nothing but the depoliticization of society and the depoliticization of demands. it is on 
the basis of these arguments and observations, that I can now answer my principal 
research question: ‘How should radical politics engage with Left/Right?’ 
Radical politics should not seek to engage Left/Right. To seek to channel radical politics 
through ‘the Left’ is to engage the Left/Right-ordered hegemonic political space. Radical 
politics requires affectual investment in a popular subjectivity. It requires serious political 
commitment. However, the type of identification that Left/Right enable is one that 
acknowledges parity between different subjects in an overarching system. Affective 
investment then goes into the identity of the citizen-voter, rather than into Left/Right. 
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Laclauian politics does not recognise its own partiality to an overarching system. In the 
name of the people as the plebs, it seeks to mark the rupture of the system. As such, 
Laclauian politics would simply cease to be through an engagement with ‘the Left’. 
Furthermore, as I argued in Chapter Five, Left/Right-ordered hegemonic political space, 
through a qualified focus on inclusion, co-opts the potential for radical politics. It is these 
arguments that lead me to claim that radical politics should not seek to engage Left/Right. 
To further qualify and be absolutely clear about the relationship between Left/Right and 
Laclauian populism that I have advocated, I read Laclauian populist politics as the 
establishment of a radical antagonism between an amalgamation of parts – conceiving of 
themselves as excluded – and the principle of power itself. This is a momentary occurrence 
and thus cannot constitute a political philosophy. Fundamental to this politics is a 
recognition of a structuring logic that is universal. I have called this ‘the logic of lack’. This 
politics is then established through a particular reading of the universal logic.  
I have argued that Left/Right-ordered hegemonic space constitutes subjects that 
acknowledge their partiality to a system and recognise that politics is not immanent to 
them. This is a problem for radical politics, not because radical politics seeks a return to 
some pre-modern religiously informed unity or to reify some sort of Third Way 
managerialism, but because this stylised denial of immanence itself obscures the 
universality of the logic of lack. For, as the logic of lack is universal, then so is exclusion and 
the power that beget it, and while there are many different politics that engage with this 
problematic, I take Laclauian populism to effect the most forceful evidencing of this 
universality. As I argued in Chapters Four and Five, this is a politics conceived of from the 
perspective of exclusion that not only promises rectification of that exclusion, but also a 
clear exposition of the logic of lack. 
However, as it is not a political philosophy, it does not concern itself with the establishment 
of constitutional order. It concerns itself with the exposition of power and the lack/void 
that betrays it. While we might then say that political modernity is better than the pre-
modern, that has nothing to do with Laclauian populism, and when I then argue for radical 
politics to disengage from Left/Right, this is not to establish a unitary political order, but to 
effect a break from it. This is the case because I take Left/Right themselves to constitute a 
form of unity that is centred around the citizen-voter. This unity begets its own exclusions, 
and Laclauian populism, perhaps more so than most politics, makes this exclusion its 
starting point. Co-dependent on power as it is, it is a politics that will always need to be 
238 
 
renewed and one that never stops. It takes difference and division far more seriously than 
Left/Right ever could, but it does not seek to replace them. 
4. Contribution 
The two theorists who have explored Left/Right with reference to democratic theory most 
thoroughly are Gauchet and Dyrberg. The work of both has been central to this thesis. Yet 
both accounts are limited and, in some sense, also only peripheral to democratic theory. 
Gauchet’s work is primarily historical and Dyrberg’s politics is Rawlsian – even if he situates 
his intervention in more critical democratic theory. Gauchet’s work helps us relate 
Left/Right to the citizen-voter, but it does not touch on the relationality between the 
citizen-voters. Dyrberg helps more with this, but his Rawlsian politics prevents him drawing 
the appropriate conclusions. At the intersection of the literature on Left/Right and 
democratic theory, this thesis has, I hope, provided a clear contribution to reflections on 
the function of Left/Right in modernity (the legitimising of the posing of which is a 
contribution in itself) and their place in relation to radical politics.  
Furthermore, I mean for this thesis not only to offer a contribution to democratic theory 
but also to provide a friendly critique of the type of political theory that seeks a pluralism 
with acknowledgement of radical difference, such as Laclauian and Mouffean radical 
democracy. Following a Laclauian conception of populism I establish ‘the demand’ as the 
base political unit, but I also note that the Left/Right hegemonic political space constitutes 
the argument, opinion, belief, etc., as the base political unit. This circumstance, and 
Left/Right’s role in relation to it, has not been accounted for adequately in democratic 
theory, which risks the co-optation of the radical tendencies of democratic theories that 
revolve around ‘the demand’ and the logic of lack. As such, hopefully this thesis can make a 
contribution to research in the Laclauian tradition and to radical politics itself, showing how 
Left/Right, and the hegemonic political space that they order, are dimensions that restrict 
the potential for emancipatory movements to effect radical antagonisms. 
5. Moving forward 
While I have attempted to put specific points across, I do not claim to provide definitive 
answers. This is partly because of the lack of work that has been undertaken in relation to 
Left/Right, both in general and from within democratic theory. This absence of work on 
Left/Right is regrettable and means that I have had limited support to construct my 
arguments. There should be an established tradition of Left/Right scholarship, but on the 
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basis of its lack I can only hope to contribute to its establishment. While I thus hope that 
the reader will find some measure of insight in this thesis, it is my most ardent hope that 
the reader will find inspiration. It is undoubtable that there are misreadings, 
incongruences, contradictions and many other faults in this text, but I hope that they 
encourage the reader to think beyond this text and take the study of Left/Right in 
modernity forward, so that we can develop more resources for practitioners of radical 
politics. 
Additionally, it would be amiss not to comment on the now not so recent changes to 
political modernity that started to manifest themselves in relation to the public subject in 
2016 with ‘Brexit’ and ‘Trump’. This text, although situated in democratic theory in relation 
to Left/Right, undoubtedly also provides a critique of liberal democracy and the idea of the 
public sphere. However, with Trump and Brexit, I think it has become apparent to 
particularly Habermasian types of public subjects that their hegemony is not as strong as it 
appeared to them to be. I doubt it ever was particularly strong, but no counter-hegemonic 
constructions had been articulated with such force until recently. The question then 
becomes if what we are witnessing today is of a different order to what I am describing in 
my thesis. In other words, does the citizen-voter no longer qualify the public subject? 
However, I do not think this is the case. If anything, I think the opposite is true. To be sure, 
the Habermasian variant is under threat even more so than it already was, but I think that 
the reign of the opinion and the reflective judgment is upon us with an ever-increasing 
ferocity. Indeed, today the Right to an opinion seem to trump most other rights. Left/Right 
do and will continue to thrive in such an environment as a means to categorise different 
opinions and their holders. The problem with the prolificacy of ‘the opinion’ is that it is 
even more blind to power and exclusion than ‘the argument’, enabling power to manifest 
itself more discriminately. Indeed, this shift emboldens the agents of power to reject an 
increasing number of democratic demands, knowing full well that they cannot evidence 
their exclusion through the hegemonic political space constituted around ‘the opinion’. 
I do not think, then, that the citizen-voter is losing its hegemonic strength and/or that the 
relevance of this thesis is somehow diminished by the recent changes to political 
modernity. I do not think that Left/Right will soon be a thing of the past as the immanence 
of ‘the people’ is asserted once again. On the contrary, I think Left/Right will be alive as 
ever before. Left/Right always effected depoliticization, which is also the exact role of ‘the 
opinion’ as political being. If ‘the opinion’ is then to be the unit of our measurement, 
Left/Right, which has endured for so long – and despite countless eulogies – will endure a 
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lot longer still, and it is time that radical politics developed some knowledge about the 
work they do in political modernity. 
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